install_special_mapping skips security_file_mmap check.
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 install_special_mapping skips security_file_mmap check.
The install_special_mapping routine (used, for example, to setup the vdso) skips the security check before insert_vm_struct, allowing a local attacker to bypass the mmap_min_addr security restriction by limiting the available pages for special mappings. bprm_mm_init() also skips the check, although I don't think this can be used to bypass any restrictions, I don't see any reason not to have the security check.
$ uname -m
x86_64
$ cat /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr
65536
$ cat install_special_mapping.s
section .bss
resb BSS_SIZE
section .text
global _start
_start:
mov eax, __NR_pause
int 0x80
$ nasm -D__NR_pause=29 -DBSS_SIZE=0xfffed000 -f elf -o install_special_mapping.o install_special_mapping.s
$ ld -m elf_i386 -Ttext=0x10000 -Tbss=0x11000 -o install_special_mapping install_special_mapping.o
$ ./install_special_mapping &
[1] 14303
$ cat /proc/14303/maps
0000f000-00010000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso]
00010000-00011000 r-xp 00001000 00:19 2453665 /home/taviso/install_special_mapping
00011000-ffffe000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]It's worth noting that Red Hat are shipping with mmap_min_addr set to 4096.
---
fs/exec.c | 7 +++++++ mm/mmap.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
fs/exec.c +7 -0
@@ -275,7 +275,14 @@ static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm) vma->vm_flags =VM_STACK_FLAGS |VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP ; vma->vm_page_prot =vm_get_page_prot (vma->vm_flags);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&vma->anon_vma_chain); + + err =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , vma->vm_start,1 ); + +if (err) + goto err; + err =insert_vm_struct (mm, vma); +if (err) goto err;
mm/mmap.c +5 -0
@@ -2479,6 +2479,11 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, vma->vm_ops = &special_mapping_vmops; vma->vm_private_data = pages; +if (security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , vma->vm_start,1 )) { +kmem_cache_free (vm_area_cachep, vma); +return -EPERM ; + } +if (unlikely (insert_vm_struct (mm, vma))) {kmem_cache_free (vm_area_cachep, vma);return -ENOMEM ;
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Quoted 18 lines · On Thu, 9 Dec 2010 15:29:42 +0100 Tavis Ormandy wrote:
Signed-off-by Tavis Ormandy <[email protected]>Acked-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Acked-by Robert Swiecki <[email protected]>---
fs/exec.c | 7 +++++++ mm/mmap.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)fs/exec.c +1
-0@@ -275,7 +275,14 @@ static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm) vma->vm_flags =VM_STACK_FLAGS |VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP ; vma->vm_page_prot =vm_get_page_prot (vma->vm_flags);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&vma->anon_vma_chain); +
fs/exec.c static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm) · line 288
Quoted 10 lines
fs/exec.c +6
-0+ err =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , vma->vm_start,1 ); + +if (err) + goto err; + err =insert_vm_struct (mm, vma); +if (err) goto err;
Uh, something happened to the tabs at the beginning of each line... I.e., the original file content has been mucked up.
Quoted 20 lines
mm/mmap.c +5
-0@@ -2479,6 +2479,11 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, vma->vm_ops = &special_mapping_vmops; vma->vm_private_data = pages; +if (security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , vma->vm_start,1 )) { +kmem_cache_free (vm_area_cachep, vma); +return -EPERM ; + } +if (unlikely (insert_vm_struct (mm, vma))) {kmem_cache_free (vm_area_cachep, vma);return -ENOMEM ;Signature · 2 lines
-- -------------------------------------
---
~Randy
*** Remember to use Documentation/SubmitChecklist when testing your code ***
Quoted 4 lines · Randy Dunlap
Uh, something happened to the tabs at the beginning of each line... I.e., the original file content has been mucked up.
Gah. Apologies, second attempt...
The install_special_mapping routine (used, for example, to setup the vdso) skips the security check before insert_vm_struct, allowing a local attacker to bypass the mmap_min_addr security restriction by limiting the available pages for special mappings. bprm_mm_init() also skips the check, although I don't think this can be used to bypass any restrictions, I don't see any reason not to have the security check.
$ uname -m
x86_64
$ cat /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr
65536
$ cat install_special_mapping.s
section .bss
resb BSS_SIZE
section .text
global _start
_start:
mov eax, __NR_pause
int 0x80
$ nasm -D__NR_pause=29 -DBSS_SIZE=0xfffed000 -f elf -o install_special_mapping.o install_special_mapping.s
$ ld -m elf_i386 -Ttext=0x10000 -Tbss=0x11000 -o install_special_mapping install_special_mapping.o
$ ./install_special_mapping &
[1] 14303
$ cat /proc/14303/maps
0000f000-00010000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso]
00010000-00011000 r-xp 00001000 00:19 2453665 /home/taviso/install_special_mapping
00011000-ffffe000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]It's worth noting that Red Hat are shipping with mmap_min_addr set to 4096.
--- fs/exec.c | 7 +++++++ mm/mmap.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
fs/exec.c +7 -0
@@ -275,7 +275,14 @@ static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm) vma->vm_flags =VM_STACK_FLAGS |VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP ; vma->vm_page_prot =vm_get_page_prot (vma->vm_flags);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&vma->anon_vma_chain); + + err =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , vma->vm_start,1 ); + +if (err) + goto err; + err =insert_vm_struct (mm, vma); +if (err) goto err;
mm/mmap.c +5 -0
@@ -2479,6 +2479,11 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, vma->vm_ops = &special_mapping_vmops; vma->vm_private_data = pages; +if (security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , vma->vm_start,1 )) { +kmem_cache_free (vm_area_cachep, vma); +return -EPERM ; + } +if (unlikely (insert_vm_struct (mm, vma))) {kmem_cache_free (vm_area_cachep, vma);return -ENOMEM ;
Signature · 3 lines
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Andrew Morton
maintainerQuoted 43 lines · On Thu, 9 Dec 2010 20:16:37 +0100 Tavis Ormandy <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 4 lines · Randy Dunlap
Uh, something happened to the tabs at the beginning of each line... I.e., the original file content has been mucked up.
Gah. Apologies, second attempt...
The
install_special_mappingroutine (used, for example, to setup the vdso) skips the security check beforeinsert_vm_struct, allowing a local attacker to bypass themmap_min_addrsecurity restriction by limiting the available pages for special mappings.bprm_mm_init()also skips the check, although I don't think this can be used to bypass any restrictions, I don't see any reason not to have the security check.$ uname -m x86_64 $ cat /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr 65536 $ cat install_special_mapping.s section .bss resb BSS_SIZE section .text global _start _start: mov eax, __NR_pause int 0x80 $ nasm -D__NR_pause=29 -DBSS_SIZE=0xfffed000 -f elf -o install_special_mapping.o install_special_mapping.s $ ld -m elf_i386 -Ttext=0x10000 -Tbss=0x11000 -o install_special_mapping install_special_mapping.o $ ./install_special_mapping & [1] 14303 $ cat /proc/14303/maps 0000f000-00010000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 00010000-00011000 r-xp 00001000 00:19 2453665 /home/taviso/install_special_mapping 00011000-ffffe000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]It's worth noting that Red Hat are shipping with
mmap_min_addrset to 4096....
mm/mmap.c int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, · line 2485
Quoted 7 lines
mm/mmap.c +4
-0@@ -2479,6 +2479,11 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, vma->vm_ops = &special_mapping_vmops; vma->vm_private_data = pages; +if (security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , vma->vm_start,1 )) { +kmem_cache_free (vm_area_cachep, vma); +return -EPERM ; + }
This should return the security_file_mmap() errno rather than assuming EPERM. Although it happens to be the case that EPERM is the only errno which security_file_mmap() presently returns, afacit.
Ditto insert_vm_struct(), with s/EPERM/ENOMEM/
Please review and test?
mm/mmap.c renamed from mm/mmap.c~mm-install_special_mapping-skips-security_file_mmap-check-fix +11 -10
@@ -2463,6 +2463,7 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_st unsigned long vm_flags, struct page **pages) { struct vm_area_struct *vma; +int ret; vma =kmem_cache_zalloc (vm_area_cachep,GFP_KERNEL );if (unlikely (vma ==NULL ))
@@ -2479,21 +2480,21 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_st vma->vm_ops = &special_mapping_vmops; vma->vm_private_data = pages; -if (security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , vma->vm_start,1 )) { -kmem_cache_free (vm_area_cachep, vma); -return -EPERM ; - } - -if (unlikely (insert_vm_struct (mm, vma))) { -kmem_cache_free (vm_area_cachep, vma); -return -ENOMEM ; - } + ret =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , vma->vm_start,1 ); +if (ret <0 ) + goto out; + + ret =insert_vm_struct (mm, vma); +if (ret <0 ) + goto out; mm->total_vm += len >>PAGE_SHIFT ;perf_event_mmap (vma); -return 0 ; +out: +kmem_cache_free (vm_area_cachep, vma); +return ret; }static DEFINE_MUTEX (mm_all_locks_mutex);
_
James Morris
Reviewed-byQuoted 7 lines · Andrew Morton
This should return the
security_file_mmap()errno rather than assuming EPERM. Although it happens to be the case that EPERM is the only errno whichsecurity_file_mmap()presently returns, afacit.Ditto
insert_vm_struct(), with s/EPERM/ENOMEM/Please review and test?
Quoted 52 lines
mm/mmap.c renamed from mm/mmap.c~mm-install_special_mapping-skips-security_file_mmap-check-fix +11
-10@@ -2463,6 +2463,7 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_st unsigned long vm_flags, struct page **pages) { struct vm_area_struct *vma; +int ret; vma =kmem_cache_zalloc (vm_area_cachep,GFP_KERNEL );if (unlikely (vma ==NULL ))@@ -2479,21 +2480,21 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_st vma->vm_ops = &special_mapping_vmops; vma->vm_private_data = pages; -if (security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , vma->vm_start,1 )) { -kmem_cache_free (vm_area_cachep, vma); -return -EPERM ; - } - -if (unlikely (insert_vm_struct (mm, vma))) { -kmem_cache_free (vm_area_cachep, vma); -return -ENOMEM ; - } + ret =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , vma->vm_start,1 ); +if (ret <0 ) + goto out; + + ret =insert_vm_struct (mm, vma); +if (ret <0 ) + goto out; mm->total_vm += len >>PAGE_SHIFT ;perf_event_mmap (vma); -return 0 ; +out: +kmem_cache_free (vm_area_cachep, vma); +return ret; }static DEFINE_MUTEX (mm_all_locks_mutex);_
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Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>