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: Netfilter fixes

PATCH In review Patrick McHardy 2 participants 7 messages Dec 4, 2006 – Dec 5, 2006

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#0 lore raw

cover : Netfilter fixes

Hi Dave,

following are a few netfilter fixes. The iptables hook validation fixes are quite critical, so I'm going to send them to -stable along with Bart's fix.

Please apply, thanks.

 include/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_pptp.h |    3 
 net/bridge/br_netfilter.c                   |   36 +++++-
 net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c             |   48 ++++-----
 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c              |  146 ++++++++++++++--------------
 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c             |   59 ++++-------
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c         |   27 ++---
 6 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 151 deletions(-)

Bart De Schuymer:
[NETFILTER]: bridge netfilter: deal with martians correctly

Dmitry Mishin:
[NETFILTER]: Fix {ip,ip6,arp}_tables hook validation [NETFILTER]: Fix iptables compat hook validation

Yasuyuki Kozakai:
[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack: fix warning in PPTP helper [NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack: Don't try to find clashed expectation

#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/5 : Fix {ip,ip6,arp}_tables hook validation

[NETFILTER]: Fix {ip,ip6,arp}_tables hook validation

Commit 590bdf7fd2292b47c428111cb1360e312eff207e introduced a regression in match/target hook validation. mark_source_chains builds a bitmask for each rule representing the hooks it can be reached from, which is then used by the matches and targets to make sure they are only called from valid hooks. The patch moved the match/target specific validation before the mark_source_chains call, at which point the mask is always zero.

This patch returns back to the old order and moves the standard checks to mark_source_chains. This allows to get rid of a special case for standard targets as a nice side-effect.

---
commit 16649a61215e4689c2b01c3149442f089795fcd3
tree d799d1d57d88b1cf6f402b2a671c1580df6e586e
parent d916faace3efc0bf19fe9a615a1ab8fa1a24cd93
author Dmitry Mishin <[email protected]> Mon, 04 Dec 2006 11:26:59 +0100 committer Patrick McHardy <[email protected]> Mon, 04 Dec 2006 11:26:59 +0100

 net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c |   48 ++++++++++++++--------------
 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c  |   68 ++++++++++++++-------------------------
 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c |   59 +++++++++++++---------------------
 3 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 103 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +24 -24
index 413c2d0..71b76ad 100644
@@ -375,6 +375,13 @@ static int mark_source_chains(struct xt_
 			    && unconditional(&e->arp)) {
 				unsigned int oldpos, size;
 
+				if (t->verdict < -NF_MAX_VERDICT - 1) {
+					duprintf("mark_source_chains: bad "
+						"negative verdict (%i)\n",
+								t->verdict);
+					return 0;
+				}
+
 				/* Return: backtrack through the last
 				 * big jump.
 				 */
@@ -404,6 +411,14 @@ static int mark_source_chains(struct xt_
 				if (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
 					   ARPT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0
 				    && newpos >= 0) {
+					if (newpos > newinfo->size -
+						sizeof(struct arpt_entry)) {
+						duprintf("mark_source_chains: "
+							"bad verdict (%i)\n",
+								newpos);
+						return 0;
+					}
+
 					/* This a jump; chase it. */
 					duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n",
 						 pos, newpos);
@@ -426,8 +441,6 @@ static int mark_source_chains(struct xt_
 static inline int standard_check(const struct arpt_entry_target *t,
 				 unsigned int max_offset)
 {
-	struct arpt_standard_target *targ = (void *)t;
-
 	/* Check standard info. */
 	if (t->u.target_size
 	    != ARPT_ALIGN(sizeof(struct arpt_standard_target))) {
@@ -437,18 +450,6 @@ static inline int standard_check(const s
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	if (targ->verdict >= 0
-	    && targ->verdict > max_offset - sizeof(struct arpt_entry)) {
-		duprintf("arpt_standard_check: bad verdict (%i)\n",
-			 targ->verdict);
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	if (targ->verdict < -NF_MAX_VERDICT - 1) {
-		duprintf("arpt_standard_check: bad negative verdict (%i)\n",
-			 targ->verdict);
-		return 0;
-	}
 	return 1;
 }
 
@@ -627,18 +628,20 @@ static int translate_table(const char *n
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry0)) {
+		duprintf("Looping hook\n");
+		return -ELOOP;
+	}
+
 	/* Finally, each sanity check must pass */
 	i = 0;
 	ret = ARPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size,
 				 check_entry, name, size, &i);
 
-	if (ret != 0)
-		goto cleanup;
-
-	ret = -ELOOP;
-	if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry0)) {
-		duprintf("Looping hook\n");
-		goto cleanup;
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		ARPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size,
+				cleanup_entry, &i);
+		return ret;
 	}
 
 	/* And one copy for every other CPU */
@@ -647,9 +650,6 @@ static int translate_table(const char *n
 			memcpy(newinfo->entries[i], entry0, newinfo->size);
 	}
 
-	return 0;
-cleanup:
-	ARPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, cleanup_entry, &i);
 	return ret;
 }
 
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +25 -43

120 lines not on this page · raw message

net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +23 -36

100 lines not on this page · raw message

#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/5 : Fix iptables compat hook validation

In reply to Patrick McHardy

[NETFILTER]: Fix iptables compat hook validation

In compat mode, matches and targets valid hooks checks always successful due to not initialized e->comefrom field yet. This patch separates this checks from translation code and moves them after mark_source_chains() call, where these marks are initialized.

Signed-off-by; Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>

---
commit 5b7e23ebb667b2bf890844be31e46502c5b146d6
tree 54ebb21dc2cc0c76bec37044bca9f0b79ffc9517
parent 16649a61215e4689c2b01c3149442f089795fcd3
author Dmitry Mishin <[email protected]> Mon, 04 Dec 2006 11:27:20 +0100 committer Patrick McHardy <[email protected]> Mon, 04 Dec 2006 11:27:20 +0100

 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c |   78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +51 -27
index 2bddf84..0ff2956 100644
@@ -1516,25 +1516,8 @@ static inline int compat_copy_match_from
 	void **dstptr, compat_uint_t *size, const char *name,
 	const struct ipt_ip *ip, unsigned int hookmask)
 {
-	struct ipt_entry_match *dm;
-	struct ipt_match *match;
-	int ret;
-
-	dm = (struct ipt_entry_match *)*dstptr;
-	match = m->u.kernel.match;
 	xt_compat_match_from_user(m, dstptr, size);
-
-	ret = xt_check_match(match, AF_INET, dm->u.match_size - sizeof(*dm),
-			     name, hookmask, ip->proto,
-			     ip->invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO);
-	if (!ret && m->u.kernel.match->checkentry
-	    && !m->u.kernel.match->checkentry(name, ip, match, dm->data,
-					      hookmask)) {
-		duprintf("ip_tables: check failed for `%s'.\n",
-			 m->u.kernel.match->name);
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-	}
-	return ret;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct ipt_entry *e, void **dstptr,
@@ -1556,7 +1539,7 @@ static int compat_copy_entry_from_user(s
 	ret = IPT_MATCH_ITERATE(e, compat_copy_match_from_user, dstptr, size,
 			name, &de->ip, de->comefrom);
 	if (ret)
-		goto err;
+		return ret;
 	de->target_offset = e->target_offset - (origsize - *size);
 	t = ipt_get_target(e);
 	target = t->u.kernel.target;
@@ -1569,26 +1552,62 @@ static int compat_copy_entry_from_user(s
 		if ((unsigned char *)de - base < newinfo->underflow[h])
 			newinfo->underflow[h] -= origsize - *size;
 	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static inline int compat_check_match(struct ipt_entry_match *m, const char *name,
+				const struct ipt_ip *ip, unsigned int hookmask)
+{
+	struct ipt_match *match;
+	int ret;
+
+	match = m->u.kernel.match;
+	ret = xt_check_match(match, AF_INET, m->u.match_size - sizeof(*m),
+			     name, hookmask, ip->proto,
+			     ip->invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO);
+	if (!ret && m->u.kernel.match->checkentry
+	    && !m->u.kernel.match->checkentry(name, ip, match, m->data,
+					      hookmask)) {
+		duprintf("ip_tables: compat: check failed for `%s'.\n",
+			 m->u.kernel.match->name);
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static inline int compat_check_target(struct ipt_entry *e, const char *name)
+{
+ 	struct ipt_entry_target *t;
+ 	struct ipt_target *target;
+ 	int ret;
 
-	t = ipt_get_target(de);
+	t = ipt_get_target(e);
 	target = t->u.kernel.target;
 	ret = xt_check_target(target, AF_INET, t->u.target_size - sizeof(*t),
 			      name, e->comefrom, e->ip.proto,
 			      e->ip.invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO);
-	if (ret)
-		goto err;
-
-	if (t->u.kernel.target->checkentry
-		   && !t->u.kernel.target->checkentry(name, de, target,
-						      t->data, de->comefrom)) {
+	if (!ret && t->u.kernel.target->checkentry
+		   && !t->u.kernel.target->checkentry(name, e, target,
+						      t->data, e->comefrom)) {
 		duprintf("ip_tables: compat: check failed for `%s'.\n",
 			 t->u.kernel.target->name);
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 	}
-err:
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static inline int compat_check_entry(struct ipt_entry *e, const char *name)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = IPT_MATCH_ITERATE(e, compat_check_match, name, &e->ip,
+								e->comefrom);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	return compat_check_target(e, name);
+}
+
 static int
 translate_compat_table(const char *name,
 		unsigned int valid_hooks,
@@ -1677,6 +1696,11 @@ translate_compat_table(const char *name,
 	if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry1))
 		goto free_newinfo;
 
+	ret = IPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry1, newinfo->size, compat_check_entry,
+									name);
+	if (ret)
+		goto free_newinfo;
+
 	/* And one copy for every other CPU */
 	for_each_possible_cpu(i)
 		if (newinfo->entries[i] && newinfo->entries[i] != entry1)
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/5 : nf_conntrack: fix warning in PPTP helper

In reply to Patrick McHardy

[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack: fix warning in PPTP helper

---
commit b8ef637f630bc2206673170e07800a8e537f95d8
tree 7bf34146e21f397f7b58d81e9baf02912cae5ef0
parent 5b7e23ebb667b2bf890844be31e46502c5b146d6
author Yasuyuki Kozakai <[email protected]> Mon, 04 Dec 2006 11:30:09 +0100 committer Patrick McHardy <[email protected]> Mon, 04 Dec 2006 11:30:09 +0100

 include/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_pptp.h |    3 ++-
 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
include/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_pptp.h +2 -1
index fb049ec..9d8144a 100644
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
 #ifndef _NF_CONNTRACK_PPTP_H
 #define _NF_CONNTRACK_PPTP_H
 
+#include <linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_common.h>
+
 /* state of the control session */
 enum pptp_ctrlsess_state {
 	PPTP_SESSION_NONE,			/* no session present */
@@ -295,7 +297,6 @@ union pptp_ctrl_union {
 /* crap needed for nf_conntrack_compat.h */
 struct nf_conn;
 struct nf_conntrack_expect;
-enum ip_conntrack_info;
 
 extern int
 (*nf_nat_pptp_hook_outbound)(struct sk_buff **pskb,
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/5 : nf_conntrack: Don't try to find clashed expectation

In reply to Patrick McHardy

[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack: Don't try to find clashed expectation

The original code continues loop to find expectation in list if the master conntrack of the found expectation is unconfirmed. But it never success in that case, because nf_conntrack_expect_related() never insert clashed expectation to the list.

This stops loop in that case.

---
commit b7c3fd1079bf21b37b3135466418a2576d7d5fa1
tree 20a30d94395b7015450663f73c1b58f85ed5814c
parent b8ef637f630bc2206673170e07800a8e537f95d8
author Yasuyuki Kozakai <[email protected]> Mon, 04 Dec 2006 11:39:42 +0100 committer Patrick McHardy <[email protected]> Mon, 04 Dec 2006 11:39:42 +0100

 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c |   27 +++++++++++++++------------
 1 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c +15 -12
index 588d379..7df8f9a 100644
@@ -91,25 +91,28 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_conntrack_expect_fi
 struct nf_conntrack_expect *
 find_expectation(const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple)
 {
-	struct nf_conntrack_expect *i;
+	struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp;
+
+	exp = __nf_conntrack_expect_find(tuple);
+	if (!exp)
+		return NULL;
 
-	list_for_each_entry(i, &nf_conntrack_expect_list, list) {
 	/* If master is not in hash table yet (ie. packet hasn't left
 	   this machine yet), how can other end know about expected?
 	   Hence these are not the droids you are looking for (if
 	   master ct never got confirmed, we'd hold a reference to it
 	   and weird things would happen to future packets). */
-		if (nf_ct_tuple_mask_cmp(tuple, &i->tuple, &i->mask)
-		    && nf_ct_is_confirmed(i->master)) {
-			if (i->flags & NF_CT_EXPECT_PERMANENT) {
-				atomic_inc(&i->use);
-				return i;
-			} else if (del_timer(&i->timeout)) {
-				nf_ct_unlink_expect(i);
-				return i;
-			}
-		}
+	if (!nf_ct_is_confirmed(exp->master))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (exp->flags & NF_CT_EXPECT_PERMANENT) {
+		atomic_inc(&exp->use);
+		return exp;
+	} else if (del_timer(&exp->timeout)) {
+		nf_ct_unlink_expect(exp);
+		return exp;
 	}
+
 	return NULL;
 }
 
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/5 : bridge netfilter: deal with martians correctly

In reply to Patrick McHardy

[NETFILTER]: bridge netfilter: deal with martians correctly

The attached patch resolves an issue where a IP DNATed packet with a martian source is forwarded while it's better to drop it. It also resolves messages complaining about ip forwarding being disabled while it's actually enabled. Thanks to lepton <[email protected]> for reporting this problem.

This is probably a candidate for the -stable release.

---
commit a2c49af72d2edaa200fed12d840e9b2a37e266f5
tree dab62da592c8991515a487687aebf5da0696b48d
parent b7c3fd1079bf21b37b3135466418a2576d7d5fa1
author Bart De Schuymer <[email protected]> Mon, 04 Dec 2006 11:42:25 +0100 committer Patrick McHardy <[email protected]> Mon, 04 Dec 2006 11:42:25 +0100

 net/bridge/br_netfilter.c |   36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
net/bridge/br_netfilter.c +28 -8
index ac47ba2..bd221ad 100644
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter_arp.h>
 #include <linux/in_route.h>
+#include <linux/inetdevice.h>
 
 #include <net/ip.h>
 #include <net/ipv6.h>
@@ -221,10 +222,14 @@ static void __br_dnat_complain(void)
  *
  * Otherwise, the packet is considered to be routed and we just
  * change the destination MAC address so that the packet will
- * later be passed up to the IP stack to be routed.
+ * later be passed up to the IP stack to be routed. For a redirected
+ * packet, ip_route_input() will give back the localhost as output device,
+ * which differs from the bridge device.
  *
  * Let us now consider the case that ip_route_input() fails:
  *
+ * This can be because the destination address is martian, in which case
+ * the packet will be dropped.
  * After a "echo '0' > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward" ip_route_input()
  * will fail, while __ip_route_output_key() will return success. The source
  * address for __ip_route_output_key() is set to zero, so __ip_route_output_key
@@ -237,7 +242,8 @@ static void __br_dnat_complain(void)
  *
  * --Lennert, 20020411
  * --Bart, 20020416 (updated)
- * --Bart, 20021007 (updated) */
+ * --Bart, 20021007 (updated)
+ * --Bart, 20062711 (updated) */
 static int br_nf_pre_routing_finish_bridge(struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_OTHERHOST) {
@@ -264,15 +270,15 @@ static int br_nf_pre_routing_finish(stru
 	struct net_device *dev = skb->dev;
 	struct iphdr *iph = skb->nh.iph;
 	struct nf_bridge_info *nf_bridge = skb->nf_bridge;
+	int err;
 
 	if (nf_bridge->mask & BRNF_PKT_TYPE) {
 		skb->pkt_type = PACKET_OTHERHOST;
 		nf_bridge->mask ^= BRNF_PKT_TYPE;
 	}
 	nf_bridge->mask ^= BRNF_NF_BRIDGE_PREROUTING;
-
 	if (dnat_took_place(skb)) {
-		if (ip_route_input(skb, iph->daddr, iph->saddr, iph->tos, dev)) {
+		if ((err = ip_route_input(skb, iph->daddr, iph->saddr, iph->tos, dev))) {
 			struct rtable *rt;
 			struct flowi fl = {
 				.nl_u = {
@@ -283,19 +289,33 @@ static int br_nf_pre_routing_finish(stru
 				},
 				.proto = 0,
 			};
+			struct in_device *in_dev = in_dev_get(dev);
+
+			/* If err equals -EHOSTUNREACH the error is due to a
+			 * martian destination or due to the fact that
+			 * forwarding is disabled. For most martian packets,
+			 * ip_route_output_key() will fail. It won't fail for 2 types of
+			 * martian destinations: loopback destinations and destination
+			 * 0.0.0.0. In both cases the packet will be dropped because the
+			 * destination is the loopback device and not the bridge. */
+			if (err != -EHOSTUNREACH || !in_dev || IN_DEV_FORWARD(in_dev))
+				goto free_skb;
 
 			if (!ip_route_output_key(&rt, &fl)) {
 				/* - Bridged-and-DNAT'ed traffic doesn't
-				 *   require ip_forwarding.
-				 * - Deal with redirected traffic. */
-				if (((struct dst_entry *)rt)->dev == dev ||
-				    rt->rt_type == RTN_LOCAL) {
+				 *   require ip_forwarding. */
+				if (((struct dst_entry *)rt)->dev == dev) {
 					skb->dst = (struct dst_entry *)rt;
 					goto bridged_dnat;
 				}
+				/* we are sure that forwarding is disabled, so printing
+				 * this message is no problem. Note that the packet could
+				 * still have a martian destination address, in which case
+				 * the packet could be dropped even if forwarding were enabled */
 				__br_dnat_complain();
 				dst_release((struct dst_entry *)rt);
 			}
+free_skb:
 			kfree_skb(skb);
 			return 0;
 		} else {
maintainer
#6 lore raw
In reply to Patrick McHardy

From: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2006 11:55:56 +0100 (MET)

Quoted 5 lines

following are a few netfilter fixes. The iptables hook validation fixes are quite critical, so I'm going to send them to -stable along with Bart's fix.

Please apply, thanks.

All applied, thanks Patrick.