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SMB security fixes for 2.6.9

PATCH New Chuck Ebbert 1 participant 1 message Nov 23, 2004

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PATCH 1/1 SMB security fixes for 2.6.9

The SMB patch in 2.6.9-ac10 is broken. When a reply is received and it
contains no data (only parms), the data_offset is zero. Since no data will be copied, zero offset is perfectly valid. This patch, based on the one in -ac, works for me. I also cleaned up the message printing (%u vs. %d for unsigned), added unlikely() where appropriate, and removed some extra code.

Comments welcome. Like I said, at least I can use SMB servers now. With the original patch very bad things happened, like trying to save files from a text editor truncated them to 0 bytes, followed by editor freezing for many seconds then asking for a new name to save the file as.

fs/smbfs/proc.c +3 -3
diff -upr linux-2.6.9/fs/smbfs/proc.c linux-2.6.9.1-pre3/fs/smbfs/proc.c
@@ -1427,9 +1427,9 @@ smb_proc_readX_data(struct smb_request *
 	 * So we must first calculate the amount of padding used by the server.
 	 */
 	data_off -= hdrlen;
-	if (data_off > SMB_READX_MAX_PAD) {
-		PARANOIA("offset is larger than max pad!\n");
-		PARANOIA("%d > %d\n", data_off, SMB_READX_MAX_PAD);
+	if (data_off > SMB_READX_MAX_PAD || data_off < 0) {
+		PARANOIA("offset is larger than SMB_READX_MAX_PAD or negative!\n");
+		PARANOIA("%d > %d || %d < 0\n", data_off, SMB_READX_MAX_PAD, data_off);
 		req->rq_rlen = req->rq_bufsize + 1;
 		return;
 	}
fs/smbfs/request.c +39 -20

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--Chuck Ebbert 22-Nov-04 19:18:11