define convenient securebits masks for prctl users
PATCH 1/1 define convenient securebits masks for prctl users
The securebits are used by passing them to prctl with the PR_{S,G}ET_SECUREBITS commands. But the defines must be shifted to be used in prctl, which begs to be confused and misused by userspace. So define some more convenient values for userspace to specify. This way userspace does
prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, SECBIT_NOROOT);
instead of
prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 1 << SECURE_NOROOT);
Note that I'm shortcutting SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED to set (1 << SECURE_NOROOT | 1 << SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED).
Thanks to Michael for the idea.
This patch also adds include/linux/securebits to the installed headers. Then perhaps it can be included by glibc's sys/prctl.h.
Changelog:
Oct 14: As suggested by Michael Kerrisk, don't
use SB_* as that convention is already in use. Use SECBIT_ prefix instead.
--- include/linux/Kbuild | 1 + include/linux/securebits.h | 23 ++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
include/linux/Kbuild +1 -0
@@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ unifdef-y += scc.h unifdef-y += sched.h unifdef-y += screen_info.h unifdef-y += sdla.h +unifdef-y += securebits.h unifdef-y += selinux_netlink.h unifdef-y += sem.h unifdef-y += serial_core.h
include/linux/securebits.h +16 -7
@@ -1,6 +1,13 @@#ifndef _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H#define _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H 1 +/* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies +whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the +setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be +changed from user-level. */ +#define issecure_mask (X ) (1 << (X)) +#define issecure (X ) (issecure_mask(X) & current_cred_xxx(securebits)) +#define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000/* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support
@@ -12,6 +19,10 @@#define SECURE_NOROOT 0#define SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED 1/* make bit-0 immutable */ +#define SECBIT_NOROOT (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT)) +#define SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \ + issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED)) +/* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixup". When unset, to provide compatiblility with old programs relying on set*uid to gain/lose privilege, transitions to/from uid 0 cause
@@ -19,6 +30,11 @@#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP 2#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED 3/* make bit-2 immutable */ +#define SECBIT_NO_SUID_FIXUP (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) +#define SECBIT_NO_SUID_FIXUP_LOCKED \ + (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \ + issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED)) +/* When set, a process can retain its capabilities even after transitioning to a non-root user (the set-uid fixup suppressed by bit 2). Bit-4 is cleared when a process calls exec(); setting both
@@ -27,13 +43,6 @@#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS 4#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED 5/* make bit-4 immutable */ -/* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies -whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the -setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be -changed from user-level. */ -#define issecure_mask (X ) (1 << (X)) -#define issecure (X ) (issecure_mask(X) & current_cred_xxx(securebits)) -#define SECURE_ALL_BITS (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \ issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \ issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
Signature · 1 line
1.6.1
Hi Serge,
Comments below. (Sorry, I could have made most of these comments on the earlier version of the patch, but was in a hurry, and missed noticing them.)
Quoted 6 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
The securebits are used by passing them to prctl with the PR_{S,G}ET_SECUREBITS commands. But the defines must be shifted to be used in prctl, which begs to be confused and misused by userspace. So define some more convenient values for userspace to specify. This way userspace does
Quoted 8 lines
prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS,
SECBIT_NOROOT);instead of
prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 1 <<
SECURE_NOROOT);Note that I'm shortcutting
SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKEDto set (1 <<SECURE_NOROOT| 1 <<SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED).
I don't think this is a good idea. Here you are defining a kind of policy about how these bits will be used. It also invites some confusion, since we have similarly named constants that result in different semantics. I think it would be better to split these out, and have SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED mean just SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED, etc.
Quoted 61 lines
Thanks to Michael for the idea.
This patch also adds
include/linux/securebitsto the installed headers. Then perhaps it can be included by glibc'ssys/prctl.h.Changelog:
Oct 14: As suggested by Michael Kerrisk, don't use SB_* as that convention is already in use. UseSECBIT_prefix instead.Signed-off-by Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>Acked-by Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>Cc Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>Cc Ulrich Drepper <[email protected]>---
include/linux/Kbuild | 1 +include/linux/securebits.h| 23 ++++++++++++++++-------2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)include/linux/Kbuild +0
-0@@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ unifdef-y += scc.hunifdef-y +=
sched.h
unifdef-y +=screen_info.h
unifdef-y +=sdla.h
+unifdef-y +=securebits.h
unifdef-y +=selinux_netlink.h
unifdef-y +=sem.h
unifdef-y +=serial_core.hinclude/linux/securebits.h +11
-0@@ -1,6 +1,13 @@ #ifndef _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H #define _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H 1 +/* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies +whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the +setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be +changed from user-level. */ +#define issecure_mask (X ) (1 << (X)) +#define issecure (X ) (issecure_mask(X) & current_cred_xxx(securebits)) + #define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000 /* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support@@ -12,6 +19,10 @@ #define SECURE_NOROOT 0 #define SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED 1 /* make bit-0 immutable */ +#define SECBIT_NOROOT (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT)) +#define SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \ + issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED)) + /* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixup".When unset, to provide compatiblility with old programs relying on set*uid to gain/lose privilege, transitions to/from uid 0 cause
include/linux/securebits.h line 36
Quoted 7 lines
include/linux/securebits.h +4
-0@@ -19,6 +30,11 @@ #define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP 2 #define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED 3 /* make bit-2 immutable */ +#define SECBIT_NO_SUID_FIXUP (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) +#define SECBIT_NO_SUID_FIXUP_LOCKED \ + (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \ + issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED))
Please s/SUID/SETUID/ -- keep the names of the constants consistent. People can afford to type the two extra letters. But they will be puzzled by inconsistency.
include/linux/securebits.h line 44
Quoted 7 lines
include/linux/securebits.h +1
-0+ /* When set, a process can retain its capabilities even aftertransitioning to a non-root user (the set-uid fixup suppressed by bit 2). Bit-4 is cleared when a process calls
exec(); setting bothinclude/linux/securebits.h +0
-0@@ -27,13 +43,6 @@ #define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS 4 #define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED 5 /* make bit-4 immutable */
I know they may be less often used, but for consistency, I think ther should be SECBIT_* constants for KEEP_CAPS too. There's no good reason *not* to do this, AFAICT.
Cheers,
Michael
Quoted 14 lines
include/linux/securebits.h +0
-8-/* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies -whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the -setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be -changed from user-level. */ -#define issecure_mask (X ) (1 << (X)) -#define issecure (X ) (issecure_mask(X) & current_cred_xxx(securebits)) - #define SECURE_ALL_BITS (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \ issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \ issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) --1.6.1
Signature · 3 lines
Michael Kerrisk Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/ Author of "The Linux Programming Interface" http://blog.man7.org/