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install_special_mapping skips security_file_mmap check.

PATCH In review Tavis Ormandy 4 participants 5 messages Dec 9, 2010

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 install_special_mapping skips security_file_mmap check.

The install_special_mapping routine (used, for example, to setup the vdso) skips the security check before insert_vm_struct, allowing a local attacker to bypass the mmap_min_addr security restriction by limiting the available pages for special mappings. bprm_mm_init() also skips the check, although I don't think this can be used to bypass any restrictions, I don't see any reason not to have the security check.

$ uname -m
x86_64
$ cat /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr
65536
$ cat install_special_mapping.s
section .bss
    resb BSS_SIZE
section .text
    global _start
    _start:
        mov     eax, __NR_pause
        int     0x80
$ nasm -D__NR_pause=29 -DBSS_SIZE=0xfffed000 -f elf -o install_special_mapping.o install_special_mapping.s
$ ld -m elf_i386 -Ttext=0x10000 -Tbss=0x11000 -o install_special_mapping install_special_mapping.o
$ ./install_special_mapping &
[1] 14303
$ cat /proc/14303/maps 
0000f000-00010000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                                  [vdso]
00010000-00011000 r-xp 00001000 00:19 2453665                            /home/taviso/install_special_mapping
00011000-ffffe000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0                                  [stack]

It's worth noting that Red Hat are shipping with mmap_min_addr set to 4096.

---

 fs/exec.c |    7 +++++++
 mm/mmap.c |    5 +++++
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
fs/exec.c +7 -0
index d68c378..7e8c4b6 100644
@@ -275,7 +275,14 @@ static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
    vma->vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS | VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP;
    vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
    INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vma->anon_vma_chain);
+
+   err = security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1);
+
+   if (err)
+       goto err;
+
    err = insert_vm_struct(mm, vma);
+
    if (err)
        goto err;
 
mm/mmap.c +5 -0
index b179abb..1de3f4b 100644
@@ -2479,6 +2479,11 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm,
    vma->vm_ops = &special_mapping_vmops;
    vma->vm_private_data = pages;
 
+   if (security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1)) {
+       kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
+       return -EPERM;
+   }
+
    if (unlikely(insert_vm_struct(mm, vma))) {
        kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
        return -ENOMEM;
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#1 lore raw
Quoted 18 lines · On Thu, 9 Dec 2010 15:29:42 +0100 Tavis Ormandy wrote:

---

 fs/exec.c |    7 +++++++
 mm/mmap.c |    5 +++++
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
fs/exec.c +1 -0
index d68c378..7e8c4b6 100644
@@ -275,7 +275,14 @@ static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
    vma->vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS | VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP;
    vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
    INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vma->anon_vma_chain);
+

fs/exec.c static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm) · line 288

Quoted 10 lines
fs/exec.c +6 -0
+   err = security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1);
+
+   if (err)
+       goto err;
+
    err = insert_vm_struct(mm, vma);
+
    if (err)
        goto err;
 

Uh, something happened to the tabs at the beginning of each line... I.e., the original file content has been mucked up.

Quoted 20 lines
mm/mmap.c +5 -0
index b179abb..1de3f4b 100644
@@ -2479,6 +2479,11 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm,
    vma->vm_ops = &special_mapping_vmops;
    vma->vm_private_data = pages;
 
+   if (security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1)) {
+       kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
+       return -EPERM;
+   }
+
    if (unlikely(insert_vm_struct(mm, vma))) {
        kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
        return -ENOMEM;
Signature · 2 lines
-- 
-------------------------------------

---
~Randy
*** Remember to use Documentation/SubmitChecklist when testing your code ***

author Acked-by Kees Cook Acked-by Robert Swiecki
#2 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Randy Dunlap

Uh, something happened to the tabs at the beginning of each line... I.e., the original file content has been mucked up.

Gah. Apologies, second attempt...

The install_special_mapping routine (used, for example, to setup the vdso) skips the security check before insert_vm_struct, allowing a local attacker to bypass the mmap_min_addr security restriction by limiting the available pages for special mappings. bprm_mm_init() also skips the check, although I don't think this can be used to bypass any restrictions, I don't see any reason not to have the security check.

$ uname -m
x86_64
$ cat /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr
65536
$ cat install_special_mapping.s
section .bss
    resb BSS_SIZE
section .text
    global _start
    _start:
        mov     eax, __NR_pause
        int     0x80
$ nasm -D__NR_pause=29 -DBSS_SIZE=0xfffed000 -f elf -o install_special_mapping.o install_special_mapping.s
$ ld -m elf_i386 -Ttext=0x10000 -Tbss=0x11000 -o install_special_mapping install_special_mapping.o
$ ./install_special_mapping &
[1] 14303
$ cat /proc/14303/maps 
0000f000-00010000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                                  [vdso]
00010000-00011000 r-xp 00001000 00:19 2453665                            /home/taviso/install_special_mapping
00011000-ffffe000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0                                  [stack]

It's worth noting that Red Hat are shipping with mmap_min_addr set to 4096.

---
 fs/exec.c |    7 +++++++
 mm/mmap.c |    5 +++++
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
fs/exec.c +7 -0
index d68c378..7e8c4b6 100644
@@ -275,7 +275,14 @@ static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	vma->vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS | VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP;
 	vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vma->anon_vma_chain);
+
+	err = security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1);
+
+	if (err)
+		goto err;
+
 	err = insert_vm_struct(mm, vma);
+
 	if (err)
 		goto err;
 
mm/mmap.c +5 -0
index b179abb..1de3f4b 100644
@@ -2479,6 +2479,11 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	vma->vm_ops = &special_mapping_vmops;
 	vma->vm_private_data = pages;
 
+	if (security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1)) {
+		kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
+
 	if (unlikely(insert_vm_struct(mm, vma))) {
 		kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
 		return -ENOMEM;
Signature · 3 lines
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maintainer
#3 lore raw
Quoted 43 lines · On Thu, 9 Dec 2010 20:16:37 +0100 Tavis Ormandy <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 4 lines · Randy Dunlap

Uh, something happened to the tabs at the beginning of each line... I.e., the original file content has been mucked up.

Gah. Apologies, second attempt...

The install_special_mapping routine (used, for example, to setup the vdso) skips the security check before insert_vm_struct, allowing a local attacker to bypass the mmap_min_addr security restriction by limiting the available pages for special mappings. bprm_mm_init() also skips the check, although I don't think this can be used to bypass any restrictions, I don't see any reason not to have the security check.

$ uname -m
x86_64
$ cat /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr
65536
$ cat install_special_mapping.s
section .bss
    resb BSS_SIZE
section .text
    global _start
    _start:
        mov     eax, __NR_pause
        int     0x80
$ nasm -D__NR_pause=29 -DBSS_SIZE=0xfffed000 -f elf -o install_special_mapping.o install_special_mapping.s
$ ld -m elf_i386 -Ttext=0x10000 -Tbss=0x11000 -o install_special_mapping install_special_mapping.o
$ ./install_special_mapping &
[1] 14303
$ cat /proc/14303/maps 
0000f000-00010000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                                  [vdso]
00010000-00011000 r-xp 00001000 00:19 2453665                            /home/taviso/install_special_mapping
00011000-ffffe000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0                                  [stack]

It's worth noting that Red Hat are shipping with mmap_min_addr set to 4096.

...

mm/mmap.c int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, · line 2485

Quoted 7 lines
mm/mmap.c +4 -0
@@ -2479,6 +2479,11 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	vma->vm_ops = &special_mapping_vmops;
 	vma->vm_private_data = pages;
 
+	if (security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1)) {
+		kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
+		return -EPERM;
+	}

This should return the security_file_mmap() errno rather than assuming EPERM. Although it happens to be the case that EPERM is the only errno which security_file_mmap() presently returns, afacit.

Ditto insert_vm_struct(), with s/EPERM/ENOMEM/

Please review and test?

mm/mmap.c renamed from mm/mmap.c~mm-install_special_mapping-skips-security_file_mmap-check-fix +11 -10
@@ -2463,6 +2463,7 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_st
 			    unsigned long vm_flags, struct page **pages)
 {
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+	int ret;
 
 	vma = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (unlikely(vma == NULL))
@@ -2479,21 +2480,21 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_st
 	vma->vm_ops = &special_mapping_vmops;
 	vma->vm_private_data = pages;
 
-	if (security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1)) {
-		kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
-		return -EPERM;
-	}
-
-	if (unlikely(insert_vm_struct(mm, vma))) {
-		kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	}
+	ret = security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = insert_vm_struct(mm, vma);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
 
 	mm->total_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 
 	perf_event_mmap(vma);
-
 	return 0;
+out:
+	kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(mm_all_locks_mutex);

_

Reviewed-by
#4 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Andrew Morton

This should return the security_file_mmap() errno rather than assuming EPERM. Although it happens to be the case that EPERM is the only errno which security_file_mmap() presently returns, afacit.

Ditto insert_vm_struct(), with s/EPERM/ENOMEM/

Please review and test?

Quoted 52 lines
mm/mmap.c renamed from mm/mmap.c~mm-install_special_mapping-skips-security_file_mmap-check-fix +11 -10
@@ -2463,6 +2463,7 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_st
 			    unsigned long vm_flags, struct page **pages)
 {
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+	int ret;
 
 	vma = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (unlikely(vma == NULL))
@@ -2479,21 +2480,21 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_st
 	vma->vm_ops = &special_mapping_vmops;
 	vma->vm_private_data = pages;
 
-	if (security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1)) {
-		kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
-		return -EPERM;
-	}
-
-	if (unlikely(insert_vm_struct(mm, vma))) {
-		kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	}
+	ret = security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = insert_vm_struct(mm, vma);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
 
 	mm->total_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 
 	perf_event_mmap(vma);
-
 	return 0;
+out:
+	kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(mm_all_locks_mutex);

_

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Signature · 2 lines
James Morris
<[email protected]>