vsprintf: ignore arguments to %n
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 vsprintf: ignore arguments to %n
If arguments are consumed without output when encountering %n, it could be used to benefit or improve information leak attacks that were exposed via a limited size buffer. Since %n is not used by the kernel, there is no reason to make an info leak attack any easier.
--- lib/vsprintf.c | 10 +++------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
lib/vsprintf.c +3 -7
@@ -1735,14 +1735,10 @@ int vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, va_list args)case FORMAT_TYPE_NRCHARS : {/* * Since %n poses a greater security risk than -* utility, ignore %n and skip its argument. +* utility, it should not be implemented. Instead, +* when encountering %n, ignore the arguments. */ -void *skip_arg; - -WARN_ONCE (1 ,"Please remove ignored %%n in '%s'\n" , - old_fmt); - - skip_arg = va_arg(args, void *); +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"Ignored %%n in '%s'\n" , old_fmt);break ; }
Signature · 6 lines
1.7.9.5 -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security
Joe Perches
maintainerlib/vsprintf.c
Quoted 1 line · Kees Cook
lib/vsprintf.c +0
-0
[]
Quoted 7 lines
lib/vsprintf.c +2
-1@@ -1735,14 +1735,10 @@ int vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, va_list args)case FORMAT_TYPE_NRCHARS : {/* * Since %n poses a greater security risk than -* utility, ignore %n and skip its argument. +* utility, it should not be implemented. Instead, +* when encountering %n, ignore the arguments.
lib/vsprintf.c int vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, va_list args) · line 1743
Quoted 10 lines
lib/vsprintf.c +1
-6*/ -void *skip_arg; - -WARN_ONCE (1 ,"Please remove ignored %%n in '%s'\n" , - old_fmt); - - skip_arg = va_arg(args, void *); +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"Ignored %%n in '%s'\n" , old_fmt);break ; }
I don't think this is better either.
Why not tell people to fix the code?
checkpatch isn't run on quite a lot of patches.
anyway, here's a possible checkpatch test too.
--- scripts/checkpatch.pl | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
scripts/checkpatch.pl +9 -0
@@ -4069,6 +4069,15 @@ sub process { } } +# check for unsupported uses of %n in what appear to be formats + if ($sline =~ /\b$logFunctions\s*\(.*"/) { + my $fmt = get_quoted_string($line, $rawline); + if ($fmt ne "" && $fmt =~ /[^\%]\%n/) { + WARN("PRINTF_CONTROL_N", + "printf style use of \%n is not supported\n" . $herecurr); + } + } + # Check for misused memsets if ($^V && $^V ge 5.10.0 && defined $stat &&
Quoted 4 lines · Kees Cook
If arguments are consumed without output when encountering %n, it could be used to benefit or improve information leak attacks that were exposed via a limited size buffer. Since %n is not used by the kernel, there is no reason to make an info leak attack any easier.
I was thinking more like the following. Print the warning if %n is detected in format_decode(), but otherwise just remove the handling of %n outright and treat it like any other invalid format specifier. Something like this completely untested patch. Thoughts?
~Ryan
---
lib/vsprintf.c +9 -36
@@ -364,7 +364,6 @@ enum format_type {FORMAT_TYPE_SHORT ,FORMAT_TYPE_UINT ,FORMAT_TYPE_INT , -FORMAT_TYPE_NRCHARS ,FORMAT_TYPE_SIZE_T , FORMAT_TYPE_PTRDIFF };
@@ -1512,10 +1511,6 @@ qualifier:return fmt - start;/* skip alnum */ -case 'n' : - spec->type =FORMAT_TYPE_NRCHARS ; -return ++fmt - start; -case '%' : spec->type =FORMAT_TYPE_PERCENT_CHAR ;return ++fmt - start;
@@ -1538,6 +1533,15 @@ qualifier:case 'u' :break ; +case 'n' : +/* +* Since %n poses a greater security risk than utility, treat +* it as an invalid format specifier. Warn about it use, so +* new instances don't get added. +*/ +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"Please remove ignored %%n in '%s'\n" , fmt); +/* Fall-through */ +default : spec->type =FORMAT_TYPE_INVALID ;return fmt - start;
@@ -1711,20 +1715,6 @@ int vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, va_list args) ++str;break ; -case FORMAT_TYPE_NRCHARS : { -/* -* Since %n poses a greater security risk than -* utility, ignore %n and skip its argument. -*/ -void *skip_arg; - -WARN_ONCE (1 ,"Please remove ignored %%n in '%s'\n" , - old_fmt); - - skip_arg = va_arg(args, void *); -break ; - } -default :switch (spec.type) {case FORMAT_TYPE_LONG_LONG :
@@ -1999,19 +1989,6 @@ do { \ fmt++;break ; -case FORMAT_TYPE_NRCHARS : { -/* skip %n 's argument */ -u8 qualifier = spec.qualifier; -void *skip_arg; -if (qualifier =='l' ) - skip_arg = va_arg(args, long *); -else if (_tolower (qualifier) =='z' ) - skip_arg = va_arg(args, size_t *); -else - skip_arg = va_arg(args, int *); -break ; - } -default :switch (spec.type) {
@@ -2170,10 +2147,6 @@ int bstr_printf(char *buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, const u32 *bin_buf) ++str;break ; -case FORMAT_TYPE_NRCHARS : -/* skip */ -break ; -default : {unsigned long long num;
Kees Cook
Acked-byQuoted 10 lines · Ryan Mallon
Quoted 4 lines · Kees Cook
If arguments are consumed without output when encountering %n, it could be used to benefit or improve information leak attacks that were exposed via a limited size buffer. Since %n is not used by the kernel, there is no reason to make an info leak attack any easier.
I was thinking more like the following. Print the warning if %n is detected in
format_decode(), but otherwise just remove the handling of %n outright and treat it like any other invalid format specifier. Something like this completely untested patch. Thoughts?
I'd be totally fine with it. Minor typo in the comment before the WARN_ONCE (should be "its" instead of "it"), but otherwise looks good. Consider it:
It builds and boots fine for me, FWIW.
-Kees
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Chrome OS Security
Quoted 16 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 10 lines · Ryan Mallon
Quoted 4 lines · Kees Cook
If arguments are consumed without output when encountering %n, it could be used to benefit or improve information leak attacks that were exposed via a limited size buffer. Since %n is not used by the kernel, there is no reason to make an info leak attack any easier.
I was thinking more like the following. Print the warning if %n is detected in
format_decode(), but otherwise just remove the handling of %n outright and treat it like any other invalid format specifier. Something like this completely untested patch. Thoughts?I'd be totally fine with it. Minor typo in the comment before the
WARN_ONCE(should be "its" instead of "it"), but otherwise looks good. Consider it:
Quoted 6 lines
Acked-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>It builds and boots fine for me, FWIW.
-Kees
It looks like your second version already got added to Andrew's mm tree. I'm happy to repost mine with a fixed typo and proper signed-off by if you'd rather use that version.
~Ryan
Quoted 22 lines · Ryan Mallon
Quoted 20 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 10 lines · Ryan Mallon
Quoted 4 lines · Kees Cook
If arguments are consumed without output when encountering %n, it could be used to benefit or improve information leak attacks that were exposed via a limited size buffer. Since %n is not used by the kernel, there is no reason to make an info leak attack any easier.
I was thinking more like the following. Print the warning if %n is detected in
format_decode(), but otherwise just remove the handling of %n outright and treat it like any other invalid format specifier. Something like this completely untested patch. Thoughts?I'd be totally fine with it. Minor typo in the comment before the
WARN_ONCE(should be "its" instead of "it"), but otherwise looks good. Consider it:Acked-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>It builds and boots fine for me, FWIW.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
-Kees
It looks like your second version already got added to Andrew's mm tree. I'm happy to repost mine with a fixed typo and proper signed-off by if you'd rather use that version.
I think yours is much cleaner: it entirely removes the %n processing logic.
-Kees
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Chrome OS Security