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vm86.c audit_syscall_exit() call trashes registers

DISCUSSION Chuck Anderson 5 participants 15 messages Aug 14, 2007 – Oct 5, 2007 3 messages not in the archive

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#0 lore raw

Please Cc: any replies, as we are not subscribed to linux-kernel. Thanks.

Somewhere around 2.6.16.12 a call to audit_syscall_exit was added to vm86.c:

static void do_sys_vm86(struct kernel_vm86_struct *info, struct task_struct *tsk)

 {
        struct tss_struct *tss;

+ long eax;
/*
* make sure the vm86() system call doesn't try to do anything silly */
@@ -305,13 +307,19 @@ static void do_sys_vm86(struct kernel_vm

        tsk->thread.screen_bitmap = info->screen_bitmap;
        if (info->flags & VM86_SCREEN_BITMAP)
                mark_screen_rdonly(tsk->mm);

+ __asm__ __volatile__("xorl %eax,%eax; movl %eax,%fs; movl %eax,%gs\n\t");
+ __asm__ __volatile__("movl %%eax, %0\n" :"=r"(eax));
+
+ /*call audit_syscall_exit since we do not exit via the normal paths */
+ if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
+ audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(eax), eax);
+

        __asm__ __volatile__(
-               "xorl %%eax,%%eax; movl %%eax,%%fs; movl %%eax,%%gs\n\t"
                "movl %0,%%esp\n\t"
                "movl %1,%%ebp\n\t"
                "jmp resume_userspace"
                : /* no outputs */
-               :"r" (&info->regs), "r" (task_thread_info(tsk)) : "ax");
+               :"r" (&info->regs), "r" (task_thread_info(tsk)));
        /* we never return here */

}

This appears to have caused intermittent data corruption of the results of the vm86() call that the X server uses to get EDID data from the monitor via the VESA BIOS. After removing the audit_syscall_exit() call, the problems mentioned in these bugzillas disappear:

Fetch of EDID 128 byte buffer by X server through vm86 INT 10 call is flaky.
http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=8633

RHEL 5 fails to get EDID data from monitor and sets low resolution
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=236416

If I'm reading correctly, it appears that the code above trashes the %fs and %gs registers, or otherwise doesn't leave them at zero before returning from the system call as the old code did. Is this a correct analysis? How should this be fixed?

Thanks.

-Chuck

#1 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Chuck Anderson

If I'm reading correctly, it appears that the code above trashes the %fs and %gs registers, or otherwise doesn't leave them at zero before returning from the system call as the old code did. Is this a correct analysis?

The kernel runs with defined fs -- saved and set at system call entry/exit -- and shouldn't touch gs (except on a context switch, but then it should be set back when you get scheduled again)

It's in theory possible that something went wrong with the gs saving for the vm86 path, but this changed long 2.6.16. But I assume when you just remove the call in 2.6.16 it already works? If yes it cannot be that (2.6.16 didn't use either fs or gs in the kernel)

Quoted 1 line

How should this be fixed?

The problem first needs to be fully understood. Do you have more details on the corruption?

One suspicious thing is that the audit code does mutex_lock(&tty_mutex) and could sleep there. It's a long shot, but does the problem go away when you comment that out? [such a patch is incorrect in theory, but should be unlikely enough to crash for a quick test]

But actually sleeping should be ok here and a preemptible kernel could do it anyways.

-Andi

#2 lore raw

The corruption originally looked like a race condition.

Sometimes the EDID buffer would be all zeros.
Sometimes it would contain partial data, and then the rest of the buffer filled with zeros. The amount of data transferred into the buffer before going to all zeros is non-deterministic.

When we put a known value in each byte of the buffer before making the vm86 call, the known data would always be overwritten either with EDID data or zeros.

-Bill

----

William Cattey
Linux Platform Coordinator
MIT Information Services & Technology

W92-176, 617-253-0140, [email protected]
http://web.mit.edu/wdc/www/

Quoted 30 lines · Andi Kleen
Quoted 5 lines · Chuck Anderson

If I'm reading correctly, it appears that the code above trashes the %fs and %gs registers, or otherwise doesn't leave them at zero before returning from the system call as the old code did. Is this a correct analysis?

The kernel runs with defined fs -- saved and set at system call entry/exit -- and shouldn't touch gs (except on a context switch, but then it should be set back when you get scheduled again)

It's in theory possible that something went wrong with the gs saving for the vm86 path, but this changed long 2.6.16. But I assume when you just remove the call in 2.6.16 it already works? If yes it cannot be that (2.6.16 didn't use either fs or gs in the kernel)

Quoted 1 line

How should this be fixed?

The problem first needs to be fully understood. Do you have more details on the corruption?

One suspicious thing is that the audit code does mutex_lock(&tty_mutex) and could sleep there. It's a long shot, but does the problem go away when you comment that out? [such a patch is incorrect in theory, but should be unlikely enough to crash for a quick test]

But actually sleeping should be ok here and a preemptible kernel could do it anyways.

-Andi

#3 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · William Cattey

The corruption originally looked like a race condition.

Sometimes the EDID buffer would be all zeros.
Sometimes it would contain partial data, and then the rest of the buffer filled with zeros.
The amount of data transferred into the buffer before going to all zeros is non-deterministic.

When we put a known value in each byte of the buffer before making the vm86 call, the known data would always be overwritten either with EDID data or zeros.

Hmm, that might be consistent with something going wrong with sleeping. Was the system under high load? Perhaps something else can thrash some real mode state when you sleep. On the other hand vm86 in user mode can schedule anyways, so it might have already happened.

But I think the mutex was actually added post 2.6.16 so if you saw it in 2.6.16 already it might have been something else.

Also when audit is not enabled (did you have it enabled?) the audit function doesn't do very much?

If you can reliably reproduce it one way might be to comment out more and more of the audit code until you find who causes the corruption (that might cause some corrupted audit data, but that should be fine for testing)

-Andi

#4 lore raw

The system was otherwise completely idle. The only active task was starting the X server.

The failure is 100% reproducible on my test system.

We have not run a lot of different kernels per se. We ran 2.6.9, and it was fine. When we ran RHEL 5, it came with 2.6.18. All we really did was rebuild 2.6.18 with that chunk of code removed, and the problem went away. Mind you, when that chunk of code was removed, there were a ton of errors about multiply freed audit blocks. But at least the X server EDID transfer was successful.

As far as enabling/disabling the audit functionality: I'm clueless about it. I think RHEL turned it on by default, but I don't know how to turn it on or off myself.

I will also note that the small stand-alone utility read_edid never failed. It was only when vm86 was called from inside of the X server. So perhaps there's a race condition with memory not being where it's expected to be when a large app calls out to real mode?

-Bill

----

William Cattey
Linux Platform Coordinator
MIT Information Services & Technology

W92-176, 617-253-0140, [email protected]
http://web.mit.edu/wdc/www/

Quoted 30 lines · Andi Kleen
Quoted 11 lines · William Cattey

The corruption originally looked like a race condition.

Sometimes the EDID buffer would be all zeros.
Sometimes it would contain partial data, and then the rest of the buffer filled with zeros.
The amount of data transferred into the buffer before going to all zeros is non-deterministic.

When we put a known value in each byte of the buffer before making the vm86 call, the known data would always be overwritten either with EDID data or zeros.

Hmm, that might be consistent with something going wrong with sleeping. Was the system under high load? Perhaps something else can thrash some real mode state when you sleep. On the other hand vm86 in user mode can schedule anyways, so it might have already happened.

But I think the mutex was actually added post 2.6.16 so if you saw it in 2.6.16 already it might have been something else.

Also when audit is not enabled (did you have it enabled?) the audit function doesn't do very much?

If you can reliably reproduce it one way might be to comment out more and more of the audit code until you find who causes the corruption (that might cause some corrupted audit data, but that should be fine for testing)

-Andi

A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]

A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]

A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]

#8 lore raw

Andi,

Sorry to have taken so long to take another step with this problem. Once my customers had a work-around, other priorities crowded out this project. Today Chuck and I did a little more work. We'd heard that a more recent kernel alleged to fix this stuff. Doing some digging, we came across this:

(http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.20)

commit 49d26b6eaa8e970c8cf6e299e6ccba2474191bf5
Author: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <[email protected]>
Date: Thu Dec 7 02:14:03 2006 +0100

[PATCH] i386: Update sys_vm86 to cope with changed pt_regs and %
gs usage

sys_vm86 uses a struct kernel_vm86_regs, which is identical to
pt_regs, but
adds an extra space for all the segment registers. Previously
this structure
was completely independent, so changes in pt_regs had to be
reflected in
kernel_vm86_regs. This changes just embeds pt_regs in
kernel_vm86_regs, and
makes the appropriate changes to vm86.c to deal with the new
naming.

Also, since %gs is dealt with differently in the kernel, this
change adjusts
vm86.c to reflect this.

While making these changes, I also cleaned up some frankly
bizarre code which
was added when auditing was added to sys_vm86.

Cc Chuck Ebbert <[email protected]>
Cc Zachary Amsden <[email protected]>
Cc Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc Jason Baron <[email protected]>
Cc Chris Wright <[email protected]>

Chuck and I took a stab at extracting what we thought was the relevant change to the audit_syscall_exit code, but we must have gotten it wrong. The EDID transfer always comes up zeros with our extract of Fitzhardinge's patch.

arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c +3 -4
@@ -306,19 +334,18 @@ static void do_sys_vm86(struct kernel_vm86_struct *info, struct task_struct *tsk
 	tsk->thread.screen_bitmap = info->screen_bitmap;
 	if (info->flags & VM86_SCREEN_BITMAP)
 		mark_screen_rdonly(tsk->mm);
-	__asm__ __volatile__("xorl %eax,%eax; movl %eax,%fs; movl %eax,%gs\n\t");
-	__asm__ __volatile__("movl %%eax, %0\n" :"=r"(eax));
 
 	/*call audit_syscall_exit since we do not exit via the normal paths */
 	if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
-		audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(eax), eax);
+		audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(0), 0);
 
 	__asm__ __volatile__(
 		"movl %0,%%esp\n\t"
 		"movl %1,%%ebp\n\t"
+		"mov  %2, %%fs\n\t"
 		"jmp resume_userspace"
 		: /* no outputs */
-		:"r" (&info->regs), "r" (task_thread_info(tsk)));
+		:"r" (&info->regs), "r" (task_thread_info(tsk)), "r" (0));
 	/* we never return here */
 }
 

At this point Chuck and I are trying to decide what will get us the best testing with the least effort. (We keep planning to test with a stock kernel, but last time that was on our TODO list, the project languished for a month.)

Do you have a specific stock kernel revision to recommend we try on our test system currently running Red Hat's 2.6.18? Are we right to presume it would be 2.6.18-0 to demonstrate failure and 2.6.20.0 to attempt to demonstrate success?

Are you the Andi Kleen who signed off on Fitzhardinge's patch, and if so do you have some insight for Chuck and I about what pieces are required to test and see if the bug really got fixed with his cleanup?

I'd feel a lot more confident we were on the right track if I could just correctly patch Fitzhardinge's cleanup into the test setup I have now.

-Bill

----

William Cattey
Linux Platform Coordinator
MIT Information Services & Technology

N42-040M, 617-253-0140, [email protected]
http://web.mit.edu/wdc/www/

Quoted 22 lines · Andi Kleen
Quoted 3 lines · William Cattey

In fact, I had begun the process of assuring myself that I could indeed take a main line kernel, and install it in place of a Red Hat Kernel.

Should normally work. Sometimes there are incompatibilities with udev -- it is safest to just compile in the drivers you need to avoid that -- but likely it would work even without that on a modern distro.

Quoted 6 lines

Shall I check back with you after we've re-run the test after putting the stock kernel on the machine? It will be a couple weeks because they're moving my office on Thursday, I'm away on vacation the following week, and I'm still unsure of the procedure to follow to build a totally stock totally mainline kernel and put it into place instead of what Red Hat has made.

Better report to the list again in case others want to chime in. But you can put me into cc because I would need to merge any resulting patch anyways.

-Andi

#9 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · William Cattey

Andi,

Sorry to have taken so long to take another step with this problem. Once my customers had a work-around, other priorities crowded out this project. Today Chuck and I did a little more work. We'd heard that a more recent kernel alleged to fix this stuff. Doing some digging, we came across this:

Hi,

I cleaned up some completely bogus code in vm86.c. I don't have any context for your mail though: is my change causing you problems, or does it fix something for you?

Thanks,
J

Quoted 100 lines

(http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.20)

commit 49d26b6eaa8e970c8cf6e299e6ccba2474191bf5
Author: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <[email protected]>
Date: Thu Dec 7 02:14:03 2006 +0100

[PATCH] i386: Update sys_vm86 to cope with changed pt_regs and %gs
usage

sys_vm86 uses a struct kernel_vm86_regs, which is identical to
pt_regs, but
adds an extra space for all the segment registers. Previously
this structure
was completely independent, so changes in pt_regs had to be
reflected in
kernel_vm86_regs. This changes just embeds pt_regs in
kernel_vm86_regs, and
makes the appropriate changes to vm86.c to deal with the new naming.

Also, since %gs is dealt with differently in the kernel, this
change adjusts
vm86.c to reflect this.

While making these changes, I also cleaned up some frankly bizarre
code which
was added when auditing was added to sys_vm86.

Cc Chuck Ebbert <[email protected]>
Cc Zachary Amsden <[email protected]>
Cc Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc Jason Baron <[email protected]>
Cc Chris Wright <[email protected]>

Chuck and I took a stab at extracting what we thought was the relevant change to the audit_syscall_exit code, but we must have gotten it wrong. The EDID transfer always comes up zeros with our extract of Fitzhardinge's patch.

At this point Chuck and I are trying to decide what will get us the best testing with the least effort. (We keep planning to test with a stock kernel, but last time that was on our TODO list, the project languished for a month.)

Do you have a specific stock kernel revision to recommend we try on our test system currently running Red Hat's 2.6.18? Are we right to presume it would be 2.6.18-0 to demonstrate failure and 2.6.20.0 to attempt to demonstrate success?

Are you the Andi Kleen who signed off on Fitzhardinge's patch, and if so do you have some insight for Chuck and I about what pieces are required to test and see if the bug really got fixed with his cleanup?

I'd feel a lot more confident we were on the right track if I could just correctly patch Fitzhardinge's cleanup into the test setup I have now.

-Bill

----

William Cattey
Linux Platform Coordinator
MIT Information Services & Technology

N42-040M, 617-253-0140, [email protected]
http://web.mit.edu/wdc/www/

Quoted 22 lines · Andi Kleen
Quoted 3 lines · William Cattey

In fact, I had begun the process of assuring myself that I could indeed take a main line kernel, and install it in place of a Red Hat Kernel.

Should normally work. Sometimes there are incompatibilities with udev -- it is safest to just compile in the drivers you need to avoid that -- but likely it would work even without that on a modern distro.

Quoted 6 lines

Shall I check back with you after we've re-run the test after putting the stock kernel on the machine? It will be a couple weeks because they're moving my office on Thursday, I'm away on vacation the following week, and I'm still unsure of the procedure to follow to build a totally stock totally mainline kernel and put it into place instead of what Red Hat has made.

Better report to the list again in case others want to chime in. But you can put me into cc because I would need to merge any resulting patch anyways.

-Andi

#10 lore raw

Your fix seems to have remedied a problem we are having with EDID fetches through vm86.c. At the present moment, we're trying to understand your cleanup so as to back port it to an earlier rev of the kernel (2.6.18).

3 questions for you:

1. Are we correct in understanding that your cleanup only touched vm86.c and vm86.h?

2. Do you remember your changes well enough from back when you made them in December 2006 to be able to point out the changes solely made to the audit calls?

3. Does correct operation of vm86.c in the 2.6 kernel require all of your changes, or just the subset that affects the audit calls?

Thanks in advance,

-Bill Cattey

----

William Cattey
Linux Platform Coordinator
MIT Information Services & Technology

N42-040M, 617-253-0140, [email protected]
http://web.mit.edu/wdc/www/

Quoted 122 lines · Jeremy Fitzhardinge
Quoted 7 lines · William Cattey

Andi,

Sorry to have taken so long to take another step with this problem. Once my customers had a work-around, other priorities crowded out this project. Today Chuck and I did a little more work. We'd heard that a more recent kernel alleged to fix this stuff. Doing some digging, we came across this:

Hi,

I cleaned up some completely bogus code in vm86.c. I don't have any context for your mail though: is my change causing you problems, or does it fix something for you?

Thanks,
J

Quoted 103 lines

(http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.20)

commit 49d26b6eaa8e970c8cf6e299e6ccba2474191bf5
Author: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <[email protected]>
Date: Thu Dec 7 02:14:03 2006 +0100

[PATCH] i386: Update sys_vm86 to cope with changed pt_regs and
%gs
usage

sys_vm86 uses a struct kernel_vm86_regs, which is identical to
pt_regs, but
adds an extra space for all the segment registers. Previously
this structure
was completely independent, so changes in pt_regs had to be
reflected in
kernel_vm86_regs. This changes just embeds pt_regs in
kernel_vm86_regs, and
makes the appropriate changes to vm86.c to deal with the new
naming.

Also, since %gs is dealt with differently in the kernel, this
change adjusts
vm86.c to reflect this.

While making these changes, I also cleaned up some frankly
bizarre
code which
was added when auditing was added to sys_vm86.

Cc Chuck Ebbert <[email protected]>
Cc Zachary Amsden <[email protected]>
Cc Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc Jason Baron <[email protected]>
Cc Chris Wright <[email protected]>

Chuck and I took a stab at extracting what we thought was the relevant change to the audit_syscall_exit code, but we must have gotten it wrong. The EDID transfer always comes up zeros with our extract of Fitzhardinge's patch.

At this point Chuck and I are trying to decide what will get us the best testing with the least effort. (We keep planning to test with a stock kernel, but last time that was on our TODO list, the project languished for a month.)

Do you have a specific stock kernel revision to recommend we try on our test system currently running Red Hat's 2.6.18? Are we right to presume it would be 2.6.18-0 to demonstrate failure and 2.6.20.0 to attempt to demonstrate success?

Are you the Andi Kleen who signed off on Fitzhardinge's patch, and if so do you have some insight for Chuck and I about what pieces are required to test and see if the bug really got fixed with his cleanup?

I'd feel a lot more confident we were on the right track if I could just correctly patch Fitzhardinge's cleanup into the test setup I have now.

-Bill

----

William Cattey
Linux Platform Coordinator
MIT Information Services & Technology

N42-040M, 617-253-0140, [email protected]
http://web.mit.edu/wdc/www/

Quoted 22 lines · Andi Kleen
Quoted 3 lines · William Cattey

In fact, I had begun the process of assuring myself that I could indeed take a main line kernel, and install it in place of a Red Hat Kernel.

Should normally work. Sometimes there are incompatibilities with udev -- it is safest to just compile in the drivers you need to avoid that -- but likely it would work even without that on a modern distro.

Quoted 6 lines

Shall I check back with you after we've re-run the test after putting the stock kernel on the machine? It will be a couple weeks because they're moving my office on Thursday, I'm away on vacation the following week, and I'm still unsure of the procedure to follow to build a totally stock totally mainline kernel and put it into place instead of what Red Hat has made.

Better report to the list again in case others want to chime in. But you can put me into cc because I would need to merge any resulting patch anyways.

-Andi

#11 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · William Cattey

Your fix seems to have remedied a problem we are having with EDID fetches through vm86.c. At the present moment, we're trying to understand your cleanup so as to back port it to an earlier rev of the kernel (2.6.18).

3 questions for you:

1. Are we correct in understanding that your cleanup only touched vm86.c and vm86.h?

Quoted 6 lines

2. Do you remember your changes well enough from back when you made them in December 2006 to be able to point out the changes solely made to the audit calls?

3. Does correct operation of vm86.c in the 2.6 kernel require all of your changes, or just the subset that affects the audit calls?

It was only a small part of the patch. I think it was basically this hunk (hand-edited, so this won't apply directly):

@@ -306,19 +334,18 @@ static void do_sys_vm86(struct kernel_vm

        tsk->thread.screen_bitmap = info->screen_bitmap;
        if (info->flags & VM86_SCREEN_BITMAP)
                mark_screen_rdonly(tsk->mm);
        __asm__ __volatile__("xorl %eax,%eax; movl %eax,%fs; movl %eax,%gs\n\t");

- __asm__ __volatile__("movl %%eax, %0\n" :"=r"(eax));

        /*call audit_syscall_exit since we do not exit via the normal paths */
        if (unlikely(current->audit_context))

- audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(eax), eax);
+ audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(0), 0);

This is certainly a bogus piece of code, and it could result in more or
less random values of eax being passed to audit_syscall_exit(). But I
don't know if it will have any bearing on your EDID problem; the rest of the patch is related to the introduction of using %gs as the base for the per-processor data area, and shouldn't cause any functional change to sys_vm86(), but its possible I fixed some other bug in the process.

J

#12 lore raw

arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c static void do_sys_vm86(struct kernel_vm · line 338

Quoted 6 lines · Jeremy Fitzhardinge
arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c +0 -0
@@ -306,19 +334,18 @@ static void do_sys_vm86(struct kernel_vm
        tsk->thread.screen_bitmap = info->screen_bitmap;
        if (info->flags & VM86_SCREEN_BITMAP)
                mark_screen_rdonly(tsk->mm);
        __asm__ __volatile__("xorl %eax,%eax; movl %eax,%fs; movl %eax,%gs\n\t");
 

Oh, this line is also clearly bogus, since it clobbers %eax without telling the compiler. The minimal change would be something like:

	asm volatile("mov %0, %%fs; mov %0, %%gs" : : "r" (0));


    J
#13 lore raw

Thanks very much for responding.

From your two replies, I crafted the attached patch. Alas, the EDID transfer comes up all zeros. I see two possible causes of this behavior:

1. I misunderstood how you intended the file to be modified.
2. The fix for my bug is NOT in correcting the audit call, but instead from some other fix, perhaps from the other aspect that you worked on.

I know that when I surrounded the audit_syscall_exit with #if 0 I got correct EDID fetches, so the most likely cause is #1, that I didn't correctly incorporate your understanding of correct operation of the call to audit_syscall_exit.

Here's my patch. Where did I screw up?

arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c renamed from arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c.foonly +2 -3
@@ -318,12 +318,11 @@
 	tsk->thread.screen_bitmap = info->screen_bitmap;
 	if (info->flags & VM86_SCREEN_BITMAP)
 		mark_screen_rdonly(tsk->mm);
-	__asm__ __volatile__("xorl %eax,%eax; movl %eax,%fs; movl %eax,%gs\n\t");
-	__asm__ __volatile__("movl %%eax, %0\n" :"=r"(eax));
+	__asm__ __volatile__("mov %0, %%fs; mov %0, %%gs" : : "r" (0));
 
 	/*call audit_syscall_exit since we do not exit via the normal paths */
 	if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
-		audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(eax), eax);
+		audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(0), 0);
 
 	__asm__ __volatile__(
 		"movl %0,%%esp\n\t"

-Bill

----

William Cattey
Linux Platform Coordinator
MIT Information Services & Technology

N42-040M, 617-253-0140, [email protected]
http://web.mit.edu/wdc/www/

Quoted 16 lines · Jeremy Fitzhardinge

Review static void do_sys_vm86(struct kernel_vm · line 339

Quoted 7 lines · Jeremy Fitzhardinge
(quoted diff) +0 -0
@@ -306,19 +334,18 @@ static void do_sys_vm86(struct kernel_vm
        tsk->thread.screen_bitmap = info->screen_bitmap;
        if (info->flags & VM86_SCREEN_BITMAP)
                mark_screen_rdonly(tsk->mm);
        __asm__ __volatile__("xorl %eax,%eax; movl %eax,%fs; movl % 
 eax,%gs\n\t");
 

Oh, this line is also clearly bogus, since it clobbers %eax without telling the compiler. The minimal change would be something like:

	asm volatile("mov %0, %%fs; mov %0, %%gs" : : "r" (0));


    J
#14 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · William Cattey

Thanks very much for responding.

From your two replies, I crafted the attached patch. Alas, the EDID transfer comes up all zeros. I see two possible causes of this behavior:

1. I misunderstood how you intended the file to be modified.
2. The fix for my bug is NOT in correcting the audit call, but instead from some other fix, perhaps from the other aspect that you worked on.

Quoted 6 lines

I know that when I surrounded the audit_syscall_exit with #if 0 I got correct EDID fetches, so the most likely cause is #1, that I didn't correctly incorporate your understanding of correct operation of the call to audit_syscall_exit.

Here's my patch. Where did I screw up?

Not sure, it looks OK to me. I guess it could be something else that got fixed in that change; I'll have another look.

Can you explain again what works and what doesn't? Do you have auditing enabled, or does it break things anyway?

J

#15 lore raw
In reply to William Cattey
Quoted 4 lines · William Cattey

I'd feel a lot more confident we were on the right track if I could just correctly patch Fitzhardinge's cleanup into the test setup I have now.

I think you need to zero both registers if you're using 2.6.16, and force %eax as the source so it doesn't choose %ebp?

arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c +4 -4
@@ -306,19 +334,19 @@ static void do_sys_vm86(struct kernel_vm86_struct *info, struct task_struct *tsk
 	tsk->thread.screen_bitmap = info->screen_bitmap;
 	if (info->flags & VM86_SCREEN_BITMAP)
 		mark_screen_rdonly(tsk->mm);
-	__asm__ __volatile__("xorl %eax,%eax; movl %eax,%fs; movl %eax,%gs\n\t");
-	__asm__ __volatile__("movl %%eax, %0\n" :"=r"(eax));
 
 	/*call audit_syscall_exit since we do not exit via the normal paths */
 	if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
-		audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(eax), eax);
+		audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(0), 0);
 
 	__asm__ __volatile__(
 		"movl %0,%%esp\n\t"
 		"movl %1,%%ebp\n\t"
+		"mov  %2, %%fs\n\t"
+		"mov  %2, %%gs\n\t"
 		"jmp resume_userspace"
 		: /* no outputs */
-		:"r" (&info->regs), "r" (task_thread_info(tsk)));
+		:"r" (&info->regs), "r" (task_thread_info(tsk)), "a" (0));
 	/* we never return here */
 }
 
#16 lore raw

Thanks very much for thinking about this and providing a revised candidate patch.

Sadly, the effect of the patch is the same as the most recent candidate patch from Jeremy Fitzhardinge: The EDID transfer still comes up all zeros.

This is very perplexing to me. If I take the code that appears in 2.6.18's vm86.c, and simply put #if 0 around the call to audit_syscall_exit I get good data.

If this is indeed a correct minimal correction to the audit_syscall_exit code, then perhaps there's some other condition being exercised. I guess my next step is to take the whole pt_regs patch (commit 49d26b6eaa8e970c8cf6e299e6ccba2474191bf5) from kernel.org and see if that has a beneficial effect.

-Bill

----

William Cattey
Linux Platform Coordinator
MIT Information Services & Technology

N42-040M, 617-253-0140, [email protected]
http://web.mit.edu/wdc/www/

Quoted 38 lines · Chuck Ebbert
Quoted 4 lines · William Cattey

I'd feel a lot more confident we were on the right track if I could just correctly patch Fitzhardinge's cleanup into the test setup I have now.

I think you need to zero both registers if you're using 2.6.16, and force %eax as the source so it doesn't choose %ebp?

arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c +0 -0
@@ -306,19 +334,19 @@ static void do_sys_vm86(struct  

kernel_vm86_struct *info, struct task_struct *tsk

arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c +0 -1
 	tsk->thread.screen_bitmap = info->screen_bitmap;
 	if (info->flags & VM86_SCREEN_BITMAP)
 		mark_screen_rdonly(tsk->mm);
-	__asm__ __volatile__("xorl %eax,%eax; movl %eax,%fs; movl %eax,%gs 

\n\t");

arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c +0 -1
-	__asm__ __volatile__("movl %%eax, %0\n" :"=r"(eax));
 
 	/*call audit_syscall_exit since we do not exit via the normal  

paths */

arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c +4 -2
 	if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
-		audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(eax), eax);
+		audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(0), 0);
 
 	__asm__ __volatile__(
 		"movl %0,%%esp\n\t"
 		"movl %1,%%ebp\n\t"
+		"mov  %2, %%fs\n\t"
+		"mov  %2, %%gs\n\t"
 		"jmp resume_userspace"
 		: /* no outputs */
-		:"r" (&info->regs), "r" (task_thread_info(tsk)));
+		:"r" (&info->regs), "r" (task_thread_info(tsk)), "a" (0));
 	/* we never return here */
 }
#17 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · William Cattey

Sadly, the effect of the patch is the same as the most recent candidate patch from Jeremy Fitzhardinge: The EDID transfer still comes up all zeros.

I think maybe a better question is: why does read_edid still work? The X server might be making some invalid assumption about system state. Comparing the code the two programs use could provide some clues.