Let even non-dumpable tasks access /proc/self/fd
RFC PATCH 1/1 Let even non-dumpable tasks access /proc/self/fd
All tasks calling setuid() from root to non-root during their lifetime will not be able to access their /proc/self/fd. This is troublesome because the fstatat() and other *at() routines are emulated by accessing /proc/self/fd/*/path and that will break with setuid()ing programs, leading to various weird consequences (e.g. with the latest glibc, nftw() does not work with setuid()ing programs on ppc and furthermore causes the LSB testsuite to fail because of this).
This kernel patch fixes the problem by letting the process access its own /proc/self/fd - as far as I can see, this should be reasonably safe since for the process, this does not reveal "anything new". Feel free to comment on this.
fs/proc/base.c +7 -3
@@ -1368,7 +1368,9 @@ static struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode ei->type = ino; inode->i_uid =0 ; inode->i_gid =0 ; -if (ino ==PROC_TGID_INO || ino ==PROC_TID_INO ||task_dumpable (task)) { +if (ino ==PROC_TGID_INO || ino ==PROC_TID_INO || + ((ino ==PROC_TGID_FD || ino ==PROC_TID_FD || ino >=PROC_TID_FD_DIR ) && task == current) || +task_dumpable (task)) { inode->i_uid = task->euid; inode->i_gid = task->egid; }
@@ -1398,7 +1400,9 @@ static int pid_revalidate(struct dentrystruct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;struct task_struct *task =proc_task (inode);if (pid_alive (task)) { -if (proc_type (inode) ==PROC_TGID_INO ||proc_type (inode) ==PROC_TID_INO ||task_dumpable (task)) { +if (proc_type (inode) ==PROC_TGID_INO ||proc_type (inode) ==PROC_TID_INO || + ((proc_type (inode) ==PROC_TGID_FD ||proc_type (inode) ==PROC_TID_FD ) && task == current) || +task_dumpable (task)) { inode->i_uid = task->euid; inode->i_gid = task->egid; }else {
@@ -1425,7 +1429,7 @@ static int tid_fd_revalidate(struct dentif (fcheck_files (files, fd)) {rcu_read_unlock ();put_files_struct (files); -if (task_dumpable (task)) { +if (task_dumpable (task) || task == current) { inode->i_uid = task->euid; inode->i_gid = task->egid; }else {
Signature · 4 lines
Petr "Pasky" Baudis Stuff: http://pasky.or.cz/ Right now I am having amnesia and deja-vu at the same time. I think I have forgotten this before.
Quoted 4 lines · Petr Baudis
This kernel patch fixes the problem by letting the process access its own
/proc/self/fd- as far as I can see, this should be reasonably safe since for the process, this does not reveal "anything new". Feel free to comment on this.
Given that
fd=open("/etc/shadow", "r");
setuid(1000);
read(fd, buf, 100);is possible before this patch, I agree - nothing new is revealed with this patch :)
(I've been waiting to respond because it does make me nervous, but it seems clear that is unwarranted)
thanks,
-serge