cr: lsm: provide hooks for an LSM to track policy changes
Subsystems (3)
RFC PATCH 1/2 cr: lsm: provide hooks for an LSM to track policy changes
[ This applies on top of the previous LSM c/r patchset. A corresponding patch against mktree is needed as well. ]
Provide two new security_ hooks:security_checkpoint_header:
Gives the LSM a chance to write a checkpoint
header object of type CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO. This
can be any data the LSM deems fit, and can be
written out using
ckpt_write_obj_type(ctx, data, datalen, CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO);
security_may_restart:
Give the LSM an extra chance to refuse restart. In particular the LSM may want to do this if the poicy has changed since checkpoint. The checkpoint per-lsm data can be retrieved using
ckpt_read_buf_type(ctx, MAX_INFO_LEN, CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO);
Note that the LSM should only look at that data if ctx->lsm_name is the current LSM's name. Otherwise the info will be for another LSM (or the string "dummy"). The hook will still be called, even if ctx->flags does not have RESTART_KEEP_LSM (meaning we do not restore checkpointed security labels) since the LSM may have other reasons to want to refuse restart.
--- checkpoint/checkpoint.c | 4 +++ checkpoint/restart.c | 4 +++ checkpoint/sys.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++ include/linux/checkpoint.h | 3 ++ include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h | 1 + include/linux/security.h | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/capability.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 14 +++++++++++ 8 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
checkpoint/checkpoint.c +4 -0
@@ -257,6 +257,10 @@ static int checkpoint_write_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)if (ret <0 )return ret; + ret =security_checkpoint_header (ctx); +if (ret <0 ) +return ret; +return checkpoint_write_header_arch (ctx); }
checkpoint/restart.c +4 -0
@@ -446,6 +446,10 @@ static int restore_read_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx) } } + ret =security_may_restart (ctx); +if (ret <0 ) + goto out; + ret =restore_read_header_arch (ctx); out:kfree (uts);
checkpoint/sys.c +22 -0
@@ -169,6 +169,28 @@ void *ckpt_hdr_get_type(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, int len, int type)return h; } +#define DUMMY_LSM_INFO "dummy" + +int ckpt_write_dummy_lsm_info (struct ckpt_ctx *ctx) +{ +return ckpt_write_obj_type (ctx,DUMMY_LSM_INFO , +strlen (DUMMY_LSM_INFO ),CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO ); +} + +/* +* ckpt_snarf_lsm_info +* If there is a CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO field, toss it. +* Used when the current LSM doesn't care about this field. +*/ +void ckpt_snarf_lsm_info (struct ckpt_ctx *ctx) +{ +struct ckpt_hdr *h; + + h =ckpt_read_buf_type (ctx,CKPT_LSM_INFO_LEN ,CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO ); +if (!IS_ERR (h)) +ckpt_hdr_put (ctx, h); +} +/* * Helpers to manage c/r contexts: allocated for each checkpoint and/or
include/linux/checkpoint.h +3 -0
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@#define CHECKPOINT_USER_FLAGS CHECKPOINT_SUBTREE#define RESTART_USER_FLAGS (RESTART_TASKSELF | RESTART_FROZEN | \ RESTART_KEEP_LSM) +#define CKPT_LSM_INFO_LEN 200extern void exit_checkpoint (struct task_struct *tsk);
@@ -57,6 +58,8 @@ extern void _ckpt_hdr_put(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, void *ptr, int n);extern void ckpt_hdr_put (struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,void *ptr);extern void *ckpt_hdr_get (struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,int n);extern void *ckpt_hdr_get_type (struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,int n,int type); +extern int ckpt_write_dummy_lsm_info (struct ckpt_ctx *ctx); +extern void ckpt_snarf_lsm_info (struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);extern int ckpt_write_obj (struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,struct ckpt_hdr *h); extern int ckpt_write_obj_type(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h +1 -0
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ enum {CKPT_HDR_STRING ,CKPT_HDR_OBJREF ,CKPT_HDR_SEC , +CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO ,CKPT_HDR_TREE =101 , CKPT_HDR_TASK,
include/linux/security.h +50 -0
80 lines not on this page · raw message
security/capability.c +26 -0
@@ -841,6 +841,28 @@ static void cap_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) { } +#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT +void ckpt_snarf_lsm_info (struct ckpt_ctx *ctx); +int ckpt_write_dummy_lsm_info (struct ckpt_ctx *ctx); +static int cap_may_restart (struct ckpt_ctx *ctx) +{ +/* +* Note that all construction of kernel resources, credentials, +* etc is already authorized per the caller's credentials. This +* hook is intended for the LSM to make further decisions about +* a task not being allowed to restart at all, for instance if +* the policy has changed since checkpoint. +*/ +ckpt_snarf_lsm_info (ctx); +return 0 ; +} + +static int cap_checkpoint_header (struct ckpt_ctx *ctx) +{ +return ckpt_write_dummy_lsm_info (ctx); +} +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS static int cap_key_alloc (struct key *key,const struct cred *cred,unsigned long flags)
@@ -1049,6 +1071,10 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)set_to_cap_if_null (ops, secid_to_secctx);set_to_cap_if_null (ops, secctx_to_secid);set_to_cap_if_null (ops, release_secctx); +#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT +set_to_cap_if_null (ops, may_restart); +set_to_cap_if_null (ops, checkpoint_header); +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK set_to_cap_if_null (ops, unix_stream_connect);set_to_cap_if_null (ops, unix_may_send);
security/security.c +14 -0
@@ -1004,6 +1004,20 @@ void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_release_secctx); +#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT +int security_may_restart (struct ckpt_ctx *ctx) +{ +return security_ops->may_restart (ctx); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_may_restart); + +int security_checkpoint_header (struct ckpt_ctx *ctx) +{ +return security_ops->checkpoint_header (ctx); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_checkpoint_header); +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK int security_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other,
Signature · 1 line
1.6.1
RFC PATCH 2/2 cr: debug security_checkpoint_header and security_may_restart
This patch, for debugging only, introduces a silly admin-controlled 'policy version' for smack. By default the version is 1. An admin (with CAP_MAC_ADMIN) can change it by echoing a new value into /smack/version.
It then defines security_checkpoint_header() to add this 'policy version' into the checkpoint header, and defines security_may_restart() to refuse restart if both:
1. the caller asked for RESTART_KEEP_LSM
and
2. the checkpointed version was different from the current.
This of course is easy enough to test by doing
echo 1 > /smack/version
ckpt > out
mktree < out
succeed
mktree -k < out
succeed
echo 2 > /smack/version
mktree < out
succeed
mktree -k < out
fail
--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/smack/smackfs.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +46 -0
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@#include <linux/udp.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h> +#include <linux/checkpoint.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h> #include <linux/audit.h>
@@ -3111,6 +3112,47 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) { } +#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT +extern int smack_version; + +static int smack_may_restart (struct ckpt_ctx *ctx) +{ +struct ckpt_hdr *h; +char *smackv; +int v =0 , slen, ret; + + h =ckpt_read_buf_type (ctx,CKPT_LSM_INFO_LEN ,CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO ); +if (IS_ERR (h)) +return PTR_ERR (h); + +if (strcmp (ctx->lsm_name,"smack" ) !=0 ) +return 0 ; + + smackv = (char *) (h +1 ); + slen = h->len -sizeof (*h); +if (smackv[slen-1 ] !='\0' ) + smackv[slen-1 ] ='\0' ; + ret =sscanf (smackv,"%d" , &v); +ckpt_hdr_put (ctx, h); +if (!(ctx->uflags &RESTART_KEEP_LSM )) +return 0 ; +if (ret !=1 || v != smack_version) { +ckpt_debug ("Smack version at checkpoint was %d, now is %d\n" , + v, smack_version); +return -EINVAL ; + } +return 0 ; +} + +static int smack_checkpoint_header (struct ckpt_ctx *ctx) +{ +char smackv[10 ]; +sprintf (smackv,"%d" , smack_version); +return ckpt_write_obj_type (ctx, smackv,strlen (smackv)+1 , +CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO ); +} +#endif +struct security_operations smack_ops = { .name ="smack" ,
@@ -3245,6 +3287,10 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = { .secid_to_secctx = smack_secid_to_secctx, .secctx_to_secid = smack_secctx_to_secid, .release_secctx = smack_release_secctx, +#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT + .may_restart = smack_may_restart, + .checkpoint_header = smack_checkpoint_header, +#endif };
security/smack/smackfs.c +75 -0
105 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 7 lines
1.6.1 -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH 2/2] cr: debug security_checkpoint_header and security_may_restart
Quoted 5 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
This patch, for debugging only, introduces a silly admin-controlled 'policy version' for smack. By default the version is 1. An admin (with
CAP_MAC_ADMIN) can change it by echoing a new value into /smack/version.
The scheme you have suggested is just one step off of completely acceptable for real. More detail below, but if you make the "version" a string instead of a number I'm happy with it. In particular, a string that would itself be a valid Smack label makes everything really simple.
It would take me a few days, but if you're not in a real hurry or you're lazier than I am (yeah, right) I could provide a patch that does it. Or, if I haven't been completely incomprehensible, you could do a revision.
Quoted 40 lines
It then defines
security_checkpoint_header()to add this 'policy version' into the checkpoint header, and definessecurity_may_restart()to refuse restart if both:
1. the caller asked forRESTART_KEEP_LSM
and
2. the checkpointed version was different from the current.This of course is easy enough to test by doing
echo 1 > /smack/version
ckpt > out
mktree < out
succeed
mktree -k < out
succeed
echo 2 > /smack/version
mktree < out
succeed
mktree -k < out
failSigned-off-by Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/smack/smackfs.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)security/smack/smack_lsm.c +1
-0@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@#include <linux/udp.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h> +#include <linux/checkpoint.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h> #include <linux/audit.h>
security/smack/smack_lsm.c static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) · line 3117
Quoted 6 lines
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +2
-0@@ -3111,6 +3112,47 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) { } +#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT +extern int smack_version;
Make this a char * instead of an int and set it to smack_known_floor.smk_known (which will be "_").
security/smack/smack_lsm.c static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) · line 3158
Quoted 3 lines
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +2
-0+ +static int smack_may_restart (struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
So as to reduce confusion between ctx's and checkpoint thingies,
static int smack_may_restart(struct ckpt_ctx *ckptx)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) · line 3158
Quoted 3 lines
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +2
-0+{ +struct ckpt_hdr *h;
How about:
struct ckpt_hdr *chp;
instead for a little more consistency with Smack code.
security/smack/smack_lsm.c static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) · line 3131
Quoted 12 lines
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +11
-0+char *smackv; +int v =0 , slen, ret; + + h =ckpt_read_buf_type (ctx,CKPT_LSM_INFO_LEN ,CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO ); +if (IS_ERR (h)) +return PTR_ERR (h); + +if (strcmp (ctx->lsm_name,"smack" ) !=0 ) +return 0 ; + + smackv = (char *) (h +1 );
And delete from here ...
security/smack/smack_lsm.c static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) · line 3135
Quoted 5 lines
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +4
-0+ slen = h->len -sizeof (*h); +if (smackv[slen-1 ] !='\0' ) + smackv[slen-1 ] ='\0' ; + ret =sscanf (smackv,"%d" , &v);
... to here. How about we say that the version name meet the same requirements as a label? A call to smk_import() can verify that and take care of all the memory allocation business.
security/smack/smack_lsm.c static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) · line 3139
Quoted 5 lines
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +4
-0+ckpt_hdr_put (ctx, h); +if (!(ctx->uflags &RESTART_KEEP_LSM )) +return 0 ; +if (ret !=1 || v != smack_version) {
Make this a strcmp()
security/smack/smack_lsm.c static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) · line 3140
Quoted 2 lines
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +1
-0+ ckpt_debug("Smack version at checkpoint was %d, now is %d\n",
%s instead of %d all around.
security/smack/smack_lsm.c static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) · line 3150
Quoted 11 lines
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +10
-0+ v, smack_version); +return -EINVAL ; + } +return 0 ; +} + +static int smack_checkpoint_header (struct cpt_ctx *ctx) +{ +char smackv[10 ]; +sprintf (smackv,"%d" , smack_version);
You can drop this ...
security/smack/smack_lsm.c static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) · line 3152
Quoted 3 lines
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +2
-0+return ckpt_write_obj_type (ctx, smackv,strlen (smackv)+1 , +CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO );
And pass back smack_version, which is a string.
Quoted 38 lines
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +3
-0+} +#endif +struct
security_operationssmack_ops= {security/smack/smack_lsm.c +4
-0.name = "smack",@@ -3245,6 +3287,10 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = { .secid_to_secctx = smack_secid_to_secctx, .secctx_to_secid = smack_secctx_to_secid, .release_secctx = smack_release_secctx, +#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT + .may_restart = smack_may_restart, + .checkpoint_header = smack_checkpoint_header, +#endif };security/smack/smackfs.c +2
-0@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ enum smk_inos {SMK_NETLBLADDR =8 ,/* single label hosts */ SMK_ONLYCAP =9 ,/* the only "capable" label */ SMK_LOGGING =10 ,/* logging */ + SMK_VERSION = 11, /* logging */ };/* @@ -51,6 +52,7 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_list_lock);static DEFINE_MUTEX (smack_cipso_lock);static DEFINE_MUTEX (smack_ambient_lock);static DEFINE_MUTEX (smk_netlbladdr_lock); +static DEFINE_MUTEX (smack_version_lock);/* * This is the "ambient" label for network traffic.
security/smack/smackfs.c static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_netlbladdr_lock); · line 69
Quoted 8 lines
security/smack/smackfs.c +4
-0@@ -60,6 +62,11 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_netlbladdr_lock);char *smack_net_ambient = smack_known_floor.smk_known;/* +* this is the policy version, a simple integer +*/ +int smack_version =1 ; +
Make this a char * instead of an int and set it to smack_known_floor.smk_known (which will be "_"). As above.
security/smack/smackfs.c static const struct file_operations smk_logging_ops = { · line 1267
Quoted 11 lines
security/smack/smackfs.c +1
-0+/* * This is the level in a CIPSO header that indicates a * smack label is contained directly in the category set. * It can be reset via smackfs/direct
security/smack/smackfs.c +2
-0@@ -1255,6 +1262,72 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_logging_ops = { .read = smk_read_logging, .write = smk_write_logging, }; + +#define SMK_VERSIONLEN 12
#define SMK_VERSIONLEN SMK_LABELLEN
Quoted 10 lines
security/smack/smackfs.c +10
-0+/** +* smk_read_version - read() for /smack/version +* @filp: file pointer, not actually used +* @buf: where to put the result +* @cn: maximum to send along +* @ppos: where to start +* +* Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate +*/ +static ssize_t smk_read_version(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
security/smack/smackfs.c static const struct file_operations smk_logging_ops = {
Quoted 10 lines
security/smack/smackfs.c +9
-0+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + char temp[SMK_VERSIONLEN]; + +if (*ppos !=0 ) +return 0 ; + +mutex_lock (&smack_version_lock); +sprintf (temp,"%d\n" , smack_version);
In the scheme I'm suggesting, no need for the sprintf.
Quoted 19 lines
security/smack/smackfs.c +19
-0+mutex_unlock (&smack_version_lock); + +return simple_read_from_buffer (buf, count, ppos, temp,strlen (temp)); +} + +/** +* smk_write_version - write() for /smack/version +* @file: file pointer, not actually used +* @buf: where to get the data from +* @count: bytes sent +* @ppos: where to start +* +* Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate +*/ +static ssize_t smk_write_version (struct file *file,const char __user *buf, +size_t count,loff_t *ppos) +{ +char in[SMK_VERSIONLEN ]; +int tmp, ret;
security/smack/smackfs.c static const struct file_operations smk_logging_ops = {
Quoted 10 lines
security/smack/smackfs.c +9
-0+ +if (!capable (CAP_MAC_ADMIN )) +return -EPERM ; + +if (count >=SMK_VERSIONLEN ) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (copy_from_user (in, buf, count) !=0 ) +return -EFAULT ;
This would become smk_import(), replacing ....
security/smack/smackfs.c static const struct file_operations smk_logging_ops = { · line 1318
Quoted 6 lines
security/smack/smackfs.c +5
-0+ + in[count-1 ] ='\0' ; + ret =sscanf (in,"%d" , &tmp); +if (ret !=1 ) +return -EINVAL ;
... this
security/smack/smackfs.c static const struct file_operations smk_logging_ops = { · line 1323
Quoted 3 lines
security/smack/smackfs.c +2
-0+mutex_lock (&smack_version_lock); + smack_version = tmp;
and smack_version gets the return from smk_import unless it is NULL.
Quoted 23 lines
security/smack/smackfs.c +10
-0+mutex_unlock (&smack_version_lock); + +return count; +} + +static const struct file_operations smk_version_ops = { + .read = smk_read_version, + .write = smk_write_version, +}; +/**
*smk_fill_super- fill the /smackfs superblock
* @sb: the empty superblocksecurity/smack/smackfs.c +2
-0@@ -1287,6 +1360,8 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) {"onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, [SMK_LOGGING ] = {"logging", &smk_logging_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + [SMK_VERSION ] = + {"version", &smk_version_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, /* last one */ {""} };
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] cr: debug security_checkpoint_header and security_may_restart
Quoted 7 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 5 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
This patch, for debugging only, introduces a silly admin-controlled 'policy version' for smack. By default the version is 1. An admin (with
CAP_MAC_ADMIN) can change it by echoing a new value into /smack/version.
Quoted 5 lines
The scheme you have suggested is just one step off of completely acceptable for real. More detail below, but if you make the "version" a string instead of a number I'm happy with it. In particular, a string that would itself be a valid Smack label makes everything really simple.
Presumably at many sites the version will be a unique string not used as a label anywhere else. That's ok?
Quoted 4 lines
It would take me a few days, but if you're not in a real hurry or you're lazier than I am (yeah, right) I could provide a patch that does it. Or, if I haven't been completely incomprehensible, you could do a revision.
Heh, I'm in no hurry. I'll mark this to do midway next week, if you haven't gotten around to it first. Thanks!
-serge
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH 2/2] cr: debug security_checkpoint_header and security_may_restart
Quoted 21 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 8 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 6 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
This patch, for debugging only, introduces a silly admin-controlled 'policy version' for smack. By default the version is 1. An admin (with
CAP_MAC_ADMIN) can change it by echoing a new value into /smack/version.Quoted 6 lines
The scheme you have suggested is just one step off of completely acceptable for real. More detail below, but if you make the "version" a string instead of a number I'm happy with it. In particular, a string that would itself be a valid Smack label makes everything really simple.
Presumably at many sites the version will be a unique string not used as a label anywhere else. That's ok?
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines
It would take me a few days, but if you're not in a real hurry or you're lazier than I am (yeah, right) I could provide a patch that does it. Or, if I haven't been completely incomprehensible, you could do a revision.
Heh, I'm in no hurry. I'll mark this to do midway next week, if you haven't gotten around to it first. Thanks!
I hate to be a bother, but what tree are you basing these patches on? Suspect that I missed a round of patches along the way, and can't apply the ones I do have.
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] cr: debug security_checkpoint_header and security_may_restart
Quoted 28 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 27 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 8 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 6 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
This patch, for debugging only, introduces a silly admin-controlled 'policy version' for smack. By default the version is 1. An admin (with
CAP_MAC_ADMIN) can change it by echoing a new value into /smack/version.Quoted 6 lines
The scheme you have suggested is just one step off of completely acceptable for real. More detail below, but if you make the "version" a string instead of a number I'm happy with it. In particular, a string that would itself be a valid Smack label makes everything really simple.
Presumably at many sites the version will be a unique string not used as a label anywhere else. That's ok?
Quoted 5 lines
It would take me a few days, but if you're not in a real hurry or you're lazier than I am (yeah, right) I could provide a patch that does it. Or, if I haven't been completely incomprehensible, you could do a revision.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Heh, I'm in no hurry. I'll mark this to do midway next week, if you haven't gotten around to it first. Thanks!
I hate to be a bother, but what tree are you basing these patches on? Suspect that I missed a round of patches along the way, and can't apply the ones I do have.
Sorry, the c/r tree is at:
git://git.ncl.cs.columbia.edu/pub/git/linux-cr.git
-serge
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH 2/2] cr: debug security_checkpoint_header and security_may_restart
Quoted 39 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 37 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 35 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 10 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 7 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
This patch, for debugging only, introduces a silly admin-controlled 'policy version' for smack. By default the version is 1. An admin (with
CAP_MAC_ADMIN) can change it by echoing a new value into /smack/version.Quoted 7 lines
The scheme you have suggested is just one step off of completely acceptable for real. More detail below, but if you make the "version" a string instead of a number I'm happy with it. In particular, a string that would itself be a valid Smack label makes everything really simple.
Presumably at many sites the version will be a unique string not used as a label anywhere else. That's ok?
Quoted 6 lines
It would take me a few days, but if you're not in a real hurry or you're lazier than I am (yeah, right) I could provide a patch that does it. Or, if I haven't been completely incomprehensible, you could do a revision.
Heh, I'm in no hurry. I'll mark this to do midway next week, if you haven't gotten around to it first. Thanks!
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I hate to be a bother, but what tree are you basing these patches on? Suspect that I missed a round of patches along the way, and can't apply the ones I do have.
Sorry, the c/r tree is at:
git://git.ncl.cs.columbia.edu/pub/git/linux-cr.git
The four patches from 08/28 (2-5) and the two from 09/03 are not happy applying to this tree. Am I missing a patch?
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] cr: debug security_checkpoint_header and security_may_restart
Quoted 10 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 5 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoting Casey Schaufler ([email protected]):
Sorry, the c/r tree is at:
git://git.ncl.cs.columbia.edu/pub/git/linux-cr.gitThe four patches from 08/28 (2-5) and the two from 09/03 are not happy applying to this tree. Am I missing a patch?
There was this patch which was 1/5
https://lists.linux-foundation.org/pipermail/containers/2009-August/020212.html
But there have also been some changes since that posting to the git tree. You could rewind the git tree to the state it was in on aug 28, but I'll need to forward-port my patches anyway, so let me do that this afternoon and resend the patchset.
-serge
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH 2/2] cr: debug security_checkpoint_header and security_may_restart
Quoted 15 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 12 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 6 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoting Casey Schaufler ([email protected]):
Sorry, the c/r tree is at:
git://git.ncl.cs.columbia.edu/pub/git/linux-cr.gitThe four patches from 08/28 (2-5) and the two from 09/03 are not happy applying to this tree. Am I missing a patch?
Quoted 9 lines
There was this patch which was 1/5
https://lists.linux-foundation.org/pipermail/containers/2009-August/020212.htmlBut there have also been some changes since that posting to the git tree. You could rewind the git tree to the state it was in on aug 28, but I'll need to forward-port my patches anyway, so let me do that this afternoon and resend the patchset.
I figured it was something like that. Thank you.
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] cr: debug security_checkpoint_header and security_may_restart
Quoted 19 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 18 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 12 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 6 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoting Casey Schaufler ([email protected]):
Sorry, the c/r tree is at:
git://git.ncl.cs.columbia.edu/pub/git/linux-cr.gitThe four patches from 08/28 (2-5) and the two from 09/03 are not happy applying to this tree. Am I missing a patch?
There was this patch which was 1/5
https://lists.linux-foundation.org/pipermail/containers/2009-August/020212.html
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
But there have also been some changes since that posting to the git tree. You could rewind the git tree to the state it was in on aug 28, but I'll need to forward-port my patches anyway, so let me do that this afternoon and resend the patchset.
I figured it was something like that. Thank you.
Actually the patches still apply cleanly. But it turns out that when you clone the linux-cr tree, it pulls the ckpt-v17 branch, and only the ckpt-v17 branch. It is hugely different from the ckpt-v17-dev tree, which is the one you want. So assuming you created a kernel tree by doing git clonegit://git.ncl.cs.columbia.edu/pub/git/linux-cr.git (as opposed to tweaking your .git/config in another git tree), then you want to:
git fetch origin ckpt-v17-dev:ckpt-v17-dev git checkout ckpt-v17-dev
The lsm c/r patches should apply cleanly there.
thanks,
-serge