security: Yama LSM
Subsystems (5)
PATCH v3 1/1 security: Yama LSM
This adds the Yama Linux Security Module to collect several security features (symlink, hardlink, and PTRACE scope restrictions) that have existed in various forms over the years and have been carried outside the mainline kernel by other Linux distributions like Openwall and grsecurity.
---
v2:
- add rcu locking, thanks to Tetsuo Handa.
- add Documentation/Yama.txt for summary of features.
v3:
- drop needless cap_ callbacks.
- fix usage of get_task_comm.
- drop CONFIG_ of sysctl defaults, as recommended by Andi Kleen.
- require SYSCTL.
--- Documentation/Yama.txt | 91 ++++++++++++++++++ fs/exec.c | 1 + security/Kconfig | 6 + security/Makefile | 2 + security/yama/Kconfig | 13 +++ security/yama/Makefile | 3 + security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 233 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 349 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/Yama.txt create mode 100644 security/yama/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/yama/Makefile create mode 100644 security/yama/yama_lsm.c
Documentation/Yama.txt new file +91 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +Yama is a Linux Security Module that collects a number of security +protections that are not handled by the core kernel itself. To select +it at boot time, specify "security=yama" (though this will disable any +other LSM). + +Yama is controlled through sysctl in /proc/sys/kernel/yama: + +- protected_sticky_symlinks +- protected_nonaccess_hardlinks +- ptrace_scope + +============================================================== + +protected_sticky_symlinks: + +A long-standing class of security issues is the symlink-based +time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable +directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation of this flaw +is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given symlink (i.e. a +root process follows a symlink belonging to another user). For a likely +incomplete list of hundreds of examples across the years, please see: +http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=/tmp + +When set to "0", symlink following behavior is unrestricted. + +When set to "1" symlinks are permitted to be followed only when outside +a sticky world-writable directory, or when the uid of the symlink and +follower match, or when the directory owner matches the symlink's owner. + +This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall and grsecurity. + +============================================================== + +protected_nonaccess_hardlinks: + +Hardlinks can be abused in a similar fashion to symlinks in sticky +world-writable directories, but their weakness is not limited to +just that scenario. For example, if /etc and /home are on the same +partition, a regular user can create a hardlink to /etc/shadow in their +home directory. While it retains the original owner and permissions, +it is possible for privileged programs that are otherwise symlink-safe +to mistakenly access the file through its hardlink. Additionally, a very +minor untraceable quota-bypassing local denial of service is possible by +an attacker exhausting disk space by filling a world-writable directory +with hardlinks. + +When set to "0", hardlink creation behavior is unrestricted. + +When set to "1", hardlinks cannot be created to files that a given user +would be unable to read and write originally, or are otherwise sensitive. + +This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall and grsecurity. + +============================================================== + +ptrace_scope: + +As Linux grows in popularity, it will become a larger target for +malware. One particularly troubling weakness of the Linux process +interfaces is that a single user is able to examine the memory and +running state of any of their processes. For example, if one application +(e.g. Pidgin) was compromised, it would be possible for an attacker to +attach to other running processes (e.g. Firefox, SSH sessions, GPG agent, +etc) to extract additional credentials and continue to expand the scope +of their attack without resorting to user-assisted phishing. + +This is not a theoretical problem. SSH session hijacking +(http://www.storm.net.nz/projects/7) and arbitrary code injection +(http://c-skills.blogspot.com/2007/05/injectso.html) attacks already +exist and remain possible if PTRACE is allowed to operate as before. +PTRACE is not commonly used by non-developers and non-admins, so system +builders should be allowed the option to disable this debugging system. + +For a solution, some applications use prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, ...) to +specifically disallow such PTRACE attachment (e.g. ssh-agent), but many +do not. A more general solution is to only allow PTRACE directly from a +parent to a child process (i.e. direct "gdb EXE" and "strace EXE" still +work), or with CAP_SYS_PTRACE (i.e. "gdb --pid=PID", and "strace -p PID" +still work as root). + +0 - classic PTRACE permissions: a process can PTRACE any other process + running under the same uid, as long as it is dumpable (i.e. did not + transition uids, start privileged, or have prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE...) + called). + +1 - child-only PTRACE: a process can PTRACE only its descendants when + the above classic criteria is also met. + +This protection is based on the restrictions in grsecurity. + +==============================================================
fs/exec.c +1 -0
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@#include <linux/fsnotify.h> #include <linux/fs_struct.h> #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h> +#include <linux/ctype.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
security/Kconfig +6 -0
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR source security/selinux/Kconfig source security/smack/Kconfig source security/tomoyo/Kconfig +source security/yama/Kconfig source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -148,6 +149,7 @@ choice default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO + default DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA if SECURITY_YAMA default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC help
@@ -163,6 +165,9 @@ choice config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA + bool "Yama" if SECURITY_YAMA=y + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
@@ -173,6 +178,7 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO + default "yama" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC endmenu
security/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS) += keys/ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama # always enable default capabilities obj-y += commoncap.o
@@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += lsm_audit.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/built-in.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o # Object integrity file lists
security/yama/Kconfig new file +13 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +config SECURITY_YAMA + bool "Yama NAC Support" + depends on SECURITY + select SECURITYFS + select SECURITY_PATH + default n + help + This selects Yama, the NAKed Access Control system which + provides additional global security settings above regular + Linux discretionary access controls. Currently available + are symlink, hardlink, and PTRACE scope restrictions. + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
security/yama/Makefile new file +3 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) := yama.o + +yama-y := yama_lsm.o
security/yama/yama_lsm.c new file +233 -0
233 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 6 lines
1.7.1 -- Kees Cook Ubuntu Security Team
Quoted 6 lines · Kees Cook
This adds the Yama Linux Security Module to collect several security features (symlink, hardlink, and PTRACE scope restrictions) that have existed in various forms over the years and have been carried outside the mainline kernel by other Linux distributions like Openwall and grsecurity.
Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>
fs/exec.c line 61
Quoted 13 lines
+==============================================================
fs/exec.c +1
-0@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@#include <linux/fsnotify.h> #include <linux/fs_struct.h> #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h> +#include <linux/ctype.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
Can you explain the fs/exec.c hunk?
...
Quoted 13 lines
fs/exec.c +13
-0+static int yama_ptrace_access_check (struct task_struct *child, +unsigned int mode) +{ +int rc; + + rc =cap_ptrace_access_check (child, mode); +if (rc !=0 ) +return rc; + +/* require ptrace target be a child of ptracer on attach */ +if (mode ==PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH && ptrace_scope && + !capable (CAP_SYS_PTRACE )) { +struct task_struct *walker = child;
fs/exec.c
Quoted 10 lines
fs/exec.c +10
-0+ +rcu_read_lock (); +read_lock (&tasklist_lock); +while (walker->pid >0 ) { +if (walker == current) +break ; + walker = walker->real_parent; + } +if (walker->pid ==0 ) + rc = -EPERM ;
Don't recall whether I ended up sending the email addressing this last time, but task->pid is the global pid, so pid==0 does mean what you think it does regardless of pid namespaces.
Quoted 37 lines
fs/exec.c +37
-0+read_unlock (&tasklist_lock); +rcu_read_unlock (); + } + +if (rc) { +char name[sizeof (current->comm)]; +printk_ratelimited (KERN_INFO "ptrace of non-child" +" pid %d was attempted by: %s (pid %d)\n" , + child->pid,get_task_comm (name, current), + current->pid); + } + +return rc; +} + +/** +* yama_inode_follow_link - check for symlinks in sticky world-writeable dirs +* @dentry: The inode/dentry of the symlink +* @nameidata: The path data of the symlink +* +* In the case of the protected_sticky_symlinks sysctl being enabled, +* CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE needs to be specifically ignored if the symlink is +* in a sticky world-writable directory. This is to protect privileged +* processes from failing races against path names that may change out +* from under them by way of other users creating malicious symlinks. +* It will permit symlinks to only be followed when outside a sticky +* world-writable directory, or when the uid of the symlink and follower +* match, or when the directory owner matches the symlink's owner. +* +* Returns 0 if following the symlink is allowed, -ve on error. +*/ +static int yama_inode_follow_link (struct dentry *dentry, +struct nameidata *nameidata) +{ +int rc =0 ; +const struct inode *parent; +const struct inode *inode;
fs/exec.c
Quoted 10 lines
fs/exec.c +10
-0+const struct cred *cred; + +if (!protected_sticky_symlinks) +return 0 ; + +/* owner and follower match? */ + cred =current_cred (); + inode = dentry->d_inode; +if (cred->fsuid == inode->i_uid) +return 0 ;
This'll need user-namespace luvin' at some point, but that's my problem, not yours.
-serge
Quoted 11 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 11 lines
+==============================================================
fs/exec.c +1
-0@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@#include <linux/fsnotify.h> #include <linux/fs_struct.h> #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h> +#include <linux/ctype.h>
Quoted 4 lines
fs/exec.c line 61
Quoted 2 lines
fs/exec.c +0
-0#include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/mmu_context.h> Can you explain the
fs/exec.chunk?
Argh. This is a mis-rebase when I was working on the get_task_comm patch. This belongs there. I will resend both.
Quoted 11 lines
fs/exec.c
Quoted 7 lines
fs/exec.c +7
-0+while (walker->pid >0 ) { +if (walker == current) +break ; + walker = walker->real_parent; + } +if (walker->pid ==0 ) + rc = -EPERM ;Don't recall whether I ended up sending the email addressing this last time, but
task->pidis the global pid, so pid==0 does mean what you think it does regardless of pid namespaces.
Okay, good, thanks.
Quoted 8 lines
fs/exec.c
Quoted 5 lines
fs/exec.c +5
-0+/* owner and follower match? */ + cred =current_cred (); + inode = dentry->d_inode; +if (cred->fsuid == inode->i_uid) +return 0 ;This'll need user-namespace luvin' at some point, but that's my problem, not yours.
That's going to be quite a patch. :) I'm looking forward to it!
-Kees
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Ubuntu Security Team