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OOPS in request_key.c bisected (and then refound)

DISCUSSION Steve French 3 participants 3 messages Aug 18, 2008 – Oct 28, 2008 1 message not in the archive

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#1 lore raw

Copying lkml on this additional feedback on the patch to fix the oops introduced in April by the keyctl subsystem

Quoted 93 lines · Rutger Nijlunsing

When trying to mount an CIFS share with SPGENO on Debian, I got nothing. Digging deeping revealing on OOPS at function call_sbin_request_key+0x166/0x255in 2.6.27 which was not there in 2.6.25. Bisecting this with the simplest command generating the OOPS, which was taken from 'man keyctl':

keyctl request2 user debug:yyyy spoon

took about 4 hours on the evolutionary dead-end Pentium 4 and returned commit:

commit 69664cf16af4f31cd54d77948a4baf9c7e0ca7b9

Author: David Howells <[email protected]>
Date:   Tue Apr 29 01:01:31 2008 -0700

keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed

...as the culprit.

Googling for this revealed that this OOPS had been reported before in May, that a patch was written, tested and considered OK:
http://lists.samba.org/archive/linux-cifs-client/2008-May/003001.html

Applying this patch is still the right thing to do since it made the OOPS disappear. Hopefully this will solve my SPNEGO problems, but that's a second concern. Here is the patch again, together with additional Tested-bys:

---
KEYS: Make request key instantiate the per-user keyrings

Make request_key() instantiate the per-user keyrings so that it doesn't oops if it needs to get hold of the user session keyring because there isn't a session keyring in place.

---

 security/keys/internal.h     |    1 +
 security/keys/process_keys.c |    2 +-
 security/keys/request_key.c  |    4 ++++
 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
security/keys/internal.h +1 -0
index 8c05587..2bdfacc 100644
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
 
 extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check);
 
+extern int install_user_keyrings(struct task_struct *tsk);
 extern int install_thread_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk);
 extern int install_process_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk);
 
security/keys/process_keys.c +1 -1
index 5be6d01..45b240a 100644
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ struct key_user root_key_user = {
 /*
 * install user and user session keyrings for a particular UID
 */
-static int install_user_keyrings(struct task_struct *tsk)
+int install_user_keyrings(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
       struct user_struct *user = tsk->user;
       struct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring;
security/keys/request_key.c +4 -1
index ba32ca6..abea08f 100644
@@ -74,6 +74,10 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons,
 
       kenter("{%d},{%d},%s", key->serial, authkey->serial, op);
 
+       ret = install_user_keyrings(tsk);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto error_alloc;
+
       /* allocate a new session keyring */
       sprintf(desc, "_req.%u", key->serial);
 
 
 
--

Rutger Nijlunsing ---------------------------------- eludias ed dse.nl never attribute to a conspiracy which can be explained by incompetence
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Signature · 3 lines
Thanks,

Steve
#2 lore raw

This patch was confirmed by a user here to fix the oops (happened while using mount.cifs with kerberos).
Is there a reason not to merge it (and into stable too) ?

Quoted 97 lines · Steve French

Copying lkml on this additional feedback on the patch to fix the oops introduced in April by the keyctl subsystem

Quoted 92 lines · Rutger Nijlunsing

When trying to mount an CIFS share with SPGENO on Debian, I got nothing. Digging deeping revealing on OOPS at function call_sbin_request_key+0x166/0x255in 2.6.27 which was not there in 2.6.25. Bisecting this with the simplest command generating the OOPS, which was taken from 'man keyctl':

keyctl request2 user debug:yyyy spoon

took about 4 hours on the evolutionary dead-end Pentium 4 and returned commit:

commit 69664cf16af4f31cd54d77948a4baf9c7e0ca7b9

Author: David Howells <[email protected]>
Date:   Tue Apr 29 01:01:31 2008 -0700

keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed

...as the culprit.

Googling for this revealed that this OOPS had been reported before in May, that a patch was written, tested and considered OK:
http://lists.samba.org/archive/linux-cifs-client/2008-May/003001.html

Applying this patch is still the right thing to do since it made the OOPS disappear. Hopefully this will solve my SPNEGO problems, but that's a second concern. Here is the patch again, together with additional Tested-bys:

---
KEYS: Make request key instantiate the per-user keyrings

Make request_key() instantiate the per-user keyrings so that it doesn't oops if it needs to get hold of the user session keyring because there isn't a session keyring in place.

---

 security/keys/internal.h     |    1 +
 security/keys/process_keys.c |    2 +-
 security/keys/request_key.c  |    4 ++++
 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
security/keys/internal.h +1 -0
index 8c05587..2bdfacc 100644
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
 
 extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check);
 
+extern int install_user_keyrings(struct task_struct *tsk);
 extern int install_thread_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk);
 extern int install_process_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk);
 
security/keys/process_keys.c +1 -1
index 5be6d01..45b240a 100644
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ struct key_user root_key_user = {
 /*
 * install user and user session keyrings for a particular UID
 */
-static int install_user_keyrings(struct task_struct *tsk)
+int install_user_keyrings(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
       struct user_struct *user = tsk->user;
       struct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring;
security/keys/request_key.c +4 -1
index ba32ca6..abea08f 100644
@@ -74,6 +74,10 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons,
 
       kenter("{%d},{%d},%s", key->serial, authkey->serial, op);
 
+       ret = install_user_keyrings(tsk);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto error_alloc;
+
       /* allocate a new session keyring */
       sprintf(desc, "_req.%u", key->serial);
 
 
 
--

Rutger Nijlunsing ---------------------------------- eludias ed dse.nl never attribute to a conspiracy which can be explained by incompetence
----------------------------------------------------------------------

#3 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines · Pascal Terjan

This patch was confirmed by a user here to fix the oops (happened while using mount.cifs with kerberos).
Is there a reason not to merge it (and into stable too) ?

I thought it was upstream, but I think I must've been looking at the wrong GIT tree. I'll push it now.

David