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Providing an ELF flag for disabling LD_PRELOAD/ptrace()

DISCUSSION Martin Pitt 2 participants 2 messages Dec 13, 2007

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Hi kernel developers,

one thing that has bothered me for a long time already is the complete lack of a security boundary between processes of the same user. Things like LD_PRELOAD and ptrace() (IOW, gdb) are enabled by default for all users, and especially for developers this is a good thing.

However, a lot of programs that we have deal with passwords and other secrets which deserve some protection, like passwords you type into ssh, screensavers, seahorse, etc.

This problem has become more pressing with the advent of PolicyKit, where even fewer processes have the in-built privilege separation between root and users.

This concerns a scenario where you might have a rogue trojan in your session (e. g. a malicious firefox plugin or an autostart shell script). Admittedly, if an attacker gets that far he has almost won the machine and can easily get more privileges with some social engineering and spoofing, but I feel it is worth the small effort to at least not allow reading passwords from other processes' memory without making any noise at all. This would also greatly reduce the potential of a local trojan spreading itself over existing ssh connections to other hosts (provided that the ssh executable is protected like that, which it should be anyway because it deals with passwords).

What I want is the behaviour of suid/sgid executables (which do something like an atomic prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) to disable vectors like ptrace(), LD_PRELOAD, etc. However, making binaries setugid just for that is less than ideal, since it requires a lot of code patching (to reset the group) and packaging changes (to maintain the sgid setting), as well as confusing security scanners, etc.

So I wonder whether we can define a flag in the ELF header which triggers the same behaviour? Can we define an e_flags bit for that?

Thanks in advance for any comment or idea,

Martin

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Martin Pitt        http://www.piware.de
Ubuntu Developer   http://www.ubuntu.com
Debian Developer   http://www.debian.org
#1 lore raw

O> one thing that has bothered me for a long time already is the

Quoted 4 lines

complete lack of a security boundary between processes of the same user. Things like LD_PRELOAD and ptrace() (IOW, gdb) are enabled by default for all users, and especially for developers this is a good thing.

This is the normal Unix model.

Quoted 6 lines

What I want is the behaviour of suid/sgid executables (which do something like an atomic prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) to disable vectors like ptrace(), LD_PRELOAD, etc. However, making binaries setugid just for that is less than ideal, since it requires a lot of code patching (to reset the group) and packaging changes (to maintain the sgid setting), as well as confusing security scanners, etc.

This is an SELinux problem. In fact this kind of compartmentalisation is exactly what SELinux is designed to provide.

Quoted 2 lines

So I wonder whether we can define a flag in the ELF header which triggers the same behaviour? Can we define an e_flags bit for that?

If it were just ptrace it would be trivial, but its naiive to think that is the case. Constraining things while not entirely compartmentalising is a good thing, and policykit is the right path, but the security components that are needed seem to already exist in SELinux and little ELF binary header hacks don't do the job properly.

Alan