Skip to contentSkip to conversation

trivial patches

PATCH Russell Coker 1 participant 1 message Aug 26, 2002 SELinux security module

lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

I have attached a patch for a large number of trivial issues. privrole vs privfd, user_t vs userdomain, etc.

Signature · 3 lines
I do not get viruses because I do not use MS software.
If you use Outlook then please do not put my email address in your
address-book so that WHEN you get a virus it won't use my address in the
Quoted 1 line

From field.

domains/program/ldconfig.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/ldconfig.te +1 -1
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/ldconfig.te policy/domains/program/ldconfig.te
@@ -21,7 +22,7 @@
 file_type_auto_trans(ldconfig_t, etc_t, ld_so_cache_t)
 file_type_auto_trans(ldconfig_t, lib_t, shlib_t)
 
-allow ldconfig_t { user_t sysadm_t }:fd use;
+allow ldconfig_t userdomain:fd use;
 allow ldconfig_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
 allow ldconfig_t etc_t:lnk_file read;
 
domains/program/load_policy.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/load_policy.te +5 -1
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/load_policy.te policy/domains/program/load_policy.te
@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@
 # Rules
 
 domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, load_policy_exec_t, load_policy_t)
+ifdef(`dpkg.te', `
+role system_r types load_policy_t;
+domain_auto_trans(dpkg_t, load_policy_exec_t, load_policy_t)
+')
 
 # Reload the policy configuration (sysadm_t no longer has this ability)
 allow load_policy_t security_t:security load_policy;
@@ -46,5 +50,5 @@
 uses_shlib(load_policy_t)
 allow load_policy_t self:capability dac_override;
 
-allow load_policy_t privrole:fd use;
+allow load_policy_t privfd:fd use;
 
domains/program/login.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/login.te +5 -5
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/login.te policy/domains/program/login.te
@@ -38,9 +38,8 @@
 # But also permit other user domains to be entered by login.
 domain_trans(local_login_t, shell_exec_t, userdomain)
 
-# Permit login to read the user's home directories.
-allow local_login_t home_type:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow local_login_t home_type:file r_file_perms;
+# Permit login to search the user home directories.
+allow local_login_t home_dir_type:dir search;
 
 # Do not audit denied attempts to access devices.
 dontaudit local_login_t fixed_disk_device_t:blk_file { getattr setattr };
@@ -120,8 +119,9 @@
 
 # Run shells in user_t by default.
 domain_auto_trans(remote_login_t, shell_exec_t, user_t)
-allow remote_login_t user_home_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow remote_login_t user_home_t:file r_file_perms;
+# But also permit other user domains to be entered by login.
+domain_trans(remote_login_t, shell_exec_t, userdomain)
+allow remote_login_t home_dir_type:dir search;
 
 # Use the pty created by rlogind.
 ifdef(`rlogind.te', `
domains/program/modutil.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/modutil.te +2 -4
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/modutil.te policy/domains/program/modutil.te
@@ -43,10 +43,8 @@
 ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `allow depmod_t sysadm_gph_t:fd use;')
 
 # Read System.map from home directories.
-allow depmod_t user_home_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow depmod_t user_home_t:file r_file_perms;
-allow depmod_t sysadm_home_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow depmod_t sysadm_home_t:file r_file_perms;
+allow depmod_t { user_home_dir_type sysadm_home_dir_t }:dir r_dir_perms;
+r_dir_file(depmod_t, { user_home_type sysadm_home_t })
 
 # Rules for /proc/sys/kernel/tainted
 allow insmod_t sysctl_kernel_t:file { setattr rw_file_perms };
domains/program/mrtg.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/mrtg.te +3 -4
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/mrtg.te policy/domains/program/mrtg.te
@@ -55,12 +55,11 @@
 allow mrtg_t { etc_t etc_mrtg_t resolv_conf_t }:file { read getattr };
 allow mrtg_t etc_t:lnk_file read;
 
-#allow mrtg_t etc_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-
-#allow mrtg_t sysctl_kernel_t:dir search;
-#allow mrtg_t sysctl_kernel_t:file read;
+allow mrtg_t { sysctl_t sysctl_kernel_t }:dir search;
+allow mrtg_t sysctl_kernel_t:file read;
 
 # for uptime
 dontaudit mrtg_t initrc_var_run_t:file { read write lock };
 dontaudit mrtg_t etc_runtime_t:file { getattr read };
 
+dontaudit mrtg_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir search;
domains/program/mta.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/mta.te +0 -1
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/mta.te policy/domains/program/mta.te
@@ -35,6 +35,5 @@
 allow mta_user_agent sysadm_t:fifo_file { read write };
 
 
-allow system_mail_t initrc_t:fd use;
 allow system_mail_t privmail:fd use;
 allow system_mail_t privmail:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
domains/program/oav-update.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/oav-update.te +3 -0
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/oav-update.te policy/domains/program/oav-update.te
@@ -35,3 +35,6 @@
 
 # Can download via network
 can_network(oav_update_t)
+
+# Can read /etc/resolv.conf files
+allow amavisd_t resolv_conf_t:file r_file_perms;
domains/program/pppd.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/pppd.te +3 -3
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/pppd.te policy/domains/program/pppd.te
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
 
 allow pppd_t self:socket create_socket_perms;
 
-allow pppd_t devtty_t:chr_file { setattr rw_file_perms };
+allow pppd_t tty_device_t:chr_file { setattr rw_file_perms };
 
 # for scripts
 allow pppd_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
@@ -69,8 +69,8 @@
 
 ifdef(`pppd_for_user', `
 # Run pppd in pppd_t by default for user
-domain_auto_trans({ user_t sysadm_t }, pppd_exec_t, pppd_t)
+domain_auto_trans(userdomain, pppd_exec_t, pppd_t)
 in_user_role(pppd_t)
 role sysadm_r types pppd_t;
-allow { user_t sysadm_t } pppd_t:process signal;
+allow userdomain pppd_t:process signal;
 ')
domains/program/quota.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/quota.te +2 -1
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/quota.te policy/domains/program/quota.te
@@ -17,8 +17,9 @@
 allow quota_t self:capability sys_admin;
 
 # Read /etc/mtab.
-allow quota_t etc_runtime_t:file r_file_perms;
+allow quota_t etc_runtime_t:file { read getattr };
 
 allow quota_t device_t:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow quota_t fixed_disk_device_t:blk_file getattr;
 allow quota_t boot_t:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow quota_t sysctl_t:dir search;
domains/program/radvd.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/radvd.te +2 -2
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/radvd.te policy/domains/program/radvd.te
@@ -25,5 +27,5 @@
 allow radvd_t etc_t:lnk_file read;
 allow radvd_t null_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 
-allow radvd_t sysctl_t:file r_file_perms;
-allow radvd_t sysctl_t:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow radvd_t sysctl_net_t:file r_file_perms;
+allow radvd_t sysctl_net_t:dir r_dir_perms;
domains/program/setfiles.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/setfiles.te +7 -4
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/setfiles.te policy/domains/program/setfiles.te
@@ -19,11 +19,15 @@
 
 domain_auto_trans({ initrc_t sysadm_t }, setfiles_exec_t, setfiles_t)
 allow setfiles_t init_t:fd use;
-allow setfiles_t privrole:fd use;
+allow setfiles_t privfd:fd use;
 
 uses_shlib(setfiles_t)
 allow setfiles_t self:capability dac_override;
 
+# for upgrading glibc - without this the glibc upgrade scripts will put things
+# in a state such that setfiles can not be run!
+allow setfiles_t lib_t:file execute;
+
 allow setfiles_t security_t:security { context_to_sid sid_to_context };
 allow setfiles_t policy_src_t:file r_file_perms;
 
@@ -39,6 +43,5 @@
 allow setfiles_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;
 allow setfiles_t fs_type:dir r_dir_perms;
 
-allow setfiles_t sysadm_home_t:file r_file_perms;
-allow setfiles_t user_home_t:file r_file_perms;
-
+# for config files in a home directory
+allow setfiles_t home_type:file r_file_perms;
domains/program/tmpreaper.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/tmpreaper.te +2 -0
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/tmpreaper.te policy/domains/program/tmpreaper.te
@@ -25,5 +25,7 @@
 r_dir_file(tmpreaper_t, var_lib_t)
 allow tmpreaper_t device_t:dir { getattr search };
 
+ifdef(`rpm.te', `
 # for the Red Hat tmpreaper program which also manages tetex indexes
 create_dir_file(tmpreaper_t, tetex_data_t)
+')
file_contexts/program/apmd.fc renamed from tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/apmd.fc +0 -1
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/apmd.fc policy/file_contexts/program/apmd.fc
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
 # apmd
-/dev/apm_bios			system_u:object_r:apm_bios_t
 /usr/sbin/apmd			system_u:object_r:apmd_exec_t
 /usr/bin/apm			system_u:object_r:apm_exec_t
file_contexts/program/ftpd.fc renamed from tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/ftpd.fc +1 -0
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/ftpd.fc policy/file_contexts/program/ftpd.fc
@@ -6,3 +6,4 @@
 /etc/proftpd.conf		system_u:object_r:etc_ftpd_t
 /var/run/proftpd/proftpd-inetd	system_u:object_r:ftpd_var_run_t
 /var/log/muddleftpd.log.*	system_u:object_r:xferlog_t
+/var/log/xferlog.*		system_u:object_r:xferlog_t
file_contexts/program/load_policy.fc renamed from tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/load_policy.fc +1 -0
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/load_policy.fc policy/file_contexts/program/load_policy.fc
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
 # load_policy
 /usr/local/selinux/bin/load_policy	system_u:object_r:load_policy_exec_t
 /usr/local/bin/load_policy		system_u:object_r:load_policy_exec_t
+/usr/sbin/load_policy			system_u:object_r:load_policy_exec_t
file_contexts/program/sendmail.fc renamed from tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/sendmail.fc +0 -4
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/sendmail.fc policy/file_contexts/program/sendmail.fc
@@ -1,9 +1,5 @@
 # sendmail
-/etc/aliases			system_u:object_r:etc_aliases_t
-/etc/aliases.db			system_u:object_r:etc_aliases_t
 /etc/mail(/.*)?			system_u:object_r:etc_mail_t
-/usr/sbin/sendmail		system_u:object_r:sendmail_exec_t
-/usr/sbin/sendmail.sendmail	system_u:object_r:sendmail_exec_t
 /var/spool/mail(/.*)?		system_u:object_r:mail_spool_t
 /var/spool/mqueue(/.*)?		system_u:object_r:mqueue_spool_t
 /var/log/sendmail.st		system_u:object_r:sendmail_var_log_t
file_contexts/program/sxid.fc renamed from tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/sxid.fc +1 -0
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/sxid.fc policy/file_contexts/program/sxid.fc
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 # sxid - ldap server
 /usr/bin/sxid			system_u:object_r:sxid_exec_t
 /var/log/sxid.log.*		system_u:object_r:var_log_sxid_t
+/var/log/setuid.today.*		system_u:object_r:var_log_sxid_t
 /usr/sbin/checksecurity.se	system_u:object_r:sxid_exec_t
 /var/log/setuid.*		system_u:object_r:var_log_sxid_t
file_contexts/types.fc renamed from tmp/policy/file_contexts/types.fc +4 -1
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/file_contexts/types.fc policy/file_contexts/types.fc
@@ -215,6 +217,9 @@
 /usr/lib/perl.*\.so		system_u:object_r:shlib_t
 /usr/lib/selinux(/.*)?		system_u:object_r:policy_src_t
 /usr/lib/emacsen-common/.*	system_u:object_r:bin_t
+/usr/lib/.*/bin(/.*)?		system_u:object_r:bin_t
+/usr/lib/gconv/.*\.so		system_u:object_r:shlib_t
+/usr/share/guile/g-wrapped/.*\.so system_u:object_r:shlib_t
 /usr/share/selinux(/.*)?	system_u:object_r:policy_src_t
 /usr/games(/.*)?		system_u:object_r:bin_t
 
@@ -311,7 +317,7 @@
 # /var/log
 #
 /var/log(/.*)?			system_u:object_r:var_log_t
-/var/log/wtmp			system_u:object_r:wtmp_t
+/var/log/wtmp.*			system_u:object_r:wtmp_t
 /var/log/btmp.*			system_u:object_r:faillog_t
 /var/log/faillog		system_u:object_r:faillog_t
 /var/log/sa(/.*)?		system_u:object_r:var_log_sa_t
macros/admin_macros.te renamed from tmp/policy/macros/admin_macros.te +5 -3
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/macros/admin_macros.te policy/macros/admin_macros.te
@@ -98,19 +100,19 @@
 
 # Allow our su domain to write to .Xauthority.
 ifdef(`su.te', `
-allow $1_su_t user_home_type:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow $1_su_t user_home_dir_type:dir rw_dir_perms;
 allow $1_su_t user_home_type:file create_file_perms;
 ')
 
 # Allow our ssh domain to write to .Xauthority.
 ifdef(`ssh.te', `
-allow $1_ssh_t user_home_type:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow $1_ssh_t user_home_dir_type:dir rw_dir_perms;
 allow $1_ssh_t user_home_type:file create_file_perms;
 ')
 
 # Allow our gph domain to write to .xsession-errors.
 ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `
-allow $1_gph_t user_home_type:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow $1_gph_t user_home_dir_type:dir rw_dir_perms;
 allow $1_gph_t user_home_type:file create_file_perms;
 ')
 
@@ -141,4 +143,6 @@
 # Grant read and write access to /dev/console.
 allow $1_t console_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 
+# for lsof
+allow $1_t domain:socket_class_set getattr;
 ')
macros/global_macros.te renamed from tmp/policy/macros/global_macros.te +3 -2
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/macros/global_macros.te policy/macros/global_macros.te
@@ -303,6 +303,7 @@
 #
 define(`can_exec_any',`
 allow $1 { bin_t sbin_t lib_t etc_t }:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow $1 { bin_t sbin_t }:lnk_file read;
 uses_shlib($1)
 can_exec($1, etc_t)
 can_exec($1, lib_t)
@@ -508,7 +509,7 @@
 
 ##################################
 #
-# can_create_pty(domain_prefix)
+# can_create_pty(domain_prefix, attributes)
 #
 # Permissions for creating ptys.
 #
@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@
 
 role system_r types $1_t;
 
-domain_auto_trans(initrc_t, $1_exec_t, $1_t)
+domain_auto_trans({ init_t initrc_t }, $1_exec_t, $1_t)
 
 # For SELinux as a dynamically loaded module.
 # Normally, these transitions occur from initrc_t.
macros/program/crontab_macros.te renamed from tmp/policy/macros/program/crontab_macros.te +1 -1
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/macros/program/crontab_macros.te policy/macros/program/crontab_macros.te
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
 can_network($1_crontab_t)
 
 # Read user crontabs 
-allow $1_crontab_t $1_home_t:dir r_dir_perms;  
+allow $1_crontab_t { $1_home_t $1_home_dir_t }:dir r_dir_perms;  
 allow $1_crontab_t $1_home_t:file r_file_perms;  
 
 # Access the cron log file.
macros/program/ssh_macros.te renamed from tmp/policy/macros/program/ssh_macros.te +1 -1
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/macros/program/ssh_macros.te policy/macros/program/ssh_macros.te
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
 
 # Access the users .ssh directory.
 type $1_home_ssh_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-file_type_auto_trans($1_ssh_t, $1_home_dir_t, $1_home_ssh_t)
+file_type_auto_trans({ sysadm_ssh_t $1_ssh_t }, $1_home_dir_t, $1_home_ssh_t)
 dontaudit $1_ssh_t $1_home_t:dir search;
 r_dir_file(sshd_t, $1_home_ssh_t)
 rw_dir_create_file($1_t, $1_home_ssh_t)
macros/program/su_macros.te renamed from tmp/policy/macros/program/su_macros.te +3 -0
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/macros/program/su_macros.te policy/macros/program/su_macros.te
@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@
 allow $1_su_t sshd_tmp_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
 allow $1_su_t sshd_tmp_t:file rw_file_perms;
 file_type_auto_trans($1_su_t, sshd_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t)
+
+# stop su complaining if you run it from a directory with restrictive perms
+dontaudit $1_su_t file_type:dir search;
 ')
 
 ', `
macros/user_macros.te renamed from tmp/policy/macros/user_macros.te +7 -1
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/macros/user_macros.te policy/macros/user_macros.te
@@ -33,12 +33,17 @@
 
 # Create, access, and remove files in home directory.
 file_type_auto_trans($1_t, $1_home_dir_t, $1_home_t)
+allow $1_t $1_home_t:dir_file_class_set { relabelfrom relabelto };
 
 # Use the type when creating files in /tmp.
 file_type_auto_trans($1_t, tmp_t, $1_tmp_t)
 # Bind to a Unix domain socket in /tmp.
 allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:unix_stream_socket name_bind;
 
+ifdef(`devfsd.te', `
+allow $1_t device_t:filesystem getattr;
+')
+
 # Type for tty devices.
 type $1_tty_device_t, file_type, sysadmfile, ttyfile;
 # Access ttys.
@@ -172,7 +177,7 @@
 # Connect to portmap.
 ifdef(`portmap.te', `can_tcp_connect($1_t, portmap_t)')
 
-# Inherit and use sockets from inetd and sshd.
+# Inherit and use sockets from inetd
 ifdef(`inetd.te',
 `allow $1_t inetd_t:fd use;
 allow $1_t inetd_t:tcp_socket rw_stream_socket_perms;')
@@ -223,6 +245,7 @@
 ', `
 type $1_t, domain, userdomain, unpriv_userdomain;
 ')
+
 # $1_r is authorized for $1_t for the initial login domain.
 role $1_r types $1_t;