security: do not check mmap_min_addr on nommu systems
Subsystems (5)
PATCH 1/1 security: do not check mmap_min_addr on nommu systems
nommu systems can do anything with memory they please and so they already win. mmap_min_addr is the least of their worries. Currently the mmap_min_addr implementation is problamatic on such systems. This patch changes the addr_only argument to be a flags which can take the arguments for addr_only or not_addr. LSMs then need to properly implement these two flags.
Signed-off-by Eric Paris <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/security.h | 20 ++++++++++++++------ mm/mmap.c | 6 ++++-- mm/mremap.c | 6 ++++-- mm/nommu.c | 3 ++- security/commoncap.c | 7 ++++--- security/security.c | 5 +++-- security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 +++++---- 7 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +14 -6
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@#define SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT 0#define SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT 1 +/* sec_flags for security_file_mmap */ +#define SECURITY_MMAP_ONLY_ADDR_CHECK 0x01 +#define SECURITY_MMAP_SKIP_ADDR_CHECK 0x02 +struct ctl_table ;struct audit_krule ;
@@ -69,7 +73,7 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);extern int cap_inode_killpriv (struct dentry *dentry);extern int cap_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags, -unsigned long addr,unsigned long addr_only); +unsigned long addr,unsigned long sec_flags);extern int cap_task_fix_setuid (struct cred *new,const struct cred *old,int flags);extern int cap_task_prctl (int option,unsigned long arg2,unsigned long arg3,unsigned long arg4,unsigned long arg5);
@@ -604,11 +608,15 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)* Return 0 if permission is granted. * @file_mmap : * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g. -* if mapping anonymous memory. +* if mapping anonymous memory. This actually performs 2 seperate types +* of checks. It first checks permissions on the file in question (if +* it exists) and it also checks if the address is allowed. * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL). * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application. * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel. * @flags contains the operational flags. +* @addr address vm will map to +* @sec_flags which of the 2 types of checks should (not) be performed * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @file_mprotect: * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions.
@@ -1556,7 +1564,7 @@ struct security_operations {int (*file_mmap) (struct file *file,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags,unsigned long addr, -unsigned long addr_only); +unsigned long sec_flags);int (*file_mprotect) (struct vm_area_struct *vma,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot);
@@ -1826,7 +1834,7 @@ void security_file_free(struct file *file);int security_file_ioctl (struct file *file,unsigned int cmd,unsigned long arg);int security_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags, -unsigned long addr,unsigned long addr_only); +unsigned long addr,unsigned long sec_flags);int security_file_mprotect (struct vm_area_struct *vma,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot);int security_file_lock (struct file *file,unsigned int cmd);
@@ -2323,9 +2331,9 @@ static inline int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, unsigned long addr, - unsigned long addr_only) + unsigned long sec_flags) { - return cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); + return cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, sec_flags); } static inline int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
mm/mmap.c +4 -2
@@ -1665,7 +1665,8 @@ static int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,return -ENOMEM ; address &=PAGE_MASK ; - error =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , address,1 ); + error =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , address, +SECURITY_MMAP_ONLY_ADDR_CHECK );if (error)return error;
@@ -2006,7 +2007,8 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)if (is_hugepage_only_range (mm, addr, len))return -EINVAL ; - error =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , addr,1 ); + error =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , addr, +SECURITY_MMAP_ONLY_ADDR_CHECK );if (error)return error;
mm/mremap.c +4 -2
@@ -313,7 +313,8 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long addr,if ((addr <= new_addr) && (addr+old_len) > new_addr) goto out; - ret =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , new_addr,1 ); + ret =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , new_addr, +SECURITY_MMAP_ONLY_ADDR_CHECK );if (ret) goto out;
@@ -421,7 +422,8 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long addr, goto out; } - ret =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , new_addr,1 ); + ret =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , new_addr, +SECURITY_MMAP_ONLY_ADDR_CHECK );if (ret) goto out; }
mm/nommu.c +2 -1
@@ -974,7 +974,8 @@ static int validate_mmap_request(struct file *file, }/* allow the security API to have its say */ - ret =security_file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr,0 ); + ret =security_file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags,0 , +SECURITY_MMAP_SKIP_ADDR_CHECK );if (ret <0 )return ret;
security/commoncap.c +4 -3
@@ -924,7 +924,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)* @prot: unused * @flags: unused * @addr: address attempting to be mapped -* @addr_only: unused +* @sec_flags: should the addr be checked? * * If the process is attempting to map memory below mmap_min_addr they need * CAP_SYS_RAWIO. The other parameters to this function are unused by the
@@ -933,11 +933,12 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)*/ int cap_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags, -unsigned long addr,unsigned long addr_only) +unsigned long addr,unsigned long sec_flags) {int ret =0 ; -if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) { +if (!(sec_flags &SECURITY_MMAP_SKIP_ADDR_CHECK ) && + (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr)) { ret =cap_capable (current,current_cred (),CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT );/* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
security/security.c +3 -2
@@ -677,11 +677,12 @@ int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)int security_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags, -unsigned long addr,unsigned long addr_only) +unsigned long addr,unsigned long sec_flags) {int ret; - ret = security_ops->file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); + ret = security_ops->file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, + sec_flags);if (ret)return ret;return ima_file_mmap (file, prot);
security/selinux/hooks.c +5 -4
@@ -3043,7 +3043,7 @@ error:static int selinux_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags, -unsigned long addr,unsigned long addr_only) +unsigned long addr,unsigned long sec_flags) {int rc =0 ;u32 sid =current_sid ();
@@ -3054,7 +3054,8 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,* at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even * if DAC would have also denied the operation. */ -if (addr <CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR ) { +if (!(sec_flags &SECURITY_MMAP_SKIP_ADDR_CHECK ) && + (addr <CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR )) { rc =avc_has_perm (sid, sid,SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT ,MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO ,NULL );if (rc)
@@ -3062,8 +3063,8 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, }/* do DAC check on address space usage */ - rc =cap_file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); -if (rc || addr_only) + rc =cap_file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, sec_flags); +if (rc || (sec_flags &SECURITY_MMAP_ONLY_ADDR_CHECK ))return rc;if (selinux_checkreqprot)