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DISCUSSION [email protected] 6 participants 8 messages Sep 22, 2005

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#0 lore raw

Hi people,

I'm doing a new feature for linux kernel 2.6 to protect against all kinds of buffer overflow. It works with new sys_control() system call controling if a process can or can't call a system call ie. sys_execve();

You can do it using /bin/sys_control <pid> <enable or not system call> <eax of system call> <secret number>
for process that never call for example sys_execve(), setuid() ( you must need specify each eax for each system call) and use some functions in sys_control.h like lock_execve(n) and unlock_execve(n), where n is a secret number defined in sysctl. With this functions you will use system calls only when you need.
All shellcodes that use system calls like sys_execve() sys_setuid() will not work with this feature.

I think it can be an option in linux kernel.

Questions .. suggestions.

Thanks

Breno at kalangolinux.org

#1 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines · On Thu, 22 Sep 2005 19:44:33 -0000, [email protected] said:

I'm doing a new feature for linux kernel 2.6 to protect against all kinds of buffer overflow. It works with new sys_control() system call controling if a process can or can't call a system call ie. sys_execve();

This has been done before. ;)

Also, note *VERY* carefully that this does *NOT* protect against buffer overflow the way ExecShield and PAX and similar do - this merely tries to mitigate the damage.

Note that you probably don't *DARE* remove open()/read()/write()/close() from the "permitted syscall" list - and an attacker can have plenty of fun just with those 4 syscalls.

(That's also why SELinux was designed to give better granularity to syscalls - it can restrict a program to "write only to files it *should* be able to write").

#2 lore raw
Quoted 12 lines · On Thu, 2005-09-22 at 16:03 -0400, [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 3 lines · On Thu, 22 Sep 2005 19:44:33 -0000, [email protected] said:

I'm doing a new feature for linux kernel 2.6 to protect against all kinds of buffer overflow. It works with new sys_control() system call controling if a process can or can't call a system call ie. sys_execve();

This has been done before. ;)

Also, note *VERY* carefully that this does *NOT* protect against buffer overflow the way ExecShield and PAX and similar do - this merely tries to mitigate the damage.

Quoted 6 lines

Note that you probably don't *DARE* remove open()/read()/write()/close() from the "permitted syscall" list - and an attacker can have plenty of fun just with those 4 syscalls.

(That's also why SELinux was designed to give better granularity to syscalls - it can restrict a program to "write only to files it *should* be able to write").

An interesting thing that I don't think has been done before is to create a map linking stack call chains to syscalls. If the call stack doesn't match then it isn't a valid call.

Although that might already be part of execution fingerprinting, now that I think about it...

Signature · 1 line
Zan Lynx <[email protected]>
#3 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines · Zan Lynx

An interesting thing that I don't think has been done before is to create a map linking stack call chains to syscalls. If the call stack doesn't match then it isn't a valid call.

I suspect longjmp() and friends would play havoc on this, and vice versa, as well as those syscalls that are legal from inside signal handlers, and a few other cases.

What validity check were you planning to make on the stack call chain?

#4 lore raw
In reply to Zan Lynx
Quoted 3 lines · * Zan Lynx ([email protected]) wrote:

An interesting thing that I don't think has been done before is to create a map linking stack call chains to syscalls. If the call stack doesn't match then it isn't a valid call.

There's been a fair amount of research in anomaly detection. It's not as effective as you might hope. Can be slow, and since it's typically based on statistics, needs to be properly trained (can be difficult) and may be ineffective if you stay below anomaly threshold.

thanks,
-chris

#5 lore raw
In reply to [email protected]
Quoted 6 lines · On Thu, 22 Sep 2005 [email protected] wrote:

Hi people,

I'm doing a new feature for linux kernel 2.6 to protect against all kinds of buffer overflow. It works with new sys_control() system call controling if a process can or can't call a system call ie. sys_execve();

Are you aware that there are very few 'built-in' commands in any of the shells? If a user can't execute anything, the user can't do anything.

If you think that this will protect against improperly-written daemons, and things that never exec anything, you are wrong. The place to fix bad code is in the code.

Quoted 2 lines

You can do it using /bin/sys_control <pid> <enable or not system call> <eax of system call> <secret number>

This is a joke, right?

Quoted 7 lines

for process that never call for example sys_execve(), setuid() ( you must need specify each eax for each system call) and use some functions in sys_control.h like lock_execve(n)
and unlock_execve(n), where n is a secret number defined in sysctl. With this functions you will use system calls only when you need. All shellcodes that use system calls like sys_execve() sys_setuid() will not work with this feature.

What will they do? I try to execute ls, the kernel says I can't fork and exec /bin/ls. So, do I get killed, logged out? The shells handle errors in different ways. There is a big difference between how bash handles ENOENT (No such file or directory) and ENOSYS (Function not implimented).

Quoted 7 lines

I think it can be an option in linux kernel.

Questions .. suggestions.

Thanks

I think this is just another ruse to attempt to get the system call table exported, something you don't need to do in order to replace any of its elements. Am I guessing correctly?

Quoted 2 lines

Breno at kalangolinux.org

Cheers,
Dick Johnson
Penguin : Linux version 2.6.13 on an i686 machine (5589.55 BogoMips). Warning : 98.36% of all statistics are fiction.

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Thank you.

#6 lore raw
In reply to [email protected]
Quoted 3 lines · * [email protected] | 2005-09-22 19:44:33 [-0000]:

I'm doing a new feature for linux kernel 2.6 to protect against all kinds of buffer overflow. It works with new sys_control() system call controling if a process can or can't call a system call ie. sys_execve();

[...]

Quoted 1 line

Questions .. suggestions.

Think about userspace loaders! E.g. John Reiser's UPX or technics used in self[0]. What about "protect against all kinds of buffer overflow", at least the aplication can still be crash.

Quoted 1 line

Breno at kalangolinux.org

HGN

[0] http://www.phrack.org/show.php?p=63&a=11

#7 lore raw
In reply to [email protected]
Quoted 3 lines · * [email protected] ([email protected]) wrote:

I'm doing a new feature for linux kernel 2.6 to protect against all kinds of buffer overflow. It works with new sys_control() system call controling if a process can or can't call a system call ie. sys_execve();

This is insufficient to protect against buffer overflow. You are re-inventing something that's been done multiple times. Each are arguably more effective. Look at the seccomp option in current kernels. Look also to policy enforcement via something expressive such as SELinux.

Quoted 1 line

I think it can be an option in linux kernel.

We've got what we need in the kernel now.

thanks,
-chris