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kexec: add sysctl to disable kexec

PATCH Superseded Kees Cook 3 participants 4 messages Dec 9, 2013 – Dec 10, 2013

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v1 of 3 Superseded Latest is v3 →

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Kees Cook

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 kexec: add sysctl to disable kexec

For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build with CONFIG_KEXEC to allow end users to choose what kind of things they want to do with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec (much like module loading can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy for the root user to modify kernel memory even when CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM and modules_disabled are set.

---
 include/linux/kexec.h |    1 +
 kernel/kexec.c        |    3 ++-
 kernel/sysctl.c       |   13 +++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/kexec.h +1 -0
index d78d28a733b1..a1503ed4dde5 100644
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ unsigned long paddr_vmcoreinfo_note(void);
 
 extern struct kimage *kexec_image;
 extern struct kimage *kexec_crash_image;
+extern int kexec_disabled;
 
 #ifndef kexec_flush_icache_page
 #define kexec_flush_icache_page(page)
kernel/kexec.c +2 -1
index 490afc03627e..9d44ed203ee7 100644
@@ -929,6 +929,7 @@ static int kimage_load_segment(struct kimage *image,
  */
 struct kimage *kexec_image;
 struct kimage *kexec_crash_image;
+int kexec_disabled;
 
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(kexec_mutex);
 
@@ -939,7 +940,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
 	int result;
 
 	/* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT))
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_disabled)
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/*
kernel/sysctl.c +13 -0
index 34a604726d0b..07869ce3642d 100644
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
 #include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
 #include <linux/sched/sysctl.h>
+#include <linux/kexec.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -614,6 +615,18 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
 		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
 	},
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC
+	{
+		.procname	= "kexec_disabled",
+		.data		= &kexec_disabled,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		/* only handle a transition from default "0" to "1" */
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1		= &one,
+		.extra2		= &one,
+	},
+#endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
 	{
 		.procname	= "modprobe",
Signature · 11 lines
1.7.9.5


-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security

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Acked-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Kees Cook

For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build with CONFIG_KEXEC to allow end users to choose what kind of things they want to do with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec (much like module loading can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy for the root user to modify kernel memory even when CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM and modules_disabled are set.

Not everybody will be running with selinux, or another LSM security policy, so having this simple knob probably makes sense.

OTOH, are the people who run without a fancy security people the same people who are interested in locking down the system?

I guess I'll ack the patch, since I see no real downside to having the knob...

Quoted 1 line
Signature · 6 lines
All rights reversed

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author
#2 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Rik van Riel
Quoted 6 lines · Kees Cook

For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build with CONFIG_KEXEC to allow end users to choose what kind of things they want to do with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec (much like module loading can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy for the root user to modify kernel memory even when CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM and modules_disabled are set.

Quoted 8 lines

Not everybody will be running with selinux, or another LSM security policy, so having this simple knob probably makes sense.

OTOH, are the people who run without a fancy security people the same people who are interested in locking down the system?

I guess I'll ack the patch, since I see no real downside to having the knob...

Thanks! Yeah, there are cases of machines that are trying to be as locked down as possible while still not having secure boot, etc. This helps raise the bar for them.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Thanks! I'm sending a v2 since I spaced out on updating the sysctl docs.

-Kees

Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
#3 lore raw
In reply to Kees Cook
Quoted 8 lines · Kees Cook

For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build with CONFIG_KEXEC to allow end users to choose what kind of things they want to do with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec (much like module loading can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy for the root user to modify kernel memory even when CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM and modules_disabled are set.

Giving Sys admins more control to secure their system is a good idea. This addition looks good to me.

--
Khalid

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