refpolicy: Add missing network related MLS constraints
PATCH v2 1/1 refpolicy: Add missing network related MLS constraints
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RE: [refpolicy] [PATCH v2] refpolicy: Add missing network related MLSconstraints
Hi Paul,
Is there any reason we can't utilize the new interfaces to handle the unlabeled_t lines in the constraints? I'm not a real big fan of putting direct types into the constraints.
-Chad
Quoted 158 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: refpolicy-bounces at oss.tresys.com [mailto:refpolicy-bounces at oss.tresys.com] On Behalf Of Paul Moore
Sent: Friday, February 20, 2009 4:03 PM
To: selinux at tycho.nsa.gov; refpolicy at oss.tresys.com
Subject: [refpolicy] [PATCH v2] refpolicy: Add missing network related MLSconstraintsAdd MLS constraints for several network related access controls including the new ingress/egress controls and the older Secmark controls. Based on the following post to the SELinux Reference Policy mailing list:
* http://oss.tresys.com/pipermail/refpolicy/2009-February/000579.html
Signed-off-by Paul Moore <[email protected]>--- policy/mls | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ policy/modules/kernel/mls.if | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ policy/modules/kernel/mls.te | 2 + 3 files changed, 89 insertions(+)Index: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/mls
===================================================================policy/mls +5
-0@@ -295,8 +295,53 @@ mlsconstrain { netif node } { tcp_send u # these access vectors have no MLS restrictions # node enforce_dest +# +# MLS policy for the network ingress/egress controls # + +# the netif ingress/egress ops, the ingress permission is a "write" +operation # because the subject in this particular case isthe remote
policy/mls +10
-0+domain which is # writing data out the network interface which is +acting as the object mlsconstrain { netif } { ingress } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or + ( t1 == unlabeled_t )); +mlsconstrain { netif } { egress } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound )); +# the node recvfrom/sendto ops, the recvfrom permission is a "write" +operation # because the subject in this particular case isthe remote
+domain which is # writing data out the network node which is acting aspolicy/mls +10
-0+the object mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or + ( t1 == unlabeled_t )); +mlsconstrain { node } { sendto } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound )); +# the forward ops, the forward_in permission is a "write" operation +because the # subject in this particular case is the remote domain +which is writing data # to the network with a secmark label,the object
policy/mls +17
-0+in this case mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_in } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or + ( t1 == unlabeled_t )); +mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_out } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ) or + ( t1 == unlabeled_t )); + +# +# MLS policy for the secmark and peer controls # + +# the peer/packet recv op +mlsconstrain { peer packet } { recv } + (( l1 dom l2 ) or + (( t1 == mlsnetreadtoclr ) and ( h1 dom l2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetread )); # # MLS policy for the process classIndex: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/modules/kernel/mls.if
===================================================================policy/modules/kernel/mls.if +42
-0@@ -332,6 +332,48 @@ interface(`mls_net_write_within_range',` ######################################## ## <summary> +## Make specified domain trusted to +## write inbound packets regardless of the +## network's or node's MLS range. +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +## <rolecap/> +# +interface(`mls_net_inbound_all_levels',` + gen_require(` + attribute mlsnetinbound; + ') + + typeattribute $1 mlsnetinbound; +') + +######################################## +## <summary> +## Make specified domain trusted to +## write outbound packets regardless of the +## network's or node's MLS range. +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +## <rolecap/> +# +interface(`mls_net_outbound_all_levels',` + gen_require(` + attribute mlsnetoutbound; + ') + + typeattribute $1 mlsnetoutbound; +') + +######################################## +## <summary> ## Make specified domain MLS trusted ## for reading from System V IPC objects ## up to its clearance.Index: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/modules/kernel/mls.te
===================================================================policy/modules/kernel/mls.te +2
-1@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ attribute mlsnetwriteranged; attribute mlsnetupgrade; attribute mlsnetdowngrade; attribute mlsnetrecvall; +attribute mlsnetinbound; +attribute mlsnetoutbound; attribute mlsipcread; attribute mlsipcreadtoclr; --paul moore
linux @ hp_______________________________________________
refpolicy mailing list
refpolicy at oss.tresys.com
http://oss.tresys.com/mailman/listinfo/refpolicy
Re: [refpolicy] [PATCH v2] refpolicy: Add missing network related MLSconstraints
Quoted 5 lines · chanson at trustedcs.com
Hi Paul,
Is there any reason we can't utilize the new interfaces to handle the
unlabeled_tlines in the constraints? I'm not a real big fan of putting direct types into the constraints.
Convention and consistency with the other network constraints. I suppose this is really a judgment call because what is the real difference between using direct types and simply loading up the types with the MLS overrides/attributes? The "unlabeled_t" type really is special and it seems cleaner to me to use it directly in the constraints rather than adding a bunch of attributes to it.
Quoted 157 lines
Quoted 157 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: refpolicy-bounces at oss.tresys.com [mailto:refpolicy-bounces at oss.tresys.com] On Behalf Of Paul Moore
Sent: Friday, February 20, 2009 4:03 PM
To: selinux at tycho.nsa.gov; refpolicy at oss.tresys.com
Subject: [refpolicy] [PATCH v2] refpolicy: Add missing network related MLSconstraintsAdd MLS constraints for several network related access controls including the new ingress/egress controls and the older Secmark controls. Based on the following post to the SELinux Reference Policy mailing list:
* http://oss.tresys.com/pipermail/refpolicy/2009-February/000579.html
Signed-off-by Paul Moore <[email protected]>--- policy/mls | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ policy/modules/kernel/mls.if | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ policy/modules/kernel/mls.te | 2 + 3 files changed, 89 insertions(+)Index: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/mls
===================================================================policy/mls +5
-0@@ -295,8 +295,53 @@ mlsconstrain { netif node } { tcp_send u # these access vectors have no MLS restrictions # node enforce_dest +# +# MLS policy for the network ingress/egress controls # + +# the netif ingress/egress ops, the ingress permission is a "write" +operation # because the subject in this particular case isthe remote
policy/mls +10
-0+domain which is # writing data out the network interface which is +acting as the object mlsconstrain { netif } { ingress } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or + ( t1 == unlabeled_t )); +mlsconstrain { netif } { egress } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound )); +# the node recvfrom/sendto ops, the recvfrom permission is a "write" +operation # because the subject in this particular case isthe remote
+domain which is # writing data out the network node which is acting aspolicy/mls +10
-0+the object mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or + ( t1 == unlabeled_t )); +mlsconstrain { node } { sendto } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound )); +# the forward ops, the forward_in permission is a "write" operation +because the # subject in this particular case is the remote domain +which is writing data # to the network with a secmark label,the object
policy/mls +17
-0+in this case mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_in } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or + ( t1 == unlabeled_t )); +mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_out } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ) or + ( t1 == unlabeled_t )); + +# +# MLS policy for the secmark and peer controls # + +# the peer/packet recv op +mlsconstrain { peer packet } { recv } + (( l1 dom l2 ) or + (( t1 == mlsnetreadtoclr ) and ( h1 dom l2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetread )); # # MLS policy for the process classIndex: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/modules/kernel/mls.if
===================================================================policy/modules/kernel/mls.if +42
-0@@ -332,6 +332,48 @@ interface(`mls_net_write_within_range',` ######################################## ## <summary> +## Make specified domain trusted to +## write inbound packets regardless of the +## network's or node's MLS range. +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +## <rolecap/> +# +interface(`mls_net_inbound_all_levels',` + gen_require(` + attribute mlsnetinbound; + ') + + typeattribute $1 mlsnetinbound; +') + +######################################## +## <summary> +## Make specified domain trusted to +## write outbound packets regardless of the +## network's or node's MLS range. +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +## <rolecap/> +# +interface(`mls_net_outbound_all_levels',` + gen_require(` + attribute mlsnetoutbound; + ') + + typeattribute $1 mlsnetoutbound; +') + +######################################## +## <summary> ## Make specified domain MLS trusted ## for reading from System V IPC objects ## up to its clearance.Index: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/modules/kernel/mls.te
===================================================================policy/modules/kernel/mls.te +2
-1@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ attribute mlsnetwriteranged; attribute mlsnetupgrade; attribute mlsnetdowngrade; attribute mlsnetrecvall; +attribute mlsnetinbound; +attribute mlsnetoutbound; attribute mlsipcread; attribute mlsipcreadtoclr; --paul moore
linux @ hp_______________________________________________
refpolicy mailing list
refpolicy at oss.tresys.com
http://oss.tresys.com/mailman/listinfo/refpolicy
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore linux @ hp
Re: [refpolicy] [PATCH v2] refpolicy: Add missing network related MLSconstraints
Quoted 7 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 5 lines · chanson at trustedcs.com
Hi Paul,
Is there any reason we can't utilize the new interfaces to handle the
unlabeled_tlines in the constraints? I'm not a real big fan of putting direct types into the constraints.
Quoted 6 lines
Convention and consistency with the other network constraints. I suppose this is really a judgment call because what is the real difference between using direct types and simply loading up the types with the MLS overrides/attributes? The "
unlabeled_t" type really is special and it seems cleaner to me to use it directly in the constraints rather than adding a bunch of attributes to it.
There would also be a behavior change with the netif:egress and node:sendto permissions. Though I'm not sure it would matter in this case, I don't think doing something similar for the other two constraints that currently have explicit unlabeled_t references would work. I'm fine with the explicit references for now. If someone can make a patch that removes all the explicit references in a reasonable way, then I'd be interested.
Quoted 158 lines
Quoted 157 lines
Quoted 157 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: refpolicy-bounces at oss.tresys.com [mailto:refpolicy-bounces at oss.tresys.com] On Behalf Of Paul Moore
Sent: Friday, February 20, 2009 4:03 PM
To: selinux at tycho.nsa.gov; refpolicy at oss.tresys.com
Subject: [refpolicy] [PATCH v2] refpolicy: Add missing network related MLSconstraintsAdd MLS constraints for several network related access controls including the new ingress/egress controls and the older Secmark controls. Based on the following post to the SELinux Reference Policy mailing list:
* http://oss.tresys.com/pipermail/refpolicy/2009-February/000579.html
Signed-off-by Paul Moore <[email protected]>--- policy/mls | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ policy/modules/kernel/mls.if | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ policy/modules/kernel/mls.te | 2 + 3 files changed, 89 insertions(+)Index: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/mls
===================================================================policy/mls +5
-0@@ -295,8 +295,53 @@ mlsconstrain { netif node } { tcp_send u # these access vectors have no MLS restrictions # node enforce_dest +# +# MLS policy for the network ingress/egress controls # + +# the netif ingress/egress ops, the ingress permission is a "write" +operation # because the subject in this particular case isthe remote
policy/mls +10
-0+domain which is # writing data out the network interface which is +acting as the object mlsconstrain { netif } { ingress } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or + ( t1 == unlabeled_t )); +mlsconstrain { netif } { egress } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound )); +# the node recvfrom/sendto ops, the recvfrom permission is a "write" +operation # because the subject in this particular case isthe remote
+domain which is # writing data out the network node which is acting aspolicy/mls +10
-0+the object mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or + ( t1 == unlabeled_t )); +mlsconstrain { node } { sendto } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound )); +# the forward ops, the forward_in permission is a "write" operation +because the # subject in this particular case is the remote domain +which is writing data # to the network with a secmark label,the object
policy/mls +17
-0+in this case mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_in } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or + ( t1 == unlabeled_t )); +mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_out } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ) or + ( t1 == unlabeled_t )); + +# +# MLS policy for the secmark and peer controls # + +# the peer/packet recv op +mlsconstrain { peer packet } { recv } + (( l1 dom l2 ) or + (( t1 == mlsnetreadtoclr ) and ( h1 dom l2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetread )); # # MLS policy for the process classIndex: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/modules/kernel/mls.if
===================================================================policy/modules/kernel/mls.if +42
-0@@ -332,6 +332,48 @@ interface(`mls_net_write_within_range',` ######################################## ## <summary> +## Make specified domain trusted to +## write inbound packets regardless of the +## network's or node's MLS range. +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +## <rolecap/> +# +interface(`mls_net_inbound_all_levels',` + gen_require(` + attribute mlsnetinbound; + ') + + typeattribute $1 mlsnetinbound; +') + +######################################## +## <summary> +## Make specified domain trusted to +## write outbound packets regardless of the +## network's or node's MLS range. +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +## <rolecap/> +# +interface(`mls_net_outbound_all_levels',` + gen_require(` + attribute mlsnetoutbound; + ') + + typeattribute $1 mlsnetoutbound; +') + +######################################## +## <summary> ## Make specified domain MLS trusted ## for reading from System V IPC objects ## up to its clearance.Index: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/modules/kernel/mls.te
===================================================================policy/modules/kernel/mls.te +2
-1@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ attribute mlsnetwriteranged; attribute mlsnetupgrade; attribute mlsnetdowngrade; attribute mlsnetrecvall; +attribute mlsnetinbound; +attribute mlsnetoutbound; attribute mlsipcread; attribute mlsipcreadtoclr; --paul moore
linux @ hp_______________________________________________
refpolicy mailing list
refpolicy at oss.tresys.com
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Signature · 3 lines
Chris PeBenito Tresys Technology, LLC (410) 290-1411 x150
Quoted 6 lines · Paul Moore
plain text document attachment (netpeer-constraints)
Add MLS constraints for several network related access controls including the new ingress/egress controls and the older Secmark controls. Based on the following post to the SELinux Reference Policy mailing list:* http://oss.tresys.com/pipermail/refpolicy/2009-February/000579.html
Merged.
Quoted 133 lines
Signed-off-by Paul Moore <[email protected]>--- policy/mls | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ policy/modules/kernel/mls.if | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ policy/modules/kernel/mls.te | 2 + 3 files changed, 89 insertions(+)Index: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/mls
===================================================================policy/mls +45
-0@@ -295,8 +295,53 @@ mlsconstrain { netif node } { tcp_send u # these access vectors have no MLS restrictions # node enforce_dest +# +# MLS policy for the network ingress/egress controls +# + +# the netif ingress/egress ops, the ingress permission is a "write" operation +# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is +# writing data out the network interface which is acting as the object +mlsconstrain { netif } { ingress } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or + ( t1 == unlabeled_t )); +mlsconstrain { netif } { egress } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound )); +# the node recvfrom/sendto ops, the recvfrom permission is a "write" operation +# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is +# writing data out the network node which is acting as the object +mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or + ( t1 == unlabeled_t )); +mlsconstrain { node } { sendto } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound )); +# the forward ops, the forward_in permission is a "write" operation because the +# subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is writing data +# to the network with a secmark label, the object in this case +mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_in } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or + ( t1 == unlabeled_t )); +mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_out } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ) or + ( t1 == unlabeled_t )); + +# +# MLS policy for the secmark and peer controls +# + +# the peer/packet recv op +mlsconstrain { peer packet } { recv } + (( l1 dom l2 ) or + (( t1 == mlsnetreadtoclr ) and ( h1 dom l2 )) or + ( t1 == mlsnetread )); # # MLS policy for the process classIndex: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/modules/kernel/mls.if
===================================================================policy/modules/kernel/mls.if +42
-0@@ -332,6 +332,48 @@ interface(`mls_net_write_within_range',` ######################################## ## <summary> +## Make specified domain trusted to +## write inbound packets regardless of the +## network's or node's MLS range. +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +## <rolecap/> +# +interface(`mls_net_inbound_all_levels',` + gen_require(` + attribute mlsnetinbound; + ') + + typeattribute $1 mlsnetinbound; +') + +######################################## +## <summary> +## Make specified domain trusted to +## write outbound packets regardless of the +## network's or node's MLS range. +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +## <rolecap/> +# +interface(`mls_net_outbound_all_levels',` + gen_require(` + attribute mlsnetoutbound; + ') + + typeattribute $1 mlsnetoutbound; +') + +######################################## +## <summary> ## Make specified domain MLS trusted ## for reading from System V IPC objects ## up to its clearance.Index: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/modules/kernel/mls.te
===================================================================policy/modules/kernel/mls.te +2
-0@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ attribute mlsnetwriteranged; attribute mlsnetupgrade; attribute mlsnetdowngrade; attribute mlsnetrecvall; +attribute mlsnetinbound; +attribute mlsnetoutbound; attribute mlsipcread; attribute mlsipcreadtoclr;
Signature · 3 lines
Chris PeBenito Tresys Technology, LLC (410) 290-1411 x150