proc: advertise new restrictions on /proc/*/maps & /proc/*/smaps
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 proc: advertise new restrictions on /proc/*/maps & /proc/*/smaps
Now that strangers are kept out of /proc/<pid>/maps, let's welcome them with -EPERM instead of a blank file.
---
fs/proc/base.c | 8 ++++---- 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/proc/base.c +4 -4
@@ -2207,7 +2207,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = {INF ("cmdline" ,S_IRUGO , pid_cmdline),INF ("stat" ,S_IRUGO , tgid_stat),INF ("statm" ,S_IRUGO , pid_statm), -REG ("maps" ,S_IRUGO , maps), +REG ("maps" ,S_IRUSR , maps), #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA REG("numa_maps", S_IRUGO, numa_maps), #endif
@@ -2219,7 +2219,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = { REG("mountstats", S_IRUSR, mountstats),#ifdef CONFIG_MMU REG("clear_refs", S_IWUSR, clear_refs), - REG("smaps", S_IRUGO, smaps), + REG("smaps", S_IRUSR, smaps),#endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY DIR("attr", S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO, attr_dir),
@@ -2533,7 +2533,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = {INF ("cmdline" ,S_IRUGO , pid_cmdline),INF ("stat" ,S_IRUGO , tid_stat),INF ("statm" ,S_IRUGO , pid_statm), -REG ("maps" ,S_IRUGO , maps), +REG ("maps" ,S_IRUSR , maps), #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA REG("numa_maps", S_IRUGO, numa_maps), #endif
@@ -2544,7 +2544,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = { REG("mounts", S_IRUGO, mounts),#ifdef CONFIG_MMU REG("clear_refs", S_IWUSR, clear_refs), - REG("smaps", S_IRUGO, smaps), + REG("smaps", S_IRUSR, smaps),#endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY DIR("attr", S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO, attr_dir),
Al Viro
NAKQuoted 2 lines · Guillaume Chazarain
Now that strangers are kept out of /proc/<pid>/maps, let's welcome them with
-EPERMinstead of a blank file.
NAK
The whole point is that we have to reject it at read() time, not open() time. Checks in open() are
a) useless (since conditions can change later)
and
b) actually broken, since CAP_SYS_PTRACE != CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
Quoted 2 lines · Al Viro
The whole point is that we have to reject it at
read()time, notopen()time.
Yes, my patch was a complement to yours to propagate the -EPERM in easy cases. As you noted it added restrictions on reading /proc/*/maps, even though I found them acceptable.
How about this instead?
Maybe you'd prefer to propagate the actual -EPERM from __ptrace_may_attach but that would be more invasive.
Sidenote: do you think a sparse annotation to check IS_ERR/PTR_ERR usage would make sense?
proc: return -EPERM when preventing read of /proc/*/maps
Return an error instead of successfully reading an empty file.
---
fs/proc/base.c | 2 +- fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 8 +++++--- fs/proc/task_nommu.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/proc/base.c +1 -1
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ out:task_unlock (task);up_read (&mm->mmap_sem);mmput (mm); -return NULL ; +return ERR_PTR (-EPERM ); }static int proc_pid_cmdline (struct task_struct *task,char * buffer)
fs/proc/task_mmu.c +0 -0
@@ -398,8 +398,8 @@ static void *m_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t
*pos) return NULL;
mm = mm_for_maps(priv->task);
- if (!mm)
- return NULL;
+ if (IS_ERR(mm) || !mm)
+ return mm;
priv->tail_vma = tail_vma = get_gate_vma(priv->task);
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ out:
static void vma_stop(struct proc_maps_private *priv, structvm_area_struct *vma) {
- if (vma && vma != priv->tail_vma) {
+ if (vma && !IS_ERR(vma) && vma != priv->tail_vma) {
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm; up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
mmput(mm);
@@ -451,6 +451,8 @@ static void *m_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos) struct vm_area_struct *tail_vma = priv->tail_vma;
(*pos)++;
+ if (IS_ERR(vma))
+ return vma;
if (vma && (vma != tail_vma) && vma->vm_next)
return vma->vm_next;
vma_stop(priv, vma);
fs/proc/task_nommu.c +0 -0
@@ -166,10 +166,10 @@ static void *m_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t
*pos) return NULL;
mm = mm_for_maps(priv->task);
- if (!mm) {
+ if (IS_ERR(mm) || !mm) {
put_task_struct(priv->task);
priv->task = NULL;
- return NULL;
+ return mm;
}
/* start from the Nth VMA */
Signature · 1 line
Guillaume
Quoted 14 lines · Guillaume Chazarain
Quoted 2 lines · Al Viro
The whole point is that we have to reject it at
read()time, notopen()time.Yes, my patch was a complement to yours to propagate the
-EPERMin easy cases. As you noted it added restrictions on reading/proc/*/maps, even though I found them acceptable.How about this instead?
Maybe you'd prefer to propagate the actual
-EPERMfrom__ptrace_may_attachbut that would be more invasive.
Quoted 6 lines
Sidenote: do you think a sparse annotation to check IS_ERR/PTR_ERR usage would make sense?
proc: return
-EPERMwhen preventing read of/proc/*/mapsReturn an error instead of successfully reading an empty file.
You are overcomplicating it - if ->start() returns ERR_PTR(), it's over; read() will fail with that error and that's it. No need to mess with ->next(), etc. - it'll never see that ERR_PTR(-EPERM). Drop these chunks and you've got an ACK...