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refpolicy: Add missing network related MLS constraints

PATCH In review Paul Moore 3 participants 5 messages Feb 20, 2009 – Mar 2, 2009 SELinux security module

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#1 lore raw

RE: [refpolicy] [PATCH v2] refpolicy: Add missing network related MLSconstraints

Hi Paul,

Is there any reason we can't utilize the new interfaces to handle the unlabeled_t lines in the constraints? I'm not a real big fan of putting direct types into the constraints.

-Chad

Quoted 158 lines

-----Original Message-----
From: refpolicy-bounces at oss.tresys.com [mailto:refpolicy-bounces at oss.tresys.com] On Behalf Of Paul Moore
Sent: Friday, February 20, 2009 4:03 PM
To: selinux at tycho.nsa.gov; refpolicy at oss.tresys.com
Subject: [refpolicy] [PATCH v2] refpolicy: Add missing network related MLSconstraints

Add MLS constraints for several network related access controls including the new ingress/egress controls and the older Secmark controls. Based on the following post to the SELinux Reference Policy mailing list:

* http://oss.tresys.com/pipermail/refpolicy/2009-February/000579.html

---
 policy/mls                   |   45 
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 policy/modules/kernel/mls.if |   42 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 policy/modules/kernel/mls.te |    2 +
 3 files changed, 89 insertions(+)

Index: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/mls
===================================================================

policy/mls +5 -0
@@ -295,8 +295,53 @@ mlsconstrain { netif node } { tcp_send u 
 # these access vectors have no MLS restrictions  # node enforce_dest
 
+#
+# MLS policy for the network ingress/egress controls #
+
+# the netif ingress/egress ops, the ingress permission is a "write" 
+operation # because the subject in this particular case is 

the remote

policy/mls +10 -0
+domain which is # writing data out the network interface which is 
+acting as the object mlsconstrain { netif } { ingress }
+	((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or
+	 ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { netif } { egress }
+	((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
 
+# the node recvfrom/sendto ops, the recvfrom permission is a "write" 
+operation # because the subject in this particular case is 

the remote
+domain which is # writing data out the network node which is acting as

policy/mls +10 -0
+the object mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom }
+	((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or
+	 ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { node } { sendto }
+	((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
 
+# the forward ops, the forward_in permission is a "write" operation 
+because the # subject in this particular case is the remote domain 
+which is writing data # to the network with a secmark label, 

the object

policy/mls +17 -0
+in this case mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_in }
+	((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or
+	 ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_out }
+	((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ) or
+	 ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+
+#
+# MLS policy for the secmark and peer controls #
+
+# the peer/packet recv op
+mlsconstrain { peer packet } { recv }
+	(( l1 dom l2 ) or
+	 (( t1 == mlsnetreadtoclr ) and ( h1 dom l2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetread ));
 
 #
 # MLS policy for the process class

Index: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/modules/kernel/mls.if
===================================================================

policy/modules/kernel/mls.if +42 -0
@@ -332,6 +332,48 @@ interface(`mls_net_write_within_range',`
 
 ########################################
 ## <summary>
+##	Make specified domain trusted to
+##	write inbound packets regardless of the
+##	network's or node's MLS range.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain allowed access.
+##	</summary>
+## </param>
+## <rolecap/>
+#
+interface(`mls_net_inbound_all_levels',`
+	gen_require(`
+		attribute mlsnetinbound;
+	')
+
+	typeattribute $1 mlsnetinbound;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+##	Make specified domain trusted to
+##	write outbound packets regardless of the
+##	network's or node's MLS range.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain allowed access.
+##	</summary>
+## </param>
+## <rolecap/>
+#
+interface(`mls_net_outbound_all_levels',`
+	gen_require(`
+		attribute mlsnetoutbound;
+	')
+
+	typeattribute $1 mlsnetoutbound;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
 ##	Make specified domain MLS trusted
 ##	for reading from System V IPC objects
 ##	up to its clearance.

Index: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/modules/kernel/mls.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/kernel/mls.te +2 -1
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ attribute mlsnetwriteranged;  attribute 
 mlsnetupgrade;  attribute mlsnetdowngrade;  attribute mlsnetrecvall;
+attribute mlsnetinbound;
+attribute mlsnetoutbound;
 
 attribute mlsipcread;
 attribute mlsipcreadtoclr;
 
--

paul moore
linux @ hp

_______________________________________________
refpolicy mailing list
refpolicy at oss.tresys.com
http://oss.tresys.com/mailman/listinfo/refpolicy

author
#2 lore raw

Re: [refpolicy] [PATCH v2] refpolicy: Add missing network related MLSconstraints

Quoted 5 lines · chanson at trustedcs.com

Hi Paul,

Is there any reason we can't utilize the new interfaces to handle the unlabeled_t lines in the constraints? I'm not a real big fan of putting direct types into the constraints.

Convention and consistency with the other network constraints. I suppose this is really a judgment call because what is the real difference between using direct types and simply loading up the types with the MLS overrides/attributes? The "unlabeled_t" type really is special and it seems cleaner to me to use it directly in the constraints rather than adding a bunch of attributes to it.

Quoted 157 lines
Quoted 157 lines

-----Original Message-----
From: refpolicy-bounces at oss.tresys.com [mailto:refpolicy-bounces at oss.tresys.com] On Behalf Of Paul Moore
Sent: Friday, February 20, 2009 4:03 PM
To: selinux at tycho.nsa.gov; refpolicy at oss.tresys.com
Subject: [refpolicy] [PATCH v2] refpolicy: Add missing network related MLSconstraints

Add MLS constraints for several network related access controls including the new ingress/egress controls and the older Secmark controls. Based on the following post to the SELinux Reference Policy mailing list:

* http://oss.tresys.com/pipermail/refpolicy/2009-February/000579.html

---
 policy/mls                   |   45
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 policy/modules/kernel/mls.if |   42
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 policy/modules/kernel/mls.te |    2 +
 3 files changed, 89 insertions(+)

Index: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/mls
===================================================================

policy/mls +5 -0
@@ -295,8 +295,53 @@ mlsconstrain { netif node } { tcp_send u
 # these access vectors have no MLS restrictions  # node enforce_dest
 
+#
+# MLS policy for the network ingress/egress controls #
+
+# the netif ingress/egress ops, the ingress permission is a "write"
+operation # because the subject in this particular case is

the remote

policy/mls +10 -0
+domain which is # writing data out the network interface which is
+acting as the object mlsconstrain { netif } { ingress }
+	((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or
+	 ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { netif } { egress }
+	((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
 
+# the node recvfrom/sendto ops, the recvfrom permission is a "write"
+operation # because the subject in this particular case is

the remote
+domain which is # writing data out the network node which is acting as

policy/mls +10 -0
+the object mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom }
+	((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or
+	 ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { node } { sendto }
+	((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
 
+# the forward ops, the forward_in permission is a "write" operation
+because the # subject in this particular case is the remote domain
+which is writing data # to the network with a secmark label,

the object

policy/mls +17 -0
+in this case mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_in }
+	((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or
+	 ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_out }
+	((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ) or
+	 ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+
+#
+# MLS policy for the secmark and peer controls #
+
+# the peer/packet recv op
+mlsconstrain { peer packet } { recv }
+	(( l1 dom l2 ) or
+	 (( t1 == mlsnetreadtoclr ) and ( h1 dom l2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetread ));
 
 #
 # MLS policy for the process class

Index: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/modules/kernel/mls.if
===================================================================

policy/modules/kernel/mls.if +42 -0
@@ -332,6 +332,48 @@ interface(`mls_net_write_within_range',`
 
 ########################################
 ## <summary>
+##	Make specified domain trusted to
+##	write inbound packets regardless of the
+##	network's or node's MLS range.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain allowed access.
+##	</summary>
+## </param>
+## <rolecap/>
+#
+interface(`mls_net_inbound_all_levels',`
+	gen_require(`
+		attribute mlsnetinbound;
+	')
+
+	typeattribute $1 mlsnetinbound;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+##	Make specified domain trusted to
+##	write outbound packets regardless of the
+##	network's or node's MLS range.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain allowed access.
+##	</summary>
+## </param>
+## <rolecap/>
+#
+interface(`mls_net_outbound_all_levels',`
+	gen_require(`
+		attribute mlsnetoutbound;
+	')
+
+	typeattribute $1 mlsnetoutbound;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
 ##	Make specified domain MLS trusted
 ##	for reading from System V IPC objects
 ##	up to its clearance.

Index: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/modules/kernel/mls.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/kernel/mls.te +2 -1
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ attribute mlsnetwriteranged;  attribute
 mlsnetupgrade;  attribute mlsnetdowngrade;  attribute mlsnetrecvall;
+attribute mlsnetinbound;
+attribute mlsnetoutbound;
 
 attribute mlsipcread;
 attribute mlsipcreadtoclr;
 
--

paul moore
linux @ hp

_______________________________________________
refpolicy mailing list
refpolicy at oss.tresys.com
http://oss.tresys.com/mailman/listinfo/refpolicy

Signature · 2 lines
paul moore
linux @ hp
#3 lore raw

Re: [refpolicy] [PATCH v2] refpolicy: Add missing network related MLSconstraints

Quoted 7 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 5 lines · chanson at trustedcs.com

Hi Paul,

Is there any reason we can't utilize the new interfaces to handle the unlabeled_t lines in the constraints? I'm not a real big fan of putting direct types into the constraints.

Quoted 6 lines

Convention and consistency with the other network constraints. I suppose this is really a judgment call because what is the real difference between using direct types and simply loading up the types with the MLS overrides/attributes? The "unlabeled_t" type really is special and it seems cleaner to me to use it directly in the constraints rather than adding a bunch of attributes to it.

There would also be a behavior change with the netif:egress and node:sendto permissions. Though I'm not sure it would matter in this case, I don't think doing something similar for the other two constraints that currently have explicit unlabeled_t references would work. I'm fine with the explicit references for now. If someone can make a patch that removes all the explicit references in a reasonable way, then I'd be interested.

Quoted 158 lines
Quoted 157 lines
Quoted 157 lines

-----Original Message-----
From: refpolicy-bounces at oss.tresys.com [mailto:refpolicy-bounces at oss.tresys.com] On Behalf Of Paul Moore
Sent: Friday, February 20, 2009 4:03 PM
To: selinux at tycho.nsa.gov; refpolicy at oss.tresys.com
Subject: [refpolicy] [PATCH v2] refpolicy: Add missing network related MLSconstraints

Add MLS constraints for several network related access controls including the new ingress/egress controls and the older Secmark controls. Based on the following post to the SELinux Reference Policy mailing list:

* http://oss.tresys.com/pipermail/refpolicy/2009-February/000579.html

---
 policy/mls                   |   45
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 policy/modules/kernel/mls.if |   42
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 policy/modules/kernel/mls.te |    2 +
 3 files changed, 89 insertions(+)

Index: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/mls
===================================================================

policy/mls +5 -0
@@ -295,8 +295,53 @@ mlsconstrain { netif node } { tcp_send u
 # these access vectors have no MLS restrictions  # node enforce_dest
 
+#
+# MLS policy for the network ingress/egress controls #
+
+# the netif ingress/egress ops, the ingress permission is a "write"
+operation # because the subject in this particular case is

the remote

policy/mls +10 -0
+domain which is # writing data out the network interface which is
+acting as the object mlsconstrain { netif } { ingress }
+	((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or
+	 ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { netif } { egress }
+	((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
 
+# the node recvfrom/sendto ops, the recvfrom permission is a "write"
+operation # because the subject in this particular case is

the remote
+domain which is # writing data out the network node which is acting as

policy/mls +10 -0
+the object mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom }
+	((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or
+	 ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { node } { sendto }
+	((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
 
+# the forward ops, the forward_in permission is a "write" operation
+because the # subject in this particular case is the remote domain
+which is writing data # to the network with a secmark label,

the object

policy/mls +17 -0
+in this case mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_in }
+	((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or
+	 ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_out }
+	((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ) or
+	 ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+
+#
+# MLS policy for the secmark and peer controls #
+
+# the peer/packet recv op
+mlsconstrain { peer packet } { recv }
+	(( l1 dom l2 ) or
+	 (( t1 == mlsnetreadtoclr ) and ( h1 dom l2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetread ));
 
 #
 # MLS policy for the process class

Index: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/modules/kernel/mls.if
===================================================================

policy/modules/kernel/mls.if +42 -0
@@ -332,6 +332,48 @@ interface(`mls_net_write_within_range',`
 
 ########################################
 ## <summary>
+##	Make specified domain trusted to
+##	write inbound packets regardless of the
+##	network's or node's MLS range.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain allowed access.
+##	</summary>
+## </param>
+## <rolecap/>
+#
+interface(`mls_net_inbound_all_levels',`
+	gen_require(`
+		attribute mlsnetinbound;
+	')
+
+	typeattribute $1 mlsnetinbound;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+##	Make specified domain trusted to
+##	write outbound packets regardless of the
+##	network's or node's MLS range.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain allowed access.
+##	</summary>
+## </param>
+## <rolecap/>
+#
+interface(`mls_net_outbound_all_levels',`
+	gen_require(`
+		attribute mlsnetoutbound;
+	')
+
+	typeattribute $1 mlsnetoutbound;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
 ##	Make specified domain MLS trusted
 ##	for reading from System V IPC objects
 ##	up to its clearance.

Index: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/modules/kernel/mls.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/kernel/mls.te +2 -1
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ attribute mlsnetwriteranged;  attribute
 mlsnetupgrade;  attribute mlsnetdowngrade;  attribute mlsnetrecvall;
+attribute mlsnetinbound;
+attribute mlsnetoutbound;
 
 attribute mlsipcread;
 attribute mlsipcreadtoclr;
 
--

paul moore
linux @ hp

_______________________________________________
refpolicy mailing list
refpolicy at oss.tresys.com
http://oss.tresys.com/mailman/listinfo/refpolicy

Signature · 3 lines
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
(410) 290-1411 x150
#4 lore raw
In reply to Paul Moore
Quoted 6 lines · Paul Moore

plain text document attachment (netpeer-constraints)
Add MLS constraints for several network related access controls including the new ingress/egress controls and the older Secmark controls. Based on the following post to the SELinux Reference Policy mailing list:

* http://oss.tresys.com/pipermail/refpolicy/2009-February/000579.html

Merged.

Quoted 133 lines
---
 policy/mls                   |   45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 policy/modules/kernel/mls.if |   42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 policy/modules/kernel/mls.te |    2 +
 3 files changed, 89 insertions(+)

Index: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/mls
===================================================================

policy/mls +45 -0
@@ -295,8 +295,53 @@ mlsconstrain { netif node } { tcp_send u
 # these access vectors have no MLS restrictions
 # node enforce_dest
 
+#
+# MLS policy for the network ingress/egress controls
+#
+
+# the netif ingress/egress ops, the ingress permission is a "write" operation
+# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is
+# writing data out the network interface which is acting as the object
+mlsconstrain { netif } { ingress }
+	((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or
+	 ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { netif } { egress }
+	((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
 
+# the node recvfrom/sendto ops, the recvfrom permission is a "write" operation
+# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is
+# writing data out the network node which is acting as the object
+mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom }
+	((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or
+	 ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { node } { sendto }
+	((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
 
+# the forward ops, the forward_in permission is a "write" operation because the
+# subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is writing data
+# to the network with a secmark label, the object in this case
+mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_in }
+	((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or
+	 ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_out }
+	((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ) or
+	 ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+
+#
+# MLS policy for the secmark and peer controls
+#
+
+# the peer/packet recv op
+mlsconstrain { peer packet } { recv }
+	(( l1 dom l2 ) or
+	 (( t1 == mlsnetreadtoclr ) and ( h1 dom l2 )) or
+	 ( t1 == mlsnetread ));
 
 #
 # MLS policy for the process class

Index: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/modules/kernel/mls.if
===================================================================

policy/modules/kernel/mls.if +42 -0
@@ -332,6 +332,48 @@ interface(`mls_net_write_within_range',`
 
 ########################################
 ## <summary>
+##	Make specified domain trusted to
+##	write inbound packets regardless of the
+##	network's or node's MLS range.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain allowed access.
+##	</summary>
+## </param>
+## <rolecap/>
+#
+interface(`mls_net_inbound_all_levels',`
+	gen_require(`
+		attribute mlsnetinbound;
+	')
+
+	typeattribute $1 mlsnetinbound;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+##	Make specified domain trusted to
+##	write outbound packets regardless of the
+##	network's or node's MLS range.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain allowed access.
+##	</summary>
+## </param>
+## <rolecap/>
+#
+interface(`mls_net_outbound_all_levels',`
+	gen_require(`
+		attribute mlsnetoutbound;
+	')
+
+	typeattribute $1 mlsnetoutbound;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
 ##	Make specified domain MLS trusted
 ##	for reading from System V IPC objects
 ##	up to its clearance.

Index: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/modules/kernel/mls.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/kernel/mls.te +2 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ attribute mlsnetwriteranged;
 attribute mlsnetupgrade;
 attribute mlsnetdowngrade;
 attribute mlsnetrecvall;
+attribute mlsnetinbound;
+attribute mlsnetoutbound;
 
 attribute mlsipcread;
 attribute mlsipcreadtoclr;
Signature · 3 lines
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
(410) 290-1411 x150