kexec: add sysctl to disable kexec
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 kexec: add sysctl to disable kexec
For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build with CONFIG_KEXEC to allow end users to choose what kind of things they want to do with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec (much like module loading can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy for the root user to modify kernel memory even when CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM and modules_disabled are set.
--- include/linux/kexec.h | 1 + kernel/kexec.c | 3 ++- kernel/sysctl.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/kexec.h +1 -0
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ unsigned long paddr_vmcoreinfo_note(void);extern struct kimage *kexec_image;extern struct kimage *kexec_crash_image; +extern int kexec_disabled;#ifndef kexec_flush_icache_page#define kexec_flush_icache_page (page)
kernel/kexec.c +2 -1
@@ -929,6 +929,7 @@ static int kimage_load_segment(struct kimage *image,*/ struct kimage *kexec_image;struct kimage *kexec_crash_image; +int kexec_disabled;static DEFINE_MUTEX (kexec_mutex);
@@ -939,7 +940,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,int result;/* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_BOOT )) +if (!capable (CAP_SYS_BOOT ) || kexec_disabled)return -EPERM ;/*
kernel/sysctl.c +13 -0
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@#include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/binfmts.h> #include <linux/sched/sysctl.h> +#include <linux/kexec.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -614,6 +615,18 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, },#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC + { + .procname = "kexec_disabled", + .data = &kexec_disabled, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + /* only handle a transition from default "0" to "1" */ + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = &one, + .extra2 = &one, + }, +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES { .procname = "modprobe",
Signature · 11 lines
1.7.9.5 -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Quoted 6 lines · Kees Cook
For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build with
CONFIG_KEXECto allow end users to choose what kind of things they want to do with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec (much like module loading can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy for the root user to modify kernel memory even whenCONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEMandmodules_disabledare set.
Not everybody will be running with selinux, or another LSM security policy, so having this simple knob probably makes sense.
OTOH, are the people who run without a fancy security people the same people who are interested in locking down the system?
I guess I'll ack the patch, since I see no real downside to having the knob...
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signature · 6 lines
All rights reversed _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Quoted 8 lines · Rik van Riel
Quoted 6 lines · Kees Cook
For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build with
CONFIG_KEXECto allow end users to choose what kind of things they want to do with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec (much like module loading can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy for the root user to modify kernel memory even whenCONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEMandmodules_disabledare set.
Quoted 8 lines
Not everybody will be running with selinux, or another LSM security policy, so having this simple knob probably makes sense.
OTOH, are the people who run without a fancy security people the same people who are interested in locking down the system?
I guess I'll ack the patch, since I see no real downside to having the knob...
Thanks! Yeah, there are cases of machines that are trying to be as locked down as possible while still not having secure boot, etc. This helps raise the bar for them.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Acked-by Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Thanks! I'm sending a v2 since I spaced out on updating the sysctl docs.
-Kees
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Chrome OS Security
Quoted 8 lines · Kees Cook
For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build with
CONFIG_KEXECto allow end users to choose what kind of things they want to do with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec (much like module loading can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy for the root user to modify kernel memory even whenCONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEMandmodules_disabledare set.Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Giving Sys admins more control to secure their system is a good idea. This addition looks good to me.
--
Khalid
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