LSM: MntRestrict blocks mounts on symlink targets
PATCH 1/1 LSM: MntRestrict blocks mounts on symlink targets
On systems where certain filesystem contents cannot be entirely trusted, it is beneficial to block mounts on symlinks. This makes sure that malicious filesystem contents cannot trigger the over-mounting of trusted filesystems. (For example, a bind-mounted subdirectory of /var cannot be redirected to mount on /etc via a symlink: a daemon cannot elevate privs to uid-0.)
--- security/Kconfig | 6 ++++ security/Makefile | 2 ++ security/mntrestrict/Kconfig | 13 ++++++++ security/mntrestrict/Makefile | 1 + security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 85 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/mntrestrict/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/mntrestrict/Makefile create mode 100644 security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c
security/Kconfig +6 -0
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ source security/selinux/Kconfig source security/smack/Kconfig source security/tomoyo/Kconfig source security/apparmor/Kconfig +source security/mntrestrict/Kconfig source security/yama/Kconfig source security/integrity/Kconfig
@@ -131,6 +132,7 @@ choice default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR + default DEFAULT_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT if SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT default DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA if SECURITY_YAMA default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
@@ -150,6 +152,9 @@ choice config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT + bool "MntRestrict" if SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT=y + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA bool "Yama" if SECURITY_YAMA=y
@@ -164,6 +169,7 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR + default "mntrestrict" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT default "yama" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
security/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT) += mntrestrict subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama # always enable default capabilities
@@ -22,6 +23,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += lsm_audit.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/built-in.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT) += mntrestrict/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
security/mntrestrict/Kconfig new file +13 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +config SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT + bool "Restrict mounts on symlinks system-wide" + depends on SECURITY + help + Enforces that rule that symlinks cannot be used as mount + destinations across the entire system. This is to make sure + it is never possible to redirect locations using symlinks + when the process doing the mount may not be able to strictly + trust the contents of the filesystem where it is happening. For + example, making sure a bind mounted subdirectory in /var is not + redirected into /etc: stops a daemon without full privileges + from elevating to uid-0 by tricking the system init filesystem + mounting infrastructure.
security/mntrestrict/Makefile new file +1 -0
@@ -0,0 +1 @@ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT) += mntrestrict.o
security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c new file +63 -0
63 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 6 lines
1.7.9.5 -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security
Pinging on this too. Any feedback?
-Kees
Quoted 183 lines · Kees Cook
On systems where certain filesystem contents cannot be entirely trusted, it is beneficial to block mounts on symlinks. This makes sure that malicious filesystem contents cannot trigger the over-mounting of trusted filesystems. (For example, a bind-mounted subdirectory of /var cannot be redirected to mount on /etc via a symlink: a daemon cannot elevate privs to uid-0.)
Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>--- security/Kconfig | 6 ++++ security/Makefile | 2 ++ security/mntrestrict/Kconfig | 13 ++++++++ security/mntrestrict/Makefile | 1 + security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 85 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/mntrestrict/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/mntrestrict/Makefile create mode 100644 security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.csecurity/Kconfig +6
-0@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ source security/selinux/Kconfig source security/smack/Kconfig source security/tomoyo/Kconfig source security/apparmor/Kconfig +source security/mntrestrict/Kconfig source security/yama/Kconfig source security/integrity/Kconfig@@ -131,6 +132,7 @@ choice default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR + default DEFAULT_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT if SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT default DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA if SECURITY_YAMA default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC@@ -150,6 +152,9 @@ choice config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT + bool "MntRestrict" if SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT=y + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA bool "Yama" if SECURITY_YAMA=y@@ -164,6 +169,7 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR + default "mntrestrict" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT default "yama" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DACsecurity/Makefile +2
-0@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT) += mntrestrict subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama # always enable default capabilities@@ -22,6 +23,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += lsm_audit.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/built-in.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT) += mntrestrict/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.osecurity/mntrestrict/Kconfig new file +13
-0@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +config SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT + bool "Restrict mounts on symlinks system-wide" + depends on SECURITY + help + Enforces that rule that symlinks cannot be used as mount + destinations across the entire system. This is to make sure + it is never possible to redirect locations using symlinks + when the process doing the mount may not be able to strictly + trust the contents of the filesystem where it is happening. For + example, making sure a bind mounted subdirectory in /var is not + redirected into /etc: stops a daemon without full privileges + from elevating to uid-0 by tricking the system init filesystem + mounting infrastructure.security/mntrestrict/Makefile new file +1
-0@@ -0,0 +1 @@ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT) += mntrestrict.osecurity/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c new file +63
-0@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +/* +* Mount Restriction Security Module +* +* Copyright 2011-2013 Google Inc. +* +* Authors: +* Stephan Uphoff <[email protected]> +* Kees Cook <[email protected]> +* +* This software is licensed under the terms of the GNU General Public +* License version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation, and +* may be copied, distributed, and modified under those terms. +* +* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +* GNU General Public License for more details. +*/ + +#define pr_fmt (fmt) "MntRestrict LSM: " fmt + +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/fs_struct.h> +#include <linux/mount.h> +#include <linux/path.h> +#include <linux/root_dev.h> + +static int mntrestrict_sb_mount (const char *dev_name,struct path *path, +const char *type,unsigned long flags, +void *data) +{ +int error = current->total_link_count ? -ELOOP :0 ; + +if (error) { +pr_notice ("Mount path with symlinks prohibited - pid=%d\n" , +task_pid_nr (current)); + } + +return error; +} + +static struct security_operations mntrestrict_ops = { + .name ="mntrestrict" , + .sb_mount = mntrestrict_sb_mount, +}; + +static int __init mntrestrict_init (void ) +{ +int error; + + error =register_security (&mntrestrict_ops); + +if (error) +panic ("Could not register MntRestrict security module" ); + +pr_info ("symlink destinations will be blocked.\n" ); + +return error; +} +security_initcall (mntrestrict_init);Signature · 10 lines
1.7.9.5 -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to [email protected] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook @outflux.net
Why is this an LSM and not something further up in the VFS? Why not make a sysctl for this and place it further up in the VFS? Has it already been rejected from there? If so why not include it in the things covered by Yama? From a code perspective I can't find anything wrong code wise but it seems odd to make a security module for something which is clearly a change to VFS semantics not really a security module.
Quoted 192 lines · Kees Cook
Pinging on this too. Any feedback?
-Kees
Quoted 187 lines · Kees Cook
On systems where certain filesystem contents cannot be entirely trusted, it is beneficial to block mounts on symlinks. This makes sure that malicious filesystem contents cannot trigger the over-mounting of trusted filesystems. (For example, a bind-mounted subdirectory of /var cannot be redirected to mount on /etc via a symlink: a daemon cannot elevate privs to uid-0.)
Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>--- security/Kconfig | 6 ++++ security/Makefile | 2 ++ security/mntrestrict/Kconfig | 13 ++++++++ security/mntrestrict/Makefile | 1 + security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 85 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/mntrestrict/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/mntrestrict/Makefile create mode 100644 security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.csecurity/Kconfig +6
-0@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ source security/selinux/Kconfig source security/smack/Kconfig source security/tomoyo/Kconfig source security/apparmor/Kconfig +source security/mntrestrict/Kconfig source security/yama/Kconfig source security/integrity/Kconfig@@ -131,6 +132,7 @@ choice default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR + default DEFAULT_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT if SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT default DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA if SECURITY_YAMA default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC@@ -150,6 +152,9 @@ choice config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT + bool "MntRestrict" if SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT=y + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA bool "Yama" if SECURITY_YAMA=y@@ -164,6 +169,7 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR + default "mntrestrict" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT default "yama" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DACsecurity/Makefile +2
-0@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT) += mntrestrict subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama # always enable default capabilities@@ -22,6 +23,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += lsm_audit.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/built-in.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT) += mntrestrict/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.osecurity/mntrestrict/Kconfig new file +13
-0@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +config SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT + bool "Restrict mounts on symlinks system-wide" + depends on SECURITY + help + Enforces that rule that symlinks cannot be used as mount + destinations across the entire system. This is to make sure + it is never possible to redirect locations using symlinks + when the process doing the mount may not be able to strictly + trust the contents of the filesystem where it is happening. For + example, making sure a bind mounted subdirectory in /var is not + redirected into /etc: stops a daemon without full privileges + from elevating to uid-0 by tricking the system init filesystem + mounting infrastructure.security/mntrestrict/Makefile new file +1
-0@@ -0,0 +1 @@ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT) += mntrestrict.osecurity/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c new file +10
-0@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +/* +* Mount Restriction Security Module +* +* Copyright 2011-2013 Google Inc. +* +* Authors: +* Stephan Uphoff <[email protected]> +* Kees Cook <[email protected]> +* +* This software is licensed under the terms of the GNU General Public
+ * License version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation, and
+ * may be copied, distributed, and modified under those terms.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ */security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c new file +13
-0+ +#define pr_fmt (fmt) "MntRestrict LSM: " fmt + +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/fs_struct.h> +#include <linux/mount.h> +#include <linux/path.h> +#include <linux/root_dev.h> + +static int mntrestrict_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path*path,
security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c new file +32
-1+ const char *type, unsigned long flags, + void *data) +{ + int error = current->total_link_count ? -ELOOP : 0; + +if (error) { +pr_notice ("Mount path with symlinks prohibited - pid=%d\n" , +task_pid_nr (current)); + } + +return error; +} + +static struct security_operations mntrestrict_ops = { + .name ="mntrestrict" , + .sb_mount = mntrestrict_sb_mount, +}; + +static int __init mntrestrict_init (void ) +{ +int error; + + error =register_security (&mntrestrict_ops); + +if (error) +panic ("Could not register MntRestrict security module" ); + +pr_info ("symlink destinations will be blocked.\n" ); + +return error; +} +security_initcall (mntrestrict_init); --1.7.9.5
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
--
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Quoted 6 lines · David Quigley
Why is this an LSM and not something further up in the VFS? Why not make a sysctl for this and place it further up in the VFS? Has it already been rejected from there? If so why not include it in the things covered by Yama? From a code perspective I can't find anything wrong code wise but it seems odd to make a security module for something which is clearly a change to VFS semantics not really a security module.
There is this proposal:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-fsdevel&m=137876254501993&w=2
But we're looking for a way to disable it across the entire system. Using the LSM hook proved extremely effective.
-Kees
Quoted 199 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 196 lines
Pinging on this too. Any feedback?
-Kees
Quoted 190 lines · Kees Cook
On systems where certain filesystem contents cannot be entirely trusted, it is beneficial to block mounts on symlinks. This makes sure that malicious filesystem contents cannot trigger the over-mounting of trusted filesystems. (For example, a bind-mounted subdirectory of /var cannot be redirected to mount on /etc via a symlink: a daemon cannot elevate privs to uid-0.)
Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>--- security/Kconfig | 6 ++++ security/Makefile | 2 ++ security/mntrestrict/Kconfig | 13 ++++++++ security/mntrestrict/Makefile | 1 + security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 85 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/mntrestrict/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/mntrestrict/Makefile create mode 100644 security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.csecurity/Kconfig +6
-0@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ source security/selinux/Kconfig source security/smack/Kconfig source security/tomoyo/Kconfig source security/apparmor/Kconfig +source security/mntrestrict/Kconfig source security/yama/Kconfig source security/integrity/Kconfig@@ -131,6 +132,7 @@ choice default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR + default DEFAULT_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT if SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT default DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA if SECURITY_YAMA default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC@@ -150,6 +152,9 @@ choice config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT + bool "MntRestrict" if SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT=y + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA bool "Yama" if SECURITY_YAMA=y@@ -164,6 +169,7 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR + default "mntrestrict" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT default "yama" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DACsecurity/Makefile +1
-0@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT) += mntrestrict subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama # always enable default capabilities@@ -22,6 +23,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) +=
smack/built-in.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += lsm_audit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) +=tomoyo/built-in.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) +=apparmor/built-in.osecurity/Makefile +1
-0+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT) += mntrestrict/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.osecurity/mntrestrict/Kconfig new file +13
-0@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +config SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT + bool "Restrict mounts on symlinks system-wide" + depends on SECURITY + help + Enforces that rule that symlinks cannot be used as mount + destinations across the entire system. This is to make sure + it is never possible to redirect locations using symlinks + when the process doing the mount may not be able to strictly + trust the contents of the filesystem where it is happening. For + example, making sure a bind mounted subdirectory in /var is not + redirected into /etc: stops a daemon without full privileges + from elevating to uid-0 by tricking the system init filesystem + mounting infrastructure.security/mntrestrict/Makefile new file +1
-0@@ -0,0 +1 @@ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT) += mntrestrict.osecurity/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c new file +38
-0@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +/* +* Mount Restriction Security Module +* +* Copyright 2011-2013 Google Inc. +* +* Authors: +* Stephan Uphoff <[email protected]> +* Kees Cook <[email protected]> +* +* This software is licensed under the terms of the GNU General Public +* License version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation, and +* may be copied, distributed, and modified under those terms. +* +* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +* GNU General Public License for more details. +*/ + +#define pr_fmt (fmt) "MntRestrict LSM: " fmt + +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/fs_struct.h> +#include <linux/mount.h> +#include <linux/path.h> +#include <linux/root_dev.h> + +static int mntrestrict_sb_mount (const char *dev_name,struct path *path, +const char *type,unsigned long flags, +void *data) +{ +int error = current->total_link_count ? -ELOOP :0 ; + +if (error) { + pr_notice("Mount path with symlinks prohibited -pid=%d\n",
security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c new file +25
-1+ task_pid_nr(current)); + } + +return error; +} + +static struct security_operations mntrestrict_ops = { + .name ="mntrestrict" , + .sb_mount = mntrestrict_sb_mount, +}; + +static int __init mntrestrict_init (void ) +{ +int error; + + error =register_security (&mntrestrict_ops); + +if (error) +panic ("Could not register MntRestrict security module" ); + +pr_info ("symlink destinations will be blocked.\n" ); + +return error; +} +security_initcall (mntrestrict_init); --1.7.9.5
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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the body of a message to [email protected]
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Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Chrome OS Security