3.4.67-stable review
Subsystems (13)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainercover 3.4.67-stable review
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.4.67 release. There are 11 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun Oct 20 19:50:39 UTC 2013. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/stable-review/patch-3.4.67-rc1.gz
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 3.4.67-rc1
Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
mm: do not grow the stack vma just because of an overrun on preceding vma
Cyril Hrubis <[email protected]>
mm/mmap: check for RLIMIT_AS before unmapping
wojciech kapuscinski <[email protected]>
drm/radeon: fix hw contexts for SUMO2 asics
Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
watchdog: ts72xx_wdt: locking bug in ioctl
Helge Deller <[email protected]>
parisc: fix interruption handler to respect pagefault_disable()
Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix typo in saving DSCR
Dave Jones <[email protected]>
ext4: fix memory leak in xattr
Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
vfs: allow O_PATH file descriptors for fstatfs()
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
random: run random_int_secret_init() run after all late_initcalls
Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda - Add fixup for ASUS N56VZ
Daniel Mack <[email protected]>
ALSA: snd-usb-usx2y: remove bogus frame checks
-------------
Diffstat:
Makefile | 4 +- arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c | 6 +-- arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S | 2 +- drivers/char/random.c | 3 +- drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/evergreen.c | 2 +- drivers/watchdog/ts72xx_wdt.c | 3 +- fs/ext4/xattr.c | 2 + fs/statfs.c | 2 +- include/linux/random.h | 1 + init/main.c | 2 + mm/mmap.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 1 + sound/usb/usx2y/usbusx2yaudio.c | 22 ++-------- sound/usb/usx2y/usx2yhwdeppcm.c | 7 +-- 14 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 11/11 mm: do not grow the stack vma just because of an overrun on preceding vma
3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
commit 09884964335e85e897876d17783c2ad33cf8a2e0 upstream.
The stack vma is designed to grow automatically (marked with VM_GROWSUP or VM_GROWSDOWN depending on architecture) when an access is made beyond the existing boundary. However, particularly if you have not limited your stack at all ("ulimit -s unlimited"), this can cause the stack to grow even if the access was really just one past *another* segment.
And that's wrong, especially since we first grow the segment, but then immediately later enforce the stack guard page on the last page of the segment. So _despite_ first growing the stack segment as a result of the access, the kernel will then make the access cause a SIGSEGV anyway!
So do the same logic as the guard page check does, and consider an access to within one page of the next segment to be a bad access, rather than growing the stack to abut the next segment.
--- mm/mmap.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
mm/mmap.c +27 -0
@@ -1875,9 +1875,28 @@ int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_strureturn error; } +/* +* Note how expand_stack() refuses to expand the stack all the way to +* abut the next virtual mapping, *unless* that mapping itself is also +* a stack mapping. We want to leave room for a guard page, after all +* (the guard page itself is not added here, that is done by the +* actual page faulting logic) +* +* This matches the behavior of the guard page logic (see mm/memory.c: +* check_stack_guard_page()), which only allows the guard page to be +* removed under these circumstances. +*/ #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP int expand_stack (struct vm_area_struct *vma,unsigned long address) { +struct vm_area_struct *next; + + address &=PAGE_MASK ; + next = vma->vm_next; +if (next && next->vm_start == address +PAGE_SIZE ) { +if (!(next->vm_flags &VM_GROWSUP )) +return -ENOMEM ; + }return expand_upwards (vma, address); }
@@ -1900,6 +1919,14 @@ find_extend_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, un#else int expand_stack (struct vm_area_struct *vma,unsigned long address) { +struct vm_area_struct *prev; + + address &=PAGE_MASK ; + prev = vma->vm_prev; +if (prev && prev->vm_end == address) { +if (!(prev->vm_flags &VM_GROWSDOWN )) +return -ENOMEM ; + }return expand_downwards (vma, address); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 1/11 ALSA: snd-usb-usx2y: remove bogus frame checks
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daniel Mack <[email protected]>
commit a9d14bc0b188a822e42787d01e56c06fe9750162 upstream.
The frame check in i_usX2Y_urb_complete() and i_usX2Y_usbpcm_urb_complete() is bogus and produces false positives as described in this LAU thread:
http://linuxaudio.org/mailarchive/lau/2013/5/20/200177
This patch removes the check code entirely.
--- sound/usb/usx2y/usbusx2yaudio.c | 22 +++------------------- sound/usb/usx2y/usx2yhwdeppcm.c | 7 +------ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
sound/usb/usx2y/usbusx2yaudio.c +3 -19
@@ -295,19 +295,6 @@ static void usX2Y_error_urb_status(strucusX2Y_clients_stop (usX2Y); } -static void usX2Y_error_sequence (struct usX2Ydev *usX2Y, -struct snd_usX2Y_substream *subs,struct urb *urb) -{ -snd_printk (KERN_ERR -"Sequence Error!(hcd_frame=%i ep=%i%s;wait=%i,frame=%i).\n" -"Most probably some urb of usb-frame %i is still missing.\n" -"Cause could be too long delays in usb-hcd interrupt handling.\n" , -usb_get_current_frame_number (usX2Y->dev), - subs->endpoint,usb_pipein (urb->pipe) ?"in" :"out" , - usX2Y->wait_iso_frame, urb->start_frame, usX2Y->wait_iso_frame); -usX2Y_clients_stop (usX2Y); -} -static void i_usX2Y_urb_complete (struct urb *urb) {struct snd_usX2Y_substream *subs = urb->context;
@@ -324,12 +311,9 @@ static void i_usX2Y_urb_complete(structusX2Y_error_urb_status (usX2Y, subs, urb);return ; } -if (likely ((urb->start_frame &0xFFFF ) == (usX2Y->wait_iso_frame &0xFFFF ))) - subs->completed_urb = urb; -else { -usX2Y_error_sequence (usX2Y, subs, urb); -return ; - } + + subs->completed_urb = urb; + {struct snd_usX2Y_substream *capsubs = usX2Y->subs[SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_CAPTURE ], *playbacksubs = usX2Y->subs[SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_PLAYBACK ];
sound/usb/usx2y/usx2yhwdeppcm.c +1 -6
@@ -244,13 +244,8 @@ static void i_usX2Y_usbpcm_urb_complete(usX2Y_error_urb_status (usX2Y, subs, urb);return ; } -if (likely ((urb->start_frame &0xFFFF ) == (usX2Y->wait_iso_frame &0xFFFF ))) - subs->completed_urb = urb; -else { -usX2Y_error_sequence (usX2Y, subs, urb); -return ; - } + subs->completed_urb = urb; capsubs = usX2Y->subs[SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_CAPTURE ]; capsubs2 = usX2Y->subs[SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_CAPTURE +2 ]; playbacksubs = usX2Y->subs[SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_PLAYBACK ];
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 10/11 mm/mmap: check for RLIMIT_AS before unmapping
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cyril Hrubis <[email protected]>
commit e8420a8ece80b3fe810415ecf061d54ca7fab266 upstream.
Fix a corner case for MAP_FIXED when requested mapping length is larger than rlimit for virtual memory. In such case any overlapping mappings are unmapped before we check for the limit and return ENOMEM.
The check is moved before the loop that unmaps overlapping parts of existing mappings. When we are about to hit the limit (currently mapped pages + len > limit) we scan for overlapping pages and check again accounting for them.
This fixes situation when userspace program expects that the previous mappings are preserved after the mmap() syscall has returned with error. (POSIX clearly states that successfull mapping shall replace any previous mappings.)
This corner case was found and can be tested with LTP testcase:
testcases/open_posix_testsuite/conformance/interfaces/mmap/24-2.c
In this case the mmap, which is clearly over current limit, unmaps dynamic libraries and the testcase segfaults right after returning into userspace.
I've also looked at the second instance of the unmapping loop in the do_brk(). The do_brk() is called from brk() syscall and from vm_brk(). The brk() syscall checks for overlapping mappings and bails out when there are any (so it can't be triggered from the brk syscall). The vm_brk() is called only from binmft handlers so it shouldn't be triggered unless binmft handler created overlapping mappings.
--- mm/mmap.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
mm/mmap.c +46 -4
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@* Address space accounting code <[email protected]> */ +#include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/backing-dev.h> #include <linux/mm.h>
@@ -392,6 +393,34 @@ find_vma_prepare(struct mm_struct *mm, ureturn vma; } +static unsigned long count_vma_pages_range (struct mm_struct *mm, +unsigned long addr,unsigned long end) +{ +unsigned long nr_pages =0 ; +struct vm_area_struct *vma; + +/* Find first overlaping mapping */ + vma =find_vma_intersection (mm, addr, end); +if (!vma) +return 0 ; + + nr_pages = (min (end, vma->vm_end) - +max (addr, vma->vm_start)) >>PAGE_SHIFT ; + +/* Iterate over the rest of the overlaps */ +for (vma = vma->vm_next; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) { +unsigned long overlap_len; + +if (vma->vm_start > end) +break ; + + overlap_len =min (end, vma->vm_end) - vma->vm_start; + nr_pages += overlap_len >>PAGE_SHIFT ; + } + +return nr_pages; +} +void __vma_link_rb (struct mm_struct *mm,struct vm_area_struct *vma,struct rb_node **rb_link,struct rb_node *rb_parent) {
@@ -1245,6 +1274,23 @@ unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *funsigned long charged =0 ;struct inode *inode = file ? file->f_path.dentry->d_inode :NULL ; +/* Check against address space limit. */ +if (!may_expand_vm (mm, len >>PAGE_SHIFT )) { +unsigned long nr_pages; + +/* +* MAP_FIXED may remove pages of mappings that intersects with +* requested mapping. Account for the pages it would unmap. +*/ +if (!(vm_flags &MAP_FIXED )) +return -ENOMEM ; + + nr_pages =count_vma_pages_range (mm, addr, addr + len); + +if (!may_expand_vm (mm, (len >>PAGE_SHIFT ) - nr_pages)) +return -ENOMEM ; + } +/* Clear old maps */ error = -ENOMEM ; munmap_back:
@@ -1255,10 +1301,6 @@ munmap_back: goto munmap_back; } -/* Check against address space limit. */ -if (!may_expand_vm (mm, len >>PAGE_SHIFT )) -return -ENOMEM ; -/* * Set 'VM_NORESERVE' if we should not account for the * memory use of this mapping.
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 8/11 watchdog: ts72xx_wdt: locking bug in ioctl
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
commit 8612ed0d97abcf1c016d34755b7cf2060de71963 upstream.
Calling the WDIOC_GETSTATUS & WDIOC_GETBOOTSTATUS and twice will cause a interruptible deadlock.
--- drivers/watchdog/ts72xx_wdt.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/watchdog/ts72xx_wdt.c +2 -1
@@ -310,7 +310,8 @@ static long ts72xx_wdt_ioctl(struct filecase WDIOC_GETSTATUS :case WDIOC_GETBOOTSTATUS : -return put_user (0 , p); + error =put_user (0 , p); +break ;case WDIOC_KEEPALIVE :ts72xx_wdt_kick (wdt);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 9/11 drm/radeon: fix hw contexts for SUMO2 asics
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: wojciech kapuscinski <[email protected]>
commit 50b8f5aec04ebec7dbdf2adb17220b9148c99e63 upstream.
They have 4 rather than 8.
Fixes:
https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=63599
--- drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/evergreen.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/evergreen.c +1 -1
@@ -1912,7 +1912,7 @@ static void evergreen_gpu_init(struct ra rdev->config.evergreen.sx_max_export_size =256 ; rdev->config.evergreen.sx_max_export_pos_size =64 ; rdev->config.evergreen.sx_max_export_smx_size =192 ; - rdev->config.evergreen.max_hw_contexts =8 ; + rdev->config.evergreen.max_hw_contexts =4 ; rdev->config.evergreen.sq_num_cf_insts =2 ; rdev->config.evergreen.sc_prim_fifo_size =0x40 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 7/11 parisc: fix interruption handler to respect pagefault_disable()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
commit 59b33f148cc08fb33cbe823fca1e34f7f023765e upstream.
Running an "echo t > /proc/sysrq-trigger" crashes the parisc kernel. The problem is, that in print_worker_info() we try to read the workqueue info via the probe_kernel_read() functions which use pagefault_disable() to avoid crashes like this:
probe_kernel_read(&pwq, &worker->current_pwq, sizeof(pwq));
probe_kernel_read(&wq, &pwq->wq, sizeof(wq));
probe_kernel_read(name, wq->name, sizeof(name) - 1);The problem here is, that the first probe_kernel_read(&pwq) might return zero in pwq and as such the following probe_kernel_reads() try to access contents of the page zero which is read protected and generate a kernel segfault.
With this patch we fix the interruption handler to call parisc_terminate() directly only if pagefault_disable() was not called (in which case preempt_count()==0). Otherwise we hand over to the pagefault handler which will try to look up the faulting address in the fixup tables.
--- arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c +3 -3
@@ -810,14 +810,14 @@ void notrace handle_interruption(int codelse {/* -* The kernel should never fault on its own address space. +* The kernel should never fault on its own address space, +* unless pagefault_disable() was called before. */ -if (fault_space ==0 ) +if (fault_space ==0 && !in_atomic ()) {pdc_chassis_send_status (PDC_CHASSIS_DIRECT_PANIC );parisc_terminate ("Kernel Fault" , regs, code, fault_address); - } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 2/11 ALSA: hda - Add fixup for ASUS N56VZ
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit c6cc3d58b4042f5cadae653ff8d3df26af1a0169 upstream.
ASUS N56VZ needs a fixup for the bass speaker pin, which was already provided via model=asus-mode4.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=841645
--- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +1 -0
@@ -6832,6 +6832,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc662SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x1025 ,0x031c ,"Gateway NV79" ,ALC662_FIXUP_SKU_IGNORE ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x1025 ,0x038b ,"Acer Aspire 8943G" ,ALC662_FIXUP_ASPIRE ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x1632 ,"HP RP5800" ,ALC662_FIXUP_HP_RP5800 ), +SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x1043 ,0x1477 ,"ASUS N56VZ" ,ALC662_FIXUP_ASUS_MODE4 ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x1043 ,0x8469 ,"ASUS mobo" ,ALC662_FIXUP_NO_JACK_DETECT ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x105b ,0x0cd6 ,"Foxconn" ,ALC662_FIXUP_ASUS_MODE2 ), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x144d, 0xc051, "Samsung R720", ALC662_FIXUP_IDEAPAD),
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 3/11 random: run random_int_secret_init() run after all late_initcalls
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit 47d06e532e95b71c0db3839ebdef3fe8812fca2c upstream.
The some platforms (e.g., ARM) initializes their clocks as late_initcalls for some unknown reason. So make sure random_int_secret_init() is run after all of the late_initcalls are run.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 3 +-- include/linux/random.h | 1 + init/main.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +1 -2
@@ -1435,12 +1435,11 @@ ctl_table random_table[] = {static u32 random_int_secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES /4 ]____cacheline_aligned ; -static int __init random_int_secret_init (void ) +int random_int_secret_init (void ) {get_random_bytes (random_int_secret,sizeof (random_int_secret));return 0 ; } -late_initcall (random_int_secret_init);/* * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. Similar to urandom but
include/linux/random.h +1 -0
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ extern void add_interrupt_randomness(intextern void get_random_bytes (void *buf,int nbytes);extern void get_random_bytes_arch (void *buf,int nbytes);void generate_random_uuid (unsigned char uuid_out[16 ]); +extern int random_int_secret_init (void );#ifndef MODULE extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
init/main.c +2 -0
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@#include <linux/shmem_fs.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/perf_event.h> +#include <linux/random.h> #include <asm/io.h> #include <asm/bugs.h>
@@ -779,6 +780,7 @@ static void __init do_basic_setup(void)do_ctors ();usermodehelper_enable ();do_initcalls (); +random_int_secret_init (); }static void __init do_pre_smp_initcalls (void )
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 4/11 vfs: allow O_PATH file descriptors for fstatfs()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
commit 9d05746e7b16d8565dddbe3200faa1e669d23bbf upstream.
Olga reported that file descriptors opened with O_PATH do not work with fstatfs(), found during further development of ksh93's thread support.
There is no reason to not allow O_PATH file descriptors here (fstatfs is very much a path operation), so use "fdget_raw()". See commit 55815f70147d ("vfs: make O_PATH file descriptors usable for 'fstat()'") for a very similar issue reported for fstat() by the same team.
--- fs/statfs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/statfs.c +1 -1
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int user_statfs(const char __user *pathnint fd_statfs (int fd,struct kstatfs *st) { -struct file *file =fget (fd); +struct file *file =fget_raw (fd);int error = -EBADF ;if (file) { error =vfs_statfs (&file->f_path, st);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 5/11 ext4: fix memory leak in xattr
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
commit 6e4ea8e33b2057b85d75175dd89b93f5e26de3bc upstream.
If we take the 2nd retry path in ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea, we potentionally return from the function without having freed these allocations. If we don't do the return, we over-write the previous allocation pointers, so we leak either way.
Spotted with Coverity.
[ Fixed by tytso to set is and bs to NULL after freeing these
pointers, in case in the retry loop we later end up triggering an error causing a jump to cleanup, at which point we could have a double free bug. -- Ted ]
--- fs/ext4/xattr.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
fs/ext4/xattr.c +2 -0
@@ -1268,6 +1268,8 @@ retry: s_min_extra_isize) { tried_min_extra_isize++; new_extra_isize = s_min_extra_isize; +kfree (is); is =NULL ; +kfree (bs); bs =NULL ; goto retry; } error =-1 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 6/11 KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix typo in saving DSCR
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
commit cfc860253abd73e1681696c08ea268d33285a2c4 upstream.
This fixes a typo in the code that saves the guest DSCR (Data Stream Control Register) into the kvm_vcpu_arch struct on guest exit. The effect of the typo was that the DSCR value was saved in the wrong place, so changes to the DSCR by the guest didn't persist across guest exit and entry, and some host kernel memory got corrupted.
--- arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S +1 -1
@@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ARCH_206) BEGIN_FTR_SECTION mfspr r8, SPRN_DSCR ld r7, HSTATE_DSCR(r13) - std r8, VCPU_DSCR(r7) + std r8, VCPU_DSCR(r9) mtspr SPRN_DSCR, r7 END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ARCH_206)
Guenter Roeck
maintainerQuoted 5 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.4.67 release. There are 11 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Quoted 7 lines
Responses should be made by Sun Oct 20 19:50:39 UTC 2013. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/stable-review/patch-3.4.67-rc1.gzand the diffstat can be found below.
Build results:
total: 103 pass: 89 skipped: 10 fail: 4
qemu tests all pass.
This matches the results seen with the previous 3.4 release, so everything is as expected.
Details are available at http://server.roeck-us.net:8010/builders.
Thanks,
Guenter
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 13 lines · Guenter Roeck
Quoted 5 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.4.67 release. There are 11 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Quoted 7 lines
Responses should be made by Sun Oct 20 19:50:39 UTC 2013. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/stable-review/patch-3.4.67-rc1.gzand the diffstat can be found below.
Quoted 7 lines
Build results:
total: 103 pass: 89 skipped: 10 fail: 4qemu tests all pass.
This matches the results seen with the previous 3.4 release, so everything is as expected.
Great, thanks for testing and letting me know.
greg k-h
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.4.67 release. There are 11 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun Oct 20 19:50:39 UTC 2013. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Quoted 8 lines
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/stable-review/patch-3.4.67-rc1.gzand the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
Patch applied cleanly yes
Compile testing passed
Boot testing passed
dmesg regression testing passed
Cross-compile testing passed
dmesgs look good. No regressions compared to the previous dmesgs for this release. dmesg emerg, crit, alert, err are clean. No regressions in warn.
Test systems
Samsung Series 9 900X4C Intel Corei5 (3.4 and later) HP ProBook 6475b AMD A10-4600M APU with Radeon(tm) HD Graphics HP Compaq dc7700 SFF desktop: x86-64 Intel Core-i2 (cross-compile
testing)
alpha defconfig Passed
arm defconfig passed
arm64 defconfig Not applicable
blackfin defconfig Passed
c6x dsk6455_defconfig Passed
mips defconfig Passed
mipsel defconfig Passed
powerpc wii_defconfig Passed
sh defconfig Passed
sparc defconfig Passed
tile tilegx_defconfig Passed
-- Shuah
Signature · 4 lines
Shuah Khan Senior Linux Kernel Developer - Open Source Group Samsung Research America(Silicon Valley) [email protected] | (970) 672-0658
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 24 lines · Shuah Khan
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.4.67 release. There are 11 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun Oct 20 19:50:39 UTC 2013. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Quoted 8 lines
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/stable-review/patch-3.4.67-rc1.gzand the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
Patch applied cleanly yes
Compile testing passed
Boot testing passed
dmesg regression testing passed
Cross-compile testing passed
Quoted 3 lines
dmesgs look good. No regressions compared to the previous dmesgs for this release. dmesg emerg, crit, alert, err are clean. No regressions in warn.
Thanks for testing and letting me know.
greg k-h
Re: [ 05/11] ext4: fix memory leak in xattr
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanQuoted 20 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
commit
6e4ea8e33b2057b85d75175dd89b93f5e26de3bcupstream.If we take the 2nd retry path in
ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea, we potentionally return from the function without having freed these allocations. If we don't do the return, we over-write the previous allocation pointers, so we leak either way.Spotted with Coverity.
[ Fixed by tytso to set is and bs to NULL after freeing these
pointers, in case in the retry loop we later end up triggering an error causing a jump to cleanup, at which point we could have a double free bug. -- Ted ]
Quoted 4 lines
Signed-off-by Dave Jones <[email protected]>Signed-off-by "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Eric Sandeen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
I'm still waiting to hear if we also need this..
Ted ?
Signature · 4 lines
If we take the retry path here, we end up potentially overwriting bh, leaving it with an elevated reference count. Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
fs/ext4/xattr.c +1 -0
@@ -1352,6 +1352,7 @@ retry: new_extra_isize = s_min_extra_isize;kfree (is); is =NULL ;kfree (bs); bs =NULL ; +brelse (bh); goto retry; } error =-1 ;