kernel/time: Make /proc/timer_list mode 0400
PATCH 1/1 kernel/time: Make /proc/timer_list mode 0400
Hi,
/proc/timer_list contains kernel addresses, like e.g.:
#0: <c000000001404158>, tick_sched_timer, S:01, .tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick, swapper/0
...
Avoid leaking them to user space to make writing kernel exploits a bit harder.
(I currently cannot think of a userland tool that uses this, this is likely pretty much root-only.)
Ciao, Marcus
--- kernel/time/timer_list.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
kernel/time/timer_list.c +1 -1
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static int __init init_timer_list_procfs(void) {struct proc_dir_entry *pe; - pe =proc_create ("timer_list" ,0444 ,NULL , &timer_list_fops); + pe =proc_create ("timer_list" ,0400 ,NULL , &timer_list_fops);if (!pe)return -ENOMEM ;return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
1.7.1
Quoted 10 lines · Marcus Meissner
Hi,
/proc/timer_listcontains kernel addresses, like e.g.:
#0: <c000000001404158>,tick_sched_timer, S:01, .tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick, swapper/0
...Avoid leaking them to user space to make writing kernel exploits a bit harder.
(I currently cannot think of a userland tool that uses this, this is likely pretty much root-only.)
iirc powertop parses this..
Quoted 7 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 6 lines · Marcus Meissner
Hi,
/proc/timer_listcontains kernel addresses, like e.g.:
#0: <c000000001404158>,tick_sched_timer, S:01, .tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick, swapper/0
...
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Avoid leaking them to user space to make writing kernel exploits a bit harder.
(I currently cannot think of a userland tool that uses this, this is likely pretty much root-only.)
iirc powertop parses this..
powertop already says on startup:
PowerTOP needs to be run as root to collect enough information
And as developer tool it usually is for people having root access.
Ciao, Marcus
Quoted 10 lines · Marcus Meissner
Quoted 9 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 8 lines · Marcus Meissner
Hi,
/proc/timer_listcontains kernel addresses, like e.g.:
#0: <c000000001404158>,tick_sched_timer, S:01, .tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick, swapper/0
...Avoid leaking them to user space to make writing kernel exploits a bit harder.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
(I currently cannot think of a userland tool that uses this, this is likely pretty much root-only.)
iirc powertop parses this..
powertop already says on startup:
PowerTOP needs to be run as root to collect enough information
I know, but you said you didn't know of a tool that used the file.. now you do ;-)
Quoted 7 lines · On Wed, 17 Nov 2010 18:18:32 +0100 Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>…
Quoted 6 lines · Marcus Meissner
Hi,
/proc/timer_listcontains kernel addresses, like e.g.:
#0: <c000000001404158>,tick_sched_timer, S:01, .tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick, swapper/0
...
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Avoid leaking them to user space to make writing kernel exploits a bit harder.
(I currently cannot think of a userland tool that uses this, this is likely pretty much root-only.)
iirc powertop parses this..
I bet it doesn't look at the kernel address (why was that added in the first place, anyway?)
I'd suggest that the risk of breakage would be much less if we left the file permissions alone and arranged for those addresses to be 0000000000000000 for non-root readers.
Quoted 15 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 12 lines · On Wed, 17 Nov 2010 18:18:32 +0100 Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>…
Quoted 10 lines · Marcus Meissner
Hi,
/proc/timer_listcontains kernel addresses, like e.g.:
#0: <c000000001404158>,tick_sched_timer, S:01, .tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick, swapper/0
...Avoid leaking them to user space to make writing kernel exploits a bit harder.
(I currently cannot think of a userland tool that uses this, this is likely pretty much root-only.)
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
iirc powertop parses this..
I bet it doesn't look at the kernel address (why was that added in the first place, anyway?)
I'd suggest that the risk of breakage would be much less if we left the file permissions alone and arranged for those addresses to be 0000000000000000 for non-root readers.
You beat me to it. Having the full information is quite helpful at times.
Thanks,
tglx
Quoted 22 lines · Thomas Gleixner
Quoted 20 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 7 lines · On Wed, 17 Nov 2010 18:18:32 +0100 Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>…
Quoted 6 lines · Marcus Meissner
Hi,
/proc/timer_listcontains kernel addresses, like e.g.:
#0: <c000000001404158>,tick_sched_timer, S:01, .tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick, swapper/0
...Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Avoid leaking them to user space to make writing kernel exploits a bit harder.
(I currently cannot think of a userland tool that uses this, this is likely pretty much root-only.)
iirc powertop parses this..
I bet it doesn't look at the kernel address (why was that added in the first place, anyway?)
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I'd suggest that the risk of breakage would be much less if we left the file permissions alone and arranged for those addresses to be 0000000000000000 for non-root readers.
You beat me to it. Having the full information is quite helpful at times.
We should do something like:
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) print_ptr = NULL; sprintf(s, "%p", print_ptr);
Thanks,
Ingo
Quoted 6 lines · Ingo Molnar
We should do something like:
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) print_ptr = NULL; sprintf(s, "%p", print_ptr);
A while ago, Thomas suggested following idea :
<quote>
Considering the amount of duplication you are about to do, you may want to think about adding a new pointer format extension then. We already have special '%p' modes for IPv6 addresse, MAC addresses and various other pointer types. It wouldn't be hard to add one which does not print (null).
</quote>
http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg146606.html
So the if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) could be centralized in %pX handling (X being a new letter, not actually 'X')
Hi!
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 8 lines
/proc/timer_listcontains kernel addresses, like e.g.:
#0: <c000000001404158>,tick_sched_timer, S:01, .tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick, swapper/0
...Avoid leaking them to user space to make writing kernel exploits a bit harder.
(I currently cannot think of a userland tool that uses this, this is likely pretty much root-only.)
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
iirc powertop parses this..
powertop already says on startup:
PowerTOP needs to be run as root to collect enough information
And as developer tool it usually is for people having root access.
.....and now you are actively decreasing security.
Yes, developers usally have root access, but no, developers do not like to work as root.
Signature · 2 lines
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
Hi!
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
iirc powertop parses this..
I bet it doesn't look at the kernel address (why was that added in the first place, anyway?)
I'd suggest that the risk of breakage would be much less if we left the file permissions alone and arranged for those addresses to be 0000000000000000 for non-root readers.
You beat me to it. Having the full information is quite helpful at times.
Quoted 6 lines
We should do something like:
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) print_ptr = NULL; sprintf(s, "%p", print_ptr);
Having single file that contains different stuff based on capable() is very very ugly.
Pavel
Signature · 2 lines
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html