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disablenetwork (v5): Simplify the disablenetwork sendmsg hook.

DISCUSSION Michael S. Tsirkin 2 participants 2 messages Jan 17, 2010 2 messages not in the archive

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Quoted 38 lines · Michael Stone
Quoted 15 lines · Michael Tsirkin
Quoted 14 lines · Michael Stone

The idea is that calls like

   sendto(fd, buffer, len, 0, NULL, 0);
   send(fd, buffer, len, 0)
   write(fd, buffer, len)

are all to be permitted but that calls like

   sendto(fd, buffer, len, 0, (struct sockadr *) &addr, sizeof(addr));

are to be rejected when the current task's network is disabled on the grounds that the former calls must use previously connected sockets but that the latter socket need not have been previously connected.

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Michael, if I understand correctly, with this patch one could use disablenetwork to pass an af_packet socket bound to a device to a task, and make sure that the task does not use it to inject packets into another device?

Michael,

Thanks for writing. If I understand you correctly, you're asking:

May a network-disabled process use recvmsg() with SCM_RIGHTS control messages to receive a file descriptor pointing to previously connected or bound AF_PACKET socket and, having received such an fd, may the network-disabled process use the socket normally?

If I've understood correctly, then the answer is "yes, to the extent that you can't do stupid things with sendmsg(), fnctl(), ioctl(), and friends."

I intend to look more carefully at the ability to use those calls to do stupid things in coming weeks.

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Does this help?

Regards,

Michael

P.S. - Incidentally, what is the nature of your interest?

We discussed using af_packet sockets for networking in qemu. qemu is a large project so it might not be a great idea to run it as root all the
time: a better idea is to e.g. get fd from a priveledged server. However, we'd like to limit qemu even more, so that it can only use the fd for send/receive.

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(And was your question intentionally or accidentally off-list?)

Oops. Adding it back.

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Quoted 7 lines
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are all to be permitted but that calls like

   sendto(fd, buffer, len, 0, (struct sockadr *) &addr, sizeof(addr));

are to be rejected when the current task's network is disabled on the grounds that the former calls must use previously connected sockets but that the latter socket need not have been previously connected.

Not surprised to see this "simple" idea is unsurprisingly turning incredibly complex, full of policy and also holes. Can people now accept that the reason we have rather more complex models for security policy is because generally speaking these "oh so simple" little magic switches don't actually work or solve any real world problems.

And just to point out further problems - there are numerous cases where I can control the remote destination of messages without using sendto or passing addresses in obvious manners. You'll need to parse all the ioctls and protocol specific calls as a starter. You'll also need a policy engine of some form to detect when I can use send stuff in one socket I have rights to in order to influence routing of another by talking to network stuff or emitting controlling messages of any form.

(and even then there are tons of cases you can't fix that way as the early Java people found to their cost. Things like connecting to a web server via a socket that can only connect to port 80 and issuing proxy requests, or triggering a remote carefully placed cgi script to produce tunnels with total control.

Alan