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refpol: Add netif, node and peer constraints for MCS based policies

RFC PATCH Superseded Paul Moore 2 participants 3 messages Oct 1, 2009 – Oct 6, 2009 SELinux security module

v1 of 2 Superseded Latest is v2 →

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Paul Moore

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#0 lore raw

RFC PATCH 1/1 refpol: Add netif, node and peer constraints for MCS based policies

Adapt the MLS netif, node and peer networking constraints for MCS. This patch preserves the basic structure of the MLS constraints and converts them to use the MCS model which means the "(( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 ))" constraints are converted to "( h1 dom h2 )".

---

 policy/mcs |   36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
policy/mcs +36 -0
index b8dc0d6..0759021 100644
@@ -99,6 +99,42 @@ mlsconstrain process { sigkill sigstop }
 	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcskillall ));
 
 #
+# MCS policy for the network ingress/egress controls
+#
+
+# the netif ingress/egress ops, the ingress permission is a "write" operation
+# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is
+# writing data out the network interface which is acting as the object
+mlsconstrain { netif } { ingress }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { netif } { egress }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
+
+# the node recvfrom/sendto ops, the recvfrom permission is a "write" operation
+# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is
+# writing data out the network node which is acting as the object
+mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { node } { sendto }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
+
+# the forward ops, the forward_in permission is a "write" operation because the
+# subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is writing data
+# to the network with a secmark label, the object in this case
+mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_in }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_out }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+
+#
+# MCS policy for the secmark and peer controls
+#
+
+# the peer/packet recv op
+mlsconstrain { peer packet } { recv }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetread ));
+
+#
 # MCS policy for SELinux-enabled databases
 #
 
#1 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Paul Moore

Adapt the MLS netif, node and peer networking constraints for MCS. This patch preserves the basic structure of the MLS constraints and converts them to use the MCS model which means the "(( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 ))" constraints are converted to "( h1 dom h2 )".

These need to be switched to MCS-specific attributes.

Quoted 52 lines

---

 policy/mcs |   36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
policy/mcs +36 -0
index b8dc0d6..0759021 100644
@@ -99,6 +99,42 @@ mlsconstrain process { sigkill sigstop }
 	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcskillall ));
 
 #
+# MCS policy for the network ingress/egress controls
+#
+
+# the netif ingress/egress ops, the ingress permission is a "write" operation
+# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is
+# writing data out the network interface which is acting as the object
+mlsconstrain { netif } { ingress }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { netif } { egress }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
+
+# the node recvfrom/sendto ops, the recvfrom permission is a "write" operation
+# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is
+# writing data out the network node which is acting as the object
+mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { node } { sendto }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
+
+# the forward ops, the forward_in permission is a "write" operation because the
+# subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is writing data
+# to the network with a secmark label, the object in this case
+mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_in }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_out }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+
+#
+# MCS policy for the secmark and peer controls
+#
+
+# the peer/packet recv op
+mlsconstrain { peer packet } { recv }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetread ));
+
+#
 # MCS policy for SELinux-enabled databases
 #
Signature · 3 lines
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
(410) 290-1411 x150
author
#2 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Christopher J. PeBenito
Quoted 4 lines · Paul Moore

Adapt the MLS netif, node and peer networking constraints for MCS. This patch preserves the basic structure of the MLS constraints and converts them to use the MCS model which means the "(( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 ))" constraints are converted to "( h1 dom h2 )".

These need to be switched to MCS-specific attributes.

[Ooops, forgot to reply-all ...]

Sorry, I saw other MLS attributes being used in the MCS constraints file so I thought it was okay ... I'll resend soon.

Quoted 54 lines
Quoted 53 lines

---

 policy/mcs |   36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
policy/mcs +4 -0
index b8dc0d6..0759021 100644
@@ -99,6 +99,42 @@ mlsconstrain process { sigkill sigstop }
 	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcskillall ));
 
 #
+# MCS policy for the network ingress/egress controls
+#
+
+# the netif ingress/egress ops, the ingress permission is a "write"

operation +# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is +# writing data out the network interface which is acting as the object +mlsconstrain { netif } { ingress }

policy/mcs +5 -0
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { netif } { egress }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
+
+# the node recvfrom/sendto ops, the recvfrom permission is a "write"

operation +# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is +# writing data out the network node which is acting as the object +mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom }

policy/mcs +5 -0
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { node } { sendto }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
+
+# the forward ops, the forward_in permission is a "write" operation

because the +# subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is writing data +# to the network with a secmark label, the object in this case

policy/mcs +14 -0
+mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_in }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_out }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+
+#
+# MCS policy for the secmark and peer controls
+#
+
+# the peer/packet recv op
+mlsconstrain { peer packet } { recv }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetread ));
+
+#
 # MCS policy for SELinux-enabled databases
 #
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore
linux @ hp