x86: do not leak kernel page mapping locations
PATCH 1/1 x86: do not leak kernel page mapping locations
Without this patch, it is trivial to determine kernel page mappings by examining the error code reported to dmesg[1]. Instead, declare the entire kernel memory space as a violation of a present page.
Additionally, since show_unhandled_signals is enabled by default, switch branch hinting to the more realistic expectation, and unobfuscate the setting of the PF_PROT bit to improve readability.
[1] http://vulnfactory.org/blog/2013/02/06/a-linux-memory-trick/
--- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +5 -3
@@ -748,13 +748,15 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, return; }#endif +/* Kernel addresses are always protection faults: */ +if (address >=TASK_SIZE ) + error_code |=PF_PROT ; -if (unlikely (show_unhandled_signals)) +if (likely (show_unhandled_signals))show_signal_msg (regs, error_code, address, tsk); -/* Kernel addresses are always protection faults: */ tsk->thread.cr2 = address; - tsk->thread.error_code = error_code | (address >=TASK_SIZE ); + tsk->thread.error_code = error_code; tsk->thread.trap_nr =X86_TRAP_PF ;force_sig_info_fault (SIGSEGV , si_code, address, tsk,0 );
Signature · 6 lines
1.7.9.5 -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security
H. Peter Anvin
reviewerQuoted 8 lines · Kees Cook
Without this patch, it is trivial to determine kernel page mappings by examining the error code reported to dmesg[1]. Instead, declare the entire kernel memory space as a violation of a present page.
Additionally, since
show_unhandled_signalsis enabled by default, switch branch hinting to the more realistic expectation, and unobfuscate the setting of thePF_PROTbit to improve readability.
Quoted 6 lines
[1] http://vulnfactory.org/blog/2013/02/06/a-linux-memory-trick/
Reported-by Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>Suggested-by Brad Spengler <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>
There is, of course, tons of information in dmesg which can be used for nefarious purposes, and it is hard to avoid that without neutering dmesg to uselessness.
So the question is to some degree how much this adds in isolation from locking down dmesg (and if dmesg_restrict isn't enough, what more do we need...)?
That being said, the patch doesn't seem to do any harm so I acked it and Ingo is going to apply it.
-hpa
[tip:x86/urgent] x86: Do not leak kernel page mapping locations
In reply to Kees CookCommit-ID: e575a86fdc50d013bf3ad3aa81d9100e8e6cc60d Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/e575a86fdc50d013bf3ad3aa81d9100e8e6cc60d Author: Kees Cook <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Thu, 7 Feb 2013 09:44:13 -0800 Committer: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> CommitDate: Thu, 7 Feb 2013 19:57:44 +0100
x86: Do not leak kernel page mapping locations
Without this patch, it is trivial to determine kernel page mappings by examining the error code reported to dmesg[1]. Instead, declare the entire kernel memory space as a violation of a present page.
Additionally, since show_unhandled_signals is enabled by default, switch branch hinting to the more realistic expectation, and unobfuscate the setting of the PF_PROT bit to improve readability.
[1] http://vulnfactory.org/blog/2013/02/06/a-linux-memory-trick/
--- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +5 -3
@@ -748,13 +748,15 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, return; }#endif +/* Kernel addresses are always protection faults: */ +if (address >=TASK_SIZE ) + error_code |=PF_PROT ; -if (unlikely (show_unhandled_signals)) +if (likely (show_unhandled_signals))show_signal_msg (regs, error_code, address, tsk); -/* Kernel addresses are always protection faults: */ tsk->thread.cr2 = address; - tsk->thread.error_code = error_code | (address >=TASK_SIZE ); + tsk->thread.error_code = error_code; tsk->thread.trap_nr =X86_TRAP_PF ;force_sig_info_fault (SIGSEGV , si_code, address, tsk,0 );