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dDoS attacks

DISCUSSION Don Cohen 2 participants 2 messages Jan 28, 2003 1 message not in the archive netfilter

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A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): 20030127232648.31312.21611.Mailman@kashyyyk

Don Cohen

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#1 lore raw
Quoted 1 line

i am not very skilled in using iptables, but as far i know it is

not possible to write following rule...
To paraphrase, I think the idea is that when the router sees a packet from A to B complaining about traffic then it drops the next n packets from B to A.
You may be correct that this cannot be done by iptables, but it's not a very good solution. For one thing, what makes you think that packets with source address A were actually sent from A? Your defense could be used to prevent you from communicating with the address of the attacker's choice (unless something prevents him from source spoofing).

Something closer to a solution is to use connection tracking and rate limit (now we're getting away from nefilter into lartc territory) packets in connections that have not been replied to. There's still the problem that if you run a public server, an attacker can prevent other legitimate customers from reaching you. And all of this doesn't address the problem of packet loss due to link saturation.

For (much) more info on this subject see http://cs3-inc.com/ddos.html

#2 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines · Don Cohen

To paraphrase, I think the idea is that when the router sees a packet from A to B complaining about traffic then it drops the next n packets from B to A.

it sends them back - complaining they're sent, like A did

Quoted 3 lines

You may be correct that this cannot be done by iptables, but it's not a very good solution. For one thing, what makes you think that packets with source address A were actually sent from A?

well. this is REJECTED packet. no other router could pass it to this router, except from someone from my subnet (using same switch, being physically connected to one multiport router, which doesn't distinguish between interfaces... this way attacker can also flood me or do whatever like coz is on same subnet)
if someone would try, this can be easily detected as REJECT packed spoofing because we have REJECTED packet which we never sent to C(third party). thus we know C is spoofing our network and we can DROP all REJECT packets from C considering damage or abuse, untill damage/abuse isn't fixed.

remember that you can sent rejected packets only to peer you have bidir contact with, so i.e. if you have only downlink (i.e. via sat) you can't send rejected packet to be relayed to router (you can only do that if you have secure tunnel to router, which is usual scenario for such connection). as REJECTED packets will not be relayed, but only will either block udp traffic to your side (in this case only last router will be blocked and then will be confused, because will not know where to forward REJECTED packet to
- because it never had such packet in it's queue, neither source adress will match any of it's interfaces. it'll look like 'hey you rejected something we never sent to you, liar!')

Quoted 3 lines

Your defense could be used to prevent you from communicating with the address of the attacker's choice (unless something prevents him from source spoofing).

this defense prevents from spoofing (and also flooding with REJECTED udp packets you never sent to someone... right now you can be flooded this way.)

Quoted 1 line

Something closer to a solution is to use connection tracking and

it is completely different field.

Quoted 2 lines

For (much) more info on this subject see http://cs3-inc.com/ddos.html

thx

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