trivial patches
I have attached a patch for a large number of trivial issues. privrole vs privfd, user_t vs userdomain, etc.
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I do not get viruses because I do not use MS software. If you use Outlook then please do not put my email address in your address-book so that WHEN you get a virus it won't use my address in the
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From field.
domains/program/ldconfig.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/ldconfig.te +1 -1
@@ -21,7 +22,7 @@ file_type_auto_trans(ldconfig_t, etc_t, ld_so_cache_t) file_type_auto_trans(ldconfig_t, lib_t, shlib_t) -allow ldconfig_t { user_t sysadm_t }:fd use; +allow ldconfig_t userdomain:fd use; allow ldconfig_t etc_t:file { getattr read }; allow ldconfig_t etc_t:lnk_file read;
domains/program/load_policy.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/load_policy.te +5 -1
@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ # Rules domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, load_policy_exec_t, load_policy_t) +ifdef(`dpkg.te', ` +role system_r types load_policy_t; +domain_auto_trans(dpkg_t, load_policy_exec_t, load_policy_t) +') # Reload the policy configuration (sysadm_t no longer has this ability) allow load_policy_t security_t:security load_policy;
@@ -46,5 +50,5 @@ uses_shlib(load_policy_t) allow load_policy_t self:capability dac_override; -allow load_policy_t privrole:fd use; +allow load_policy_t privfd:fd use;
domains/program/login.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/login.te +5 -5
@@ -38,9 +38,8 @@ # But also permit other user domains to be entered by login. domain_trans(local_login_t, shell_exec_t, userdomain) -# Permit login to read the user's home directories. -allow local_login_t home_type:dir r_dir_perms; -allow local_login_t home_type:file r_file_perms; +# Permit login to search the user home directories. +allow local_login_t home_dir_type:dir search; # Do not audit denied attempts to access devices. dontaudit local_login_t fixed_disk_device_t:blk_file { getattr setattr };
@@ -120,8 +119,9 @@ # Run shells in user_t by default. domain_auto_trans(remote_login_t, shell_exec_t, user_t) -allow remote_login_t user_home_t:dir r_dir_perms; -allow remote_login_t user_home_t:file r_file_perms; +# But also permit other user domains to be entered by login. +domain_trans(remote_login_t, shell_exec_t, userdomain) +allow remote_login_t home_dir_type:dir search; # Use the pty created by rlogind. ifdef(`rlogind.te', `
domains/program/modutil.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/modutil.te +2 -4
@@ -43,10 +43,8 @@ ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `allow depmod_t sysadm_gph_t:fd use;') # Read System.map from home directories. -allow depmod_t user_home_t:dir r_dir_perms; -allow depmod_t user_home_t:file r_file_perms; -allow depmod_t sysadm_home_t:dir r_dir_perms; -allow depmod_t sysadm_home_t:file r_file_perms; +allow depmod_t { user_home_dir_type sysadm_home_dir_t }:dir r_dir_perms; +r_dir_file(depmod_t, { user_home_type sysadm_home_t }) # Rules for /proc/sys/kernel/tainted allow insmod_t sysctl_kernel_t:file { setattr rw_file_perms };
domains/program/mrtg.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/mrtg.te +3 -4
@@ -55,12 +55,11 @@ allow mrtg_t { etc_t etc_mrtg_t resolv_conf_t }:file { read getattr }; allow mrtg_t etc_t:lnk_file read; -#allow mrtg_t etc_t:dir r_dir_perms; - -#allow mrtg_t sysctl_kernel_t:dir search; -#allow mrtg_t sysctl_kernel_t:file read; +allow mrtg_t { sysctl_t sysctl_kernel_t }:dir search; +allow mrtg_t sysctl_kernel_t:file read; # for uptime dontaudit mrtg_t initrc_var_run_t:file { read write lock }; dontaudit mrtg_t etc_runtime_t:file { getattr read }; +dontaudit mrtg_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir search;
domains/program/mta.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/mta.te +0 -1
@@ -35,6 +35,5 @@ allow mta_user_agent sysadm_t:fifo_file { read write }; -allow system_mail_t initrc_t:fd use; allow system_mail_t privmail:fd use; allow system_mail_t privmail:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
domains/program/oav-update.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/oav-update.te +3 -0
@@ -35,3 +35,6 @@ # Can download via network can_network(oav_update_t) + +# Can read /etc/resolv.conf files +allow amavisd_t resolv_conf_t:file r_file_perms;
domains/program/pppd.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/pppd.te +3 -3
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ allow pppd_t self:socket create_socket_perms; -allow pppd_t devtty_t:chr_file { setattr rw_file_perms }; +allow pppd_t tty_device_t:chr_file { setattr rw_file_perms }; # for scripts allow pppd_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
@@ -69,8 +69,8 @@ ifdef(`pppd_for_user', ` # Run pppd in pppd_t by default for user -domain_auto_trans({ user_t sysadm_t }, pppd_exec_t, pppd_t) +domain_auto_trans(userdomain, pppd_exec_t, pppd_t) in_user_role(pppd_t) role sysadm_r types pppd_t; -allow { user_t sysadm_t } pppd_t:process signal; +allow userdomain pppd_t:process signal; ')
domains/program/quota.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/quota.te +2 -1
@@ -17,8 +17,9 @@ allow quota_t self:capability sys_admin; # Read /etc/mtab. -allow quota_t etc_runtime_t:file r_file_perms; +allow quota_t etc_runtime_t:file { read getattr }; allow quota_t device_t:dir r_dir_perms; allow quota_t fixed_disk_device_t:blk_file getattr; allow quota_t boot_t:dir r_dir_perms; +allow quota_t sysctl_t:dir search;
domains/program/radvd.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/radvd.te +2 -2
@@ -25,5 +27,5 @@ allow radvd_t etc_t:lnk_file read; allow radvd_t null_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms; -allow radvd_t sysctl_t:file r_file_perms; -allow radvd_t sysctl_t:dir r_dir_perms; +allow radvd_t sysctl_net_t:file r_file_perms; +allow radvd_t sysctl_net_t:dir r_dir_perms;
domains/program/setfiles.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/setfiles.te +7 -4
@@ -19,11 +19,15 @@ domain_auto_trans({ initrc_t sysadm_t }, setfiles_exec_t, setfiles_t) allow setfiles_t init_t:fd use; -allow setfiles_t privrole:fd use; +allow setfiles_t privfd:fd use; uses_shlib(setfiles_t) allow setfiles_t self:capability dac_override; +# for upgrading glibc - without this the glibc upgrade scripts will put things +# in a state such that setfiles can not be run! +allow setfiles_t lib_t:file execute; + allow setfiles_t security_t:security { context_to_sid sid_to_context }; allow setfiles_t policy_src_t:file r_file_perms;
@@ -39,6 +43,5 @@ allow setfiles_t fs_t:filesystem getattr; allow setfiles_t fs_type:dir r_dir_perms; -allow setfiles_t sysadm_home_t:file r_file_perms; -allow setfiles_t user_home_t:file r_file_perms; - +# for config files in a home directory +allow setfiles_t home_type:file r_file_perms;
domains/program/tmpreaper.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/tmpreaper.te +2 -0
@@ -25,5 +25,7 @@ r_dir_file(tmpreaper_t, var_lib_t) allow tmpreaper_t device_t:dir { getattr search }; +ifdef(`rpm.te', ` # for the Red Hat tmpreaper program which also manages tetex indexes create_dir_file(tmpreaper_t, tetex_data_t) +')
file_contexts/program/apmd.fc renamed from tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/apmd.fc +0 -1
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@ # apmd -/dev/apm_bios system_u:object_r:apm_bios_t /usr/sbin/apmd system_u:object_r:apmd_exec_t /usr/bin/apm system_u:object_r:apm_exec_t
file_contexts/program/ftpd.fc renamed from tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/ftpd.fc +1 -0
@@ -6,3 +6,4 @@ /etc/proftpd.conf system_u:object_r:etc_ftpd_t /var/run/proftpd/proftpd-inetd system_u:object_r:ftpd_var_run_t /var/log/muddleftpd.log.* system_u:object_r:xferlog_t +/var/log/xferlog.* system_u:object_r:xferlog_t
file_contexts/program/load_policy.fc renamed from tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/load_policy.fc +1 -0
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ # load_policy /usr/local/selinux/bin/load_policy system_u:object_r:load_policy_exec_t /usr/local/bin/load_policy system_u:object_r:load_policy_exec_t +/usr/sbin/load_policy system_u:object_r:load_policy_exec_t
file_contexts/program/sendmail.fc renamed from tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/sendmail.fc +0 -4
@@ -1,9 +1,5 @@ # sendmail -/etc/aliases system_u:object_r:etc_aliases_t -/etc/aliases.db system_u:object_r:etc_aliases_t /etc/mail(/.*)? system_u:object_r:etc_mail_t -/usr/sbin/sendmail system_u:object_r:sendmail_exec_t -/usr/sbin/sendmail.sendmail system_u:object_r:sendmail_exec_t /var/spool/mail(/.*)? system_u:object_r:mail_spool_t /var/spool/mqueue(/.*)? system_u:object_r:mqueue_spool_t /var/log/sendmail.st system_u:object_r:sendmail_var_log_t
file_contexts/program/sxid.fc renamed from tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/sxid.fc +1 -0
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ # sxid - ldap server /usr/bin/sxid system_u:object_r:sxid_exec_t /var/log/sxid.log.* system_u:object_r:var_log_sxid_t +/var/log/setuid.today.* system_u:object_r:var_log_sxid_t /usr/sbin/checksecurity.se system_u:object_r:sxid_exec_t /var/log/setuid.* system_u:object_r:var_log_sxid_t
file_contexts/types.fc renamed from tmp/policy/file_contexts/types.fc +4 -1
@@ -215,6 +217,9 @@ /usr/lib/perl.*\.so system_u:object_r:shlib_t /usr/lib/selinux(/.*)? system_u:object_r:policy_src_t /usr/lib/emacsen-common/.* system_u:object_r:bin_t +/usr/lib/.*/bin(/.*)? system_u:object_r:bin_t +/usr/lib/gconv/.*\.so system_u:object_r:shlib_t +/usr/share/guile/g-wrapped/.*\.so system_u:object_r:shlib_t /usr/share/selinux(/.*)? system_u:object_r:policy_src_t /usr/games(/.*)? system_u:object_r:bin_t
@@ -311,7 +317,7 @@ # /var/log # /var/log(/.*)? system_u:object_r:var_log_t -/var/log/wtmp system_u:object_r:wtmp_t +/var/log/wtmp.* system_u:object_r:wtmp_t /var/log/btmp.* system_u:object_r:faillog_t /var/log/faillog system_u:object_r:faillog_t /var/log/sa(/.*)? system_u:object_r:var_log_sa_t
macros/admin_macros.te renamed from tmp/policy/macros/admin_macros.te +5 -3
@@ -98,19 +100,19 @@ # Allow our su domain to write to .Xauthority. ifdef(`su.te', ` -allow $1_su_t user_home_type:dir rw_dir_perms; +allow $1_su_t user_home_dir_type:dir rw_dir_perms; allow $1_su_t user_home_type:file create_file_perms; ') # Allow our ssh domain to write to .Xauthority. ifdef(`ssh.te', ` -allow $1_ssh_t user_home_type:dir rw_dir_perms; +allow $1_ssh_t user_home_dir_type:dir rw_dir_perms; allow $1_ssh_t user_home_type:file create_file_perms; ') # Allow our gph domain to write to .xsession-errors. ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', ` -allow $1_gph_t user_home_type:dir rw_dir_perms; +allow $1_gph_t user_home_dir_type:dir rw_dir_perms; allow $1_gph_t user_home_type:file create_file_perms; ')
@@ -141,4 +143,6 @@ # Grant read and write access to /dev/console. allow $1_t console_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms; +# for lsof +allow $1_t domain:socket_class_set getattr; ')
macros/global_macros.te renamed from tmp/policy/macros/global_macros.te +3 -2
@@ -303,6 +303,7 @@ # define(`can_exec_any',` allow $1 { bin_t sbin_t lib_t etc_t }:dir r_dir_perms; +allow $1 { bin_t sbin_t }:lnk_file read; uses_shlib($1) can_exec($1, etc_t) can_exec($1, lib_t)
@@ -508,7 +509,7 @@ ################################## # -# can_create_pty(domain_prefix) +# can_create_pty(domain_prefix, attributes) # # Permissions for creating ptys. #
@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ role system_r types $1_t; -domain_auto_trans(initrc_t, $1_exec_t, $1_t) +domain_auto_trans({ init_t initrc_t }, $1_exec_t, $1_t) # For SELinux as a dynamically loaded module. # Normally, these transitions occur from initrc_t.
macros/program/crontab_macros.te renamed from tmp/policy/macros/program/crontab_macros.te +1 -1
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ can_network($1_crontab_t) # Read user crontabs -allow $1_crontab_t $1_home_t:dir r_dir_perms; +allow $1_crontab_t { $1_home_t $1_home_dir_t }:dir r_dir_perms; allow $1_crontab_t $1_home_t:file r_file_perms; # Access the cron log file.
macros/program/ssh_macros.te renamed from tmp/policy/macros/program/ssh_macros.te +1 -1
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ # Access the users .ssh directory. type $1_home_ssh_t, file_type, sysadmfile; -file_type_auto_trans($1_ssh_t, $1_home_dir_t, $1_home_ssh_t) +file_type_auto_trans({ sysadm_ssh_t $1_ssh_t }, $1_home_dir_t, $1_home_ssh_t) dontaudit $1_ssh_t $1_home_t:dir search; r_dir_file(sshd_t, $1_home_ssh_t) rw_dir_create_file($1_t, $1_home_ssh_t)
macros/program/su_macros.te renamed from tmp/policy/macros/program/su_macros.te +3 -0
@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ allow $1_su_t sshd_tmp_t:dir rw_dir_perms; allow $1_su_t sshd_tmp_t:file rw_file_perms; file_type_auto_trans($1_su_t, sshd_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t) + +# stop su complaining if you run it from a directory with restrictive perms +dontaudit $1_su_t file_type:dir search; ') ', `
macros/user_macros.te renamed from tmp/policy/macros/user_macros.te +7 -1
@@ -33,12 +33,17 @@ # Create, access, and remove files in home directory. file_type_auto_trans($1_t, $1_home_dir_t, $1_home_t) +allow $1_t $1_home_t:dir_file_class_set { relabelfrom relabelto }; # Use the type when creating files in /tmp. file_type_auto_trans($1_t, tmp_t, $1_tmp_t) # Bind to a Unix domain socket in /tmp. allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:unix_stream_socket name_bind; +ifdef(`devfsd.te', ` +allow $1_t device_t:filesystem getattr; +') + # Type for tty devices. type $1_tty_device_t, file_type, sysadmfile, ttyfile; # Access ttys.
@@ -172,7 +177,7 @@ # Connect to portmap. ifdef(`portmap.te', `can_tcp_connect($1_t, portmap_t)') -# Inherit and use sockets from inetd and sshd. +# Inherit and use sockets from inetd ifdef(`inetd.te', `allow $1_t inetd_t:fd use; allow $1_t inetd_t:tcp_socket rw_stream_socket_perms;')
@@ -223,6 +245,7 @@ ', ` type $1_t, domain, userdomain, unpriv_userdomain; ') + # $1_r is authorized for $1_t for the initial login domain. role $1_r types $1_t;