3.8.2-stable review
Subsystems (44)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainercover 3.8.2-stable review
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.8.2 release. There are 77 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun Mar 3 19:42:25 UTC 2013. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/stable-review/patch-3.8.2-rc1.gz
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 3.8.2-rc1
Matt Fleming <[email protected]>
efivarfs: guid part of filenames are case-insensitive
Matt Fleming <[email protected]>
efivarfs: Validate filenames much more aggressively
Thomas Renninger <[email protected]>
ACPI: Overriding ACPI tables via initrd only works with an initrd and on X86
Lee, Chun-Yi <[email protected]>
x86, efi: Allow slash in file path of initrd
Alexey Klimov <[email protected]>
usb hid quirks for Masterkit MA901 usb radio
James Ralston <[email protected]>
ahci: Add Device IDs for Intel Wellsburg PCH
Seth Heasley <[email protected]>
ahci: AHCI-mode SATA patch for Intel Avoton DeviceIDs
James Ralston <[email protected]>
ata_piix: Add Device IDs for Intel Wellsburg PCH
Seth Heasley <[email protected]>
ata_piix: IDE-mode SATA patch for Intel Avoton DeviceIDs
Ian Abbott <[email protected]>
staging: comedi: check s->async for poll(), read() and write()
Joseph Salisbury <[email protected]>
ACPI: Add DMI entry for Sony VGN-FW41E_H
Rajanikanth H.V <[email protected]>
ab8500_btemp: Demote initcall sequence
Lee Jones <[email protected]>
ab8500-chargalg: Only root should have write permission on sysfs file
NeilBrown <[email protected]>
bq27x00_battery: Fix bugs introduced with BQ27425 support
Li Zefan <[email protected]>
cgroup: fix exit() vs rmdir() race
Li Zefan <[email protected]>
cpuset: fix cpuset_print_task_mems_allowed() vs rename() race
Seiji Aguchi <[email protected]>
pstore: Avoid deadlock in panic and emergency-restart path
Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
workqueue: consider work function when searching for busy work items
Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
fuse: don't WARN when nlink is zero
Fernando Luis Vázquez Cao <[email protected]>
HID: clean up quirk for Sony RF receivers
Fernando Luis Vázquez Cao <[email protected]>
HID: add support for Sony RF receiver with USB product id 0x0374
J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
svcrpc: fix rpc server shutdown races
J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
svcrpc: make svc_age_temp_xprts enqueue under sv_lock
majianpeng <[email protected]>
nfsd: Fix memleak
Lukas Czerner <[email protected]>
ext4: fix free clusters calculation in bigalloc filesystem
Lukas Czerner <[email protected]>
ext4: fix xattr block allocation/release with bigalloc
Niu Yawei <[email protected]>
ext4: fix race in ext4_mb_add_n_trim()
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
ext4: release sysfs kobject when failing to enable quotas on mount
Eryu Guan <[email protected]>
ext4: check bh in ext4_read_block_bitmap()
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
ext4: return ENOMEM if sb_getblk() fails
Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
media: rc: unlock on error in show_protocols()
Al Viro <[email protected]>
media: omap_vout: find_vma() needs ->mmap_sem held
Laurent Pinchart <[email protected]>
media: v4l: Reset subdev v4l2_dev field to NULL if registration fails
Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
media: cx18/ivtv: fix regression: remove __init from a non-init function
Jan Kara <[email protected]>
ext4: fix possible use-after-free with AIO
Jan Kara <[email protected]>
fs: Fix possible use-after-free with AIO
Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
nbd: fsync and kill block device on shutdown
Xi Wang <[email protected]>
sysctl: fix null checking in bin_dn_node_address()
Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
firewire: add minor number range check to fw_device_init()
Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
block: fix synchronization and limit check in blk_alloc_devt()
Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
idr: fix a subtle bug in idr_get_next()
Roger Pau Monne <[email protected]>
xen-blkback: use balloon pages for persistent grants
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
xen-blkfront: drop the use of llist_for_each_entry_safe
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
xen/blkback: Don't trust the handle from the frontend.
Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
xen-blkback: do not leak mode property
Tomas Henzl <[email protected]>
block: fix ext_devt_idr handling
Xiaowei.Hu <[email protected]>
ocfs2: ac->ac_allow_chain_relink=0 won't disable group relink
Jeff Liu <[email protected]>
ocfs2: fix ocfs2_init_security_and_acl() to initialize acl correctly
Jan Kara <[email protected]>
ocfs2: fix possible use-after-free with AIO
Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
target: Add missing mapped_lun bounds checking during make_mappedlun setup
Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
target: Fix lookup of dynamic NodeACLs during cached demo-mode operation
H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
x86: Make sure we can boot in the case the BDA contains pure garbage
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
doc, kernel-parameters: Document 'console=hvc<n>'
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
doc, xen: Mention 'earlyprintk=xen' in the documentation.
Matt Fleming <[email protected]>
x86, efi: Make "noefi" really disable EFI runtime serivces
Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
x86/apic: Fix parsing of the 'lapic' cmdline option
Steven Rostedt (Red Hat) <[email protected]>
ftrace: Call ftrace cleanup module notifier after all other notifiers
Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
posix-timer: Don't call idr_find() with out-of-range ID
Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
iommu/amd: Initialize device table after dma_ops
Adam Thomas <[email protected]>
UBIFS: fix double free of ubifs_orphan objects
Adam Thomas <[email protected]>
UBIFS: fix use of freed ubifs_orphan objects
Larry Finger <[email protected]>
b43: Fix lockdep splat on module unload
Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
usb: dwc3: gadget: change HIRD threshold to 12
Pratyush Anand <[email protected]>
usb: dwc3: gadget: fix skip LINK_TRB on ISOC
Pratyush Anand <[email protected]>
usb: dwc3: gadget: fix isoc END TRANSFER Condition
Pratyush Anand <[email protected]>
usb: dwc3: gadget: fix missed isoc
Pratyush Anand <[email protected]>
usb: dwc3: Enable usb2 LPM only when connected as usb2.0
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
quota: autoload the quota_v2 module for QFMT_VFS_V1 quota format
Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
IB/srp: Fail I/O requests if the transport is offline
Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
IB/srp: Avoid endless SCSI error handling loop
Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
IB/srp: Avoid sending a task management function needlessly
Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
IB/srp: Track connection state properly
Florian Zeitz <[email protected]>
ALSA: emu10k1: Load firmware when it was already cached
Mihail Zenkov <[email protected]>
ALSA: emu10k1: Fix regression in emu1010 firmware loading
David Henningsson <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda - hdmi: Make jacks phantom, if they're not detectable
Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: bt87x: Make load_all parameter working again
Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
mm: do not grow the stack vma just because of an overrun on preceding vma
-------------
Diffstat:
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 ++ Makefile | 4 +- arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 26 ++++-- arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/head.c | 53 +++++++---- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 5 +- block/genhd.c | 15 ++-- block/partition-generic.c | 2 +- drivers/acpi/Kconfig | 3 +- drivers/acpi/sleep.c | 8 ++ drivers/ata/ahci.c | 24 +++++ drivers/ata/ata_piix.c | 17 ++++ drivers/block/nbd.c | 10 +++ drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c | 7 +- drivers/block/xen-blkback/xenbus.c | 49 +++++----- drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c | 13 ++- drivers/firewire/core-device.c | 4 + drivers/firmware/efivars.c | 144 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- drivers/hid/hid-core.c | 2 + drivers/hid/hid-ids.h | 4 + drivers/hid/hid-sony.c | 18 +++- drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c | 42 +++++---- drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.h | 1 + drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c | 10 +-- drivers/media/pci/cx18/cx18-alsa-main.c | 2 +- drivers/media/pci/cx18/cx18-alsa-pcm.h | 2 +- drivers/media/pci/ivtv/ivtv-alsa-main.c | 2 +- drivers/media/pci/ivtv/ivtv-alsa-pcm.h | 2 +- drivers/media/platform/omap/omap_vout.c | 12 +-- drivers/media/rc/rc-main.c | 4 +- drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-device.c | 30 +++---- drivers/net/wireless/b43/main.c | 3 +- drivers/power/ab8500_btemp.c | 2 +- drivers/power/abx500_chargalg.c | 2 +- drivers/power/bq27x00_battery.c | 2 - drivers/staging/comedi/comedi_fops.c | 8 +- drivers/target/target_core_device.c | 13 +-- drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c | 12 ++- drivers/target/target_core_internal.h | 2 +- drivers/target/target_core_tpg.c | 10 +-- drivers/usb/dwc3/core.h | 2 - drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c | 98 +++++++++++++------- fs/direct-io.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/balloc.c | 13 ++- fs/ext4/extents.c | 25 +++--- fs/ext4/indirect.c | 9 +- fs/ext4/inline.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/inode.c | 11 +-- fs/ext4/mballoc.c | 6 +- fs/ext4/mmp.c | 2 + fs/ext4/page-io.c | 9 +- fs/ext4/resize.c | 8 +- fs/ext4/super.c | 12 ++- fs/ext4/xattr.c | 10 ++- fs/fuse/dir.c | 9 +- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 2 + fs/ocfs2/aops.c | 2 +- fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c | 7 +- fs/ocfs2/suballoc.h | 2 +- fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 2 +- fs/pstore/platform.c | 35 ++++++-- fs/ubifs/orphan.c | 12 ++- fs/ubifs/ubifs.h | 6 +- include/linux/llist.h | 25 ------ include/linux/pstore.h | 6 ++ include/linux/quota.h | 1 + kernel/cgroup.c | 8 ++ kernel/cpuset.c | 12 ++- kernel/posix-timers.c | 7 ++ kernel/sysctl_binary.c | 3 +- kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 46 +++++++--- kernel/workqueue.c | 36 ++++++-- lib/idr.c | 9 +- mm/mmap.c | 27 ++++++ net/sunrpc/svc.c | 9 -- net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c | 72 +++++++-------- sound/pci/bt87x.c | 19 +++- sound/pci/emu10k1/emu10k1_main.c | 6 ++ sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c | 3 + 79 files changed, 795 insertions(+), 356 deletions(-)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 1/77 mm: do not grow the stack vma just because of an overrun on preceding vma
3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
commit 09884964335e85e897876d17783c2ad33cf8a2e0 upstream.
The stack vma is designed to grow automatically (marked with VM_GROWSUP or VM_GROWSDOWN depending on architecture) when an access is made beyond the existing boundary. However, particularly if you have not limited your stack at all ("ulimit -s unlimited"), this can cause the stack to grow even if the access was really just one past *another* segment.
And that's wrong, especially since we first grow the segment, but then immediately later enforce the stack guard page on the last page of the segment. So _despite_ first growing the stack segment as a result of the access, the kernel will then make the access cause a SIGSEGV anyway!
So do the same logic as the guard page check does, and consider an access to within one page of the next segment to be a bad access, rather than growing the stack to abut the next segment.
--- mm/mmap.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
mm/mmap.c +27 -0
@@ -2169,9 +2169,28 @@ int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_strureturn error; } +/* +* Note how expand_stack() refuses to expand the stack all the way to +* abut the next virtual mapping, *unless* that mapping itself is also +* a stack mapping. We want to leave room for a guard page, after all +* (the guard page itself is not added here, that is done by the +* actual page faulting logic) +* +* This matches the behavior of the guard page logic (see mm/memory.c: +* check_stack_guard_page()), which only allows the guard page to be +* removed under these circumstances. +*/ #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP int expand_stack (struct vm_area_struct *vma,unsigned long address) { +struct vm_area_struct *next; + + address &=PAGE_MASK ; + next = vma->vm_next; +if (next && next->vm_start == address +PAGE_SIZE ) { +if (!(next->vm_flags &VM_GROWSUP )) +return -ENOMEM ; + }return expand_upwards (vma, address); }
@@ -2194,6 +2213,14 @@ find_extend_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, un#else int expand_stack (struct vm_area_struct *vma,unsigned long address) { +struct vm_area_struct *prev; + + address &=PAGE_MASK ; + prev = vma->vm_prev; +if (prev && prev->vm_end == address) { +if (!(prev->vm_flags &VM_GROWSDOWN )) +return -ENOMEM ; + }return expand_downwards (vma, address); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 2/77 ALSA: bt87x: Make load_all parameter working again
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit aacfddfdadb3540651d263245069631f341e953a upstream.
Along with a clean up commit [e9f66d9b9: ALSA: pci: clean up using module_pci_driver()], bt87x driver lost the functionality of load_all parameter. This patch does a partial revert of the commit only for bt87x.c to recover it.
--- sound/pci/bt87x.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
sound/pci/bt87x.c +17 -2
@@ -836,6 +836,8 @@ static struct { {0x7063, 0x2000}, /* pcHDTV HD-2000 TV */ }; +static struct pci_driver driver; +/* return the id of the card, or a negative value if it's blacklisted */ static int snd_bt87x_detect_card (struct pci_dev *pci) {
@@ -962,11 +964,24 @@ static DEFINE_PCI_DEVICE_TABLE(snd_bt87x { } }; -static struct pci_driver bt87x_driver = { +static struct pci_driver driver = { .name =KBUILD_MODNAME , .id_table = snd_bt87x_ids, .probe = snd_bt87x_probe, .remove = snd_bt87x_remove, }; -module_pci_driver (bt87x_driver); +static int __init alsa_card_bt87x_init (void ) +{ +if (load_all) + driver.id_table = snd_bt87x_default_ids; +return pci_register_driver (&driver); +} + +static void __exit alsa_card_bt87x_exit(void) +{ +pci_unregister_driver (&driver); +} + +module_init (alsa_card_bt87x_init) +module_exit (alsa_card_bt87x_exit)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 3/77 ALSA: hda - hdmi: Make jacks phantom, if theyre not detectable
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Henningsson <[email protected]>
commit 30efd8debd1ef30be342d374f01e993509f5b76b upstream.
Just as for analog codecs, a jack that isn't suitable for detection (in this case, NO_PRESENCE was set) should be a phantom Jack instead of a normal one.
Thanks to Raymond Yau for spotting.
--- sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c +3 -0
@@ -1573,6 +1573,9 @@ static int generic_hdmi_build_jack(strucif (pcmdev >0 )sprintf (hdmi_str +strlen (hdmi_str),",pcm=%d" , pcmdev); +if (!is_jack_detectable (codec, per_pin->pin_nid)) +strncat (hdmi_str," Phantom" , +sizeof (hdmi_str) -strlen (hdmi_str) -1 );return snd_hda_jack_add_kctl (codec, per_pin->pin_nid, hdmi_str,0 ); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 4/77 ALSA: emu10k1: Fix regression in emu1010 firmware loading
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mihail Zenkov <[email protected]>
commit d28215996b0c3a900411769039aa3c54cf7008ab upstream.
This patch fix regression in emu1010 firmware loading after
http://git.alsa-project.org/?p=alsa-kprivate.git;a=commitdiff;h=b209c4dfcd960ab176d4746ab7dc442a3edb4575
I just revert small part of this commit. Tested on emu1212m pci.
--- sound/pci/emu10k1/emu10k1_main.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
sound/pci/emu10k1/emu10k1_main.c +5 -0
@@ -860,6 +860,11 @@ static int snd_emu10k1_emu1010_init(stru }snd_printk (KERN_INFO "emu1010: firmware file = %s, size = 0x%zx\n" , filename, emu->firmware->size); + err =snd_emu1010_load_firmware (emu); +if (err !=0 ) { +snd_printk (KERN_INFO "emu1010: Loading Firmware file %s failed\n" , filename); +return err; + } }/* ID, should read & 0x7f = 0x55 when FPGA programmed. */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 5/77 ALSA: emu10k1: Load firmware when it was already cached
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Florian Zeitz <[email protected]>
commit b56ddbe55a363eee4ff7410a97050dad08215f7c upstream.
This expands the regression fix from d28215996b0c3a900411769039aa3c54cf7008ab.
The firmware also needs to be loaded when it was already cached.
--- sound/pci/emu10k1/emu10k1_main.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
sound/pci/emu10k1/emu10k1_main.c +6 -5
@@ -860,11 +860,12 @@ static int snd_emu10k1_emu1010_init(stru }snd_printk (KERN_INFO "emu1010: firmware file = %s, size = 0x%zx\n" , filename, emu->firmware->size); - err =snd_emu1010_load_firmware (emu); -if (err !=0 ) { -snd_printk (KERN_INFO "emu1010: Loading Firmware file %s failed\n" , filename); -return err; - } + } + + err =snd_emu1010_load_firmware (emu); +if (err !=0 ) { +snd_printk (KERN_INFO "emu1010: Loading Firmware failed\n" ); +return err; }/* ID, should read & 0x7f = 0x55 when FPGA programmed. */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 6/77 IB/srp: Track connection state properly
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
commit e1b2f13aba9ff714d23ecd4a950e744ee7ad72e1 upstream.
Remove an assignment that incorrectly overwrites the connection state update by srp_connect_target().
--- drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c +0 -1
@@ -1972,7 +1972,6 @@ static int srp_add_target(struct srp_hosspin_unlock (&host->target_lock); target->state =SRP_TARGET_LIVE ; - target->connected = false;scsi_scan_target (&target->scsi_host->shost_gendev,0 , target->scsi_id,SCAN_WILD_CARD ,0 );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 7/77 IB/srp: Avoid sending a task management function needlessly
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
commit 3780d1f08856f692116bcf026e4acf1c521df1c7 upstream.
Do not send a task management function if sending will fail anyway because either there is no RDMA/RC connection or the QP is in the error state.
--- drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c +3 -2
@@ -1695,6 +1695,9 @@ static int srp_send_tsk_mgmt(struct srp_struct srp_iu *iu;struct srp_tsk_mgmt *tsk_mgmt; +if (!target->connected || target->qp_in_error) +return -1 ; +init_completion (&target->tsk_mgmt_done);spin_lock_irq (&target->lock);
@@ -1754,8 +1757,6 @@ static int srp_reset_device(struct scsi_shost_printk (KERN_ERR , target->scsi_host,"SRP reset_device called\n" ); -if (target->qp_in_error) -return FAILED ;if (srp_send_tsk_mgmt (target,SRP_TAG_NO_REQ , scmnd->device->lun,SRP_TSK_LUN_RESET ))return FAILED ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 8/77 IB/srp: Avoid endless SCSI error handling loop
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
commit c7c4e7ff8047e43c45628b85ac200582e9404c39 upstream.
If a SCSI command times out it is passed to the SCSI error handler. The SCSI error handler will try to abort the commands that timed out. If aborting fails, a device reset will be attempted. If the device reset also fails a host reset will be attempted. If the host reset also fails the whole procedure will be repeated.
srp_abort() and srp_reset_device() fail for a QP in the error state. srp_reset_host() fails after host removal has started. Hence if the SCSI error handler gets invoked after host removal has started and with the QP in the error state an endless loop will be triggered.
Modify the SCSI error handling functions in ib_srp as follows:
- Abort SCSI commands properly even if the QP is in the error state.
- Make srp_reset_host() reset SCSI requests even after host removal has already started or if reconnecting fails.
--- drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c | 29 +++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c +15 -14
@@ -700,23 +700,24 @@ static int srp_reconnect_target(struct sstruct Scsi_Host *shost = target->scsi_host;int i, ret; -if (target->state !=SRP_TARGET_LIVE ) -return -EAGAIN ; -scsi_target_block (&shost->shost_gendev);srp_disconnect_target (target);/* -* Now get a new local CM ID so that we avoid confusing the -* target in case things are really fouled up. +* Now get a new local CM ID so that we avoid confusing the target in +* case things are really fouled up. Doing so also ensures that all CM +* callbacks will have finished before a new QP is allocated. */ ret =srp_new_cm_id (target); -if (ret) - goto unblock; - - ret =srp_create_target_ib (target); -if (ret) - goto unblock; +/* +* Whether or not creating a new CM ID succeeded, create a new +* QP. This guarantees that all completion callback function +* invocations have finished before request resetting starts. +*/ +if (ret ==0 ) + ret =srp_create_target_ib (target); +else +srp_create_target_ib (target);for (i =0 ; i <SRP_CMD_SQ_SIZE ; ++i) {struct srp_request *req = &target->req_ring[i];
@@ -728,9 +729,9 @@ static int srp_reconnect_target(struct sfor (i =0 ; i <SRP_SQ_SIZE ; ++i)list_add (&target->tx_ring[i]->list, &target->free_tx); - ret =srp_connect_target (target); +if (ret ==0 ) + ret =srp_connect_target (target); -unblock:scsi_target_unblock (&shost->shost_gendev, ret ==0 ?SDEV_RUNNING :SDEV_TRANSPORT_OFFLINE );
@@ -1739,7 +1740,7 @@ static int srp_abort(struct scsi_cmnd *sshost_printk (KERN_ERR , target->scsi_host,"SRP abort called\n" ); -if (!req || target->qp_in_error || !srp_claim_req (target, req, scmnd)) +if (!req || !srp_claim_req (target, req, scmnd))return FAILED ;srp_send_tsk_mgmt (target, req->index, scmnd->device->lun,SRP_TSK_ABORT_TASK );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 9/77 IB/srp: Fail I/O requests if the transport is offline
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
commit 2ce19e72f4d570c87e025ee6fca4eae699a8b712 upstream.
If an SRP target is no longer reachable and srp_reset_host() fails to reconnect then ib_srp will invoke scsi_remove_host(). That function will invoke __scsi_remove_device() for each LUN. And that last function will change the device state from SDEV_TRANSPORT_OFFLINE into SDEV_CANCEL. Certain user space software, e.g. older versions of multipathd, continue queueing I/O to SCSI devices that are in the SDEV_CANCEL state.
If these I/O requests are submitted as SG_IO that means that the REQ_PREEMPT flag will be set and hence that these requests will be passed to srp_queuecommand(). These requests will time out. If new requests are queued fast enough from user space these active requests will prevent __scsi_remove_device() to finish.
Avoid this by failing I/O requests in the SDEV_CANCEL state if the transport is offline. Introduce a new variable to keep track of the transport state instead of failing requests if (!target->connected || target->qp_in_error), so that the SCSI error handler has a chance to retry commands after a transport layer failure occurred.
--- drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c | 7 +++++++ drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c +7 -0
@@ -734,6 +734,7 @@ static int srp_reconnect_target(struct sscsi_target_unblock (&shost->shost_gendev, ret ==0 ?SDEV_RUNNING :SDEV_TRANSPORT_OFFLINE ); + target->transport_offline = !!ret;if (ret) goto err;
@@ -1353,6 +1354,12 @@ static int srp_queuecommand(struct Scsi_unsigned long flags;int len; +if (unlikely (target->transport_offline)) { + scmnd->result =DID_NO_CONNECT <<16 ; + scmnd->scsi_done (scmnd); +return 0 ; + } +spin_lock_irqsave (&target->lock, flags); iu =__srp_get_tx_iu (target,SRP_IU_CMD );if (!iu)
drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.h +1 -0
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ struct srp_target_port {unsigned int cmd_sg_cnt;unsigned int indirect_size;bool allow_ext_sg; +bool transport_offline;/* Everything above this point is used in the hot path of * command processing. Try to keep them packed into cachelines.
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 10/77 quota: autoload the quota_v2 module for QFMT_VFS_V1 quota format
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit c3ad83d9efdfe6a86efd44945a781f00c879b7b4 upstream.
Otherwise, ext4 file systems with the quota featured enable will get a very confusing "No such process" error message if the quota code is built as a module and the quota_v2 module has not been loaded.
--- include/linux/quota.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
include/linux/quota.h +1 -0
@@ -405,6 +405,7 @@ struct quota_module_name {#define INIT_QUOTA_MODULE_NAMES {\ {QFMT_VFS_OLD, "quota_v1"},\ {QFMT_VFS_V0, "quota_v2"},\ + {QFMT_VFS_V1, "quota_v2"},\ {0, NULL}}#endif /* _QUOTA_ */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 11/77 usb: dwc3: Enable usb2 LPM only when connected as usb2.0
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pratyush Anand <[email protected]>
commit 2b758350af19db9a5c98241cf222c2e211d7a912 upstream.
Synopsys says:
The HIRD Threshold field must be set to ‘0’ when the device core is operating in super speed mode.
This patch implements above statement.
--- drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c +18 -13
@@ -2157,6 +2157,23 @@ static void dwc3_gadget_conndone_interrubreak ; } +/* Enable USB2 LPM Capability */ + +if ((dwc->revision >DWC3_REVISION_194A ) + && (speed !=DWC3_DCFG_SUPERSPEED )) { + reg =dwc3_readl (dwc->regs,DWC3_DCFG ); + reg |=DWC3_DCFG_LPM_CAP ; +dwc3_writel (dwc->regs,DWC3_DCFG , reg); + + reg =dwc3_readl (dwc->regs,DWC3_DCTL ); + reg &= ~(DWC3_DCTL_HIRD_THRES_MASK |DWC3_DCTL_L1_HIBER_EN ); + +/* TODO: This should be configurable */ + reg |=DWC3_DCTL_HIRD_THRES (28 ); + +dwc3_writel (dwc->regs,DWC3_DCTL , reg); + } +/* Recent versions support automatic phy suspend and don't need this */ if (dwc->revision <DWC3_REVISION_194A ) {/* Suspend unneeded PHY */
@@ -2463,20 +2480,8 @@ int dwc3_gadget_init(struct dwc3 *dwc) DWC3_DEVTEN_DISCONNEVTEN);dwc3_writel (dwc->regs,DWC3_DEVTEN , reg); -/* Enable USB2 LPM and automatic phy suspend only on recent versions */ +/* automatic phy suspend only on recent versions */ if (dwc->revision >=DWC3_REVISION_194A ) { - reg =dwc3_readl (dwc->regs,DWC3_DCFG ); - reg |=DWC3_DCFG_LPM_CAP ; -dwc3_writel (dwc->regs,DWC3_DCFG , reg); - - reg =dwc3_readl (dwc->regs,DWC3_DCTL ); - reg &= ~(DWC3_DCTL_HIRD_THRES_MASK |DWC3_DCTL_L1_HIBER_EN ); - -/* TODO: This should be configurable */ - reg |=DWC3_DCTL_HIRD_THRES (28 ); - -dwc3_writel (dwc->regs,DWC3_DCTL , reg); -dwc3_gadget_usb2_phy_suspend (dwc, false);dwc3_gadget_usb3_phy_suspend (dwc, false); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 12/77 usb: dwc3: gadget: fix missed isoc
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pratyush Anand <[email protected]>
commit 7efea86c2868b8fd9df65e589e33aebe498ce21d upstream.
There are two reasons to generate missed isoc.
1. when the host does not poll for all the data.
2. because of application-side delays that prevent all the data from being transferred in programmed microframe.
Current code was able to handle first case only. This patch handles scenario 2 as well.Scenario 2 sometime may occur with complex gadget application, however it can be easily reproduced for testing purpose as follows:
a. use isoc binterval as 1 in f_sourcesink.
b. use pattern=0
c. introduce a delay of 150us deliberately in source_sink_complete, so that after few frames it lands into scenario 2.
d. now run testusb 16 (isoc in test). You will notice that if this patch is not applied then isoc transfer is not able to recover after first missed.
Current patch's approach is as under:
If missed isoc occurs and there is no request queued then issue END TRANSFER, so that core generates next xfernotready and we will issue a fresh START TRANSFER.
If there are still queued request then wait, do not issue either END or UPDATE TRANSFER, just attach next request in request_list during giveback. If any future queued request is successfully transferred then we will issue UPDATE TRANSFER for all request in the request_list.
--- drivers/usb/dwc3/core.h | 2 -- drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/dwc3/core.h +0 -2
@@ -405,7 +405,6 @@ struct dwc3_event_buffer {* @number: endpoint number (1 - 15) * @type: set to bmAttributes & USB_ENDPOINT_XFERTYPE_MASK * @resource_index: Resource transfer index -* @current_uf: Current uf received through last event parameter * @interval: the intervall on which the ISOC transfer is started * @name: a human readable name e.g. ep1out-bulk * @direction: true for TX, false for RX
@@ -439,7 +438,6 @@ struct dwc3_ep {u8 number;u8 type;u8 resource_index; -u16 current_uf;u32 interval;char name[20 ];
drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c +24 -12
@@ -1117,16 +1117,6 @@ static int __dwc3_gadget_ep_queue(struct dep->name); } -/* -* 3. Missed ISOC Handling. We need to start isoc transfer on the saved -* uframe number. -*/ -if (usb_endpoint_xfer_isoc (dep->endpoint.desc) && - (dep->flags &DWC3_EP_MISSED_ISOC )) { -__dwc3_gadget_start_isoc (dwc, dep, dep->current_uf); - dep->flags &= ~DWC3_EP_MISSED_ISOC ; - } -return 0 ; }
@@ -1689,14 +1679,29 @@ static int dwc3_cleanup_done_reqs(structif (trb_status ==DWC3_TRBSTS_MISSED_ISOC ) {dev_dbg (dwc->dev,"incomplete IN transfer %s\n" , dep->name); - dep->current_uf = event->parameters & - ~(dep->interval -1 ); +/* +* If missed isoc occurred and there is +* no request queued then issue END +* TRANSFER, so that core generates +* next xfernotready and we will issue +* a fresh START TRANSFER. +* If there are still queued request +* then wait, do not issue either END +* or UPDATE TRANSFER, just attach next +* request in request_list during +* giveback.If any future queued request +* is successfully transferred then we +* will issue UPDATE TRANSFER for all +* request in the request_list. +*/ dep->flags |=DWC3_EP_MISSED_ISOC ; }else {dev_err (dwc->dev,"incomplete IN transfer %s\n" , dep->name); status = -ECONNRESET ; } + }else { + dep->flags &= ~DWC3_EP_MISSED_ISOC ; } }else {if (count && (event->status &DEPEVT_STATUS_SHORT ))
@@ -1723,6 +1728,13 @@ static int dwc3_cleanup_done_reqs(structbreak ; }while (1 ); +if (list_empty (&dep->req_queued) && + (dep->flags &DWC3_EP_MISSED_ISOC )) { +dwc3_stop_active_transfer (dwc, dep->number); + dep->flags &= ~DWC3_EP_MISSED_ISOC ; +return 1 ; + } +if ((event->status &DEPEVT_STATUS_IOC ) && (trb->ctrl &DWC3_TRB_CTRL_IOC ))return 0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 13/77 usb: dwc3: gadget: fix isoc END TRANSFER Condition
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pratyush Anand <[email protected]>
commit cdc359dd87ab6c39a67dab724fd0b61c16e6f08b upstream.
There were still some corner cases where isoc transfer was not able to restart, specially when missed isoc does not happen , and in fact gadget does not queue any new request during giveback.
Cleanup function calls giveback first, which provides a way to queue another request to gadget. But gadget did not had any data. So , it did not call ep_queue. To twist it further, gadget did not queue till cleanup for last queued TRB is called. If we ever reach this scenario, we must call END TRANSFER, so that we receive a new xfernotready with information about current microframe number.
Also insure that there is no request submitted to core when issuing END TRANSFER.
--- drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c +18 -5
@@ -1091,7 +1091,10 @@ static int __dwc3_gadget_ep_queue(struct* notion of current microframe. */ if (usb_endpoint_xfer_isoc (dep->endpoint.desc)) { -dwc3_stop_active_transfer (dwc, dep->number); +if (list_empty (&dep->req_queued)) { +dwc3_stop_active_transfer (dwc, dep->number); + dep->flags =DWC3_EP_ENABLED ; + }return 0 ; }
@@ -1728,10 +1731,20 @@ static int dwc3_cleanup_done_reqs(structbreak ; }while (1 ); -if (list_empty (&dep->req_queued) && - (dep->flags &DWC3_EP_MISSED_ISOC )) { -dwc3_stop_active_transfer (dwc, dep->number); - dep->flags &= ~DWC3_EP_MISSED_ISOC ; +if (usb_endpoint_xfer_isoc (dep->endpoint.desc) && +list_empty (&dep->req_queued)) { +if (list_empty (&dep->request_list)) { +/* +* If there is no entry in request list then do +* not issue END TRANSFER now. Just set PENDING +* flag, so that END TRANSFER is issued when an +* entry is added into request list. +*/ + dep->flags =DWC3_EP_PENDING_REQUEST ; + }else { +dwc3_stop_active_transfer (dwc, dep->number); + dep->flags =DWC3_EP_ENABLED ; + }return 1 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 14/77 usb: dwc3: gadget: fix skip LINK_TRB on ISOC
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pratyush Anand <[email protected]>
commit 915e202aeeb59e272992a6364c910aaef3073544 upstream.
When we reach to link trb, we just need to increase free_slot and then calculate TRB. Return is not correct, as it will cause wrong TRB DMA address to fetch in case of update transfer.
--- drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c | 13 +++++-------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c +5 -8
@@ -754,21 +754,18 @@ static void dwc3_prepare_one_trb(structstruct dwc3 *dwc = dep->dwc;struct dwc3_trb *trb; -unsigned int cur_slot; -dev_vdbg (dwc->dev,"%s: req %p dma %08llx length %d%s%s\n" , dep->name, req, (unsigned long long ) dma, length, last ?" last" :"" , chain ?" chain" :"" ); - trb = &dep->trb_pool[dep->free_slot &DWC3_TRB_MASK ]; - cur_slot = dep->free_slot; - dep->free_slot++; -/* Skip the LINK-TRB on ISOC */ -if (((cur_slot &DWC3_TRB_MASK ) ==DWC3_TRB_NUM -1 ) && +if (((dep->free_slot &DWC3_TRB_MASK ) ==DWC3_TRB_NUM -1 ) &&usb_endpoint_xfer_isoc (dep->endpoint.desc)) -return ; + dep->free_slot++; + + trb = &dep->trb_pool[dep->free_slot &DWC3_TRB_MASK ]; + dep->free_slot++;if (!req->trb) {dwc3_gadget_move_request_queued (req);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 15/77 usb: dwc3: gadget: change HIRD threshold to 12
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
commit 1a947746dbe1486d0e305ab512ddf085b7874cb3 upstream.
First of all, that 28 value makes no sense as HIRD threshold is a 4-bit value, second of all it's causing issues for OMAP5.
Using 12 because commit cbc725b3 (usb: dwc3:
keep default hird threshold value as 4b1100) had the intention of setting the maximum allowed value of 0xc.
Also, original code has been wrong forever, so this should be backported as far back as possible.
--- drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c +5 -2
@@ -2190,8 +2190,11 @@ static void dwc3_gadget_conndone_interru reg =dwc3_readl (dwc->regs,DWC3_DCTL ); reg &= ~(DWC3_DCTL_HIRD_THRES_MASK |DWC3_DCTL_L1_HIBER_EN ); -/* TODO: This should be configurable */ - reg |=DWC3_DCTL_HIRD_THRES (28 ); +/* +* TODO: This should be configurable. For now using +* maximum allowed HIRD threshold value of 0b1100 +*/ + reg |=DWC3_DCTL_HIRD_THRES (12 );dwc3_writel (dwc->regs,DWC3_DCTL , reg); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 16/77 b43: Fix lockdep splat on module unload
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Larry Finger <[email protected]>
commit 63a02ce1c5c59baa40b99756492e3ec8d6b51483 upstream.
On unload, b43 produces a lockdep warning that can be summarized in the following way:
======================================================
[ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
3.8.0-wl+ #117 Not tainted
-------------------------------------------------------
modprobe/5557 is trying to acquire lock:
((&wl->firmware_load)){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81062160>] flush_work+0x0/0x2a0
but task is already holding lock:
(rtnl_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff813bd7d2>] rtnl_lock+0x12/0x20
which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
======================================================
The full output is available at http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1302.3/00060.html.
To summarize, commit 6b6fa58 added a 'cancel_work_sync(&wl->firmware_load)'
call in the wrong place.
The fix is to move the cancel_work_sync() call to b43_bcma_remove() and b43_ssb_remove(). Thanks to Johannes Berg and Michael Buesch for help in diagnosing the log output.
--- drivers/net/wireless/b43/main.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/b43/main.c +2 -1
@@ -4214,7 +4214,6 @@ redo:mutex_unlock (&wl->mutex);cancel_delayed_work_sync (&dev->periodic_work);cancel_work_sync (&wl->tx_work); -cancel_work_sync (&wl->firmware_load);mutex_lock (&wl->mutex); dev = wl->current_dev;if (!dev ||b43_status (dev) <B43_STAT_STARTED ) {
@@ -5434,6 +5433,7 @@ static void b43_bcma_remove(struct bcma_/* We must cancel any work here before unregistering from ieee80211, * as the ieee80211 unreg will destroy the workqueue. */ cancel_work_sync (&wldev->restart_work); +cancel_work_sync (&wl->firmware_load);B43_WARN_ON (!wl);if (!wldev->fw.ucode.data)
@@ -5510,6 +5510,7 @@ static void b43_ssb_remove(struct ssb_de/* We must cancel any work here before unregistering from ieee80211, * as the ieee80211 unreg will destroy the workqueue. */ cancel_work_sync (&wldev->restart_work); +cancel_work_sync (&wl->firmware_load);B43_WARN_ON (!wl);if (!wldev->fw.ucode.data)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 17/77 UBIFS: fix use of freed ubifs_orphan objects
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Adam Thomas <[email protected]>
commit 2928f0d0c5ebd6c9605c0d98207a44376387c298 upstream.
The last orphan in the cnext list has its cnext set to NULL. Because of that, ubifs_delete_orphan assumes that it is not on the cnext list and frees it immediately instead of adding it to the dnext list. The freed orphan is later modified by write_orph_node.
This can cause various inconsistencies including directory entries that cannot be removed and this error:
UBIFS error (pid 20685): layout_cnodes: LPT out of space at LEB 14:129009 needing 17, done_ltab 1, done_lsave 1
This is a regression introduced by
"7074e5eb UBIFS: remove invalid reference to list iterator variable".
This change adds an explicit flag to ubifs_orphan indicating whether it is pending commit.
--- fs/ubifs/orphan.c | 7 ++++++- fs/ubifs/ubifs.h | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ubifs/orphan.c +6 -1
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ void ubifs_delete_orphan(struct ubifs_in (unsigned long)inum);return ; } -if (o->cnext) { +if (o->cmt) { o->dnext = c->orph_dnext; c->orph_dnext = o;spin_unlock (&c->orphan_lock);
@@ -172,7 +172,9 @@ int ubifs_orphan_start_commit(struct ubi last = &c->orph_cnext;list_for_each_entry (orphan, &c->orph_new, new_list) {ubifs_assert (orphan->new); +ubifs_assert (!orphan->cmt); orphan->new =0 ; + orphan->cmt =1 ; *last = orphan; last = &orphan->cnext; }
@@ -299,7 +301,9 @@ static int write_orph_node(struct ubifs_ cnext = c->orph_cnext;for (i =0 ; i < cnt; i++) { orphan = cnext; +ubifs_assert (orphan->cmt); orph->inos[i] =cpu_to_le64 (orphan->inum); + orphan->cmt =0 ; cnext = orphan->cnext; orphan->cnext =NULL ; }
@@ -378,6 +382,7 @@ static int consolidate(struct ubifs_infolist_for_each_entry (orphan, &c->orph_list, list) {if (orphan->new)continue ; + orphan->cmt =1 ; *last = orphan; last = &orphan->cnext; cnt +=1 ;
fs/ubifs/ubifs.h +3 -1
@@ -904,6 +904,7 @@ struct ubifs_budget_req {* @dnext: next orphan to delete * @inum: inode number * @new: %1 => added since the last commit, otherwise %0 +* @cmt: %1 => commit pending, otherwise %0 */ struct ubifs_orphan {struct rb_node rb;
@@ -912,7 +913,8 @@ struct ubifs_orphan {struct ubifs_orphan *cnext;struct ubifs_orphan *dnext;ino_t inum; -int new; + unsigned new:1; + unsigned cmt:1; };/**
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 18/77 UBIFS: fix double free of ubifs_orphan objects
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Adam Thomas <[email protected]>
commit 8afd500cb52a5d00bab4525dd5a560d199f979b9 upstream.
The last orphan in the dnext list has its dnext set to NULL. Because of that, ubifs_delete_orphan assumes that it is not on the dnext list and frees it immediately instead ignoring it as a second delete. The orphan is later freed again by erase_deleted.
This change adds an explicit flag to ubifs_orphan indicating whether it is pending delete.
--- fs/ubifs/orphan.c | 5 ++++- fs/ubifs/ubifs.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ubifs/orphan.c +4 -1
@@ -126,13 +126,14 @@ void ubifs_delete_orphan(struct ubifs_inelse if (inum > o->inum) p = p->rb_right;else { -if (o->dnext) { +if (o->del) {spin_unlock (&c->orphan_lock);dbg_gen ("deleted twice ino %lu" , (unsigned long )inum);return ; }if (o->cmt) { + o->del =1 ; o->dnext = c->orph_dnext; c->orph_dnext = o;spin_unlock (&c->orphan_lock);
@@ -447,6 +448,7 @@ static void erase_deleted(struct ubifs_i orphan = dnext; dnext = orphan->dnext;ubifs_assert (!orphan->new); +ubifs_assert (orphan->del);rb_erase (&orphan->rb, &c->orph_tree);list_del (&orphan->list); c->tot_orphans -=1 ;
@@ -536,6 +538,7 @@ static int insert_dead_orphan(struct ubirb_link_node (&orphan->rb, parent, p);rb_insert_color (&orphan->rb, &c->orph_tree);list_add_tail (&orphan->list, &c->orph_list); + orphan->del =1 ; orphan->dnext = c->orph_dnext; c->orph_dnext = orphan; dbg_mnt("ino %lu, new %d, tot %d", (unsigned long)inum,
fs/ubifs/ubifs.h +2 -0
@@ -905,6 +905,7 @@ struct ubifs_budget_req {* @inum: inode number * @new: %1 => added since the last commit, otherwise %0 * @cmt: %1 => commit pending, otherwise %0 +* @del: %1 => delete pending, otherwise %0 */ struct ubifs_orphan {struct rb_node rb;
@@ -915,6 +916,7 @@ struct ubifs_orphan {ino_t inum; unsigned new:1; unsigned cmt:1; + unsigned del:1; };/**
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 19/77 iommu/amd: Initialize device table after dma_ops
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
commit f528d980c17b8714aedc918ba86e058af914d66b upstream.
When dma_ops are initialized the unity mappings are created. The init_device_table_dma() function makes sure DMA from all devices is blocked by default. This opens a short window in time where DMA to unity mapped regions is blocked by the IOMMU. Make sure this does not happen by initializing the device table after dma_ops.
--- drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c +5 -5
@@ -1876,11 +1876,6 @@ static int amd_iommu_init_dma(void)struct amd_iommu *iommu;int ret; -init_device_table_dma (); - -for_each_iommu (iommu) -iommu_flush_all_caches (iommu); -if (iommu_pass_through) ret =amd_iommu_init_passthrough ();else
@@ -1889,6 +1884,11 @@ static int amd_iommu_init_dma(void)if (ret)return ret; +init_device_table_dma (); + +for_each_iommu (iommu) +iommu_flush_all_caches (iommu); +amd_iommu_init_api ();amd_iommu_init_notifier ();
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 20/77 posix-timer: Dont call idr_find() with out-of-range ID
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
commit e182bb38d7db7494fa5dcd82da17fe0dedf60ecf upstream.
When idr_find() was fed a negative ID, it used to look up the ID ignoring the sign bit before recent ("idr: remove MAX_IDR_MASK and move left MAX_IDR_* into idr.c") patch. Now a negative ID triggers a WARN_ON_ONCE().
__lock_timer() feeds timer_id from userland directly to idr_find() without sanitizing it which can trigger the above malfunctions. Add a range check on @timer_id before invoking idr_find() in __lock_timer().
While timer_t is defined as int by all archs at the moment, Andrew worries that it may be defined as a larger type later on. Make the test cover larger integers too so that it at least is guaranteed to not return the wrong timer.
Note that WARN_ON_ONCE() in idr_find() on id < 0 is transitional precaution while moving away from ignoring MSB. Once it's gone we can remove the guard as long as timer_t isn't larger than int.
--- kernel/posix-timers.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
kernel/posix-timers.c +7 -0
@@ -639,6 +639,13 @@ static struct k_itimer *__lock_timer(tim {struct k_itimer *timr; +/* +* timer_t could be any type >= int and we want to make sure any +* @timer_id outside positive int range fails lookup. +*/ +if ((unsigned long long )timer_id >INT_MAX ) +return NULL ; +rcu_read_lock (); timr =idr_find (&posix_timers_id, (int )timer_id);if (timr) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 21/77 ftrace: Call ftrace cleanup module notifier after all other notifiers
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Steven Rostedt (Red Hat)" <[email protected]>
commit 8c189ea64eea01ca20d102ddb74d6936dd16c579 upstream.
Commit: c1bf08ac "ftrace: Be first to run code modification on modules"
changed ftrace module notifier's priority to INT_MAX in order to process the ftrace nops before anything else could touch them (namely kprobes). This was the correct thing to do.
Unfortunately, the ftrace module notifier also contains the ftrace clean up code. As opposed to the set up code, this code should be run *after* all the module notifiers have run in case a module is doing correct clean-up and unregisters its ftrace hooks. Basically, ftrace needs to do clean up on module removal, as it needs to know about code being removed so that it doesn't try to modify that code. But after it removes the module from its records, if a ftrace user tries to remove a probe, that removal will fail due as the record of that code segment no longer exists.
Nothing really bad happens if the probe removal is called after ftrace did the clean up, but the ftrace removal function will return an error. Correct code (such as kprobes) will produce a WARN_ON() if it fails to remove the probe. As people get annoyed by frivolous warnings, it's best to do the ftrace clean up after everything else.
By splitting the ftrace_module_notifier into two notifiers, one that does the module load setup that is run at high priority, and the other that is called for module clean up that is run at low priority, the problem is solved.
--- kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
kernel/trace/ftrace.c +32 -14
@@ -3970,37 +3970,51 @@ static void ftrace_init_module(struct moftrace_process_locs (mod, start, end); } -static int ftrace_module_notify (struct notifier_block *self, -unsigned long val,void *data) +static int ftrace_module_notify_enter (struct notifier_block *self, +unsigned long val,void *data) {struct module *mod = data; -switch (val) { -case MODULE_STATE_COMING : +if (val ==MODULE_STATE_COMING )ftrace_init_module (mod, mod->ftrace_callsites, mod->ftrace_callsites + mod->num_ftrace_callsites); -break ; -case MODULE_STATE_GOING : +return 0 ; +} + +static int ftrace_module_notify_exit (struct notifier_block *self, +unsigned long val,void *data) +{ +struct module *mod = data; + +if (val ==MODULE_STATE_GOING )ftrace_release_mod (mod); -break ; - }return 0 ; }#else -static int ftrace_module_notify (struct notifier_block *self, -unsigned long val,void *data) +static int ftrace_module_notify_enter (struct notifier_block *self, +unsigned long val,void *data) +{ +return 0 ; +} +static int ftrace_module_notify_exit (struct notifier_block *self, +unsigned long val,void *data) {return 0 ; }#endif /* CONFIG_MODULES */ -struct notifier_block ftrace_module_nb = { - .notifier_call = ftrace_module_notify, +struct notifier_block ftrace_module_enter_nb = { + .notifier_call = ftrace_module_notify_enter, .priority =INT_MAX ,/* Run before anything that can use kprobes */ }; +struct notifier_block ftrace_module_exit_nb = { + .notifier_call = ftrace_module_notify_exit, + .priority =INT_MIN ,/* Run after anything that can remove kprobes */ +}; +extern unsigned long __start_mcount_loc[];extern unsigned long __stop_mcount_loc[];
@@ -4032,9 +4046,13 @@ void __init ftrace_init(void) __start_mcount_loc, __stop_mcount_loc); - ret =register_module_notifier (&ftrace_module_nb); + ret =register_module_notifier (&ftrace_module_enter_nb); +if (ret) +pr_warning ("Failed to register trace ftrace module enter notifier\n" ); + + ret =register_module_notifier (&ftrace_module_exit_nb);if (ret) -pr_warning ("Failed to register trace ftrace module notifier\n" ); +pr_warning ("Failed to register trace ftrace module exit notifier\n" );set_ftrace_early_filters ();
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 22/77 x86/apic: Fix parsing of the lapic cmdline option
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
commit 27cf929845b10043f2257693c7d179a9e0b1980e upstream.
Including " lapic " in the kernel cmdline on an x86-64 kernel makes it panic while parsing early params -- e.g. with no user visible output.
Fix this bug by ensuring arg is non-NULL before passing it to strncmp().
--- arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c +1 -1
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static int __init parse_lapic(char *arg) {if (config_enabled (CONFIG_X86_32 ) && !arg) force_enable_local_apic =1 ; -else if (!strncmp (arg,"notscdeadline" ,13 )) +else if (arg && !strncmp (arg,"notscdeadline" ,13 ))setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_TSC_DEADLINE_TIMER );return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 23/77 x86, efi: Make "noefi" really disable EFI runtime serivces
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matt Fleming <[email protected]>
commit fb834c7acc5e140cf4f9e86da93a66de8c0514da upstream.
commit 1de63d60cd5b ("efi: Clear EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES rather than EFI_BOOT by "noefi" boot parameter") attempted to make "noefi" true to its documentation and disable EFI runtime services to prevent the bricking bug described in commit e0094244e41c ("samsung-laptop:
Disable on EFI hardware"). However, it's not possible to clear EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES from an early param function because EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES is set in efi_init() *after* parse_early_param().
This resulted in "noefi" effectively becoming a no-op and no longer providing users with a way to disable EFI, which is bad for those users that have buggy machines.
--- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c +3 -2
@@ -85,9 +85,10 @@ int efi_enabled(int facility) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (efi_enabled); +static bool disable_runtime = false;static int __init setup_noefi (char *arg) { -clear_bit (EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES , &x86_efi_facility); + disable_runtime = true;return 0 ; }early_param ("noefi" , setup_noefi);
@@ -734,7 +735,7 @@ void __init efi_init(void)if (!efi_is_native ())pr_info ("No EFI runtime due to 32/64-bit mismatch with kernel\n" );else { -if (efi_runtime_init ()) +if (disable_runtime ||efi_runtime_init ())return ;set_bit (EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES , &x86_efi_facility); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 24/77 doc, xen: Mention earlyprintk=xen in the documentation.
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
commit 2482a92e7d17187301d7313cfe5021b13393a0b4 upstream.
The earlyprintk for Xen PV guests utilizes a simple hypercall (console_io) to provide output to Xen emergency console.
Note that the Xen hypervisor should be booted with 'loglevel=all' to output said information.
--- Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +3 -0
@@ -754,6 +754,7 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes earlyprintk= [X86,SH,BLACKFIN] earlyprintk=vga + earlyprintk=xen earlyprintk=serial[,ttySn[,baudrate]] earlyprintk=ttySn[,baudrate] earlyprintk=dbgp[debugController#]
@@ -771,6 +772,8 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes The VGA output is eventually overwritten by the real console. + The xen output can only be used by Xen PV guests. + ekgdboc= [X86,KGDB] Allow early kernel console debugging ekgdboc=kbd
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 25/77 doc, kernel-parameters: Document console=hvc<n>
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
commit a2fd6419174470f5ae6383f5037d0ee21ed9833f upstream.
Both the PowerPC hypervisor and Xen hypervisor can utilize the hvc driver.
--- Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +2 -0
@@ -564,6 +564,8 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes UART at the specified I/O port or MMIO address, switching to the matching ttyS device later. The options are the same as for ttyS, above. + hvc<n> Use the hypervisor console device <n>. This is for + both Xen and PowerPC hypervisors. If the device connected to the port is not a TTY but a braille device, prepend "brl," before the device type, for instance
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 26/77 x86: Make sure we can boot in the case the BDA contains pure garbage
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
commit 7c10093692ed2e6f318387d96b829320aa0ca64c upstream.
On non-BIOS platforms it is possible that the BIOS data area contains garbage instead of being zeroed or something equivalent (firmware
people: we are talking of 1.5K here, so please do the sane thing.)
We need on the order of 20-30K of low memory in order to boot, which may grow up to < 64K in the future. We probably want to avoid the lowest of the low memory. At the same time, it seems extremely unlikely that a legitimate EBDA would ever reach down to the 128K (which would require it to be over half a megabyte in size.) Thus, pick 128K as the cutoff for "this is insane, ignore." We may still end up reserving a bunch of extra memory on the low megabyte, but that is not really a major issue these days. In the worst case we lose 512K of RAM.
This code really should be merged with trim_bios_range() in arch/x86/kernel/setup.c, but that is a bigger patch for a later merge window.
--- arch/x86/kernel/head.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/head.c +36 -21
@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@#include <asm/setup.h> #include <asm/bios_ebda.h> -#define BIOS_LOWMEM_KILOBYTES 0x413 -/* * The BIOS places the EBDA/XBDA at the top of conventional * memory, and usually decreases the reported amount of
@@ -16,17 +14,30 @@* chipset: reserve a page before VGA to prevent PCI prefetch * into it (errata #56). Usually the page is reserved anyways, * unless you have no PS/2 mouse plugged in. +* +* This functions is deliberately very conservative. Losing +* memory in the bottom megabyte is rarely a problem, as long +* as we have enough memory to install the trampoline. Using +* memory that is in use by the BIOS or by some DMA device +* the BIOS didn't shut down *is* a big problem. */ + +#define BIOS_LOWMEM_KILOBYTES 0x413 +#define LOWMEM_CAP 0x9f000U/* Absolute maximum */ +#define INSANE_CUTOFF 0x20000U/* Less than this = insane */ +void __init reserve_ebda_region (void ) {unsigned int lowmem, ebda_addr; -/* To determine the position of the EBDA and the */ -/* end of conventional memory, we need to look at */ -/* the BIOS data area. In a paravirtual environment */ -/* that area is absent. We'll just have to assume */ -/* that the paravirt case can handle memory setup */ -/* correctly, without our help. */ +/* +* To determine the position of the EBDA and the +* end of conventional memory, we need to look at +* the BIOS data area. In a paravirtual environment +* that area is absent. We'll just have to assume +* that the paravirt case can handle memory setup +* correctly, without our help. +*/ if (paravirt_enabled ())return ;
@@ -37,19 +48,23 @@ void __init reserve_ebda_region(void)/* start of EBDA area */ ebda_addr =get_bios_ebda (); -/* Fixup: bios puts an EBDA in the top 64K segment */ -/* of conventional memory, but does not adjust lowmem. */ -if ((lowmem - ebda_addr) <=0x10000 ) - lowmem = ebda_addr; - -/* Fixup: bios does not report an EBDA at all. */ -/* Some old Dells seem to need 4k anyhow (bugzilla 2990) */ -if ((ebda_addr ==0 ) && (lowmem >=0x9f000 )) - lowmem =0x9f000 ; - -/* Paranoia: should never happen, but... */ -if ((lowmem ==0 ) || (lowmem >=0x100000 )) - lowmem =0x9f000 ; +/* +* Note: some old Dells seem to need 4k EBDA without +* reporting so, so just consider the memory above 0x9f000 +* to be off limits (bugzilla 2990). +*/ + +/* If the EBDA address is below 128K, assume it is bogus */ +if (ebda_addr <INSANE_CUTOFF ) + ebda_addr =LOWMEM_CAP ; + +/* If lowmem is less than 128K, assume it is bogus */ +if (lowmem <INSANE_CUTOFF ) + lowmem =LOWMEM_CAP ; + +/* Use the lower of the lowmem and EBDA markers as the cutoff */ + lowmem =min (lowmem, ebda_addr); + lowmem =min (lowmem,LOWMEM_CAP );/* Absolute cap */ /* reserve all memory between lowmem and the 1MB mark */ memblock_reserve (lowmem,0x100000 - lowmem);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 27/77 target: Fix lookup of dynamic NodeACLs during cached demo-mode operation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
commit fcf29481fb8e106daad6688f2e898226ee928992 upstream.
This patch fixes a bug in core_tpg_check_initiator_node_acl() -> core_tpg_get_initiator_node_acl() where a dynamically created se_node_acl generated during session login would be skipped during subsequent lookup due to the '!acl->dynamic_node_acl' check, causing a new se_node_acl to be created with a duplicate ->initiatorname.
This would occur when a fabric endpoint was configured with TFO->tpg_check_demo_mode()=1 + TPF->tpg_check_demo_mode_cache()=1 preventing the release of an existing se_node_acl during se_session shutdown.
Also, drop the unnecessary usage of core_tpg_get_initiator_node_acl() within core_dev_init_initiator_node_lun_acl() that originally required the extra '!acl->dynamic_node_acl' check, and just pass the configfs provided se_node_acl pointer instead.
--- drivers/target/target_core_device.c | 13 ++++--------- drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c | 4 ++-- drivers/target/target_core_internal.h | 2 +- drivers/target/target_core_tpg.c | 10 ++-------- 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
drivers/target/target_core_device.c +4 -9
@@ -1182,24 +1182,18 @@ static struct se_lun *core_dev_get_lun(sstruct se_lun_acl *core_dev_init_initiator_node_lun_acl (struct se_portal_group *tpg, +struct se_node_acl *nacl,u32 mapped_lun, -char *initiatorname,int *ret) {struct se_lun_acl *lacl; -struct se_node_acl *nacl; -if (strlen (initiatorname) >=TRANSPORT_IQN_LEN ) { +if (strlen (nacl->initiatorname) >=TRANSPORT_IQN_LEN ) {pr_err ("%s InitiatorName exceeds maximum size.\n" , tpg->se_tpg_tfo->get_fabric_name ()); *ret = -EOVERFLOW ;return NULL ; } - nacl =core_tpg_get_initiator_node_acl (tpg, initiatorname); -if (!nacl) { - *ret = -EINVAL ; -return NULL ; - } lacl =kzalloc (sizeof (struct se_lun_acl ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!lacl) {pr_err ("Unable to allocate memory for struct se_lun_acl.\n" );
@@ -1210,7 +1204,8 @@ struct se_lun_acl *core_dev_init_initiatINIT_LIST_HEAD (&lacl->lacl_list); lacl->mapped_lun = mapped_lun; lacl->se_lun_nacl = nacl; -snprintf (lacl->initiatorname,TRANSPORT_IQN_LEN ,"%s" , initiatorname); +snprintf (lacl->initiatorname,TRANSPORT_IQN_LEN ,"%s" , + nacl->initiatorname);return lacl; }
drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c +2 -2
@@ -355,8 +355,8 @@ static struct config_group *target_fabri goto out; } - lacl =core_dev_init_initiator_node_lun_acl (se_tpg, mapped_lun, -config_item_name (acl_ci), &ret); + lacl =core_dev_init_initiator_node_lun_acl (se_tpg, se_nacl, + mapped_lun, &ret);if (!lacl) { ret = -EINVAL ; goto out;
drivers/target/target_core_internal.h +1 -1
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ struct se_lun *core_dev_add_lun(struct sint core_dev_del_lun (struct se_portal_group *,u32 );struct se_lun *core_get_lun_from_tpg (struct se_portal_group *,u32 );struct se_lun_acl *core_dev_init_initiator_node_lun_acl (struct se_portal_group *, -u32 ,char *,int *); +struct se_node_acl *,u32 ,int *);int core_dev_add_initiator_node_lun_acl (struct se_portal_group *,struct se_lun_acl *,u32 ,u32 ); int core_dev_del_initiator_node_lun_acl(struct se_portal_group *,
drivers/target/target_core_tpg.c +2 -8
@@ -111,16 +111,10 @@ struct se_node_acl *core_tpg_get_initiatstruct se_node_acl *acl;spin_lock_irq (&tpg->acl_node_lock); -list_for_each_entry (acl, &tpg->acl_node_list, acl_list) { -if (!strcmp (acl->initiatorname, initiatorname) && - !acl->dynamic_node_acl) { -spin_unlock_irq (&tpg->acl_node_lock); -return acl; - } - } + acl =__core_tpg_get_initiator_node_acl (tpg, initiatorname);spin_unlock_irq (&tpg->acl_node_lock); -return NULL ; +return acl; }/* core_tpg_add_node_to_devs():
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 28/77 target: Add missing mapped_lun bounds checking during make_mappedlun setup
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
commit fbbf8555a986ed31e54f006b6cc637ea4ff1425b upstream.
This patch adds missing bounds checking for the configfs provided mapped_lun value during target_fabric_make_mappedlun() setup ahead of se_lun_acl initialization.
This addresses a potential OOPs when using a mapped_lun value that exceeds the hardcoded TRANSPORT_MAX_LUNS_PER_TPG-1 value within se_node_acl->device_list[].
--- drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c +8 -0
@@ -354,6 +354,14 @@ static struct config_group *target_fabri ret = -EINVAL ; goto out; } +if (mapped_lun > (TRANSPORT_MAX_LUNS_PER_TPG -1 )) { +pr_err ("Mapped LUN: %lu exceeds TRANSPORT_MAX_LUNS_PER_TPG" +"-1: %u for Target Portal Group: %u\n" , mapped_lun, +TRANSPORT_MAX_LUNS_PER_TPG -1 , + se_tpg->se_tpg_tfo->tpg_get_tag (se_tpg)); + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } lacl =core_dev_init_initiator_node_lun_acl (se_tpg, se_nacl, mapped_lun, &ret);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 29/77 ocfs2: fix possible use-after-free with AIO
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
commit 9b171e0c74ca0549d0610990a862dd895870f04a upstream.
Running AIO is pinning inode in memory using file reference. Once AIO is completed using aio_complete(), file reference is put and inode can be freed from memory. So we have to be sure that calling aio_complete() is the last thing we do with the inode.
--- fs/ocfs2/aops.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ocfs2/aops.c +1 -1
@@ -593,9 +593,9 @@ static void ocfs2_dio_end_io(struct kioc level =ocfs2_iocb_rw_locked_level (iocb);ocfs2_rw_unlock (inode, level); +inode_dio_done (inode);if (is_async)aio_complete (iocb, ret,0 ); -inode_dio_done (inode); }/*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 30/77 ocfs2: fix ocfs2_init_security_and_acl() to initialize acl correctly
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jeff Liu <[email protected]>
commit 32918dd9f19e5960af4cdfa41190bb843fb2247b upstream.
We need to re-initialize the security for a new reflinked inode with its parent dirs if it isn't specified to be preserved for ocfs2_reflink(). However, the code logic is broken at ocfs2_init_security_and_acl() although ocfs2_init_security_get() succeed. As a result, ocfs2_acl_init() does not involked and therefore the default ACL of parent dir was missing on the new inode.
Note this was introduced by 9d8f13ba3 ("security: new security_inode_init_security API adds function callback")
To reproduce:
set default ACL for the parent dir(ocfs2 in this case):
$ setfacl -m default:user:jeff:rwx ../ocfs2/
$ getfacl ../ocfs2/
# file: ../ocfs2/
# owner: jeff
# group: jeff
user::rwx
group::r-x
other::r-x
default:user::rwx
default:user:jeff:rwx
default:group::r-x
default:mask::rwx
default:other::r-x
$ touch a
$ getfacl a
# file: a
# owner: jeff
# group: jeff
user::rw-
group::rw-
other::r--
Before patching, create reflink file b from a, the user default ACL entry(user:jeff:rwx)was missing:
$ ./ocfs2_reflink a b
$ getfacl b
# file: b
# owner: jeff
# group: jeff
user::rw-
group::rw-
other::r--In this case, the end user can also observed an error message at syslog:
(ocfs2_reflink,3229,2):ocfs2_init_security_and_acl:7193 ERROR: status = 0
After applying this patch, create reflink file c from a:
$ ./ocfs2_reflink a c
$ getfacl c
# file: c
# owner: jeff
# group: jeff
user::rw-
user:jeff:rwx #effective:rw-
group::r-x #effective:r--
mask::rw-
other::r--Test program:
/* Usage: reflink <source> <dest> */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
static int
reflink_file(char const *src_name, char const *dst_name,
bool preserve_attrs)
{
int fd;#ifndef REFLINK_ATTR_NONE
# define REFLINK_ATTR_NONE 0
#endif
#ifndef REFLINK_ATTR_PRESERVE
# define REFLINK_ATTR_PRESERVE 1
#endif
#ifndef OCFS2_IOC_REFLINK
struct reflink_arguments {
uint64_t old_path;
uint64_t new_path;
uint64_t preserve;
};# define OCFS2_IOC_REFLINK _IOW ('o', 4, struct reflink_arguments)
#endif
struct reflink_arguments args = {
.old_path = (unsigned long) src_name,
.new_path = (unsigned long) dst_name,
.preserve = preserve_attrs ? REFLINK_ATTR_PRESERVE :
REFLINK_ATTR_NONE,
};
fd = open(src_name, O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open %s: %s\n",
src_name, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (ioctl(fd, OCFS2_IOC_REFLINK, &args) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to reflink %s to %s: %s\n",
src_name, dst_name, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
}intmain(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc != 3) {
fprintf(stdout, "Usage: %s source dest\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
return reflink_file(argv[1], argv[2], 0);
}--- fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ocfs2/xattr.c +1 -1
@@ -7189,7 +7189,7 @@ int ocfs2_init_security_and_acl(struct istruct buffer_head *dir_bh =NULL ; ret =ocfs2_init_security_get (inode, dir, qstr,NULL ); -if (!ret) { +if (ret) {mlog_errno (ret); goto leave; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 31/77 ocfs2: ac->ac_allow_chain_relink=0 wont disable group relink
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Xiaowei.Hu" <[email protected]>
commit 309a85b6861fedbb48a22d45e0e079d1be993b3a upstream.
ocfs2_block_group_alloc_discontig() disables chain relink by setting ac->ac_allow_chain_relink = 0 because it grabs clusters from multiple cluster groups.
It doesn't keep the credits for all chain relink,but ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits overrides this in this call trace:
ocfs2_block_group_claim_bits()->ocfs2_claim_clusters()-> __ocfs2_claim_clusters()->ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits() ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits set ac->ac_allow_chain_relink = 1; then call ocfs2_search_chain() one time and disable it again, and then we run out of credits.
Fix is to allow relink by default and disable it in ocfs2_block_group_alloc_discontig.
Without this patch, End-users will run into a crash due to run out of credits, backtrace like this:
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0808b14>] [<ffffffffa0808b14>]
jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata+0x164/0x170 [jbd2]
RSP: 0018:ffff8801b919b5b8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88022139ddc0 RCX: ffff880159f652d0
RDX: ffff880178aa3000 RSI: ffff880159f652d0 RDI: ffff880087f09bf8
RBP: ffff8801b919b5e8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000001e00 R11: 00000000000150b0 R12: ffff880159f652d0
R13: ffff8801a0cae908 R14: ffff880087f09bf8 R15: ffff88018d177800
FS: 00007fc9b0b6b6e0(0000) GS:ffff88022fd40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 000000000040819c CR3: 0000000184017000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process dd (pid: 9945, threadinfo ffff8801b919a000, task ffff880149a264c0)
Call Trace:
ocfs2_journal_dirty+0x2f/0x70 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_relink_block_group+0x111/0x480 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_search_chain+0x455/0x9a0 [ocfs2]
...--- fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c | 7 +++---- fs/ocfs2/suballoc.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c +3 -4
@@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ ocfs2_block_group_alloc_discontig(handle* cluster groups will be staying in cache for the duration of * this operation. */ - ac->ac_allow_chain_relink =0 ; + ac->ac_disable_chain_relink =1 ;/* Claim the first region */ status = ocfs2_block_group_claim_bits(osb, handle, ac, min_bits,
@@ -1823,7 +1823,7 @@ static int ocfs2_search_chain(struct ocf* Do this *after* figuring out how many bits we're taking out * of our target group. */ -if (ac->ac_allow_chain_relink && +if (!ac->ac_disable_chain_relink && (prev_group_bh) && (ocfs2_block_group_reasonably_empty (bg, res->sr_bits))) { status = ocfs2_relink_block_group(handle, alloc_inode,
@@ -1928,7 +1928,6 @@ static int ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits(str victim =ocfs2_find_victim_chain (cl); ac->ac_chain = victim; - ac->ac_allow_chain_relink =1 ; status =ocfs2_search_chain (ac, handle, bits_wanted, min_bits, res, &bits_left);
@@ -1947,7 +1946,7 @@ static int ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits(str* searching each chain in order. Don't allow chain relinking * because we only calculate enough journal credits for one * relink per alloc. */ - ac->ac_allow_chain_relink =0 ; + ac->ac_disable_chain_relink =1 ;for (i =0 ; i <le16_to_cpu (cl->cl_next_free_rec); i ++) {if (i == victim)continue ;
fs/ocfs2/suballoc.h +1 -1
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ struct ocfs2_alloc_context {/* these are used by the chain search */ u16 ac_chain; -int ac_allow_chain_relink; +int ac_disable_chain_relink;group_search_t *ac_group_search;u64 ac_last_group;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 32/77 block: fix ext_devt_idr handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tomas Henzl <[email protected]>
commit 7b74e912785a11572da43292786ed07ada7e3e0c upstream.
While adding and removing a lot of disks disks and partitions this sometimes shows up:
WARNING: at fs/sysfs/dir.c:512 sysfs_add_one+0xc9/0x130() (Not tainted)
Hardware name:
sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/dev/block/259:751'
Modules linked in: raid1 autofs4 bnx2fc cnic uio fcoe libfcoe libfc 8021q scsi_transport_fc scsi_tgt garp stp llc sunrpc cpufreq_ondemand powernow_k8 freq_table mperf ipv6 dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log power_meter microcode dcdbas serio_raw amd64_edac_mod edac_core edac_mce_amd i2c_piix4 i2c_core k10temp bnx2 sg ixgbe dca mdio ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_round_robin sr_mod cdrom sd_mod crc_t10dif ata_generic pata_acpi pata_atiixp ahci mptsas mptscsih mptbase scsi_transport_sas dm_multipath dm_mod [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan]
Pid: 44103, comm: async/16 Not tainted 2.6.32-195.el6.x86_64 #1
Call Trace:
warn_slowpath_common+0x87/0xc0
warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x50
sysfs_add_one+0xc9/0x130
sysfs_do_create_link+0x12b/0x170
sysfs_create_link+0x13/0x20
device_add+0x317/0x650
idr_get_new+0x13/0x50
add_partition+0x21c/0x390
rescan_partitions+0x32b/0x470
sd_open+0x81/0x1f0 [sd_mod]
__blkdev_get+0x1b6/0x3c0
blkdev_get+0x10/0x20
register_disk+0x155/0x170
add_disk+0xa6/0x160
sd_probe_async+0x13b/0x210 [sd_mod]
add_wait_queue+0x46/0x60
async_thread+0x102/0x250
default_wake_function+0x0/0x20
async_thread+0x0/0x250
kthread+0x96/0xa0
child_rip+0xa/0x20
kthread+0x0/0xa0
child_rip+0x0/0x20This most likely happens because dev_t is freed while the number is still used and idr_get_new() is not protected on every use. The fix adds a mutex where it wasn't before and moves the dev_t free function so it is called after device del.
--- block/genhd.c | 6 +++++- block/partition-generic.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
block/genhd.c +5 -1
@@ -422,14 +422,18 @@ int blk_alloc_devt(struct hd_struct *pardo {if (!idr_pre_get (&ext_devt_idr,GFP_KERNEL ))return -ENOMEM ; +mutex_lock (&ext_devt_mutex); rc =idr_get_new (&ext_devt_idr, part, &idx); +mutex_unlock (&ext_devt_mutex); }while (rc == -EAGAIN );if (rc)return rc;if (idx >MAX_EXT_DEVT ) { +mutex_lock (&ext_devt_mutex);idr_remove (&ext_devt_idr, idx); +mutex_unlock (&ext_devt_mutex);return -EBUSY ; }
@@ -646,7 +650,6 @@ void del_gendisk(struct gendisk *disk)disk_part_iter_exit (&piter);invalidate_partition (disk,0 ); -blk_free_devt (disk_to_dev (disk)->devt);set_capacity (disk,0 ); disk->flags &= ~GENHD_FL_UP ;
@@ -664,6 +667,7 @@ void del_gendisk(struct gendisk *disk)if (!sysfs_deprecated)sysfs_remove_link (block_depr,dev_name (disk_to_dev (disk)));device_del (disk_to_dev (disk)); +blk_free_devt (disk_to_dev (disk)->devt); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (del_gendisk);
block/partition-generic.c +1 -1
@@ -249,11 +249,11 @@ void delete_partition(struct gendisk *diif (!part)return ; -blk_free_devt (part_devt (part));rcu_assign_pointer (ptbl->part[partno],NULL );rcu_assign_pointer (ptbl->last_lookup,NULL );kobject_put (part->holder_dir);device_del (part_to_dev (part)); +blk_free_devt (part_devt (part));hd_struct_put (part); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 33/77 xen-blkback: do not leak mode property
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
commit 9d092603cc306ee6edfe917bf9ab8beb5f32d7bc upstream.
"be->mode" is obtained from xenbus_read(), which does a kmalloc() for the message body. The short string is never released, so do it along with freeing "be" itself, and make sure the string isn't kept when backend_changed() doesn't complete successfully (which made it desirable to slightly re-structure that function, so that the error cleanup can be done in one place).
--- drivers/block/xen-blkback/xenbus.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
drivers/block/xen-blkback/xenbus.c +24 -25
@@ -367,6 +367,7 @@ static int xen_blkbk_remove(struct xenbu be->blkif =NULL ; } +kfree (be->mode);kfree (be);dev_set_drvdata (&dev->dev,NULL );return 0 ;
@@ -502,6 +503,7 @@ static void backend_changed(struct xenbu = container_of(watch, struct backend_info, backend_watch);struct xenbus_device *dev = be->dev;int cdrom =0 ; +unsigned long handle;char *device_type;DPRINTK ("" );
@@ -521,10 +523,10 @@ static void backend_changed(struct xenbureturn ; } -if ((be->major || be->minor) && - ((be->major != major) || (be->minor != minor))) { -pr_warn (DRV_PFX "changing physical device (from %x:%x to %x:%x) not supported.\n" , - be->major, be->minor, major, minor); +if (be->major | be->minor) { +if (be->major != major || be->minor != minor) +pr_warn (DRV_PFX "changing physical device (from %x:%x to %x:%x) not supported.\n" , + be->major, be->minor, major, minor);return ; }
@@ -542,36 +544,33 @@ static void backend_changed(struct xenbukfree (device_type); } -if (be->major ==0 && be->minor ==0 ) { -/* Front end dir is a number, which is used as the handle. */ +/* Front end dir is a number, which is used as the handle. */ + err =strict_strtoul (strrchr (dev->otherend,'/' ) +1 ,0 , &handle); +if (err) +return ; -char *p =strrchr (dev->otherend,'/' ) +1 ; -long handle; - err =strict_strtoul (p,0 , &handle); -if (err) -return ; + be->major = major; + be->minor = minor; - be->major = major; - be->minor = minor; - - err =xen_vbd_create (be->blkif, handle, major, minor, - (NULL ==strchr (be->mode,'w' )), cdrom); -if (err) { - be->major =0 ; - be->minor =0 ; -xenbus_dev_fatal (dev, err,"creating vbd structure" ); -return ; - } + err =xen_vbd_create (be->blkif, handle, major, minor, + !strchr (be->mode,'w' ), cdrom); +if (err) +xenbus_dev_fatal (dev, err,"creating vbd structure" ); +else { err =xenvbd_sysfs_addif (dev);if (err) {xen_vbd_free (&be->blkif->vbd); - be->major =0 ; - be->minor =0 ;xenbus_dev_fatal (dev, err,"creating sysfs entries" ); -return ; } + } +if (err) { +kfree (be->mode); + be->mode =NULL ; + be->major =0 ; + be->minor =0 ; + }else {/* We're potentially connected now */ xen_update_blkif_status (be->blkif); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 34/77 xen/blkback: Dont trust the handle from the frontend.
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
commit 01c681d4c70d64cb72142a2823f27c4146a02e63 upstream.
The 'handle' is the device that the request is from. For the life-time of the ring we copy it from a request to a response so that the frontend is not surprised by it. But we do not need it - when we start processing I/Os we have our own 'struct phys_req' which has only most essential information about the request. In fact the 'vbd_translate' ends up over-writing the preq.dev with a value from the backend.
This assignment of preq.dev with the 'handle' value is superfluous so lets not do it.
--- drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c +0 -1
@@ -879,7 +879,6 @@ static int dispatch_rw_block_io(struct x goto fail_response; } - preq.dev = req->u.rw.handle; preq.sector_number = req->u.rw.sector_number; preq.nr_sects =0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 35/77 xen-blkfront: drop the use of llist_for_each_entry_safe
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
commit f84adf4921ae3115502f44ff467b04bf2f88cf04 upstream.
Replace llist_for_each_entry_safe with a while loop.
llist_for_each_entry_safe can trigger a bug in GCC 4.1, so it's best to remove it and use a while loop and do the deletion manually.
Specifically this bug can be triggered by hot-unplugging a disk, either by doing xm block-detach or by save/restore cycle.
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffffffffffff0 IP: [<ffffffffa0047223>] blkif_free+0x63/0x130 [xen_blkfront] The crash call trace is: ... bad_area_nosemaphore+0x13/0x20 do_page_fault+0x25e/0x4b0 page_fault+0x25/0x30 ? blkif_free+0x63/0x130 [xen_blkfront] blkfront_resume+0x46/0xa0 [xen_blkfront] xenbus_dev_resume+0x6c/0x140 pm_op+0x192/0x1b0 device_resume+0x82/0x1e0 dpm_resume+0xc9/0x1a0 dpm_resume_end+0x15/0x30 do_suspend+0x117/0x1e0
When drilling down to the assembler code, on newer GCC it does .L29:
cmpq $-16, %r12 #, persistent_gnt check
je .L30 #, out of the loop
.L25:
... code in the loop
testq %r13, %r13 # n
je .L29 #, back to the top of the loop
cmpq $-16, %r12 #, persistent_gnt check
movq 16(%r12), %r13 # <variable>.node.next, n
jne .L25 #, back to the top of the loop
.L30:
While on GCC 4.1, it is:
L78:
... code in the loop
testq %r13, %r13 # n
je .L78 #, back to the top of the loop
movq 16(%rbx), %r13 # <variable>.node.next, n
jmp .L78 #, back to the top of the loop
Which basically means that the exit loop condition instead of being:
&(pos)->member != NULL;
is:
;
which makes the loop unbound.
Since xen-blkfront is the only user of the llist_for_each_entry_safe macro remove it from llist.h.
Orabug: 16263164
--- drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c | 13 ++++++++++--- include/linux/llist.h | 25 ------------------------- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c +10 -3
@@ -791,7 +791,7 @@ static void blkif_restart_queue(struct wstatic void blkif_free (struct blkfront_info *info,int suspend) {struct llist_node *all_gnts; -struct grant *persistent_gnt; +struct grant *persistent_gnt, *tmp;struct llist_node *n;/* Prevent new requests being issued until we fix things up. */
@@ -805,10 +805,17 @@ static void blkif_free(struct blkfront_i/* Remove all persistent grants */ if (info->persistent_gnts_c) { all_gnts =llist_del_all (&info->persistent_gnts); -llist_for_each_entry_safe (persistent_gnt, n, all_gnts, node) { + persistent_gnt =llist_entry (all_gnts,typeof (*(persistent_gnt)), node); +while (persistent_gnt) {gnttab_end_foreign_access (persistent_gnt->gref,0 ,0UL );__free_page (pfn_to_page (persistent_gnt->pfn)); -kfree (persistent_gnt); + tmp = persistent_gnt; + n = persistent_gnt->node.next; +if (n) + persistent_gnt =llist_entry (n,typeof (*(persistent_gnt)), node); +else + persistent_gnt =NULL ; +kfree (tmp); } info->persistent_gnts_c =0 ; }
include/linux/llist.h +0 -25
@@ -125,31 +125,6 @@ static inline void init_llist_head(struc (pos) = llist_entry((pos)->member.next, typeof(*(pos)), member))/** -* llist_for_each_entry_safe - iterate safely against remove over some entries -* of lock-less list of given type. -* @pos: the type * to use as a loop cursor. -* @n: another type * to use as a temporary storage. -* @node: the fist entry of deleted list entries. -* @member: the name of the llist_node with the struct. -* -* In general, some entries of the lock-less list can be traversed -* safely only after being removed from list, so start with an entry -* instead of list head. This variant allows removal of entries -* as we iterate. -* -* If being used on entries deleted from lock-less list directly, the -* traverse order is from the newest to the oldest added entry. If -* you want to traverse from the oldest to the newest, you must -* reverse the order by yourself before traversing. -*/ -#define llist_for_each_entry_safe (pos, n, node, member) \ - for ((pos) = llist_entry((node), typeof(*(pos)), member), \ - (n) = (pos)->member.next; \ - &(pos)->member != NULL; \ - (pos) = llist_entry(n, typeof(*(pos)), member), \ - (n) = (&(pos)->member != NULL) ? (pos)->member.next : NULL) - -/** * llist_empty - tests whether a lock-less list is empty * @head: the list to test *
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 36/77 xen-blkback: use balloon pages for persistent grants
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Roger Pau Monne <[email protected]>
commit 087ffecdaa1875cc683a7a5bc0695b3ebfce3bad upstream.
With current persistent grants implementation we are not freeing the persistent grants after we disconnect the device. Since grant map operations change the mfn of the allocated page, and we can no longer pass it to __free_page without setting the mfn to a sane value, use balloon grant pages instead, as the gntdev device does.
--- drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c +4 -2
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@#include <xen/xen.h> #include <asm/xen/hypervisor.h> #include <asm/xen/hypercall.h> +#include <xen/balloon.h> #include "common.h" /*
@@ -239,6 +240,7 @@ static void free_persistent_gnts(struct ret =gnttab_unmap_refs (unmap,NULL , pages, segs_to_unmap);BUG_ON (ret); +free_xenballooned_pages (segs_to_unmap, pages); segs_to_unmap =0 ; }
@@ -527,8 +529,8 @@ static int xen_blkbk_map(struct blkif_re GFP_KERNEL);if (!persistent_gnt)return -ENOMEM ; - persistent_gnt->page =alloc_page (GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!persistent_gnt->page) { +if (alloc_xenballooned_pages (1 , &persistent_gnt->page, + false)) {kfree (persistent_gnt);return -ENOMEM ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 37/77 idr: fix a subtle bug in idr_get_next()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
commit 6cdae7416a1c45c2ce105a78187d9b7e8feb9e24 upstream.
The iteration logic of idr_get_next() is borrowed mostly verbatim from idr_for_each(). It walks down the tree looking for the slot matching the current ID. If the matching slot is not found, the ID is incremented by the distance of single slot at the given level and repeats.
The implementation assumes that during the whole iteration id is aligned to the layer boundaries of the level closest to the leaf, which is true for all iterations starting from zero or an existing element and thus is fine for idr_for_each().
However, idr_get_next() may be given any point and if the starting id hits in the middle of a non-existent layer, increment to the next layer will end up skipping the same offset into it. For example, an IDR with IDs filled between [64, 127] would look like the following.
[ 0 64 ... ]
/----/ |
| |
NULL [ 64 ... 127 ]If idr_get_next() is called with 63 as the starting point, it will try to follow down the pointer from 0. As it is NULL, it will then try to proceed to the next slot in the same level by adding the slot distance at that level which is 64 - making the next try 127. It goes around the loop and finds and returns 127 skipping [64, 126].
Note that this bug also triggers in idr_for_each_entry() loop which deletes during iteration as deletions can make layers go away leaving the iteration with unaligned ID into missing layers.
Fix it by ensuring proceeding to the next slot doesn't carry over the unaligned offset - ie. use round_up(id + 1, slot_distance) instead of id += slot_distance.
--- lib/idr.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
lib/idr.c +8 -1
@@ -625,7 +625,14 @@ void *idr_get_next(struct idr *idp, intreturn p; } - id +=1 << n; +/* +* Proceed to the next layer at the current level. Unlike +* idr_for_each(), @id isn't guaranteed to be aligned to +* layer boundary at this point and adding 1 << n may +* incorrectly skip IDs. Make sure we jump to the +* beginning of the next layer using round_up(). +*/ + id =round_up (id +1 ,1 << n);while (n <fls (id)) { n +=IDR_BITS ; p = *--paa;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 38/77 block: fix synchronization and limit check in blk_alloc_devt()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
commit ce23bba842aee98092225d9576dba47c82352521 upstream.
idr allocation in blk_alloc_devt() wasn't synchronized against lookup and removal, and its limit check was off by one - 1 << MINORBITS is the number of minors allowed, not the maximum allowed minor.
Add locking and rename MAX_EXT_DEVT to NR_EXT_DEVT and fix limit checking.
--- block/genhd.c | 13 +++++-------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
block/genhd.c +5 -8
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(block_class_lock);struct kobject *block_depr;/* for extended dynamic devt allocation, currently only one major is used */ -#define MAX_EXT_DEVT (1 << MINORBITS) +#define NR_EXT_DEVT (1 << MINORBITS)/* For extended devt allocation. ext_devt_mutex prevents look up * results from going away underneath its user.
@@ -424,19 +424,16 @@ int blk_alloc_devt(struct hd_struct *parreturn -ENOMEM ;mutex_lock (&ext_devt_mutex); rc =idr_get_new (&ext_devt_idr, part, &idx); +if (!rc && idx >=NR_EXT_DEVT ) { +idr_remove (&ext_devt_idr, idx); + rc = -EBUSY ; + }mutex_unlock (&ext_devt_mutex); }while (rc == -EAGAIN );if (rc)return rc; -if (idx >MAX_EXT_DEVT ) { -mutex_lock (&ext_devt_mutex); -idr_remove (&ext_devt_idr, idx); -mutex_unlock (&ext_devt_mutex); -return -EBUSY ; - } - *devt =MKDEV (BLOCK_EXT_MAJOR ,blk_mangle_minor (idx));return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 39/77 firewire: add minor number range check to fw_device_init()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
commit 3bec60d511179853138836ae6e1b61fe34d9235f upstream.
fw_device_init() didn't check whether the allocated minor number isn't too large. Fail if it goes overflows MINORBITS.
--- drivers/firewire/core-device.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/firewire/core-device.c +4 -0
@@ -1020,6 +1020,10 @@ static void fw_device_init(struct work_s ret =idr_pre_get (&fw_device_idr,GFP_KERNEL ) ?idr_get_new (&fw_device_idr, device, &minor) : -ENOMEM ; +if (minor >=1 <<MINORBITS ) { +idr_remove (&fw_device_idr, minor); + minor = -ENOSPC ; + }up_write (&fw_device_rwsem);if (ret <0 )
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 40/77 sysctl: fix null checking in bin_dn_node_address()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xi Wang <[email protected]>
commit df1778be1a33edffa51d094eeda87c858ded6560 upstream.
The null check of `strchr() + 1' is broken, which is always non-null, leading to OOB read. Instead, check the result of strchr().
--- kernel/sysctl_binary.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/sysctl_binary.c +2 -1
@@ -1194,9 +1194,10 @@ static ssize_t bin_dn_node_address(struc/* Convert the decnet address to binary */ result = -EIO ; - nodep =strchr (buf,'.' ) +1 ; + nodep =strchr (buf,'.' );if (!nodep) goto out; + ++nodep; area =simple_strtoul (buf,NULL ,10 ); node =simple_strtoul (nodep,NULL ,10 );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 41/77 nbd: fsync and kill block device on shutdown
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
commit 3a2d63f87989e01437ba994df5f297528c353d7d upstream.
There are two problems with shutdown in the NBD driver.
1: Receiving the NBD_DISCONNECT ioctl does not sync the filesystem.
This patch adds the sync operation into __nbd_ioctl()'s NBD_DISCONNECT handler. This is useful because BLKFLSBUF is restricted to processes that have CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and the NBD client may not possess it (fsync of the block device does not sync the filesystem, either).
2: Once we clear the socket we have no guarantee that later reads will
come from the same backing storage.
The patch adds calls to kill_bdev() in __nbd_ioctl()'s socket clearing code so the page cache is cleaned, lest reads that hit on the page cache will return stale data from the previously-accessible disk.
Example:
# qemu-nbd -r -c/dev/nbd0 /dev/sr0
# file -s /dev/nbd0
/dev/stdin: # UDF filesystem data (version 1.5) etc.
# qemu-nbd -d /dev/nbd0
# qemu-nbd -r -c/dev/nbd0 /dev/sda
# file -s /dev/nbd0
/dev/stdin: # UDF filesystem data (version 1.5) etc.While /dev/sda has:
# file -s /dev/sda
/dev/sda: x86 boot sector; etc.--- drivers/block/nbd.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
drivers/block/nbd.c +10 -0
@@ -595,12 +595,20 @@ static int __nbd_ioctl(struct block_devistruct request sreq;dev_info (disk_to_dev (nbd->disk),"NBD_DISCONNECT\n" ); +if (!nbd->sock) +return -EINVAL ; +mutex_unlock (&nbd->tx_lock); +fsync_bdev (bdev); +mutex_lock (&nbd->tx_lock);blk_rq_init (NULL , &sreq); sreq.cmd_type =REQ_TYPE_SPECIAL ;nbd_cmd (&sreq) =NBD_CMD_DISC ; + +/* Check again after getting mutex back. */ if (!nbd->sock)return -EINVAL ; +nbd_send_req (nbd, &sreq);return 0 ; }
@@ -614,6 +622,7 @@ static int __nbd_ioctl(struct block_devinbd_clear_que (nbd);BUG_ON (!list_empty (&nbd->queue_head));BUG_ON (!list_empty (&nbd->waiting_queue)); +kill_bdev (bdev);if (file)fput (file);return 0 ;
@@ -702,6 +711,7 @@ static int __nbd_ioctl(struct block_devi nbd->file =NULL ;nbd_clear_que (nbd);dev_warn (disk_to_dev (nbd->disk),"queue cleared\n" ); +kill_bdev (bdev);queue_flag_clear_unlocked (QUEUE_FLAG_DISCARD , nbd->disk->queue);if (file)fput (file);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 42/77 fs: Fix possible use-after-free with AIO
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
commit 54c807e71d5ac59dee56c685f2b66e27cd54c475 upstream.
Running AIO is pinning inode in memory using file reference. Once AIO is completed using aio_complete(), file reference is put and inode can be freed from memory. So we have to be sure that calling aio_complete() is the last thing we do with the inode.
--- fs/direct-io.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/direct-io.c +1 -1
@@ -261,9 +261,9 @@ static ssize_t dio_complete(struct dio * dio->end_io (dio->iocb, offset, transferred, dio->private, ret, is_async); }else { +inode_dio_done (dio->inode);if (is_async)aio_complete (dio->iocb, ret,0 ); -inode_dio_done (dio->inode); }return ret;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 43/77 ext4: fix possible use-after-free with AIO
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
commit 091e26dfc156aeb3b73bc5c5f277e433ad39331c upstream.
Running AIO is pinning inode in memory using file reference. Once AIO is completed using aio_complete(), file reference is put and inode can be freed from memory. So we have to be sure that calling aio_complete() is the last thing we do with the inode.
--- fs/ext4/inode.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/page-io.c | 9 ++++----- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/inode.c +1 -1
@@ -2977,9 +2977,9 @@ static void ext4_end_io_dio(struct kiocbif (!(io_end->flag &EXT4_IO_END_UNWRITTEN )) {ext4_free_io_end (io_end); out: +inode_dio_done (inode);if (is_async)aio_complete (iocb, ret,0 ); -inode_dio_done (inode);return ; }
fs/ext4/page-io.c +4 -5
@@ -103,14 +103,13 @@ static int ext4_end_io(ext4_io_end_t *io"(inode %lu, offset %llu, size %zd, error %d)" , inode->i_ino, offset, size, ret); } -if (io->iocb) -aio_complete (io->iocb, io->result,0 ); - -if (io->flag &EXT4_IO_END_DIRECT ) -inode_dio_done (inode);/* Wake up anyone waiting on unwritten extent conversion */ if (atomic_dec_and_test (&EXT4_I (inode)->i_unwritten))wake_up_all (ext4_ioend_wq (inode)); +if (io->flag &EXT4_IO_END_DIRECT ) +inode_dio_done (inode); +if (io->iocb) +aio_complete (io->iocb, io->result,0 );return ret; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 44/77 media: cx18/ivtv: fix regression: remove __init from a non-init function
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
commit cfb046cb800ba306b211fbbe4ac633486e11055f upstream.
Commits 5e6e81b2890db3969527772a8350825a85c22d5c (cx18) and 2aebbf6737212265b917ed27c875c59d3037110a (ivtv) added an __init annotation to the cx18-alsa-load and ivtv-alsa-load functions. However, these functions are called *after* initialization by the main cx18/ivtv driver. By that time the memory containing those functions is already freed and your machine goes BOOM.
--- drivers/media/pci/cx18/cx18-alsa-main.c | 2 +- drivers/media/pci/cx18/cx18-alsa-pcm.h | 2 +- drivers/media/pci/ivtv/ivtv-alsa-main.c | 2 +- drivers/media/pci/ivtv/ivtv-alsa-pcm.h | 2 +- 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/media/pci/cx18/cx18-alsa-main.c +1 -1
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ err_exit:return ret; } -static int __init cx18_alsa_load (struct cx18 *cx) +static int cx18_alsa_load (struct cx18 *cx) {struct v4l2_device *v4l2_dev = &cx->v4l2_dev;struct cx18_stream *s;
drivers/media/pci/cx18/cx18-alsa-pcm.h +1 -1
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@* 02111-1307 USA */ -int __init snd_cx18_pcm_create (struct snd_cx18_card *cxsc); +int snd_cx18_pcm_create (struct snd_cx18_card *cxsc);/* Used by cx18-mailbox to announce the PCM data to the module */ void cx18_alsa_announce_pcm_data(struct snd_cx18_card *card, u8 *pcm_data,
drivers/media/pci/ivtv/ivtv-alsa-main.c +1 -1
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ err_exit:return ret; } -static int __init ivtv_alsa_load (struct ivtv *itv) +static int ivtv_alsa_load (struct ivtv *itv) {struct v4l2_device *v4l2_dev = &itv->v4l2_dev;struct ivtv_stream *s;
drivers/media/pci/ivtv/ivtv-alsa-pcm.h +1 -1
@@ -20,4 +20,4 @@* 02111-1307 USA */ -int __init snd_ivtv_pcm_create (struct snd_ivtv_card *itvsc); +int snd_ivtv_pcm_create (struct snd_ivtv_card *itvsc);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 45/77 media: v4l: Reset subdev v4l2_dev field to NULL if registration fails
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Laurent Pinchart <[email protected]>
commit 317efce991620adc589b3005b9baed433dcb2a56 upstream.
When subdev registration fails the subdev v4l2_dev field is left to a non-NULL value. Later calls to v4l2_device_unregister_subdev() will consider the subdev as registered and will module_put() the subdev module without any matching module_get().
Fix this by setting the subdev v4l2_dev field to NULL in v4l2_device_register_subdev() when the function fails.
--- drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-device.c | 30 ++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-device.c +14 -16
@@ -159,31 +159,21 @@ int v4l2_device_register_subdev(struct v sd->v4l2_dev = v4l2_dev;if (sd->internal_ops && sd->internal_ops->registered) { err = sd->internal_ops->registered (sd); -if (err) { -module_put (sd->owner); -return err; - } +if (err) + goto error_module; }/* This just returns 0 if either of the two args is NULL */ err =v4l2_ctrl_add_handler (v4l2_dev->ctrl_handler, sd->ctrl_handler,NULL ); -if (err) { -if (sd->internal_ops && sd->internal_ops->unregistered) - sd->internal_ops->unregistered (sd); -module_put (sd->owner); -return err; - } +if (err) + goto error_unregister;#if defined(CONFIG_MEDIA_CONTROLLER )/* Register the entity. */ if (v4l2_dev->mdev) { err =media_device_register_entity (v4l2_dev->mdev, entity); -if (err <0 ) { -if (sd->internal_ops && sd->internal_ops->unregistered) - sd->internal_ops->unregistered (sd); -module_put (sd->owner); -return err; - } +if (err <0 ) + goto error_unregister; }#endif
@@ -192,6 +182,14 @@ int v4l2_device_register_subdev(struct vspin_unlock (&v4l2_dev->lock);return 0 ; + +error_unregister: +if (sd->internal_ops && sd->internal_ops->unregistered) + sd->internal_ops->unregistered (sd); +error_module: +module_put (sd->owner); + sd->v4l2_dev =NULL ; +return err; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (v4l2_device_register_subdev);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 46/77 media: omap_vout: find_vma() needs ->mmap_sem held
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
commit 55ee64b30a38d688232e5eb2860467dddc493573 upstream.
Walking rbtree while it's modified is a Bad Idea(tm); besides, the result of find_vma() can be freed just as it's getting returned to caller. Fortunately, it's easy to fix - just take ->mmap_sem a bit earlier (and don't bother with find_vma() at all if virtp >= PAGE_OFFSET - in that case we don't even look at its result).
While we are at it, what prevents VIDIOC_PREPARE_BUF calling v4l_prepare_buf() -> (e.g) vb2_ioctl_prepare_buf() -> vb2_prepare_buf() -> __buf_prepare() -> __qbuf_userptr() -> vb2_vmalloc_get_userptr() -> find_vma(), AFAICS without having taken ->mmap_sem anywhere in process? The code flow is bloody convoluted and depends on a bunch of things done by initialization, so I certainly might've missed something...
--- drivers/media/platform/omap/omap_vout.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/omap/omap_vout.c +7 -5
@@ -205,19 +205,21 @@ static u32 omap_vout_uservirt_to_phys(u3struct vm_area_struct *vma;struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; - vma =find_vma (mm, virtp);/* For kernel direct-mapped memory, take the easy way */ -if (virtp >=PAGE_OFFSET ) { - physp =virt_to_phys ((void *) virtp); - }else if (vma && (vma->vm_flags &VM_IO ) && vma->vm_pgoff) { +if (virtp >=PAGE_OFFSET ) +return virt_to_phys ((void *) virtp); + +down_read (¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + vma =find_vma (mm, virtp); +if (vma && (vma->vm_flags &VM_IO ) && vma->vm_pgoff) {/* this will catch, kernel-allocated, mmaped-to-usermode addresses */ physp = (vma->vm_pgoff <<PAGE_SHIFT ) + (virtp - vma->vm_start); +up_read (¤t->mm->mmap_sem); }else {/* otherwise, use get_user_pages() for general userland pages */ int res, nr_pages =1 ;struct page *pages; -down_read (¤t->mm->mmap_sem); res =get_user_pages (current, current->mm, virtp, nr_pages,1 ,0 , &pages,NULL );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 47/77 media: rc: unlock on error in show_protocols()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
commit 30ebc5e44d057a1619ad63fe32c8c1670c37c4b8 upstream.
We recently introduced a new return -ENODEV in this function but we need to unlock before returning.
--- drivers/media/rc/rc-main.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/rc/rc-main.c +3 -1
@@ -789,8 +789,10 @@ static ssize_t show_protocols(struct dev }else if (dev->raw) { enabled = dev->raw->enabled_protocols; allowed =ir_raw_get_allowed_protocols (); - }else + }else { +mutex_unlock (&dev->lock);return -ENODEV ; + } IR_dprintk(1, "allowed - 0x%llx, enabled - 0x%llx\n", (long long)allowed,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 48/77 ext4: return ENOMEM if sb_getblk() fails
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit 860d21e2c585f7ee8a4ecc06f474fdc33c9474f4 upstream.
The only reason for sb_getblk() failing is if it can't allocate the buffer_head. So ENOMEM is more appropriate than EIO. In addition, make sure that the file system is marked as being inconsistent if sb_getblk() fails.
--- fs/ext4/extents.c | 25 ++++++++++++++----------- fs/ext4/indirect.c | 9 ++++++--- fs/ext4/inline.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/inode.c | 9 +++------ fs/ext4/mmp.c | 2 ++ fs/ext4/resize.c | 8 ++++---- fs/ext4/xattr.c | 3 ++- 7 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/extents.c +14 -11
@@ -725,6 +725,7 @@ ext4_ext_find_extent(struct inode *inodestruct ext4_extent_header *eh;struct buffer_head *bh;short int depth, i, ppos =0 , alloc =0 ; +int ret; eh =ext_inode_hdr (inode); depth =ext_depth (inode);
@@ -752,12 +753,15 @@ ext4_ext_find_extent(struct inode *inode path[ppos].p_ext =NULL ; bh =sb_getblk (inode->i_sb, path[ppos].p_block); -if (unlikely (!bh)) +if (unlikely (!bh)) { + ret = -ENOMEM ; goto err; + }if (!bh_uptodate_or_lock (bh)) {trace_ext4_ext_load_extent (inode, block, path[ppos].p_block); -if (bh_submit_read (bh) <0 ) { + ret =bh_submit_read (bh); +if (ret <0 ) {put_bh (bh); goto err; }
@@ -768,13 +772,15 @@ ext4_ext_find_extent(struct inode *inodeput_bh (bh);EXT4_ERROR_INODE (inode,"ppos %d > depth %d" , ppos, depth); + ret = -EIO ; goto err; } path[ppos].p_bh = bh; path[ppos].p_hdr = eh; i--; -if (ext4_ext_check_block (inode, eh, i, bh)) + ret =ext4_ext_check_block (inode, eh, i, bh); +if (ret <0 ) goto err; }
@@ -796,7 +802,7 @@ err:ext4_ext_drop_refs (path);if (alloc)kfree (path); -return ERR_PTR (-EIO ); +return ERR_PTR (ret); }/*
@@ -951,7 +957,7 @@ static int ext4_ext_split(handle_t *hand } bh =sb_getblk (inode->i_sb, newblock);if (!bh) { - err = -EIO ; + err = -ENOMEM ; goto cleanup; }lock_buffer (bh);
@@ -1024,7 +1030,7 @@ static int ext4_ext_split(handle_t *hand newblock = ablocks[--a]; bh =sb_getblk (inode->i_sb, newblock);if (!bh) { - err = -EIO ; + err = -ENOMEM ; goto cleanup; }lock_buffer (bh);
@@ -1136,11 +1142,8 @@ static int ext4_ext_grow_indepth(handle_return err; bh =sb_getblk (inode->i_sb, newblock); -if (!bh) { - err = -EIO ; -ext4_std_error (inode->i_sb, err); -return err; - } +if (!bh) +return -ENOMEM ;lock_buffer (bh); err =ext4_journal_get_create_access (handle, bh);
fs/ext4/indirect.c +6 -3
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ static Indirect *ext4_get_branch(structstruct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;Indirect *p = chain;struct buffer_head *bh; +int ret = -EIO ; *err =0 ;/* i_data is not going away, no lock needed */
@@ -154,8 +155,10 @@ static Indirect *ext4_get_branch(struct goto no_block;while (--depth) { bh =sb_getblk (sb,le32_to_cpu (p->key)); -if (unlikely (!bh)) +if (unlikely (!bh)) { + ret = -ENOMEM ; goto failure; + }if (!bh_uptodate_or_lock (bh)) {if (bh_submit_read (bh) <0 ) {
@@ -177,7 +180,7 @@ static Indirect *ext4_get_branch(structreturn NULL ; failure: - *err = -EIO ; + *err = ret; no_block:return p; }
@@ -471,7 +474,7 @@ static int ext4_alloc_branch(handle_t *h*/ bh =sb_getblk (inode->i_sb, new_blocks[n-1 ]);if (unlikely (!bh)) { - err = -EIO ; + err = -ENOMEM ; goto failed; }
fs/ext4/inline.c +1 -1
@@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@ static int ext4_convert_inline_data_nolo data_bh =sb_getblk (inode->i_sb, map.m_pblk);if (!data_bh) { - error = -EIO ; + error = -ENOMEM ; goto out_restore; }
fs/ext4/inode.c +3 -6
@@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ struct buffer_head *ext4_getblk(handle_t bh =sb_getblk (inode->i_sb, map.m_pblk);if (!bh) { - *errp = -EIO ; + *errp = -ENOMEM ;return NULL ; }if (map.m_flags &EXT4_MAP_NEW ) {
@@ -3660,11 +3660,8 @@ static int __ext4_get_inode_loc(struct i iloc->offset = (inode_offset % inodes_per_block) *EXT4_INODE_SIZE (sb); bh =sb_getblk (sb, block); -if (!bh) { -EXT4_ERROR_INODE_BLOCK (inode, block, -"unable to read itable block" ); -return -EIO ; - } +if (!bh) +return -ENOMEM ;if (!buffer_uptodate (bh)) {lock_buffer (bh);
fs/ext4/mmp.c +2 -0
@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ static int read_mmp_block(struct super_b* is not blocked in the elevator. */ if (!*bh) *bh =sb_getblk (sb, mmp_block); +if (!*bh) +return -ENOMEM ;if (*bh) {get_bh (*bh);lock_buffer (*bh);
fs/ext4/resize.c +4 -4
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ static struct buffer_head *bclean(handle bh =sb_getblk (sb, blk);if (!bh) -return ERR_PTR (-EIO ); +return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM );if ((err =ext4_journal_get_write_access (handle, bh))) {brelse (bh); bh =ERR_PTR (err);
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ static int set_flexbg_block_bitmap(struc bh =sb_getblk (sb, flex_gd->groups[group].block_bitmap);if (!bh) -return -EIO ; +return -ENOMEM ; err =ext4_journal_get_write_access (handle, bh);if (err)
@@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ static int setup_new_flex_group_blocks(s gdb =sb_getblk (sb, block);if (!gdb) { - err = -EIO ; + err = -ENOMEM ; goto out; }
@@ -1065,7 +1065,7 @@ static void update_backups(struct super_ bh =sb_getblk (sb, backup_block);if (!bh) { - err = -EIO ; + err = -ENOMEM ;break ; } ext4_debug("update metadata backup %llu(+%llu)\n",
fs/ext4/xattr.c +2 -1
@@ -887,16 +887,17 @@ inserted: new_bh =sb_getblk (sb, block);if (!new_bh) { + error = -ENOMEM ; getblk_failed:ext4_free_blocks (handle, inode,NULL , block,1 ,EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_METADATA ); - error = -EIO ; goto cleanup; }lock_buffer (new_bh); error =ext4_journal_get_create_access (handle, new_bh);if (error) {unlock_buffer (new_bh); + error = -EIO ; goto getblk_failed; }memcpy (new_bh->b_data, s->base, new_bh->b_size);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 49/77 ext4: check bh in ext4_read_block_bitmap()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eryu Guan <[email protected]>
commit 15b49132fc972c63894592f218ea5a9a61b1a18f upstream.
Validate the bh pointer before using it, since ext4_read_block_bitmap_nowait() might return NULL.
I've seen this in fsfuzz testing.
EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_read_block_bitmap_nowait:385: comm touch: Cannot get buffer for block bitmap - block_group = 0, block_bitmap = 3925999616
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<ffffffff8121de25>] ext4_wait_block_bitmap+0x25/0xe0 ... Call Trace: [<ffffffff8121e1e5>] ext4_read_block_bitmap+0x35/0x60 [<ffffffff8125e9c6>] ext4_free_blocks+0x236/0xb80 [<ffffffff811d0d36>] ? __getblk+0x36/0x70 [<ffffffff811d0a5f>] ? __find_get_block+0x8f/0x210 [<ffffffff81191ef3>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x33/0x140 [<ffffffff812678e5>] ext4_xattr_release_block+0x1b5/0x1d0 [<ffffffff812679be>] ext4_xattr_delete_inode+0xbe/0x100 [<ffffffff81222a7c>] ext4_free_inode+0x7c/0x4d0 [<ffffffff812277b8>] ? ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x88/0x230 [<ffffffff8122993c>] ext4_evict_inode+0x32c/0x490 [<ffffffff811b8cd7>] evict+0xa7/0x1c0 [<ffffffff811b8ed3>] iput_final+0xe3/0x170 [<ffffffff811b8f9e>] iput+0x3e/0x50 [<ffffffff812316fd>] ext4_add_nondir+0x4d/0x90 [<ffffffff81231d0b>] ext4_create+0xeb/0x170 [<ffffffff811aae9c>] vfs_create+0xac/0xd0 [<ffffffff811ac845>] lookup_open+0x185/0x1c0 [<ffffffff8129e3b9>] ? selinux_inode_permission+0xa9/0x170 [<ffffffff811acb54>] do_last+0x2d4/0x7a0 [<ffffffff811af743>] path_openat+0xb3/0x480 [<ffffffff8116a8a1>] ? handle_mm_fault+0x251/0x3b0 [<ffffffff811afc49>] do_filp_open+0x49/0xa0 [<ffffffff811bbaad>] ? __alloc_fd+0xdd/0x150 [<ffffffff8119da28>] do_sys_open+0x108/0x1f0 [<ffffffff8119db51>] sys_open+0x21/0x30 [<ffffffff81618959>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Also fix comment for ext4_read_block_bitmap_nowait()
--- fs/ext4/balloc.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/balloc.c +3 -1
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ void ext4_validate_block_bitmap(struct s }/** -* ext4_read_block_bitmap() +* ext4_read_block_bitmap_nowait() * @sb: super block * @block_group: given block group *
@@ -457,6 +457,8 @@ ext4_read_block_bitmap(struct super_blocstruct buffer_head *bh; bh =ext4_read_block_bitmap_nowait (sb, block_group); +if (!bh) +return NULL ;if (ext4_wait_block_bitmap (sb, block_group, bh)) {put_bh (bh);return NULL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 50/77 ext4: release sysfs kobject when failing to enable quotas on mount
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit 72ba74508b2857e71d65fc93f0d6b684492fc740 upstream.
In addition, print the error returned from ext4_enable_quotas()
--- fs/ext4/super.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/super.c +8 -4
@@ -4008,7 +4008,7 @@ no_journal: !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)) { err =ext4_enable_quotas (sb);if (err) - goto failed_mount7; + goto failed_mount8; }#endif /* CONFIG_QUOTA */
@@ -4035,6 +4035,10 @@ cantfind_ext4:ext4_msg (sb,KERN_ERR ,"VFS: Can't find ext4 filesystem" ); goto failed_mount; +#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA +failed_mount8: +kobject_del (&sbi->s_kobj); +#endif failed_mount7:ext4_unregister_li_request (sb); failed_mount6:
@@ -5005,9 +5009,9 @@ static int ext4_enable_quotas(struct sup DQUOT_USAGE_ENABLED);if (err) {ext4_warning (sb, -"Failed to enable quota (type=%d) " -"tracking. Please run e2fsck to fix." , - type); +"Failed to enable quota tracking " +"(type=%d, err=%d). Please run " +"e2fsck to fix." , type, err);return err; } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 51/77 ext4: fix race in ext4_mb_add_n_trim()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Niu Yawei <[email protected]>
commit f1167009711032b0d747ec89a632a626c901a1ad upstream.
In ext4_mb_add_n_trim(), lg_prealloc_lock should be taken when changing the lg_prealloc_list.
--- fs/ext4/mballoc.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/mballoc.c +3 -3
@@ -4136,7 +4136,7 @@ static void ext4_mb_add_n_trim(struct ex/* The max size of hash table is PREALLOC_TB_SIZE */ order =PREALLOC_TB_SIZE -1 ;/* Add the prealloc space to lg */ -rcu_read_lock (); +spin_lock (&lg->lg_prealloc_lock);list_for_each_entry_rcu (tmp_pa, &lg->lg_prealloc_list[order], pa_inode_list) {spin_lock (&tmp_pa->pa_lock);
@@ -4160,12 +4160,12 @@ static void ext4_mb_add_n_trim(struct exif (!added)list_add_tail_rcu (&pa->pa_inode_list, &lg->lg_prealloc_list[order]); -rcu_read_unlock (); +spin_unlock (&lg->lg_prealloc_lock);/* Now trim the list to be not more than 8 elements */ if (lg_prealloc_count >8 ) {ext4_mb_discard_lg_preallocations (sb, lg, - order, lg_prealloc_count); + order, lg_prealloc_count);return ; }return ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 52/77 ext4: fix xattr block allocation/release with bigalloc
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lukas Czerner <[email protected]>
commit 1231b3a1eb5740192aeebf5344dd6d6da000febf upstream.
Currently when new xattr block is created or released we we would call dquot_free_block() or dquot_alloc_block() respectively, among the else decrementing or incrementing the number of blocks assigned to the inode by one block.
This however does not work for bigalloc file system because we always allocate/free the whole cluster so we have to count with that in dquot_free_block() and dquot_alloc_block() as well.
Use the clusters-to-blocks conversion EXT4_C2B() when passing number of blocks to the dquot_alloc/free functions to fix the problem.
The problem has been revealed by xfstests #117 (and possibly others).
--- fs/ext4/xattr.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/xattr.c +4 -3
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ ext4_xattr_release_block(handle_t *handl error =ext4_handle_dirty_xattr_block (handle, inode, bh);if (IS_SYNC (inode))ext4_handle_sync (handle); -dquot_free_block (inode,1 ); +dquot_free_block (inode,EXT4_C2B (EXT4_SB (inode->i_sb),1 ));ea_bdebug (bh,"refcount now=%d; releasing" ,le32_to_cpu (BHDR (bh)->h_refcount)); }
@@ -832,7 +832,8 @@ inserted:else {/* The old block is released after updating the inode. */ - error =dquot_alloc_block (inode,1 ); + error =dquot_alloc_block (inode, +EXT4_C2B (EXT4_SB (sb),1 ));if (error) goto cleanup; error = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle,
@@ -929,7 +930,7 @@ cleanup:return error; cleanup_dquot: -dquot_free_block (inode,1 ); +dquot_free_block (inode,EXT4_C2B (EXT4_SB (sb),1 )); goto cleanup; bad_block:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 53/77 ext4: fix free clusters calculation in bigalloc filesystem
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lukas Czerner <[email protected]>
commit 304e220f0879198b1f5309ad6f0be862b4009491 upstream.
ext4_has_free_clusters() should tell us whether there is enough free clusters to allocate, however number of free clusters in the file system is converted to blocks using EXT4_C2B() which is not only wrong use of the macro (we should have used EXT4_NUM_B2C) but it's also completely wrong concept since everything else is in cluster units.
Moreover when calculating number of root clusters we should be using macro EXT4_NUM_B2C() instead of EXT4_B2C() otherwise the result might be off by one. However r_blocks_count should always be a multiple of the cluster ratio so doing a plain bit shift should be enough here. We avoid using EXT4_B2C() because it's confusing.
As a result of the first problem number of free clusters is much bigger than it should have been and ext4_has_free_clusters() would return 1 even if there is really not enough free clusters available.
Fix this by removing the EXT4_C2B() conversion of free clusters and using bit shift when calculating number of root clusters. This bug affects number of xfstests tests covering file system ENOSPC situation handling. With this patch most of the ENOSPC problems with bigalloc file system disappear, especially the errors caused by delayed allocation not having enough space when the actual allocation is finally requested.
--- fs/ext4/balloc.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/balloc.c +7 -2
@@ -484,11 +484,16 @@ static int ext4_has_free_clusters(struct free_clusters =percpu_counter_read_positive (fcc); dirty_clusters =percpu_counter_read_positive (dcc); - root_clusters =EXT4_B2C (sbi,ext4_r_blocks_count (sbi->s_es)); + +/* +* r_blocks_count should always be multiple of the cluster ratio so +* we are safe to do a plane bit shift only. +*/ + root_clusters =ext4_r_blocks_count (sbi->s_es) >> sbi->s_cluster_bits;if (free_clusters - (nclusters + root_clusters + dirty_clusters) <EXT4_FREECLUSTERS_WATERMARK ) { - free_clusters =EXT4_C2B (sbi,percpu_counter_sum_positive (fcc)); + free_clusters =percpu_counter_sum_positive (fcc); dirty_clusters =percpu_counter_sum_positive (dcc); }/* Check whether we have space after accounting for current
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 54/77 nfsd: Fix memleak
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: majianpeng <[email protected]>
commit 2d32b29a1c2830f7c42caa8258c714acd983961f upstream.
When free nfs-client, it must free the ->cl_stateids.
--- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +2 -0
@@ -1060,6 +1060,8 @@ free_client(struct nfs4_client *clp) }free_svc_cred (&clp->cl_cred);kfree (clp->cl_name.data); +idr_remove_all (&clp->cl_stateids); +idr_destroy (&clp->cl_stateids);kfree (clp); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 55/77 svcrpc: make svc_age_temp_xprts enqueue under sv_lock
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "J. Bruce Fields" <[email protected]>
commit e75bafbff2270993926abcc31358361db74a9bc2 upstream.
svc_age_temp_xprts expires xprts in a two-step process: first it takes the sv_lock and moves the xprts to expire off their server-wide list (sv_tempsocks or sv_permsocks) to a local list. Then it drops the sv_lock and enqueues and puts each one.
I see no reason for this: svc_xprt_enqueue() will take sp_lock, but the sv_lock and sp_lock are not otherwise nested anywhere (and documentation at the top of this file claims it's correct to nest these with sp_lock inside.)
--- net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c | 15 ++------------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c +2 -13
@@ -856,7 +856,6 @@ static void svc_age_temp_xprts(unsignedstruct svc_serv *serv = (struct svc_serv *)closure;struct svc_xprt *xprt;struct list_head *le, *next; -LIST_HEAD (to_be_aged);dprintk ("svc_age_temp_xprts\n" );
@@ -877,25 +876,15 @@ static void svc_age_temp_xprts(unsignedif (atomic_read (&xprt->xpt_ref.refcount) >1 ||test_bit (XPT_BUSY , &xprt->xpt_flags))continue ; -svc_xprt_get (xprt); -list_move (le, &to_be_aged); +list_del_init (le);set_bit (XPT_CLOSE , &xprt->xpt_flags);set_bit (XPT_DETACHED , &xprt->xpt_flags); - } -spin_unlock_bh (&serv->sv_lock); - -while (!list_empty (&to_be_aged)) { - le = to_be_aged.next; -/* fiddling the xpt_list node is safe 'cos we're XPT_DETACHED */ -list_del_init (le); - xprt = list_entry(le, struct svc_xprt, xpt_list); -dprintk ("queuing xprt %p for closing\n" , xprt);/* a thread will dequeue and close it soon */ svc_xprt_enqueue (xprt); -svc_xprt_put (xprt); } +spin_unlock_bh (&serv->sv_lock);mod_timer (&serv->sv_temptimer, jiffies + svc_conn_age_period *HZ ); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 56/77 svcrpc: fix rpc server shutdown races
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "J. Bruce Fields" <[email protected]>
commit cc630d9f476445927fca599f81182c7f06f79058 upstream.
Rewrite server shutdown to remove the assumption that there are no longer any threads running (no longer true, for example, when shutting down the service in one network namespace while it's still running in others).
Do that by doing what we'd do in normal circumstances: just CLOSE each socket, then enqueue it.
Since there may not be threads to handle the resulting queued xprts, also run a simplified version of the svc_recv() loop run by a server to clean up any closed xprts afterwards.
--- net/sunrpc/svc.c | 9 ------- net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
net/sunrpc/svc.c +0 -9
@@ -515,15 +515,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(svc_create_pooled);void svc_shutdown_net (struct svc_serv *serv,struct net *net) { -/* -* The set of xprts (contained in the sv_tempsocks and -* sv_permsocks lists) is now constant, since it is modified -* only by accepting new sockets (done by service threads in -* svc_recv) or aging old ones (done by sv_temptimer), or -* configuration changes (excluded by whatever locking the -* caller is using--nfsd_mutex in the case of nfsd). So it's -* safe to traverse those lists and shut everything down: -*/ svc_close_net (serv, net);if (serv->sv_shutdown)
net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c +32 -25
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Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 57/77 HID: add support for Sony RF receiver with USB product id 0x0374
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Fernando Luis Vázquez Cao <[email protected]>
commit a464918419f94a0043d2f549d6defb4c3f69f68a upstream.
Some Vaio desktop computers, among them the VGC-LN51JGB multimedia PC, have a RF receiver, multi-interface USB device 054c:0374, that is used to connect a wireless keyboard and a wireless mouse.
The keyboard works flawlessly, but the mouse (VGP-WMS3 in my case) does not seem to be generating any pointer events. The problem is that the mouse pointer is wrongly declared as a constant non-data variable in the report descriptor (see lsusb and usbhid-dump output below), with the consequence that it is ignored by the HID code.
Add this device to the have-special-driver list and fix up the report descriptor in the Sony-specific driver which happens to already have a fixup for a similar firmware bug.
# lsusb -vd 054C:0374
Bus 003 Device 002: ID 054c:0374 Sony Corp.
Device Descriptor:
bLength 18
bDescriptorType 1
bcdUSB 2.00
bDeviceClass 0 (Defined at Interface level)
bDeviceSubClass 0
bDeviceProtocol 0
bMaxPacketSize0 8
idVendor 0x054c Sony Corp.
idProduct 0x0374
iSerial 0
[...]
Interface Descriptor:
bLength 9
bDescriptorType 4
bInterfaceNumber 1
bAlternateSetting 0
bNumEndpoints 1
bInterfaceClass 3 Human Interface Device
bInterfaceSubClass 1 Boot Interface Subclass
bInterfaceProtocol 2 Mouse
iInterface 2 RF Receiver
[...]
Report Descriptor: (length is 100)
[...]
Item(Global): Usage Page, data= [ 0x01 ] 1
Generic Desktop Controls
Item(Local ): Usage, data= [ 0x30 ] 48
Direction-X
Item(Local ): Usage, data= [ 0x31 ] 49
Direction-Y
Item(Global): Report Count, data= [ 0x02 ] 2
Item(Global): Report Size, data= [ 0x08 ] 8
Item(Global): Logical Minimum, data= [ 0x81 ] 129
Item(Global): Logical Maximum, data= [ 0x7f ] 127
Item(Main ): Input, data= [ 0x07 ] 7
Constant Variable Relative No_Wrap Linear
Preferred_State No_Null_Position Non_Volatile Bitfield# usbhid-dump 003:002:001:DESCRIPTOR 1357910009.758544 05 01 09 02 A1 01 05 01 09 02 A1 02 85 01 09 01 A1 00 05 09 19 01 29 05 95 05 75 01 15 00 25 01 81 02 75 03 95 01 81 01 05 01 09 30 09 31 95 02 75 08 15 81 25 7F 81 07 A1 02 85 01 09 38 35 00 45 00 15 81 25 7F 95 01 75 08 81 06 C0 A1 02 85 01 05 0C 15 81 25 7F 95 01 75 08 0A 38 02 81 06 C0 C0 C0 C0
--- drivers/hid/hid-core.c | 1 + drivers/hid/hid-ids.h | 1 + drivers/hid/hid-sony.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/hid/hid-core.c +1 -0
@@ -1697,6 +1697,7 @@ static const struct hid_device_id hid_ha { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_NAVIGATION_CONTROLLER) }, { HID_BLUETOOTH_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS3_CONTROLLER) }, { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_VAIO_VGX_MOUSE) }, + { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_VAIO_VGP_MOUSE) }, { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SUNPLUS, USB_DEVICE_ID_SUNPLUS_WDESKTOP) }, { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_THRUSTMASTER, 0xb300) }, { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_THRUSTMASTER, 0xb304) },
drivers/hid/hid-ids.h +1 -0
@@ -709,6 +709,7 @@#define USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY 0x054c#define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_VAIO_VGX_MOUSE 0x024b +#define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_VAIO_VGP_MOUSE 0x0374#define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS3_BDREMOTE 0x0306#define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS3_CONTROLLER 0x0268#define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_NAVIGATION_CONTROLLER 0x042f
drivers/hid/hid-sony.c +3 -1
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ static __u8 *sony_report_fixup(struct hiif ((sc->quirks &VAIO_RDESC_CONSTANT ) && *rsize >=56 && rdesc[54 ] ==0x81 && rdesc[55 ] ==0x07 ) { -hid_info (hdev,"Fixing up Sony Vaio VGX report descriptor\n" ); +hid_info (hdev,"Fixing up Sony RF Receiver report descriptor\n" ); rdesc[55 ] =0x06 ; }
@@ -217,6 +217,8 @@ static const struct hid_device_id sony_d .driver_data = SIXAXIS_CONTROLLER_BT }, { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_VAIO_VGX_MOUSE), .driver_data = VAIO_RDESC_CONSTANT }, + { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_VAIO_VGP_MOUSE), + .driver_data = VAIO_RDESC_CONSTANT }, { } };MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE (hid, sony_devices);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 58/77 HID: clean up quirk for Sony RF receivers
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Fernando Luis Vázquez Cao <[email protected]>
commit 99d249021abd4341771523ed8dd7946276103432 upstream.
Document what the fix-up is does and make it more robust by ensuring that it is only applied to the USB interface that corresponds to the mouse (sony_report_fixup() is called once per interface during probing).
--- drivers/hid/hid-sony.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/hid/hid-sony.c +12 -2
@@ -43,9 +43,19 @@ static __u8 *sony_report_fixup(struct hi {struct sony_sc *sc =hid_get_drvdata (hdev); -if ((sc->quirks &VAIO_RDESC_CONSTANT ) && - *rsize >=56 && rdesc[54 ] ==0x81 && rdesc[55 ] ==0x07 ) { +/* +* Some Sony RF receivers wrongly declare the mouse pointer as a +* a constant non-data variable. +*/ +if ((sc->quirks &VAIO_RDESC_CONSTANT ) && *rsize >=56 && +/* usage page: generic desktop controls */ +/* rdesc[0] == 0x05 && rdesc[1] == 0x01 && */ +/* usage: mouse */ + rdesc[2 ] ==0x09 && rdesc[3 ] ==0x02 && +/* input (usage page for x,y axes): constant, variable, relative */ + rdesc[54 ] ==0x81 && rdesc[55 ] ==0x07 ) {hid_info (hdev,"Fixing up Sony RF Receiver report descriptor\n" ); +/* input: data, variable, relative */ rdesc[55 ] =0x06 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 59/77 fuse: dont WARN when nlink is zero
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
commit dfca7cebc2679f3d129f8e680a8f199a7ad16e38 upstream.
drop_nlink() warns if nlink is already zero. This is triggerable by a buggy userspace filesystem. The cure, I think, is worse than the disease so disable the warning.
--- fs/fuse/dir.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/fuse/dir.c +8 -1
@@ -682,7 +682,14 @@ static int fuse_unlink(struct inode *dirspin_lock (&fc->lock); fi->attr_version = ++fc->attr_version; -drop_nlink (inode); +/* +* If i_nlink == 0 then unlink doesn't make sense, yet this can +* happen if userspace filesystem is careless. It would be +* difficult to enforce correct nlink usage so just ignore this +* condition here +*/ +if (inode->i_nlink >0 ) +drop_nlink (inode);spin_unlock (&fc->lock);fuse_invalidate_attr (inode);fuse_invalidate_attr (dir);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 60/77 workqueue: consider work function when searching for busy work items
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
commit a2c1c57be8d9fd5b716113c8991d3d702eeacf77 upstream.
To avoid executing the same work item concurrenlty, workqueue hashes currently busy workers according to their current work items and looks up the the table when it wants to execute a new work item. If there already is a worker which is executing the new work item, the new item is queued to the found worker so that it gets executed only after the current execution finishes.
Unfortunately, a work item may be freed while being executed and thus recycled for different purposes. If it gets recycled for a different work item and queued while the previous execution is still in progress, workqueue may make the new work item wait for the old one although the two aren't really related in any way.
In extreme cases, this false dependency may lead to deadlock although it's extremely unlikely given that there aren't too many self-freeing work item users and they usually don't wait for other work items.
To alleviate the problem, record the current work function in each busy worker and match it together with the work item address in find_worker_executing_work(). While this isn't complete, it ensures that unrelated work items don't interact with each other and in the very unlikely case where a twisted wq user triggers it, it's always onto itself making the culprit easy to spot.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=51701
Cc: [email protected]
--- kernel/workqueue.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
kernel/workqueue.c +29 -7
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ struct worker { };struct work_struct *current_work;/* L: work being processed */ +work_func_t current_func;/* L: current_work's fn */ struct cpu_workqueue_struct *current_cwq;/* L: current_work's cwq */ struct list_head scheduled;/* L: scheduled works */ struct task_struct *task;/* I: worker task */
@@ -910,7 +911,8 @@ static struct worker *__find_worker_execstruct hlist_node *tmp;hlist_for_each_entry (worker, tmp, bwh, hentry) -if (worker->current_work == work) +if (worker->current_work == work && + worker->current_func == work->func)return worker;return NULL ; }
@@ -920,9 +922,27 @@ static struct worker *__find_worker_exec* @gcwq: gcwq of interest * @work: work to find worker for * -* Find a worker which is executing @work on @gcwq. This function is -* identical to __find_worker_executing_work() except that this -* function calculates @bwh itself. +* Find a worker which is executing @work on @gcwq by searching +* @gcwq->busy_hash which is keyed by the address of @work. For a worker +* to match, its current execution should match the address of @work and +* its work function. This is to avoid unwanted dependency between +* unrelated work executions through a work item being recycled while still +* being executed. +* +* This is a bit tricky. A work item may be freed once its execution +* starts and nothing prevents the freed area from being recycled for +* another work item. If the same work item address ends up being reused +* before the original execution finishes, workqueue will identify the +* recycled work item as currently executing and make it wait until the +* current execution finishes, introducing an unwanted dependency. +* +* This function checks the work item address, work function and workqueue +* to avoid false positives. Note that this isn't complete as one may +* construct a work function which can introduce dependency onto itself +* through a recycled work item. Well, if somebody wants to shoot oneself +* in the foot that badly, there's only so much we can do, and if such +* deadlock actually occurs, it should be easy to locate the culprit work +* function. * * CONTEXT: * spin_lock_irq(gcwq->lock).
@@ -2168,7 +2188,6 @@ __acquires(&gcwq->lock)struct global_cwq *gcwq = pool->gcwq;struct hlist_head *bwh =busy_worker_head (gcwq, work);bool cpu_intensive = cwq->wq->flags &WQ_CPU_INTENSIVE ; -work_func_t f = work->func;int work_color;struct worker *collision;#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
@@ -2208,6 +2227,7 @@ __acquires(&gcwq->lock)debug_work_deactivate (work);hlist_add_head (&worker->hentry, bwh); worker->current_work = work; + worker->current_func = work->func; worker->current_cwq = cwq; work_color =get_work_color (work);
@@ -2240,7 +2260,7 @@ __acquires(&gcwq->lock)lock_map_acquire_read (&cwq->wq->lockdep_map);lock_map_acquire (&lockdep_map);trace_workqueue_execute_start (work); -f (work); + worker->current_func (work);/* * While we must be careful to not use "work" after this, the trace * point will only record its address.
@@ -2252,7 +2272,8 @@ __acquires(&gcwq->lock)if (unlikely (in_atomic () ||lockdep_depth (current) >0 )) {pr_err ("BUG: workqueue leaked lock or atomic: %s/0x%08x/%d\n" " last function: %pf\n" , - current->comm,preempt_count (),task_pid_nr (current), f); + current->comm,preempt_count (),task_pid_nr (current), + worker->current_func);debug_show_held_locks (current);dump_stack (); }
@@ -2266,6 +2287,7 @@ __acquires(&gcwq->lock)/* we're done with it, release */ hlist_del_init (&worker->hentry); worker->current_work =NULL ; + worker->current_func =NULL ; worker->current_cwq =NULL ;cwq_dec_nr_in_flight (cwq, work_color); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 61/77 pstore: Avoid deadlock in panic and emergency-restart path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Seiji Aguchi <[email protected]>
commit 9f244e9cfd70c7c0f82d3c92ce772ab2a92d9f64 upstream.
[Issue]
When pstore is in panic and emergency-restart paths, it may be blocked in those paths because it simply takes spin_lock.
This is an example scenario which pstore may hang up in a panic path:
- cpuA grabs psinfo->buf_lock
- cpuB panics and calls smp_send_stop
- smp_send_stop sends IRQ to cpuA
- after 1 second, cpuB gives up on cpuA and sends an NMI instead
- cpuA is now in an NMI handler while still holding buf_lock
- cpuB is deadlocked
This case may happen if a firmware has a bug and cpuA is stuck talking with it more than one second.
Also, this is a similar scenario in an emergency-restart path:
- cpuA grabs psinfo->buf_lock and stucks in a firmware
- cpuB kicks emergency-restart via either sysrq-b or hangcheck timer. And then, cpuB is deadlocked by taking psinfo->buf_lock again.
[Solution]
This patch avoids the deadlocking issues in both panic and emergency_restart paths by introducing a function, is_non_blocking_path(), to check if a cpu can be blocked in current path.
With this patch, pstore is not blocked even if another cpu has taken a spin_lock, in those paths by changing from spin_lock_irqsave to spin_trylock_irqsave.
In addition, according to a comment of emergency_restart() in kernel/sys.c, spin_lock shouldn't be taken in an emergency_restart path to avoid deadlock. This patch fits the comment below.
<snip>
/**
* emergency_restart - reboot the system
*
* Without shutting down any hardware or taking any locks * reboot the system. This is called when we know we are in * trouble so this is our best effort to reboot. This is * safe to call in interrupt context.
*/
void emergency_restart(void)
<snip>
--- fs/pstore/platform.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ include/linux/pstore.h | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/pstore/platform.c +29 -6
@@ -96,6 +96,27 @@ static const char *get_reason_str(enum k } } +bool pstore_cannot_block_path (enum kmsg_dump_reason reason) +{ +/* +* In case of NMI path, pstore shouldn't be blocked +* regardless of reason. +*/ +if (in_nmi ()) +return true; + +switch (reason) { +/* In panic case, other cpus are stopped by smp_send_stop(). */ +case KMSG_DUMP_PANIC : +/* Emergency restart shouldn't be blocked by spin lock. */ +case KMSG_DUMP_EMERG : +return true; +default : +return false; + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (pstore_cannot_block_path); +/* * callback from kmsg_dump. (s2,l2) has the most recently * written bytes, older bytes are in (s1,l1). Save as much
@@ -114,10 +135,12 @@ static void pstore_dump(struct kmsg_dump why =get_reason_str (reason); -if (in_nmi ()) { - is_locked =spin_trylock (&psinfo->buf_lock); -if (!is_locked) -pr_err ("pstore dump routine blocked in NMI, may corrupt error record\n" ); +if (pstore_cannot_block_path (reason)) { + is_locked =spin_trylock_irqsave (&psinfo->buf_lock, flags); +if (!is_locked) { +pr_err ("pstore dump routine blocked in %s path, may corrupt error record\n" + ,in_nmi () ?"NMI" : why); + } }else spin_lock_irqsave (&psinfo->buf_lock, flags); oopscount++;
@@ -143,9 +166,9 @@ static void pstore_dump(struct kmsg_dump total += hsize + len; part++; } -if (in_nmi ()) { +if (pstore_cannot_block_path (reason)) {if (is_locked) -spin_unlock (&psinfo->buf_lock); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&psinfo->buf_lock, flags); }else spin_unlock_irqrestore (&psinfo->buf_lock, flags); }
include/linux/pstore.h +6 -0
@@ -68,12 +68,18 @@ struct pstore_info {#ifdef CONFIG_PSTORE extern int pstore_register (struct pstore_info *); +extern bool pstore_cannot_block_path (enum kmsg_dump_reason reason);#else static inline int pstore_register (struct pstore_info *psi) {return -ENODEV ; } +static inline bool +pstore_cannot_block_path (enum kmsg_dump_reason reason) +{ +return false; +}#endif #endif /*_LINUX_PSTORE_H*/
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 62/77 cpuset: fix cpuset_print_task_mems_allowed() vs rename() race
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Li Zefan <[email protected]>
commit 63f43f55c9bbc14f76b582644019b8a07dc8219a upstream.
rename() will change dentry->d_name. The result of this race can be worse than seeing partially rewritten name, but we might access a stale pointer because rename() will re-allocate memory to hold a longer name.
It's safe in the protection of dentry->d_lock.
v2: check NULL dentry before acquiring dentry lock.
--- kernel/cpuset.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/cpuset.c +10 -2
@@ -2511,8 +2511,16 @@ void cpuset_print_task_mems_allowed(stru dentry =task_cs (tsk)->css.cgroup->dentry;spin_lock (&cpuset_buffer_lock); -snprintf (cpuset_name,CPUSET_NAME_LEN , - dentry ? (const char *)dentry->d_name.name :"/" ); + +if (!dentry) { +strcpy (cpuset_name,"/" ); + }else { +spin_lock (&dentry->d_lock); +strlcpy (cpuset_name, (const char *)dentry->d_name.name, +CPUSET_NAME_LEN ); +spin_unlock (&dentry->d_lock); + } +nodelist_scnprintf (cpuset_nodelist,CPUSET_NODELIST_LEN , tsk->mems_allowed); printk(KERN_INFO "%s cpuset=%s mems_allowed=%s\n",
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 63/77 cgroup: fix exit() vs rmdir() race
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Li Zefan <[email protected]>
commit 71b5707e119653039e6e95213f00479668c79b75 upstream.
In cgroup_exit() put_css_set_taskexit() is called without any lock, which might lead to accessing a freed cgroup:
thread1 thread2
---------------------------------------------exit()
cgroup_exit()
put_css_set_taskexit()
atomic_dec(cgrp->count);
rmdir();
/* not safe !! */
check_for_release(cgrp);rcu_read_lock() can be used to make sure the cgroup is alive.
--- kernel/cgroup.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
kernel/cgroup.c +8 -0
@@ -426,12 +426,20 @@ static void __put_css_set(struct css_setstruct cgroup *cgrp = link->cgrp;list_del (&link->cg_link_list);list_del (&link->cgrp_link_list); + +/* +* We may not be holding cgroup_mutex, and if cgrp->count is +* dropped to 0 the cgroup can be destroyed at any time, hence +* rcu_read_lock is used to keep it alive. +*/ +rcu_read_lock ();if (atomic_dec_and_test (&cgrp->count) &¬ify_on_release (cgrp)) {if (taskexit)set_bit (CGRP_RELEASABLE , &cgrp->flags);check_for_release (cgrp); } +rcu_read_unlock ();kfree (link); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 64/77 bq27x00_battery: Fix bugs introduced with BQ27425 support
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
commit bde83b9a6b44c1e0fd872e57ecc869cfcf88538f upstream.
commit a66f59ba2e994bf70274ef0513e24e0e7ae20c63
bq27x00_battery: Add support for BQ27425 chip
introduced 2 bugs.
1/ 'chip' was set to BQ27425 unconditionally - breaking support for
other devices;
2/ BQ27425 does not support cycle count, how the code still tries to
get the cycle count for BQ27425, and now does it twice for other chips.
--- drivers/power/bq27x00_battery.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
drivers/power/bq27x00_battery.c +0 -2
@@ -448,7 +448,6 @@ static void bq27x00_update(struct bq27x0 cache.temperature =bq27x00_battery_read_temperature (di);if (!is_bq27425) cache.cycle_count =bq27x00_battery_read_cyct (di); - cache.cycle_count =bq27x00_battery_read_cyct (di); cache.power_avg =bq27x00_battery_read_pwr_avg (di, BQ27x00_POWER_AVG);
@@ -696,7 +695,6 @@ static int bq27x00_powersupply_init(struint ret; di->bat.type =POWER_SUPPLY_TYPE_BATTERY ; - di->chip =BQ27425 ;if (di->chip ==BQ27425 ) { di->bat.properties = bq27425_battery_props; di->bat.num_properties =ARRAY_SIZE (bq27425_battery_props);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 65/77 ab8500-chargalg: Only root should have write permission on sysfs file
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lee Jones <[email protected]>
commit e3455002d04276c256a531f7175dce0f7d1cb78a upstream.
Only root should have write permission on sysfs file ab8500_chargalg/chargalg.
--- drivers/power/abx500_chargalg.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/power/abx500_chargalg.c +1 -1
@@ -1698,7 +1698,7 @@ static ssize_t abx500_chargalg_sysfs_chastatic struct attribute abx500_chargalg_en_charger = \ { .name ="chargalg" , - .mode =S_IWUGO , + .mode =S_IWUSR , };static struct attribute *abx500_chargalg_chg[] = {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 66/77 ab8500_btemp: Demote initcall sequence
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Rajanikanth H.V" <[email protected]>
commit eeb0751c99522a4d1bbcc7b6bc1460cd07d07488 upstream.
Power supply subsystem creates thermal zone device for the property 'POWER_SUPPLY_PROP_TEMP' which requires thermal subsystem to be ready before 'ab8500 battery temperature monitor' driver is initialized. ab8500 btemp driver is initialized with subsys_initcall whereas thermal subsystem is initialized with fs_initcall which causes thermal_zone_device_register(...) to crash since the required structure 'thermal_class' is not initialized yet:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000a4 pgd = c0004000 [000000a4] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 Tainted: G W (3.8.0-rc4-00001-g632fda8-dirty #1) PC is at _raw_spin_lock+0x18/0x54 LR is at get_device_parent+0x50/0x1b8 pc : [<c02f1dd0>] lr : [<c01cb248>] psr: 60000013
sp : ef04bdc8 ip : 00000000 fp : c0446180
r10: ef216e38 r9 : c03af5d0 r8 : ef275c18
r7 : 00000000 r6 : c0476c14 r5 : ef275c18 r4 : ef095840 r3 : ef04a000 r2 : 00000001 r1 : 00000000 r0 : 000000a4
Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment kernel
Control: 10c5787d Table: 0000404a DAC: 00000015 Process swapper/0 (pid: 1, stack limit = 0xef04a238)
Stack: (0xef04bdc8 to 0xef04c000)
[...]
[<c02f1dd0>] (_raw_spin_lock+0x18/0x54) from [<c01cb248>] (get_device_parent+0x50/0x1b8) [<c01cb248>] (get_device_parent+0x50/0x1b8) from [<c01cb8d8>] (device_add+0xa4/0x574) [<c01cb8d8>] (device_add+0xa4/0x574) from [<c020b91c>] (thermal_zone_device_register+0x118/0x938) [<c020b91c>] (thermal_zone_device_register+0x118/0x938) from [<c0202030>] (power_supply_register+0x170/0x1f8) [<c0202030>] (power_supply_register+0x170/0x1f8) from [<c02055ec>] (ab8500_btemp_probe+0x208/0x47c) [<c02055ec>] (ab8500_btemp_probe+0x208/0x47c) from [<c01cf0dc>] (platform_drv_probe+0x14/0x18) [<c01cf0dc>] (platform_drv_probe+0x14/0x18) from [<c01cde70>] (driver_probe_device+0x74/0x20c) [<c01cde70>] (driver_probe_device+0x74/0x20c) from [<c01ce094>] (__driver_attach+0x8c/0x90) [<c01ce094>] (__driver_attach+0x8c/0x90) from [<c01cc640>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x4c/0x80) [<c01cc640>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x4c/0x80) from [<c01cd6b4>] (bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x23c) [<c01cd6b4>] (bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x23c) from [<c01ce54c>] (driver_register+0x78/0x14c) [<c01ce54c>] (driver_register+0x78/0x14c) from [<c00086ac>] (do_one_initcall+0xfc/0x164) [<c00086ac>] (do_one_initcall+0xfc/0x164) from [<c02e89c8>] (kernel_init+0x120/0x2b8) [<c02e89c8>] (kernel_init+0x120/0x2b8) from [<c000e358>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Code: e3c3303f e5932004 e2822001 e5832004 (e1903f9f) ---[ end trace ed9df72941b5bada ]---
--- drivers/power/ab8500_btemp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/power/ab8500_btemp.c +1 -1
@@ -1123,7 +1123,7 @@ static void __exit ab8500_btemp_exit(voiplatform_driver_unregister (&ab8500_btemp_driver); } -subsys_initcall_sync (ab8500_btemp_init); +device_initcall (ab8500_btemp_init);module_exit (ab8500_btemp_exit);MODULE_LICENSE ("GPL v2" );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 67/77 ACPI: Add DMI entry for Sony VGN-FW41E_H
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Joseph Salisbury <[email protected]>
commit 66f2fda93b67fa744d406e6dcf443f67bac204b6 upstream.
This patch adds a quirk to allow the Sony VGN-FW41E_H to suspend/resume properly.
References: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1113547
--- drivers/acpi/sleep.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/acpi/sleep.c +8 -0
@@ -177,6 +177,14 @@ static struct dmi_system_id __initdata a }, { .callback = init_nvs_nosave, + .ident = "Sony Vaio VGN-FW41E_H", + .matches = { +DMI_MATCH (DMI_SYS_VENDOR ,"Sony Corporation" ), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "VGN-FW41E_H"), + }, + }, + { + .callback = init_nvs_nosave, .ident = "Sony Vaio VGN-FW21E", .matches = { DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Sony Corporation"),
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 68/77 staging: comedi: check s->async for poll(), read() and write()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ian Abbott <[email protected]>
commit cc400e185c07c15a42d2635995f422de5b94b696 upstream.
Some low-level comedi drivers (incorrectly) point dev->read_subdev or dev->write_subdev to a subdevice that does not support asynchronous commands. Comedi's poll(), read() and write() file operation handlers assume these subdevices do support asynchronous commands. In particular, they assume s->async is valid (where s points to the read or write subdevice), which it won't be if it has been set incorrectly. This can lead to a NULL pointer dereference.
Check s->async is non-NULL in comedi_poll(), comedi_read() and comedi_write() to avoid the bug.
--- drivers/staging/comedi/comedi_fops.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/staging/comedi/comedi_fops.c +4 -4
@@ -1779,7 +1779,7 @@ static unsigned int comedi_poll(struct f mask =0 ; read_subdev =comedi_get_read_subdevice (dev_file_info); -if (read_subdev) { +if (read_subdev && read_subdev->async) {poll_wait (file, &read_subdev->async->wait_head, wait);if (!read_subdev->busy || comedi_buf_read_n_available(read_subdev->async) > 0
@@ -1789,7 +1789,7 @@ static unsigned int comedi_poll(struct f } } write_subdev =comedi_get_write_subdevice (dev_file_info); -if (write_subdev) { +if (write_subdev && write_subdev->async) {poll_wait (file, &write_subdev->async->wait_head, wait);comedi_buf_write_alloc (write_subdev->async, write_subdev->async->prealloc_bufsz);
@@ -1831,7 +1831,7 @@ static ssize_t comedi_write(struct file } s =comedi_get_write_subdevice (dev_file_info); -if (s ==NULL ) { +if (s ==NULL || s->async ==NULL ) { retval = -EIO ; goto done; }
@@ -1942,7 +1942,7 @@ static ssize_t comedi_read(struct file * } s =comedi_get_read_subdevice (dev_file_info); -if (s ==NULL ) { +if (s ==NULL || s->async ==NULL ) { retval = -EIO ; goto done; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 69/77 ata_piix: IDE-mode SATA patch for Intel Avoton DeviceIDs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Seth Heasley <[email protected]>
commit aaa515277db9585eeb4fdeb4637b9f9df50a1dd9 upstream.
This patch adds the IDE-mode SATA DeviceIDs for the Intel Avoton SOC.
--- drivers/ata/ata_piix.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/ata/ata_piix.c +8 -0
@@ -317,6 +317,14 @@ static const struct pci_device_id piix_p { 0x8086, 0x9c09, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, ich8_2port_sata },/* SATA Controller IDE (DH89xxCC) */ { 0x8086, 0x2326, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, ich8_2port_sata }, +/* SATA Controller IDE (Avoton) */ + { 0x8086, 0x1f20, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, ich8_sata_snb }, +/* SATA Controller IDE (Avoton) */ + { 0x8086, 0x1f21, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, ich8_sata_snb }, +/* SATA Controller IDE (Avoton) */ + { 0x8086, 0x1f30, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, ich8_2port_sata }, +/* SATA Controller IDE (Avoton) */ + { 0x8086, 0x1f31, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, ich8_2port_sata }, { } /* terminate list */ };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 70/77 ata_piix: Add Device IDs for Intel Wellsburg PCH
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: James Ralston <[email protected]>
commit 3aee8bc52c415aba8148f144e5e5359b0fd75dd1 upstream.
This patch adds the IDE-mode SATA Device IDs for the Intel Wellsburg PCH
--- drivers/ata/ata_piix.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
drivers/ata/ata_piix.c +9 -0
@@ -325,6 +325,15 @@ static const struct pci_device_id piix_p { 0x8086, 0x1f30, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, ich8_2port_sata },/* SATA Controller IDE (Avoton) */ { 0x8086, 0x1f31, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, ich8_2port_sata }, +/* SATA Controller IDE (Wellsburg) */ + { 0x8086, 0x8d00, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, ich8_sata_snb }, +/* SATA Controller IDE (Wellsburg) */ + { 0x8086, 0x8d08, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, ich8_2port_sata }, +/* SATA Controller IDE (Wellsburg) */ + { 0x8086, 0x8d60, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, ich8_sata_snb }, +/* SATA Controller IDE (Wellsburg) */ + { 0x8086, 0x8d68, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, ich8_2port_sata }, + { } /* terminate list */ };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 71/77 ahci: AHCI-mode SATA patch for Intel Avoton DeviceIDs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Seth Heasley <[email protected]>
commit 29e674dd5c8e781589f09c3ee139c80f6da274e4 upstream.
This patch adds the AHCI and RAID-mode SATA DeviceIDs for the Intel Avoton SOC.
--- drivers/ata/ahci.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
drivers/ata/ahci.c +16 -0
@@ -265,6 +265,22 @@ static const struct pci_device_id ahci_p { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x9c07), board_ahci }, /* Lynx Point-LP RAID */ { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x9c0e), board_ahci }, /* Lynx Point-LP RAID */ { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x9c0f), board_ahci }, /* Lynx Point-LP RAID */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x1f22), board_ahci }, /* Avoton AHCI */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x1f23), board_ahci }, /* Avoton AHCI */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x1f24), board_ahci }, /* Avoton RAID */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x1f25), board_ahci }, /* Avoton RAID */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x1f26), board_ahci }, /* Avoton RAID */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x1f27), board_ahci }, /* Avoton RAID */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x1f2e), board_ahci }, /* Avoton RAID */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x1f2f), board_ahci }, /* Avoton RAID */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x1f32), board_ahci }, /* Avoton AHCI */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x1f33), board_ahci }, /* Avoton AHCI */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x1f34), board_ahci }, /* Avoton RAID */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x1f35), board_ahci }, /* Avoton RAID */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x1f36), board_ahci }, /* Avoton RAID */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x1f37), board_ahci }, /* Avoton RAID */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x1f3e), board_ahci }, /* Avoton RAID */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x1f3f), board_ahci }, /* Avoton RAID *//* JMicron 360/1/3/5/6, match class to avoid IDE function */ { PCI_VENDOR_ID_JMICRON, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 72/77 ahci: Add Device IDs for Intel Wellsburg PCH
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: James Ralston <[email protected]>
commit 151743fd8dfb02956c5184b5f4f0f42677eb75bc upstream.
This patch adds the AHCI-mode SATA Device IDs for the Intel Wellsburg PCH
--- drivers/ata/ahci.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/ata/ahci.c +8 -0
@@ -281,6 +281,14 @@ static const struct pci_device_id ahci_p { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x1f37), board_ahci }, /* Avoton RAID */ { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x1f3e), board_ahci }, /* Avoton RAID */ { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x1f3f), board_ahci }, /* Avoton RAID */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x8d02), board_ahci }, /* Wellsburg AHCI */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x8d04), board_ahci }, /* Wellsburg RAID */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x8d06), board_ahci }, /* Wellsburg RAID */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x8d0e), board_ahci }, /* Wellsburg RAID */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x8d62), board_ahci }, /* Wellsburg AHCI */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x8d64), board_ahci }, /* Wellsburg RAID */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x8d66), board_ahci }, /* Wellsburg RAID */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x8d6e), board_ahci }, /* Wellsburg RAID *//* JMicron 360/1/3/5/6, match class to avoid IDE function */ { PCI_VENDOR_ID_JMICRON, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 73/77 usb hid quirks for Masterkit MA901 usb radio
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexey Klimov <[email protected]>
commit 0322bd3980b3ebf7dde8474e22614cb443d6479a upstream.
Don't let Masterkit MA901 USB radio be handled by usb hid drivers. This device will be handled by radio-ma901.c driver.
--- drivers/hid/hid-core.c | 1 + drivers/hid/hid-ids.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/hid/hid-core.c +1 -0
@@ -2071,6 +2071,7 @@ static const struct hid_device_id hid_ig { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_LD, USB_DEVICE_ID_LD_HYBRID) }, { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_LD, USB_DEVICE_ID_LD_HEATCONTROL) }, { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_MADCATZ, USB_DEVICE_ID_MADCATZ_BEATPAD) }, + { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_MASTERKIT, USB_DEVICE_ID_MASTERKIT_MA901RADIO) }, { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_MCC, USB_DEVICE_ID_MCC_PMD1024LS) }, { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_MCC, USB_DEVICE_ID_MCC_PMD1208LS) }, { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_MICROCHIP, USB_DEVICE_ID_PICKIT1) },
drivers/hid/hid-ids.h +3 -0
@@ -554,6 +554,9 @@#define USB_VENDOR_ID_MADCATZ 0x0738#define USB_DEVICE_ID_MADCATZ_BEATPAD 0x4540 +#define USB_VENDOR_ID_MASTERKIT 0x16c0 +#define USB_DEVICE_ID_MASTERKIT_MA901RADIO 0x05df +#define USB_VENDOR_ID_MCC 0x09db#define USB_DEVICE_ID_MCC_PMD1024LS 0x0076#define USB_DEVICE_ID_MCC_PMD1208LS 0x007a
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 74/77 x86, efi: Allow slash in file path of initrd
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <[email protected]>
commit deb94101c4fda22e152c2a311210cf09ae51adf6 upstream.
When initrd file didn't put at the same place with stub kernel, we need give the file path of initrd, but need use backslash to separate directory and file. It's not friendly to unix/linux user, and not so intuitive for bootloader forward paramters to efi stub kernel by chainloading.
This patch add support to handle_ramdisks for allow slash in file path of initrd, it convert slash to backlash when parsing path.
In additional, this patch also separates print code of efi_char16_t from efi_printk, and print out the path/filename of initrd when failed to open initrd file. It's good for debug and discover typo.
--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c +19 -7
@@ -19,23 +19,28 @@static efi_system_table_t *sys_table; +static void efi_char16_printk (efi_char16_t *str) +{ +struct efi_simple_text_output_protocol *out; + + out = (struct efi_simple_text_output_protocol *)sys_table->con_out; +efi_call_phys2 (out->output_string, out, str); +} +static void efi_printk (char *str) {char *s8;for (s8 = str; *s8; s8++) { -struct efi_simple_text_output_protocol *out;efi_char16_t ch[2 ] = {0 }; ch[0 ] = *s8; - out = (struct efi_simple_text_output_protocol *)sys_table->con_out; -if (*s8 =='\n' ) {efi_char16_t nl[2 ] = {'\r' ,0 }; -efi_call_phys2 (out->output_string, out, nl); +efi_char16_printk (nl); } -efi_call_phys2 (out->output_string, out, ch); +efi_char16_printk (ch); } }
@@ -709,7 +714,12 @@ static efi_status_t handle_ramdisks(efi_if ((u8 *)p >= (u8 *)filename_16 +sizeof (filename_16))break ; - *p++ = *str++; +if (*str =='/' ) { + *p++ ='\\' ; + *str++; + }else { + *p++ = *str++; + } } *p ='\0' ;
@@ -737,7 +747,9 @@ static efi_status_t handle_ramdisks(efi_ status =efi_call_phys5 (fh->open, fh, &h, filename_16,EFI_FILE_MODE_READ , (u64 )0 );if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) { -efi_printk ("Failed to open initrd file\n" ); +efi_printk ("Failed to open initrd file: " ); +efi_char16_printk (filename_16); +efi_printk ("\n" ); goto close_handles; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 75/77 ACPI: Overriding ACPI tables via initrd only works with an initrd and on X86
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Renninger <[email protected]>
commit 565d956a7e191e95d81f515196951715f2616e6b upstream.
Reflect this dependency in Kconfig, to prevent build failures.
Shorten the config description as suggested by Borislav Petkov.
Finding a suitable memory area to store the modified table(s) has been taken over from arch/x86/kernel/setup.c and makes use of max_low_pfn_mapped:memblock_find_in_range(0, max_low_pfn_mapped,...)
This one is X86 specific. It may not be hard to extend this functionality for other ACPI aware architectures if there is need for.
For now make this feature only available for X86 to avoid build failures on IA64, compare with:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=54091
--- drivers/acpi/Kconfig | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/acpi/Kconfig +2 -1
@@ -268,7 +268,8 @@ config ACPI_CUSTOM_DSDT default ACPI_CUSTOM_DSDT_FILE != "" config ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE - bool "ACPI tables can be passed via uncompressed cpio in initrd" + bool "ACPI tables override via initrd" + depends on BLK_DEV_INITRD && X86 default n help This option provides functionality to override arbitrary ACPI tables
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 76/77 efivarfs: Validate filenames much more aggressively
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matt Fleming <[email protected]>
commit 47f531e8ba3bc3901a0c493f4252826c41dea1a1 upstream.
The only thing that efivarfs does to enforce a valid filename is ensure that the name isn't too short. We need to strongly sanitise any filenames, not least because variable creation is delayed until efivarfs_file_write(), which means we can't rely on the firmware to inform us of an invalid name, because if the file is never written to we'll never know it's invalid.
Perform a couple of steps before agreeing to create a new file,
* hex_to_bin() returns a value indicating whether or not it was able to convert its arguments to a binary representation - we should check it.
* Ensure that the GUID portion of the filename is the correct length and format.
* The variable name portion of the filename needs to be at least one character in size.
--- drivers/firmware/efivars.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/firmware/efivars.c +44 -5
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@#include <linux/device.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/pstore.h> +#include <linux/ctype.h> #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/ramfs.h>
@@ -900,6 +901,48 @@ static struct inode *efivarfs_get_inode(return inode; } +/* +* Return true if 'str' is a valid efivarfs filename of the form, +* +* VariableName-12345678-1234-1234-1234-1234567891bc +*/ +static bool efivarfs_valid_name (const char *str,int len) +{ +static const char dashes[GUID_LEN ] = { + [8 ] =1 , [13 ] =1 , [18 ] =1 , [23 ] =1 + }; +const char *s = str + len -GUID_LEN ; +int i; + +/* +* We need a GUID, plus at least one letter for the variable name, +* plus the '-' separator +*/ +if (len <GUID_LEN +2 ) +return false; + +/* GUID should be right after the first '-' */ +if (s -1 !=strchr (str,'-' )) +return false; + +/* +* Validate that 's' is of the correct format, e.g. +* +* 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc +*/ +for (i =0 ; i <GUID_LEN ; i++) { +if (dashes[i]) { +if (*s++ !='-' ) +return false; + }else { +if (!isxdigit (*s++)) +return false; + } + } + +return true; +} +static void efivarfs_hex_to_guid (const char *str,efi_guid_t *guid) { guid->b[0 ] =hex_to_bin (str[6 ]) <<4 |hex_to_bin (str[7 ]);
@@ -928,11 +971,7 @@ static int efivarfs_create(struct inodestruct efivar_entry *var;int namelen, i =0 , err =0 ; -/* -* We need a GUID, plus at least one letter for the variable name, -* plus the '-' separator -*/ -if (dentry->d_name.len <GUID_LEN +2 ) +if (!efivarfs_valid_name (dentry->d_name.name, dentry->d_name.len))return -EINVAL ; inode =efivarfs_get_inode (dir->i_sb, dir, mode,0 );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 77/77 efivarfs: guid part of filenames are case-insensitive
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matt Fleming <[email protected]>
commit da27a24383b2b10bf6ebd0db29b325548aafecb4 upstream.
It makes no sense to treat the following filenames as unique,
VarName-abcdefab-abcd-abcd-abcd-abcdefabcdef VarName-ABCDEFAB-ABCD-ABCD-ABCD-ABCDEFABCDEF VarName-ABcDEfAB-ABcD-ABcD-ABcD-ABcDEfABcDEf VarName-aBcDEfAB-aBcD-aBcD-aBcD-aBcDEfaBcDEf ... etc ...
since the guid will be converted into a binary representation, which has no case.
Roll our own dentry operations so that we can treat the variable name part of filenames ("VarName" in the above example) as case-sensitive, but the guid portion as case-insensitive. That way, efivarfs will refuse to create the above files if any one already exists.
--- drivers/firmware/efivars.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 93 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/firmware/efivars.c +93 -2
@@ -1043,6 +1043,84 @@ static int efivarfs_unlink(struct inodereturn -EINVAL ; }; +/* +* Compare two efivarfs file names. +* +* An efivarfs filename is composed of two parts, +* +* 1. A case-sensitive variable name +* 2. A case-insensitive GUID +* +* So we need to perform a case-sensitive match on part 1 and a +* case-insensitive match on part 2. +*/ +static int efivarfs_d_compare (const struct dentry *parent,const struct inode *pinode, +const struct dentry *dentry,const struct inode *inode, +unsigned int len,const char *str, +const struct qstr *name) +{ +int guid = len -GUID_LEN ; + +if (name->len != len) +return 1 ; + +/* Case-sensitive compare for the variable name */ +if (memcmp (str, name->name, guid)) +return 1 ; + +/* Case-insensitive compare for the GUID */ +return strncasecmp (name->name + guid, str + guid,GUID_LEN ); +} + +static int efivarfs_d_hash (const struct dentry *dentry, +const struct inode *inode,struct qstr *qstr) +{ +unsigned long hash =init_name_hash (); +const unsigned char *s = qstr->name; +unsigned int len = qstr->len; + +if (!efivarfs_valid_name (s, len)) +return -EINVAL ; + +while (len-- >GUID_LEN ) + hash =partial_name_hash (*s++, hash); + +/* GUID is case-insensitive. */ +while (len--) + hash =partial_name_hash (tolower (*s++), hash); + + qstr->hash =end_name_hash (hash); +return 0 ; +} + +/* +* Retaining negative dentries for an in-memory filesystem just wastes +* memory and lookup time: arrange for them to be deleted immediately. +*/ +static int efivarfs_delete_dentry (const struct dentry *dentry) +{ +return 1 ; +} + +static struct dentry_operations efivarfs_d_ops = { + .d_compare = efivarfs_d_compare, + .d_hash = efivarfs_d_hash, + .d_delete = efivarfs_delete_dentry, +}; + +static struct dentry *efivarfs_alloc_dentry (struct dentry *parent,char *name) +{ +struct qstr q; + + q.name = name; + q.len =strlen (name); + +if (efivarfs_d_hash (NULL ,NULL , &q)) +return NULL ; + +return d_alloc (parent, &q); +} +static int efivarfs_fill_super (struct super_block *sb,void *data,int silent) {struct inode *inode =NULL ;
@@ -1058,6 +1136,7 @@ static int efivarfs_fill_super(struct su sb->s_blocksize_bits =PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT ; sb->s_magic =EFIVARFS_MAGIC ; sb->s_op = &efivarfs_ops; + sb->s_d_op = &efivarfs_d_ops; sb->s_time_gran =1 ; inode =efivarfs_get_inode (sb,NULL ,S_IFDIR |0755 ,0 );
@@ -1098,7 +1177,7 @@ static int efivarfs_fill_super(struct suif (!inode) goto fail_name; - dentry =d_alloc_name (root, name); + dentry =efivarfs_alloc_dentry (root, name);if (!dentry) goto fail_inode;
@@ -1148,8 +1227,20 @@ static struct file_system_type efivarfs_ .kill_sb = efivarfs_kill_sb, }; +/* +* Handle negative dentry. +*/ +static struct dentry *efivarfs_lookup (struct inode *dir,struct dentry *dentry, +unsigned int flags) +{ +if (dentry->d_name.len >NAME_MAX ) +return ERR_PTR (-ENAMETOOLONG ); +d_add (dentry,NULL ); +return NULL ; +} +static const struct inode_operations efivarfs_dir_inode_operations = { - .lookup = simple_lookup, + .lookup = efivarfs_lookup, .unlink = efivarfs_unlink, .create = efivarfs_create, };
Re: [ 34/77] xen/blkback: Dont trust the handle from the frontend.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanQuoted 6 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Quoted 8 lines
commit
01c681d4c70d64cb72142a2823f27c4146a02e63upstream.The 'handle' is the device that the request is from. For the life-time of the ring we copy it from a request to a response so that the frontend is not surprised by it. But we do not need it - when we start processing I/Os we have our own 'struct
phys_req' which has only most essential information about the request. In fact the 'vbd_translate' ends up over-writing the preq.dev with a value from the backend.
Unless that call to vb_translate() fails, doesn't it? Wouldn't preq.dev still contain random data in that case?
Quoted 15 lines
This assignment of preq.dev with the 'handle' value is superfluous so lets not do it.
Acked-by Jan Beulich <[email protected]>Acked-by Ian Campbell <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>--- drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c static int dispatch_rw_block_io(struct x · line 884
Quoted 7 lines
drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c +0
-1@@ -879,7 +879,6 @@ static int dispatch_rw_block_io(struct x goto fail_response; } - preq.dev = req->u.rw.handle; preq.sector_number = req->u.rw.sector_number; preq.nr_sects =0 ;
This introduces a new GCC warning in the stable 3.8.y tree:
drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c: In function 'dispatch_rw_block_io':
drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c:904:3: warning: 'preq.dev' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wuninitialized]
It does look GCC is right here. But I'm totally new to the code in question, so I'll just ask whether this can really go in stable as is.
Paul Bolle
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.8.2 release. There are 77 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun Mar 3 19:42:25 UTC 2013. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Quoted 8 lines
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/stable-review/patch-3.8.2-rc1.gzand the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
Patches applied cleanly to 3.0.67, 3.4.34, and 3.8.1
Compiled and booted on the following systems:
HP EliteBook 6930p Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU T9400 @ 2.53GHz HP ProBook 6475b AMD A10-4600M APU with Radeon(tm) HD Graphics
Special test this cycle:
HP ProLiant DL385p Gen8: Tested all three releases for the following
commit: iommu/amd: Initialize device table after dma_ops
dmesgs for all releases look good. No regressions compared to the previous dmesgs for each of these releases.
Cross-compile tests results:
alpha: defconfig passed on all
arm: defconfig passed on all
arm64: not applicable to 3.0.y, 3.4.y. defconfig passed on 3.8.y
c6x: not applicable to 3.0.y, defconfig passed on 3.4.y, and 3.8.y.
mips: defconfig passed on all
mipsel: defconfig passed on all
powerpc: wii_defconfig passed on all
sh: defconfig passed on all
sparc: defconfig passed on all
tile: tilegx_defconfig passed on all
-- Shuah
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 14 lines · Shuah Khan
Quoted 12 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.8.2 release. There are 77 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun Mar 3 19:42:25 UTC 2013. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/stable-review/patch-3.8.2-rc1.gzand the diffstat can be found below.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
thanks,
greg k-h
Patches applied cleanly to 3.0.67, 3.4.34, and 3.8.1
Compiled and booted on the following systems:
Thanks for testing and letting us know.
greg k-h
Re: [ 34/77] xen/blkback: Dont trust the handle from the frontend.
In reply to Paul BolleQuoted 46 lines · Paul Bolle
Quoted 6 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Quoted 8 lines
commit
01c681d4c70d64cb72142a2823f27c4146a02e63upstream.The 'handle' is the device that the request is from. For the life-time of the ring we copy it from a request to a response so that the frontend is not surprised by it. But we do not need it - when we start processing I/Os we have our own 'struct
phys_req' which has only most essential information about the request. In fact the 'vbd_translate' ends up over-writing the preq.dev with a value from the backend.Unless that call to
vb_translate()fails, doesn't it? Wouldn't preq.dev still contain random data in that case?Quoted 15 lines
This assignment of preq.dev with the 'handle' value is superfluous so lets not do it.
Acked-by Jan Beulich <[email protected]>Acked-by Ian Campbell <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>--- drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c static int dispatch_rw_block_io(struct x · line 884
Quoted 7 lines
drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c +0
-1@@ -879,7 +879,6 @@ static int dispatch_rw_block_io(struct x goto fail_response; } - preq.dev = req->u.rw.handle; preq.sector_number = req->u.rw.sector_number; preq.nr_sects =0 ;This introduces a new GCC warning in the stable 3.8.y tree:
drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c: In function 'dispatch_rw_block_io':
drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c:904:3: warning: 'preq.dev' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wuninitialized]
Quoted 2 lines
It does look GCC is right here. But I'm totally new to the code in question, so I'll just ask whether this can really go in stable as is.
When gcc compiles something like this:
static int foo(int *p)
{
if (rand() & 1)
return -1;
*p = 0;
return 0;
}int bar(void)
{
int i;
if (foo(&i) < 0)
return 1;
return i;
}and inlines foo() into bar(), sometimes it fails to recognise that i will definitely be initialised before use. This simple example seems to be OK but more complex functions such as these will often trigger this warning. The warning is really quite useless now.
Ben.
Signature · 2 lines
Ben Hutchings Computers are not intelligent. They only think they are.
Re: [ 34/77] xen/blkback: Dont trust the handle from the frontend.
Quoted 18 lines · Ben Hutchings
When gcc compiles something like this:
static int
foo(int *p){ if (rand() & 1) return -1; *p = 0; return 0; }int bar(void)
{ int i; if (foo(&i) < 0) return 1; return i; }
Quoted 4 lines
and inlines
foo()intobar(), sometimes it fails to recognise that i will definitely be initialised before use. This simple example seems to be OK but more complex functions such as these will often trigger this warning. The warning is really quite useless now.
0) I've had another look at the relevant code in v3.8.2-rc1. It can be summarized like this:
static int xen_vbd_translate()
{
[...]
int rc = -EACCES;
if ([...])
goto out;
[...]
[p]req->dev = vbd->pdevice;
[p]req->bdev = vbd->bdev;
[...]out:
return rc; }
static int dispatch_rw_block_io()
{
struct phys_req preq;
[...]
preq.sector_number = req->u.rw.sector_number;
preq.nr_sects = 0;
[...]
for ([...]) {
[...]
preq.nr_sects += seg[i].nsec;
}
if (xen_vbd_translate(&preq, blkif, operation) != 0) {
pr_debug(DRV_PFX "access denied: %s of [%llu,%llu] on dev=%04x\n",
operation == READ ? "read" : "write",
preq.sector_number,
preq.sector_number + preq.nr_sects, preq.dev);
goto [...];
}
[...]
}1) So if xen_vbd_translate() fails, it can return before setting preq.dev. That makes the call of pr_debug() use an uninitialized value, doesn't it? Does inlining xen_vbd_translate() and/or dispatch_rw_block_io() generate code were that can't happen anymore? (Both functions being static they probably are inlined.)
2) And even if inlining does generate code where this can't happen, isn't it enough that preq.dev can be used uninitialized if no code were inlined?
Paul Bolle
Re: [ 34/77] xen/blkback: Dont trust the handle from the frontend.
On Sat, 2013-03-02 at 23:35 +0100, Paul Bolle wrote:
[...]
Quoted 44 lines
0) I've had another look at the relevant code in v3.8.2-rc1. It can be summarized like this:
static int
xen_vbd_translate(){ [...] int rc = -EACCES; if ([...]) goto out; [...] [p]req->dev = vbd->pdevice; [p]req->bdev = vbd->bdev; [...]out:
return rc; }static int
dispatch_rw_block_io(){ struct phys_req preq; [...] preq.sector_number = req->u.rw.sector_number; preq.nr_sects = 0; [...] for ([...]) { [...] preq.nr_sects += seg[i].nsec; } if (xen_vbd_translate(&preq, blkif, operation) != 0) { pr_debug(DRV_PFX "access denied: %s of [%llu,%llu] on dev=%04x\n", operation == READ ? "read" : "write", preq.sector_number, preq.sector_number + preq.nr_sects, preq.dev); goto [...]; } [...] }
Quoted 3 lines
1) So if
xen_vbd_translate()fails, it can return before setting preq.dev. That makes the call ofpr_debug()use an uninitialized value, doesn't it?
Oh yes, so it's a completely valid warning in this case!
Quoted 7 lines
Does inlining
xen_vbd_translate()and/ordispatch_rw_block_io()generate code were that can't happen anymore? (Both functions being static they probably are inlined.)2) And even if inlining does generate code where this can't happen, isn't it enough that preq.dev can be used uninitialized if no code were inlined?
If gcc inlines a function call, it analyses data flow between the two functions. Otherwise it assumes that the called function will initialise any variable it's given a pointer to, and the warning doesn't appear. (That's my experience, anyway.)
Ben.
Signature · 2 lines
Ben Hutchings Computers are not intelligent. They only think they are.
Re: [ 34/77] xen/blkback: Dont trust the handle from the frontend.
Quoted 6 lines · Ben Hutchings
Quoted 3 lines · Paul Bolle
1) So if
xen_vbd_translate()fails, it can return before setting preq.dev. That makes the call ofpr_debug()use an uninitialized value, doesn't it?Oh yes, so it's a completely valid warning in this case!
Thanks.
Perhaps Konrad, Jan, Or Ian can tell whether the patch still needs to go in stable as is, because the problem it fixes is more severe than the problem it apparently creates. Maybe a mainline fix is needed before this can go in, or perhaps even a stable specific fix (if context changes are to blame).
Paul Bolle
At Fri, 1 Mar 2013 11:43:45 -0800,
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.8.2 release. There are 77 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun Mar 3 19:42:25 UTC 2013. Anything received after that time might be too late.
This kernel can be built and boot without any problem. Building a kernel with this kernel also works fine.
- Build Machine: debian wheezy x86_64
CPU: Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2400 CPU @ 3.10GHz x 4
memory: 8GB
- Test machine: debian wheezy x86_64(KVM guest on the Build Machine)
vCPU: x2
memory: 2GB
Thanks,
Satoru
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 8 lines · Satoru Takeuchi
At Fri, 1 Mar 2013 11:43:45 -0800,
Quoted 6 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.8.2 release. There are 77 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Responses should be made by Sun Mar 3 19:42:25 UTC 2013. Anything received after that time might be too late.
This kernel can be built and boot without any problem. Building a kernel with this kernel also works fine.
Thanks for testing this, and the other -rc stable kernels and letting us know.
greg k-h
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [ 34/77] xen/blkback: Dont trust the handle from the frontend.
In reply to Paul BolleQuoted 8 lines · Paul Bolle
Quoted 6 lines · Ben Hutchings
Quoted 3 lines · Paul Bolle
1) So if
xen_vbd_translate()fails, it can return before setting preq.dev. That makes the call ofpr_debug()use an uninitialized value, doesn't it?Oh yes, so it's a completely valid warning in this case!
Quoted 7 lines
Thanks.
Perhaps Konrad, Jan, Or Ian can tell whether the patch still needs to go in stable as is, because the problem it fixes is more severe than the problem it apparently creates. Maybe a mainline fix is needed before this can go in, or perhaps even a stable specific fix (if context changes are to blame).
I've left it in, as-is. If this is a problem, please fix it in Linus's tree, and then I'll be glad to accept the same fix here in the stable kernel releases as well. Just be sure to let me know if that happens.
thanks,
greg k-h
Re: [ 34/77] xen/blkback: Dont trust the handle from the frontend.
In reply to Paul BolleQuoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · Paul Bolle
Perhaps Konrad, Jan, Or Ian can tell whether the patch still needs to go in stable as is, because the problem it fixes is more severe than the problem it apparently creates. Maybe a mainline fix is needed before this can go in, or perhaps even a stable specific fix (if context changes are to blame).
For one, a fix for the (indeed valid) compiler warning has been in Konrad's tree for several days
(http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/konrad/xen.git/commit/drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c?id=a72d9002f80bffd7e4c7d60e5a9caa0cddffe894).
And second, there's nothing really being fixed with the patch in question here. The title is kind of misleading, as the handle coming from the frontend is - without said patch - in the worst case being used for the very message that triggered the compiler warning. Nothing else is affected, the code just gave the impression that the handle was used.
IOW I don't see why this got proposed for stable at all.
Jan
Re: [ 34/77] xen/blkback: Dont trust the handle from the frontend.
Quoted 4 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · Paul Bolle
For one, a fix for the (indeed valid) compiler warning has been in Konrad's tree for several days
(http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/konrad/xen.git/commit/drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c?id=a72d9002f80bffd7e4c7d60e5a9caa0cddffe894).
Thanks. (For the record: that commit is titled "xen/xen-blkback:
preq.dev is used without initialized".)
Quoted 8 lines
And second, there's nothing really being fixed with the patch in question here. The title is kind of misleading, as the handle coming from the frontend is - without said patch - in the worst case being used for the very message that triggered the compiler warning. Nothing else is affected, the code just gave the impression that the handle was used.
IOW I don't see why this got proposed for stable at all.
So, you suggest to just drop this patch for v3.8.3, don't you?
Paul Bolle
Re: [ 34/77] xen/blkback: Dont trust the handle from the frontend.
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · Paul Bolle
Quoted 4 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · Paul Bolle
For one, a fix for the (indeed valid) compiler warning has been in Konrad's tree for several days
(http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/konrad/xen.git/commit/drivers/bl
ock/xen-blkback/blkback.c?id=a72d9002f80bffd7e4c7d60e5a9caa0cddffe894).Thanks. (For the record: that commit is titled "xen/xen-blkback:
preq.dev is used without initialized".)Quoted 7 lines
And second, there's nothing really being fixed with the patch in question here. The title is kind of misleading, as the handle coming from the frontend is - without said patch - in the worst case being used for the very message that triggered the compiler warning. Nothing else is affected, the code just gave the impression that the handle was used.
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
IOW I don't see why this got proposed for stable at all.
So, you suggest to just drop this patch for v3.8.3, don't you?
I do, yes. But I'd suggest to get Konrad to agree.
Jan
Re: [ 73/77] [hid] usb hid quirks for Masterkit MA901 usb radio
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanHi Greg,
Quoted 35 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexey Klimov <[email protected]>
commit
0322bd3980b3ebf7dde8474e22614cb443d6479aupstream.Don't let Masterkit MA901 USB radio be handled by usb hid drivers. This device will be handled by
radio-ma901.cdriver.Signed-off-by Alexey Klimov <[email protected]>Acked-by Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>Acked-by Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>--- drivers/hid/hid-core.c | 1 + drivers/hid/hid-ids.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)drivers/hid/hid-core.c +1
-0@@ -2071,6 +2071,7 @@ static const struct hid_device_id hid_ig { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_LD, USB_DEVICE_ID_LD_HYBRID) }, { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_LD, USB_DEVICE_ID_LD_HEATCONTROL) }, { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_MADCATZ, USB_DEVICE_ID_MADCATZ_BEATPAD) }, + { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_MASTERKIT, USB_DEVICE_ID_MASTERKIT_MA901RADIO) }, { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_MCC, USB_DEVICE_ID_MCC_PMD1024LS) }, { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_MCC, USB_DEVICE_ID_MCC_PMD1208LS) }, { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_MICROCHIP, USB_DEVICE_ID_PICKIT1) },
drivers/hid/hid-ids.h line 562
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/hid/hid-ids.h +3
-0@@ -554,6 +554,9 @@#define USB_VENDOR_ID_MADCATZ 0x0738#define USB_DEVICE_ID_MADCATZ_BEATPAD 0x4540 +#define USB_VENDOR_ID_MASTERKIT 0x16c0 +#define USB_DEVICE_ID_MASTERKIT_MA901RADIO 0x05df +#define USB_VENDOR_ID_MCC 0x09db#define USB_DEVICE_ID_MCC_PMD1024LS 0x0076#define USB_DEVICE_ID_MCC_PMD1208LS 0x007a
These usb hid quirks are related to new usb radio driver media/radio/radio-ma901.c (commit 4834f4d1ff1dc574024e1a6de920ea99571090ff in upstream) that was merged during 3.9 merge window. So i am not sure if they have any sense without driver itself. Also, they shouldn't make any damage as far as i can imagine.
Signature · 1 line
Best regards, Klimov Alexey
Re: [ 73/77] [hid] usb hid quirks for Masterkit MA901 usb radio
Quoted 14 lines · Alexey Klimov
Hi Greg,
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
3.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexey Klimov <[email protected]>
commit
0322bd3980b3ebf7dde8474e22614cb443d6479aupstream.Don't let Masterkit MA901 USB radio be handled by usb hid drivers. This device will be handled by
radio-ma901.cdriver.
[...]
Quoted 6 lines
These usb hid quirks are related to new usb radio driver
media/radio/radio-ma901.c(commit4834f4d1ff1dc574024e1a6de920ea99571090ffin upstream) that was merged during 3.9 merge window. So i am not sure if they have any sense without driver itself. Also, they shouldn't make any damage as far as i can imagine.
I think that if the HID driver doesn't do anything useful with this device then this is still worth including in stable - it makes it possible to use an out-of-tree build of radio-ma901 with older kernel versions.
Ben.
Signature · 3 lines
Ben Hutchings Always try to do things in chronological order; it's less confusing that way.
Re: [ 34/77] xen/blkback: Dont trust the handle from the frontend.
In reply to Jan BeulichQuoted 12 lines · Jan Beulich
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Quoted 1 line · Paul Bolle
Quoted 4 lines · Jan Beulich
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Quoted 1 line · Paul Bolle
For one, a fix for the (indeed valid) compiler warning has been in Konrad's tree for several days
(http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/konrad/xen.git/commit/drivers/bl
ock/xen-blkback/blkback.c?id=a72d9002f80bffd7e4c7d60e5a9caa0cddffe894).Thanks. (For the record: that commit is titled "xen/xen-blkback:
preq.dev is used without initialized".)
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And second, there's nothing really being fixed with the patch in question here. The title is kind of misleading, as the handle coming from the frontend is - without said patch - in the worst case being used for the very message that triggered the compiler warning. Nothing else is affected, the code just gave the impression that the handle was used.
Which it actually is not, unless somebody compiles the kernel with #define DEBUG 1
at the top of the file.
Quoted 6 lines
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IOW I don't see why this got proposed for stable at all.
So, you suggest to just drop this patch for v3.8.3, don't you?
I do, yes. But I'd suggest to get Konrad to agree.
Yes. Lets drop it.
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [ 34/77] xen/blkback: Dont trust the handle from the frontend.
Quoted 25 lines · Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
Quoted 12 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · Paul Bolle
Quoted 4 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 1 line
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Quoted 1 line · Paul Bolle
For one, a fix for the (indeed valid) compiler warning has been in Konrad's tree for several days
(http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/konrad/xen.git/commit/drivers/bl
ock/xen-blkback/blkback.c?id=a72d9002f80bffd7e4c7d60e5a9caa0cddffe894).Thanks. (For the record: that commit is titled "xen/xen-blkback:
preq.dev is used without initialized".)Quoted 6 lines
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And second, there's nothing really being fixed with the patch in question here. The title is kind of misleading, as the handle coming from the frontend is - without said patch - in the worst case being used for the very message that triggered the compiler warning. Nothing else is affected, the code just gave the impression that the handle was used.
Which it actually is not, unless somebody compiles the kernel with #define DEBUG 1
at the top of the file.Quoted 1 line
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Quoted 1 line
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Quoted 5 lines
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IOW I don't see why this got proposed for stable at all.
So, you suggest to just drop this patch for v3.8.3, don't you?
I do, yes. But I'd suggest to get Konrad to agree.
Yes. Lets drop it.
Now reverted, thanks.
greg k-h
Re: [ 34/77] xen/blkback: Dont trust the handle from the frontend.
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
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IOW I don't see why this got proposed for stable at all.
So, you suggest to just drop this patch for v3.8.3, don't you?
I do, yes. But I'd suggest to get Konrad to agree.
Yes. Lets drop it.
Now reverted, thanks.
Seems like still present in 3.4.x branch. Is that a mistake?
Regards,
--
William
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [ 34/77] xen/blkback: Dont trust the handle from the frontend.
Quoted 6 lines · William Dauchy
Quoted 4 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
IOW I don't see why this got proposed for stable at all.
So, you suggest to just drop this patch for v3.8.3, don't you?
Quoted 7 lines
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Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
I do, yes. But I'd suggest to get Konrad to agree.
Yes. Lets drop it.
Now reverted, thanks.
Seems like still present in 3.4.x branch. Is that a mistake?
It showed up in 3.4.35, if that's a mistake, and I should revert it, please, someone let me know.
thanks,
greg k-h
Re: [ 34/77] xen/blkback: Dont trust the handle from the frontend.
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 8 lines · William Dauchy
Quoted 6 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
IOW I don't see why this got proposed for stable at all.
So, you suggest to just drop this patch for v3.8.3, don't you?
I do, yes. But I'd suggest to get Konrad to agree.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Yes. Lets drop it.
Now reverted, thanks.
Seems like still present in 3.4.x branch. Is that a mistake?
It showed up in 3.4.35, if that's a mistake, and I should revert it, please, someone let me know.
Yes. It is a mistake. Please revert it.
Quoted 4 lines
thanks,
greg k-h
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [ 34/77] xen/blkback: Dont trust the handle from the frontend.
Quoted 12 lines · Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
Quoted 11 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 10 lines · William Dauchy
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
IOW I don't see why this got proposed for stable at all.
So, you suggest to just drop this patch for v3.8.3, don't you?
I do, yes. But I'd suggest to get Konrad to agree.
Yes. Lets drop it.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Now reverted, thanks.
Seems like still present in 3.4.x branch. Is that a mistake?
It showed up in 3.4.35, if that's a mistake, and I should revert it, please, someone let me know.
Yes. It is a mistake. Please revert it.
Now reverted, thanks.
greg k-h