selinux: Fix security_compute_av() to not return unknown class errors when in permissive mode
RFC PATCH 1/1 selinux: Fix security_compute_av() to not return unknown class errors when in permissive mode
It is possible security_compute_av() to return -EINVAL, even when in permissive mode, due to unknown object classes. This patch fixes this by first checking to see if SELinux is in permissive mode or if the subject is a permissive domain, if either of these are true then security_compute_av() ignores the unknown class error and allows the operation to proceed.
Andrew: I've tested this patch to ensure it boots and does not regress my Fedora/Rawhide system but since I don't have a Debian system handy I'm not able to verify that this fixes your problem; could you please test this patch and report back?
--- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------ 1 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
security/selinux/ss/services.c +15 -6
@@ -940,6 +940,7 @@ int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, {u16 tclass;u32 requested; +struct context *scontext;int rc;read_lock (&policy_rwlock);
@@ -949,12 +950,8 @@ int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, requested =unmap_perm (orig_tclass, orig_requested); tclass =unmap_class (orig_tclass); -if (unlikely (orig_tclass && !tclass)) { -if (policydb.allow_unknown) - goto allow; - rc = -EINVAL ; - goto out; - } +if (unlikely (orig_tclass && !tclass)) + goto unknown_class; rc =security_compute_av_core (ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd);map_decision (orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown); out:
@@ -968,6 +965,18 @@ allow: avd->flags =0 ; rc =0 ; goto out; +unknown_class: +if (policydb.allow_unknown || !selinux_enforcing) + goto allow; + scontext =sidtab_search (&sidtab, ssid); +if (scontext) { +if (ebitmap_get_bit (&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type)) + goto allow; + }else +printk (KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n" , + __func__, ssid); + rc = -EINVAL ; + goto out; } int security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
--
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Quoted 53 lines · Paul Moore
It is possible
security_compute_av()to return-EINVAL, even when in permissive mode, due to unknown object classes. This patch fixes this by first checking to see if SELinux is in permissive mode or if the subject is a permissive domain, if either of these are true thensecurity_compute_av()ignores the unknown class error and allows the operation to proceed.Andrew: I've tested this patch to ensure it boots and does not regress my Fedora/Rawhide system but since I don't have a Debian system handy I'm not able to verify that this fixes your problem; could you please test this patch and report back?
Reported-by Andrew Worsley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Paul Moore <[email protected]>--- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------ 1 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)security/selinux/ss/services.c +8
-6@@ -940,6 +940,7 @@ int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, {u16 tclass;u32 requested; +struct context *scontext;int rc;read_lock (&policy_rwlock);@@ -949,12 +950,8 @@ int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, requested =unmap_perm (orig_tclass, orig_requested); tclass =unmap_class (orig_tclass); -if (unlikely (orig_tclass && !tclass)) { -if (policydb.allow_unknown) - goto allow; - rc = -EINVAL ; - goto out; - } +if (unlikely (orig_tclass && !tclass)) + goto unknown_class; rc =security_compute_av_core (ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd);map_decision (orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown); out:@@ -968,6 +965,18 @@ allow: avd->flags =0 ; rc =0 ; goto out; +unknown_class: +if (policydb.allow_unknown || !selinux_enforcing) + goto allow; + scontext =sidtab_search (&sidtab, ssid); +if (scontext) {
security/selinux/ss/services.c allow: · line 982
Quoted 10 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +7
-0+if (ebitmap_get_bit (&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type)) + goto allow; + }else +printk (KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n" , + __func__, ssid); + rc = -EINVAL ; + goto out; } int security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
Can we simplify this at all? For example, I don't really think sidtab_search() can ever fail anymore (it falls back to the unlabeled SID, which has to be defined by the initial policy load). I also think we could just clear avd->allowed and return 0 rather than returning -EINVAL in this case so that the existing avc_has_perm() logic would proceed and check permissive mode on its own. We likely should also move the permissive map test earlier so that it always get applied unconditionally.
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Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 18 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 17 lines · Paul Moore
It is possible
security_compute_av()to return-EINVAL, even when in permissive mode, due to unknown object classes. This patch fixes this by first checking to see if SELinux is in permissive mode or if the subject is a permissive domain, if either of these are true thensecurity_compute_av()ignores the unknown class error and allows the operation to proceed.Andrew: I've tested this patch to ensure it boots and does not regress my Fedora/Rawhide system but since I don't have a Debian system handy I'm not able to verify that this fixes your problem; could you please test this patch and report back?
Reported-by Andrew Worsley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Paul Moore <[email protected]>--- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------ 1 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
...
Quoted 8 lines
Can we simplify this at all? For example, I don't really think
sidtab_search()can ever fail anymore (it falls back to the unlabeled SID, which has to be defined by the initial policy load). I also think we could just clearavd->allowedand return 0 rather than returning-EINVALin this case so that the existingavc_has_perm()logic would proceed and check permissive mode on its own. We likely should also move the permissive map test earlier so that it always get applied unconditionally.
Sure, I just wanted to get something out sooner rather than later in case this turned out to be something which affected a large number of users and we needed a quick patch for -stable. I'll admit it ain't pretty but it should at least work in a pinch.
Give me a bit and let me see if I can make it less ugly.
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paul moore linux @ hp -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 3 lines · Stephen Smalley
... For example, I don't really think
sidtab_search()can ever fail anymore (it falls back to the unlabeled SID, which has to be defined by the initial policy load) ...
I just spent a bit of time looking at the policy loading code and can't seem to find where it is enforced that there must be an initial SID for the unlabeled case. I don't doubt that it is there, but I just spent an hour staring at the policydb code and I can't seem to find it ... care to toss a pointer my way :)
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paul moore linux @ hp -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 10 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 3 lines · Stephen Smalley
... For example, I don't really think
sidtab_search()can ever fail anymore (it falls back to the unlabeled SID, which has to be defined by the initial policy load) ...I just spent a bit of time looking at the policy loading code and can't seem to find where it is enforced that there must be an initial SID for the unlabeled case. I don't doubt that it is there, but I just spent an hour staring at the policydb code and I can't seem to find it ... care to toss a pointer my way :)
Hmmm...I think you are correct, although the system would not work very well if you did in fact omit such a definition from the policy. Initial SIDs handling needs an overhaul, that's already noted on the todo list.
So I guess sidtab_search() can possibly fail still, although it won't with any correctly configured policy.
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Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.