3.4.80-stable review
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainercover 3.4.80-stable review
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.4.80 release. There are 30 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu Feb 13 18:46:37 UTC 2014. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/stable-review/patch-3.4.80-rc1.gz
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 3.4.80-rc1
Colin Cross <[email protected]>
3.4.y: timekeeping: fix 32-bit overflow in get_monotonic_boottime
John Stultz <[email protected]>
timekeeping: Avoid possible deadlock from clock_was_set_delayed
Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
rtc-cmos: Add an alarm disable quirk
Ying Xue <[email protected]>
sched/rt: Avoid updating RT entry timeout twice within one tick period
Peter Boonstoppel <[email protected]>
sched: Unthrottle rt runqueues in __disable_runtime()
Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
sched,rt: fix isolated CPUs leaving root_task_group indefinitely throttled
Colin Cross <[email protected]>
sched/rt: Fix SCHED_RR across cgroups
Al Viro <[email protected]>
hpfs: deadlock and race in directory lseek()
Yijing Wang <[email protected]>
PCI: Enable ARI if dev and upstream bridge support it; disable otherwise
Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
drm/radeon/DCE4+: clear bios scratch dpms bit (v2)
Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
drm/radeon: set the full cache bit for fences on r7xx+
Marek Olšák <[email protected]>
drm/radeon: skip colorbuffer checking if COLOR_INFO.FORMAT is set to INVALID
Michel Dänzer <[email protected]>
radeon/pm: Guard access to rdev->pm.power_state array
Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
drm/radeon: warn users when hw_i2c is enabled (v2)
Joe Thornber <[email protected]>
dm space map common: make sure new space is used during extend
Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
dm: wait until embedded kobject is released before destroying a device
Weston Andros Adamson <[email protected]>
sunrpc: Fix infinite loop in RPC state machine
Weston Andros Adamson <[email protected]>
nfs4.1: properly handle ENOTSUP in SECINFO_NO_NAME
Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
NFSv4: OPEN must handle the NFS4ERR_IO return code correctly
Daniel Santos <[email protected]>
spidev: fix hang when transfer_one_message fails
Ira Weiny <[email protected]>
IB/qib: Fix QP check when looping back to/from QP1
Boaz Harrosh <[email protected]>
ore: Fix wrong math in allocation of per device BIO
Michael Grzeschik <[email protected]>
mtd: mxc_nand: remove duplicated ecc_stats counting
Mark Brown <[email protected]>
ACPI / init: Flag use of ACPI and ACPI idioms for power supplies to regulator API
Josh Triplett <[email protected]>
turbostat: Use GCC's CPUID functions to support PIC
Li Zefan <[email protected]>
slub: Fix calculation of cpu slabs
Ludovic Desroches <[email protected]>
mmc: atmel-mci: fix timeout errors in SDIO mode when using DMA
AKASHI Takahiro <[email protected]>
audit: correct a type mismatch in audit_syscall_exit()
Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
intel-iommu: fix off-by-one in pagetable freeing
Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy
-------------
Diffstat:
Makefile | 4 +- drivers/acpi/bus.c | 9 ++++ drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/evergreen_cs.c | 5 ++- drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/r600.c | 13 +++--- drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/r600_cs.c | 5 ++- drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/r600d.h | 1 + drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_atombios.c | 4 ++ drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_i2c.c | 3 ++ drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_pm.c | 6 ++- drivers/infiniband/hw/qib/qib_ud.c | 9 +++- drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c | 2 +- drivers/md/dm-sysfs.c | 10 ++++- drivers/md/dm.c | 11 +++++ drivers/md/dm.h | 2 + drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-common.c | 6 ++- drivers/mmc/host/atmel-mci.c | 13 +++++- drivers/mtd/nand/mxc_nand.c | 1 - drivers/pci/pci.c | 14 +++---- drivers/rtc/rtc-cmos.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/spi/spi.c | 4 +- fs/exofs/ore.c | 37 +++++++++++------ fs/hpfs/dir.c | 10 +++-- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 4 +- fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 47 +++++++++++++-------- include/linux/audit.h | 2 +- include/linux/sched.h | 1 + include/scsi/osd_ore.h | 1 + kernel/sched/core.c | 3 -- kernel/sched/fair.c | 7 +++- kernel/sched/rt.c | 35 +++++++++++++--- kernel/sched/sched.h | 1 - kernel/time/timekeeping.c | 14 ++++--- mm/slub.c | 8 +++- net/sunrpc/clnt.c | 8 +++- security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 14 ++++++- tools/power/x86/turbostat/turbostat.c | 11 ++--- 36 files changed, 289 insertions(+), 88 deletions(-)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 1/30 SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy
3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
commit 8ed814602876bec9bad2649ca17f34b499357a1c upstream.
Hello.
I got below leak with linux-3.10.0-54.0.1.el7.x86_64 .
[ 681.903890] kmemleak: 5538 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak)
Below is a patch, but I don't know whether we need special handing for undoing ebitmap_set_bit() call.
----------
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
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From
fe97527a90fe95e2239dfbaa7558f0ed559c0992Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 16:30:21 +0900
Subject: [PATCH 3.4 01/30] SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy
Commit 2463c26d "SELinux: put name based create rules in a hashtable" did not check return value from hashtab_insert() in filename_trans_read(). It leaks memory if hashtab_insert() returns error.
unreferenced object 0xffff88005c9160d0 (size 8):
comm "systemd", pid 1, jiffies 4294688674 (age 235.265s)
hex dump (first 8 bytes):
57 0b 00 00 6b 6b 6b a5 W...kkk.
backtrace:
[<ffffffff816604ae>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
[<ffffffff811cba5e>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x12e/0x360
[<ffffffff812aec5d>] policydb_read+0xd1d/0xf70
[<ffffffff812b345c>] security_load_policy+0x6c/0x500
[<ffffffff812a623c>] sel_write_load+0xac/0x750
[<ffffffff811eb680>] vfs_write+0xc0/0x1f0
[<ffffffff811ec08c>] SyS_write+0x4c/0xa0
[<ffffffff81690419>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffffHowever, we should not return EEXIST error to the caller, or the systemd will show below message and the boot sequence freezes.
systemd[1]: Failed to load SELinux policy. Freezing.
--- security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +13 -1
@@ -1914,7 +1914,19 @@ static int filename_trans_read(struct poif (rc) goto out; -hashtab_insert (p->filename_trans, ft, otype); + rc =hashtab_insert (p->filename_trans, ft, otype); +if (rc) { +/* +* Do not return -EEXIST to the caller, or the system +* will not boot. +*/ +if (rc != -EEXIST ) + goto out; +/* But free memory to avoid memory leak. */ +kfree (ft); +kfree (name); +kfree (otype); + } }hash_eval (p->filename_trans,"filenametr" );return 0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 2/30 intel-iommu: fix off-by-one in pagetable freeing
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
commit 08336fd218e087cc4fcc458e6b6dcafe8702b098 upstream.
dma_pte_free_level() has an off-by-one error when checking whether a pte is completely covered by a range. Take for example the case of attempting to free pfn 0x0 - 0x1ff, ie. 512 entries covering the first 2M superpage.
The level_size() is 0x200 and we test:
static void dma_pte_free_level(...
...
if (!(0 > 0 || 0x1ff < 0 + 0x200)) {
...
}Clearly the 2nd test is true, which means we fail to take the branch to clear and free the pagetable entry. As a result, we're leaking pagetables and failing to install new pages over the range.
This was found with a PCI device assigned to a QEMU guest using vfio-pci without a VGA device present. The first 1M of guest address space is mapped with various combinations of 4K pages, but eventually the range is entirely freed and replaced with a 2M contiguous mapping. intel-iommu errors out with something like:
ERROR: DMA PTE for vPFN 0x0 already set (to 5c2b8003 not 849c00083)
In this case 5c2b8003 is the pointer to the previous leaf page that was neither freed nor cleared and 849c00083 is the superpage entry that we're trying to replace it with.
--- drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c +1 -1
@@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ static void dma_pte_free_level(struct dm/* If range covers entire pagetable, free it */ if (!(start_pfn > level_pfn || - last_pfn < level_pfn +level_size (level))) { + last_pfn < level_pfn +level_size (level) -1 )) {dma_clear_pte (pte);domain_flush_cache (domain, pte,sizeof (*pte));free_pgtable_page (level_pte);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 3/30 audit: correct a type mismatch in audit_syscall_exit()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: AKASHI Takahiro <[email protected]>
commit 06bdadd7634551cfe8ce071fe44d0311b3033d9e upstream.
audit_syscall_exit() saves a result of regs_return_value() in intermediate "int" variable and passes it to __audit_syscall_exit(), which expects its second argument as a "long" value. This will result in truncating the value returned by a system call and making a wrong audit record.
I don't know why gcc compiler doesn't complain about this, but anyway it causes a problem at runtime on arm64 (and probably most 64-bit archs).
--- include/linux/audit.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/audit.h +1 -1
@@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ static inline void audit_syscall_exit(vo {if (unlikely (current->audit_context)) {int success =is_syscall_success (pt_regs); -int return_code =regs_return_value (pt_regs); +long return_code =regs_return_value (pt_regs);__audit_syscall_exit (success, return_code); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 4/30 mmc: atmel-mci: fix timeout errors in SDIO mode when using DMA
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ludovic Desroches <[email protected]>
commit 66b512eda74d59b17eac04c4da1b38d82059e6c9 upstream.
With some SDIO devices, timeout errors can happen when reading data. To solve this issue, the DMA transfer has to be activated before sending the command to the device. This order is incorrect in PDC mode. So we have to take care if we are using DMA or PDC to know when to send the MMC command.
--- drivers/mmc/host/atmel-mci.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mmc/host/atmel-mci.c +12 -1
@@ -1022,11 +1022,22 @@ static void atmci_start_request(struct a iflags |=ATMCI_CMDRDY ; cmd = mrq->cmd; cmdflags =atmci_prepare_command (slot->mmc, cmd); -atmci_send_command (host, cmd, cmdflags); + +/* +* DMA transfer should be started before sending the command to avoid +* unexpected errors especially for read operations in SDIO mode. +* Unfortunately, in PDC mode, command has to be sent before starting +* the transfer. +*/ +if (host->submit_data != &atmci_submit_data_dma) +atmci_send_command (host, cmd, cmdflags);if (data) host->submit_data (host, data); +if (host->submit_data == &atmci_submit_data_dma) +atmci_send_command (host, cmd, cmdflags); +if (mrq->stop) { host->stop_cmdr =atmci_prepare_command (slot->mmc, mrq->stop); host->stop_cmdr |=ATMCI_CMDR_STOP_XFER ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 5/30 slub: Fix calculation of cpu slabs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Li Zefan <[email protected]>
commit 8afb1474db4701d1ab80cd8251137a3260e6913e upstream.
/sys/kernel/slab/:t-0000048 # cat cpu_slabs
231 N0=16 N1=215
/sys/kernel/slab/:t-0000048 # cat slabs
145 N0=36 N1=109
See, the number of slabs is smaller than that of cpu slabs.
The bug was introduced by commit 49e2258586b423684f03c278149ab46d8f8b6700 ("slub: per cpu cache for partial pages").
We should use page->pages instead of page->pobjects when calculating the number of cpu partial slabs. This also fixes the mapping of slabs and nodes.
As there's no variable storing the number of total/active objects in cpu partial slabs, and we don't have user interfaces requiring those statistics, I just add WARN_ON for those cases.
--- mm/slub.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/slub.c +7 -1
@@ -4520,7 +4520,13 @@ static ssize_t show_slab_objects(struct page = c->partial;if (page) { - x = page->pobjects; + node =page_to_nid (page); +if (flags &SO_TOTAL ) +WARN_ON_ONCE (1 ); +else if (flags &SO_OBJECTS ) +WARN_ON_ONCE (1 ); +else + x = page->pages; total += x; nodes[node] += x; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 7/30 ACPI / init: Flag use of ACPI and ACPI idioms for power supplies to regulator API
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
commit 49a12877d2777cadcb838981c3c4f5a424aef310 upstream.
There is currently no facility in ACPI to express the hookup of voltage regulators, the expectation is that the regulators that exist in the system will be handled transparently by firmware if they need software control at all. This means that if for some reason the regulator API is enabled on such a system it should assume that any supplies that devices need are provided by the system at all relevant times without any software intervention.
Tell the regulator core to make this assumption by calling regulator_has_full_constraints(). Do this as soon as we know we are using ACPI so that the information is available to the regulator core as early as possible. This will cause the regulator core to pretend that there is an always on regulator supplying any supply that is requested but that has not otherwise been mapped which is the behaviour expected on a system with ACPI.
Should the ability to specify regulators be added in future revisions of ACPI then once we have support for ACPI mappings in the kernel the same assumptions will apply. It is also likely that systems will default to a mode of operation which does not require any interpretation of these mappings in order to be compatible with existing operating system releases so it should remain safe to make these assumptions even if the mappings exist but are not supported by the kernel.
--- drivers/acpi/bus.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
drivers/acpi/bus.c +9 -0
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@#include <linux/proc_fs.h> #include <linux/acpi.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/regulator/machine.h> #ifdef CONFIG_X86 #include <asm/mpspec.h> #endif
@@ -921,6 +922,14 @@ void __init acpi_early_init(void) goto error0; } +/* +* If the system is using ACPI then we can be reasonably +* confident that any regulators are managed by the firmware +* so tell the regulator core it has everything it needs to +* know. +*/ +regulator_has_full_constraints (); +return ; error0:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 8/30 mtd: mxc_nand: remove duplicated ecc_stats counting
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Grzeschik <[email protected]>
commit 0566477762f9e174e97af347ee9c865f908a5647 upstream.
The ecc_stats.corrected count variable will already be incremented in the above framework-layer just after this callback.
--- drivers/mtd/nand/mxc_nand.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mtd/nand/mxc_nand.c +0 -1
@@ -596,7 +596,6 @@ static int mxc_nand_correct_data_v2_v3(s ecc_stat >>=4 ; }while (--no_subpages); - mtd->ecc_stats.corrected += ret;pr_debug ("%d Symbol Correctable RS-ECC Error\n" , ret);return ret;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 9/30 ore: Fix wrong math in allocation of per device BIO
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Boaz Harrosh <[email protected]>
commit aad560b7f63b495f48a7232fd086c5913a676e6f upstream.
At IO preparation we calculate the max pages at each device and allocate a BIO per device of that size. The calculation was wrong on some unaligned corner cases offset/length combination and would make prepare return with -ENOMEM. This would be bad for pnfs-objects that would in that case IO through MDS. And fatal for exofs were it would fail writes with EIO.
Fix it by doing the proper math, that will work in all cases. (I ran a test with all possible offset/length combinations this time round).
Also when reading we do not need to allocate for the parity units since we jump over them.
Also lower the max_io_length to take into account the parity pages so not to allocate BIOs bigger than PAGE_SIZE
--- fs/exofs/ore.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ include/scsi/osd_ore.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
fs/exofs/ore.c +25 -12
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ int ore_verify_layout(unsigned total_com layout->max_io_length = (BIO_MAX_PAGES_KMALLOC *PAGE_SIZE - layout->stripe_unit) * - layout->group_width; + (layout->group_width - layout->parity);if (layout->parity) {unsigned stripe_length = (layout->group_width - layout->parity) *
@@ -286,7 +286,8 @@ int ore_get_rw_state(struct ore_layoutif (length) {ore_calc_stripe_info (layout, offset, length, &ios->si); ios->length = ios->si.length; - ios->nr_pages = (ios->length +PAGE_SIZE -1 ) /PAGE_SIZE ; + ios->nr_pages = ((ios->offset & (PAGE_SIZE -1 )) + + ios->length +PAGE_SIZE -1 ) /PAGE_SIZE ;if (layout->parity)_ore_post_alloc_raid_stuff (ios); }
@@ -536,6 +537,7 @@ void ore_calc_stripe_info(struct ore_layu64 H = LmodS -G *T ;u32 N =div_u64 (H ,U ); +u32 Nlast;/* "H - (N * U)" is just "H % U" so it's bound to u32 */ u32 C = (u32)(H - (N *U )) / stripe_unit +G * group_width;
@@ -568,6 +570,10 @@ void ore_calc_stripe_info(struct ore_lay si->length =T -H ;if (si->length > length) si->length = length; + + Nlast =div_u64 (H + si->length +U -1 ,U ); + si->maxdevUnits = Nlast -N ; + si->M =M ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (ore_calc_stripe_info);
@@ -583,13 +589,16 @@ int _ore_add_stripe_unit(struct ore_io_sint ret;if (per_dev->bio ==NULL ) { -unsigned pages_in_stripe = ios->layout->group_width * - (ios->layout->stripe_unit /PAGE_SIZE ); -unsigned nr_pages = ios->nr_pages * ios->layout->group_width / - (ios->layout->group_width - - ios->layout->parity); -unsigned bio_size = (nr_pages + pages_in_stripe) / - ios->layout->group_width; +unsigned bio_size; + +if (!ios->reading) { + bio_size = ios->si.maxdevUnits; + }else { + bio_size = (ios->si.maxdevUnits +1 ) * + (ios->layout->group_width - ios->layout->parity) / + ios->layout->group_width; + } + bio_size *= (ios->layout->stripe_unit /PAGE_SIZE ); per_dev->bio =bio_kmalloc (GFP_KERNEL , bio_size);if (unlikely (!per_dev->bio)) {
@@ -609,8 +618,12 @@ int _ore_add_stripe_unit(struct ore_io_s added_len =bio_add_pc_page (q, per_dev->bio, pages[pg], pglen, pgbase);if (unlikely (pglen != added_len)) { -ORE_DBGMSG ("Failed bio_add_pc_page bi_vcnt=%u\n" , - per_dev->bio->bi_vcnt); +/* If bi_vcnt == bi_max then this is a SW BUG */ +ORE_DBGMSG ("Failed bio_add_pc_page bi_vcnt=0x%x " +"bi_max=0x%x BIO_MAX=0x%x cur_len=0x%x\n" , + per_dev->bio->bi_vcnt, + per_dev->bio->bi_max_vecs, +BIO_MAX_PAGES_KMALLOC , cur_len); ret = -ENOMEM ; goto out; }
@@ -1099,7 +1112,7 @@ int ore_truncate(struct ore_layout *layo size_attr->attr = g_attr_logical_length; size_attr->attr.val_ptr = &size_attr->newsize; -ORE_DBGMSG ("trunc(0x%llx) obj_offset=0x%llx dev=%d\n" , +ORE_DBGMSG2 ("trunc(0x%llx) obj_offset=0x%llx dev=%d\n" ,_LLU (oc->comps->obj.id),_LLU (obj_size), i); ret =_truncate_mirrors (ios, i * ios->layout->mirrors_p1, &size_attr->attr);
include/scsi/osd_ore.h +1 -0
@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ struct ore_striping_info {unsigned unit_off;unsigned cur_pg;unsigned cur_comp; +unsigned maxdevUnits; };struct ore_io_state ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 10/30 IB/qib: Fix QP check when looping back to/from QP1
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>
commit 6e0ea9e6cbcead7fa8c76e3e3b9de4a50c5131c5 upstream.
The GSI QP type is compatible with and should be allowed to send data to/from any UD QP. This was found when testing ibacm on the same node as an SA.
--- drivers/infiniband/hw/qib/qib_ud.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/infiniband/hw/qib/qib_ud.c +8 -1
@@ -57,13 +57,20 @@ static void qib_ud_loopback(struct qib_qstruct qib_sge *sge;struct ib_wc wc;u32 length; +enum ib_qp_type sqptype, dqptype; qp =qib_lookup_qpn (ibp, swqe->wr.wr.ud.remote_qpn);if (!qp) { ibp->n_pkt_drops++;return ; } -if (qp->ibqp.qp_type != sqp->ibqp.qp_type || + + sqptype = sqp->ibqp.qp_type ==IB_QPT_GSI ? +IB_QPT_UD : sqp->ibqp.qp_type; + dqptype = qp->ibqp.qp_type ==IB_QPT_GSI ? +IB_QPT_UD : qp->ibqp.qp_type; + +if (dqptype != sqptype || !(ib_qib_state_ops[qp->state] &QIB_PROCESS_RECV_OK )) { ibp->n_pkt_drops++; goto drop;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 11/30 spidev: fix hang when transfer_one_message fails
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daniel Santos <[email protected]>
commit e120cc0dcf2880a4c5c0a6cb27b655600a1cfa1d upstream.
This corrects a problem in spi_pump_messages() that leads to an spi message hanging forever when a call to transfer_one_message() fails. This failure occurs in my MCP2210 driver when the cs_change bit is set on the last transfer in a message, an operation which the hardware does not support.
Rationale
Since the transfer_one_message() returns an int, we must presume that it may fail. If transfer_one_message() should never fail, it should return void. Thus, calls to transfer_one_message() should properly manage a failure.
--- drivers/spi/spi.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/spi/spi.c +3 -1
@@ -572,7 +572,9 @@ static void spi_pump_messages(struct kth ret = master->transfer_one_message (master, master->cur_msg);if (ret) {dev_err (&master->dev, -"failed to transfer one message from queue\n" ); +"failed to transfer one message from queue: %d\n" , ret); + master->cur_msg->status = ret; +spi_finalize_current_message (master);return ; } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 12/30 NFSv4: OPEN must handle the NFS4ERR_IO return code correctly
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
commit c7848f69ec4a8c03732cde5c949bd2aa711a9f4b upstream.
decode_op_hdr() cannot distinguish between an XDR decoding error and the perfectly valid errorcode NFS4ERR_IO. This is normally not a problem, but for the particular case of OPEN, we need to be able to increment the NFSv4 open sequence id when the server returns a valid response.
--- fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c +31 -16
@@ -2955,7 +2955,8 @@ out_overflow:return -EIO ; } -static int decode_op_hdr (struct xdr_stream *xdr,enum nfs_opnum4 expected) +static bool __decode_op_hdr (struct xdr_stream *xdr,enum nfs_opnum4 expected, +int *nfs_retval) {__be32 *p;uint32_t opnum;
@@ -2965,19 +2966,32 @@ static int decode_op_hdr(struct xdr_streif (unlikely (!p)) goto out_overflow; opnum =be32_to_cpup (p++); -if (opnum != expected) { -dprintk ("nfs: Server returned operation" -" %d but we issued a request for %d\n" , - opnum, expected); -return -EIO ; - } +if (unlikely (opnum != expected)) + goto out_bad_operation; nfserr =be32_to_cpup (p); -if (nfserr !=NFS_OK ) -return nfs4_stat_to_errno (nfserr); -return 0 ; +if (nfserr ==NFS_OK ) + *nfs_retval =0 ; +else + *nfs_retval =nfs4_stat_to_errno (nfserr); +return true; +out_bad_operation: +dprintk ("nfs: Server returned operation" +" %d but we issued a request for %d\n" , + opnum, expected); + *nfs_retval = -EREMOTEIO ; +return false; out_overflow:print_overflow_msg (__func__, xdr); -return -EIO ; + *nfs_retval = -EIO ; +return false; +} + +static int decode_op_hdr (struct xdr_stream *xdr,enum nfs_opnum4 expected) +{ +int retval; + +__decode_op_hdr (xdr, expected, &retval); +return retval; }/* Dummy routine */
@@ -4680,11 +4694,12 @@ static int decode_open(struct xdr_streamuint32_t savewords, bmlen, i;int status; - status =decode_op_hdr (xdr,OP_OPEN ); -if (status != -EIO ) -nfs_increment_open_seqid (status, res->seqid); -if (!status) - status =decode_stateid (xdr, &res->stateid); +if (!__decode_op_hdr (xdr,OP_OPEN , &status)) +return status; +nfs_increment_open_seqid (status, res->seqid); +if (status) +return status; + status =decode_stateid (xdr, &res->stateid);if (unlikely (status))return status;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 13/30 nfs4.1: properly handle ENOTSUP in SECINFO_NO_NAME
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Weston Andros Adamson <[email protected]>
commit 78b19bae0813bd6f921ca58490196abd101297bd upstream.
Don't check for -NFS4ERR_NOTSUPP, it's already been mapped to -ENOTSUPP by nfs4_stat_to_errno.
This allows the client to mount v4.1 servers that don't support SECINFO_NO_NAME by falling back to the "guess and check" method of nfs4_find_root_sec.
--- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +2 -2
@@ -6394,7 +6394,7 @@ nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_seswitch (err) {case 0 :case -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC : -case -NFS4ERR_NOTSUPP : +case -ENOTSUPP : goto out;default : err =nfs4_handle_exception (server, err, &exception);
@@ -6426,7 +6426,7 @@ nfs41_find_root_sec(struct nfs_server *s* Fall back on "guess and check" method if * the server doesn't support SECINFO_NO_NAME */ -if (err == -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC || err == -NFS4ERR_NOTSUPP ) { +if (err == -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC || err == -ENOTSUPP ) { err =nfs4_find_root_sec (server, fhandle, info); goto out_freepage; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 14/30 sunrpc: Fix infinite loop in RPC state machine
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Weston Andros Adamson <[email protected]>
commit 6ff33b7dd0228b7d7ed44791bbbc98b03fd15d9d upstream.
When a task enters call_refreshresult with status 0 from call_refresh and !rpcauth_uptodatecred(task) it enters call_refresh again with no rate-limiting or max number of retries.
Instead of trying forever, make use of the retry path that other errors use.
This only seems to be possible when the crrefresh callback is gss_refresh_null, which only happens when destroying the context.
To reproduce:
1) mount with sec=krb5 (or sec=sys with krb5 negotiated for non FSID specific operations).
2) reboot - the client will be stuck and will need to be hard rebooted
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 22s! [kworker/0:2:46] Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4 nfs fscache ppdev crc32c_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 glue_helper lrw gf128mul ablk_helper cryptd serio_raw i2c_piix4 i2c_core e1000 parport_pc parport shpchp nfsd auth_rpcgss oid_registry exportfs nfs_acl lockd sunrpc autofs4 mptspi scsi_transport_spi mptscsih mptbase ata_generic floppy irq event stamp: 195724 hardirqs last enabled at (195723): [<ffffffff814a925c>] restore_args+0x0/0x30 hardirqs last disabled at (195724): [<ffffffff814b0a6a>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x6a/0x80 softirqs last enabled at (195722): [<ffffffff8103f583>] __do_softirq+0x1df/0x276 softirqs last disabled at (195717): [<ffffffff8103f852>] irq_exit+0x53/0x9a CPU: 0 PID: 46 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 3.13.0-rc3-branch-dros_testing+ #4 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 07/31/2013 Workqueue: rpciod rpc_async_schedule [sunrpc] task: ffff8800799c4260 ti: ffff880079002000 task.ti: ffff880079002000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0064fd4>] [<ffffffffa0064fd4>] __rpc_execute+0x8a/0x362 [sunrpc] RSP: 0018:ffff880079003d18 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000005 RBX: 0000000000000007 RCX: 0000000000000007 RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: ffff88007aecbae8 RDI: ffff8800783d8900 RBP: ffff880079003d78 R08: ffff88006e30e9f8 R09: ffffffffa005a3d7 R10: ffff88006e30e7b0 R11: ffff8800783d8900 R12: ffffffffa006675e R13: ffff880079003ce8 R14: ffff88006e30e7b0 R15: ffff8800783d8900 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88007f200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f3072333000 CR3: 0000000001a0b000 CR4: 00000000001407f0 Stack: ffff880079003d98 0000000000000246 0000000000000000 ffff88007a9a4830 ffff880000000000 ffffffff81073f47 ffff88007f212b00 ffff8800799c4260 ffff8800783d8988 ffff88007f212b00 ffffe8ffff604800 0000000000000000 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81073f47>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x145/0x1a1 [<ffffffffa00652d3>] rpc_async_schedule+0x27/0x32 [sunrpc] [<ffffffff81052974>] process_one_work+0x211/0x3a5 [<ffffffff810528d5>] ? process_one_work+0x172/0x3a5 [<ffffffff81052eeb>] worker_thread+0x134/0x202 [<ffffffff81052db7>] ? rescuer_thread+0x280/0x280 [<ffffffff81052db7>] ? rescuer_thread+0x280/0x280 [<ffffffff810584a0>] kthread+0xc9/0xd1 [<ffffffff810583d7>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x61/0x61 [<ffffffff814afd6c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 [<ffffffff810583d7>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x61/0x61 Code: e8 87 63 fd e0 c6 05 10 dd 01 00 01 48 8b 43 70 4c 8d 6b 70 45 31 e4 a8 02 0f 85 d5 02 00 00 4c 8b 7b 48 48 c7 43 48 00 00 00 00 <4c> 8b 4b 50 4d 85 ff 75 0c 4d 85 c9 4d 89 cf 0f 84 32 01 00 00
And the output of "rpcdebug -m rpc -s all":
RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0) RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0) RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0 RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0 RPC: 61 call_refreshresult (status 0) RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0 RPC: 61 call_refreshresult (status 0) RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0 RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0) RPC: 61 call_refreshresult (status 0) RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0) RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0) RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0 RPC: 61 call_refreshresult (status 0) RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0) RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0 RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0) RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0 RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0 RPC: 61 call_refreshresult (status 0) RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0) RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0) RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0) RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0) RPC: 61 call_refreshresult (status 0) RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0
--- net/sunrpc/clnt.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/sunrpc/clnt.c +6 -2
@@ -1331,9 +1331,13 @@ call_refreshresult(struct rpc_task *task task->tk_action = call_refresh;switch (status) {case 0 : -if (rpcauth_uptodatecred (task)) +if (rpcauth_uptodatecred (task)) { task->tk_action = call_allocate; -return ; +return ; + } +/* Use rate-limiting and a max number of retries if refresh +* had status 0 but failed to update the cred. +*/ case -ETIMEDOUT :rpc_delay (task,3 *HZ );case -EAGAIN :
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 15/30 dm: wait until embedded kobject is released before destroying a device
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
commit be35f486108227e10fe5d96fd42fb2b344c59983 upstream.
There may be other parts of the kernel holding a reference on the dm kobject. We must wait until all references are dropped before deallocating the mapped_device structure.
The dm_kobject_release method signals that all references are dropped via completion. But dm_kobject_release doesn't free the kobject (which is embedded in the mapped_device structure).
This is the sequence of operations:
* when destroying a DM device, call kobject_put from dm_sysfs_exit
* wait until all users stop using the kobject, when it happens the release method is called
* the release method signals the completion and should return without delay
* the dm device removal code that waits on the completion continues
* the dm device removal code drops the dm_mod reference the device had
* the dm device removal code frees the mapped_device structure that contains the kobject
Using kobject this way should avoid the module unload race that was mentioned at the beginning of this thread:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/1/4/83
--- drivers/md/dm-sysfs.c | 10 +++++++++- drivers/md/dm.c | 11 +++++++++++ drivers/md/dm.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/md/dm-sysfs.c +9 -1
@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ static const struct sysfs_ops dm_sysfs_o .show = dm_attr_show, }; +static void dm_kobject_release (struct kobject *kobj) +{ +complete (dm_get_completion_from_kobject (kobj)); +} +/* * dm kobject is embedded in mapped_device structure * no need to define release function here
@@ -86,6 +91,7 @@ static const struct sysfs_ops dm_sysfs_ostatic struct kobj_type dm_ktype = { .sysfs_ops = &dm_sysfs_ops, .default_attrs = dm_attrs, + .release = dm_kobject_release, };/*
@@ -104,5 +110,7 @@ int dm_sysfs_init(struct mapped_device **/ void dm_sysfs_exit (struct mapped_device *md) { -kobject_put (dm_kobject (md)); +struct kobject *kobj =dm_kobject (md); +kobject_put (kobj); +wait_for_completion (dm_get_completion_from_kobject (kobj)); }
drivers/md/dm.c +11 -0
@@ -194,6 +194,9 @@ struct mapped_device {/* sysfs handle */ struct kobject kobj; +/* wait until the kobject is released */ +struct completion kobj_completion; +/* zero-length flush that will be cloned and submitted to targets */ struct bio flush_bio; };
@@ -1891,6 +1894,7 @@ static struct mapped_device *alloc_dev(iinit_waitqueue_head (&md->wait);INIT_WORK (&md->work, dm_wq_work);init_waitqueue_head (&md->eventq); +init_completion (&md->kobj_completion); md->disk->major = _major; md->disk->first_minor = minor;
@@ -2705,6 +2709,13 @@ struct mapped_device *dm_get_from_kobjecreturn md; } +struct completion *dm_get_completion_from_kobject (struct kobject *kobj) +{ + struct mapped_device *md = container_of(kobj, struct mapped_device, kobj); + +return &md->kobj_completion; +} +int dm_suspended_md (struct mapped_device *md) {return test_bit (DMF_SUSPENDED , &md->flags);
drivers/md/dm.h +2 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@#include <linux/list.h> #include <linux/blkdev.h> #include <linux/hdreg.h> +#include <linux/completion.h> /* * Suspend feature flags
@@ -123,6 +124,7 @@ int dm_sysfs_init(struct mapped_device *void dm_sysfs_exit (struct mapped_device *md);struct kobject *dm_kobject (struct mapped_device *md);struct mapped_device *dm_get_from_kobject (struct kobject *kobj); +struct completion *dm_get_completion_from_kobject (struct kobject *kobj);/* * Targets for linear and striped mappings
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 16/30 dm space map common: make sure new space is used during extend
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Joe Thornber <[email protected]>
commit 12c91a5c2d2a8e8cc40a9552313e1e7b0a2d9ee3 upstream.
When extending a low level space map we should update nr_blocks at the start so the new space is used for the index entries.
Otherwise extend can fail, e.g.: sm_metadata_extend call sequence that fails:
-> sm_ll_extend
-> dm_tm_new_block -> dm_sm_new_block -> sm_bootstrap_new_block
=> returns -ENOSPC because smm->begin == smm->ll.nr_blocks--- drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-common.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-common.c +5 -1
@@ -244,6 +244,10 @@ int sm_ll_extend(struct ll_disk *ll, dm_return -EINVAL ; } +/* +* We need to set this before the dm_tm_new_block() call below. +*/ + ll->nr_blocks = nr_blocks;for (i = old_blocks; i < blocks; i++) {struct dm_block *b;struct disk_index_entry idx;
@@ -251,6 +255,7 @@ int sm_ll_extend(struct ll_disk *ll, dm_ r =dm_tm_new_block (ll->tm, &dm_sm_bitmap_validator, &b);if (r <0 )return r; + idx.blocknr =cpu_to_le64 (dm_block_location (b)); r =dm_tm_unlock (ll->tm, b);
@@ -265,7 +270,6 @@ int sm_ll_extend(struct ll_disk *ll, dm_return r; } - ll->nr_blocks = nr_blocks;return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 20/30 drm/radeon: set the full cache bit for fences on r7xx+
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
commit d45b964a22cad962d3ede1eba8d24f5cee7b2a92 upstream.
Needed to properly flush the read caches for fences.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/r600.c | 13 +++++++------ drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/r600d.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/r600.c +7 -6
@@ -2313,14 +2313,17 @@ void r600_fence_ring_emit(struct radeon_ struct radeon_fence *fence) {struct radeon_ring *ring = &rdev->ring[fence->ring]; +u32 cp_coher_cntl =PACKET3_TC_ACTION_ENA |PACKET3_VC_ACTION_ENA | +PACKET3_SH_ACTION_ENA ; + +if (rdev->family >=CHIP_RV770 ) + cp_coher_cntl |=PACKET3_FULL_CACHE_ENA ;if (rdev->wb.use_event) {u64 addr = rdev->fence_drv[fence->ring].gpu_addr;/* flush read cache over gart */ radeon_ring_write (ring,PACKET3 (PACKET3_SURFACE_SYNC ,3 )); -radeon_ring_write (ring,PACKET3_TC_ACTION_ENA | -PACKET3_VC_ACTION_ENA | -PACKET3_SH_ACTION_ENA ); +radeon_ring_write (ring, cp_coher_cntl);radeon_ring_write (ring,0xFFFFFFFF );radeon_ring_write (ring,0 );radeon_ring_write (ring,10 );/* poll interval */
@@ -2334,9 +2337,7 @@ void r600_fence_ring_emit(struct radeon_ }else {/* flush read cache over gart */ radeon_ring_write (ring,PACKET3 (PACKET3_SURFACE_SYNC ,3 )); -radeon_ring_write (ring,PACKET3_TC_ACTION_ENA | -PACKET3_VC_ACTION_ENA | -PACKET3_SH_ACTION_ENA ); +radeon_ring_write (ring, cp_coher_cntl);radeon_ring_write (ring,0xFFFFFFFF );radeon_ring_write (ring,0 );radeon_ring_write (ring,10 );/* poll interval */
drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/r600d.h +1 -0
@@ -873,6 +873,7 @@#define PACKET3_INDIRECT_BUFFER 0x32#define PACKET3_SURFACE_SYNC 0x43# define PACKET3_CB0_DEST_BASE_ENA (1 << 6) +# define PACKET3_FULL_CACHE_ENA (1 << 20)/* r7xx+ only */ # define PACKET3_TC_ACTION_ENA (1 << 23)# define PACKET3_VC_ACTION_ENA (1 << 24)# define PACKET3_CB_ACTION_ENA (1 << 25)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 21/30 drm/radeon/DCE4+: clear bios scratch dpms bit (v2)
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
commit 6802d4bad83f50081b2788698570218aaff8d10e upstream.
The BlankCrtc table in some DCE8 boards has some logic shortcuts for the vbios when this bit is set. Clear it for driver use.
v2: fix typo
Bug:
https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=73420
--- drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_atombios.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_atombios.c +4 -0
@@ -2785,6 +2785,10 @@ void radeon_atom_initialize_bios_scratch/* tell the bios not to handle mode switching */ bios_6_scratch |=ATOM_S6_ACC_BLOCK_DISPLAY_SWITCH ; +/* clear the vbios dpms state */ +if (ASIC_IS_DCE4 (rdev)) + bios_2_scratch &= ~ATOM_S2_DEVICE_DPMS_STATE ; +if (rdev->family >=CHIP_R600 ) {WREG32 (R600_BIOS_2_SCRATCH , bios_2_scratch);WREG32 (R600_BIOS_6_SCRATCH , bios_6_scratch);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 22/30 PCI: Enable ARI if dev and upstream bridge support it; disable otherwise
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yijing Wang <[email protected]>
commit b0cc6020e1cc62f1253215f189611b34be4a83c7 upstream.
Currently, we enable ARI in a device's upstream bridge if the bridge and the device support it. But we never disable ARI, even if the device is removed and replaced with a device that doesn't support ARI.
This means that if we hot-remove an ARI device and replace it with a non-ARI multi-function device, we find only function 0 of the new device because the upstream bridge still has ARI enabled, and next_ari_fn() only returns function 0 for the new non-ARI device.
This patch disables ARI in the upstream bridge if the device doesn't support ARI. See the PCIe spec, r3.0, sec 6.13.
--- drivers/pci/pci.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/pci/pci.c +7 -7
@@ -1984,10 +1984,6 @@ void pci_enable_ari(struct pci_dev *dev)if (pcie_ari_disabled || !pci_is_pcie (dev) || dev->devfn)return ; - pos =pci_find_ext_capability (dev,PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_ARI ); -if (!pos) -return ; - bridge = dev->bus->self;if (!bridge || !pci_is_pcie (bridge))return ;
@@ -2006,10 +2002,14 @@ void pci_enable_ari(struct pci_dev *dev)return ;pci_read_config_word (bridge, pos +PCI_EXP_DEVCTL2 , &ctrl); - ctrl |=PCI_EXP_DEVCTL2_ARI ; +if (pci_find_ext_capability (dev,PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_ARI )) { + ctrl |=PCI_EXP_DEVCTL2_ARI ; + bridge->ari_enabled =1 ; + }else { + ctrl &= ~PCI_EXP_DEVCTL2_ARI ; + bridge->ari_enabled =0 ; + }pci_write_config_word (bridge, pos +PCI_EXP_DEVCTL2 , ctrl); - - bridge->ari_enabled =1 ; }/**
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 23/30 hpfs: deadlock and race in directory lseek()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
commit 31abdab9c11bb1694ecd1476a7edbe8e964d94ac upstream.
For one thing, there's an ABBA deadlock on hpfs fs-wide lock and i_mutex in hpfs_dir_lseek() - there's a lot of methods that grab the former with the caller already holding the latter, so it must take i_mutex first.
For another, locking the damn thing, carefully validating the offset, then dropping locks and assigning the offset is obviously racy.
Moreover, we _must_ do hpfs_add_pos(), or the machinery in dnode.c won't modify the sucker on B-tree surgeries.
--- fs/hpfs/dir.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/hpfs/dir.c +6 -4
@@ -33,25 +33,27 @@ static loff_t hpfs_dir_lseek(struct fileif (whence ==SEEK_DATA || whence ==SEEK_HOLE )return -EINVAL ; +mutex_lock (&i->i_mutex);hpfs_lock (s);/*printk("dir lseek\n");*/ if (new_off ==0 || new_off ==1 || new_off ==11 || new_off ==12 || new_off ==13 ) goto ok; -mutex_lock (&i->i_mutex); pos = ((loff_t )hpfs_de_as_down_as_possible (s, hpfs_inode->i_dno) <<4 ) +1 ;while (pos != new_off) {if (map_pos_dirent (i, &pos, &qbh))hpfs_brelse4 (&qbh);else goto fail;if (pos ==12 ) goto fail; } -mutex_unlock (&i->i_mutex); +hpfs_add_pos (i, &filp->f_pos); ok: + filp->f_pos = new_off;hpfs_unlock (s); -return filp->f_pos = new_off; -fail:mutex_unlock (&i->i_mutex); +return new_off; +fail:/*printk("illegal lseek: %016llx\n", new_off);*/ hpfs_unlock (s); +mutex_unlock (&i->i_mutex);return -ESPIPE ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 24/30 sched/rt: Fix SCHED_RR across cgroups
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Colin Cross <[email protected]>
commit 454c79999f7eaedcdf4c15c449e43902980cbdf5 upstream.
task_tick_rt() has an optimization to only reschedule SCHED_RR tasks if they were the only element on their rq. However, with cgroups a SCHED_RR task could be the only element on its per-cgroup rq but still be competing with other SCHED_RR tasks in its parent's cgroup. In this case, the SCHED_RR task in the child cgroup would never yield at the end of its timeslice. If the child cgroup rt_runtime_us was the same as the parent cgroup rt_runtime_us, the task in the parent cgroup would starve completely.
Modify task_tick_rt() to check that the task is the only task on its rq, and that the each of the scheduling entities of its ancestors is also the only entity on its rq.
--- kernel/sched/rt.c | 15 ++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
kernel/sched/rt.c +10 -5
@@ -1997,6 +1997,8 @@ static void watchdog(struct rq *rq, strustatic void task_tick_rt (struct rq *rq,struct task_struct *p,int queued) { +struct sched_rt_entity *rt_se = &p->rt; +update_curr_rt (rq);watchdog (rq, p);
@@ -2014,12 +2016,15 @@ static void task_tick_rt(struct rq *rq, p->rt.time_slice =RR_TIMESLICE ;/* -* Requeue to the end of queue if we are not the only element -* on the queue: +* Requeue to the end of queue if we (and all of our ancestors) are the +* only element on the queue */ -if (p->rt.run_list.prev != p->rt.run_list.next) { -requeue_task_rt (rq, p,0 ); -set_tsk_need_resched (p); +for_each_sched_rt_entity (rt_se) { +if (rt_se->run_list.prev != rt_se->run_list.next) { +requeue_task_rt (rq, p,0 ); +set_tsk_need_resched (p); +return ; + } } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 25/30 sched,rt: fix isolated CPUs leaving root_task_group indefinitely throttled
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
commit e221d028bb08b47e624c5f0a31732c642db9d19a upstream.
Root task group bandwidth replenishment must service all CPUs, regardless of where the timer was last started, and regardless of the isolation mechanism, lest 'Quoth the Raven, "Nevermore"' become rt scheduling policy.
--- kernel/sched/rt.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
kernel/sched/rt.c +13 -0
@@ -782,6 +782,19 @@ static int do_sched_rt_period_timer(struconst struct cpumask *span; span =sched_rt_period_mask (); +#ifdef CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED +/* +* FIXME: isolated CPUs should really leave the root task group, +* whether they are isolcpus or were isolated via cpusets, lest +* the timer run on a CPU which does not service all runqueues, +* potentially leaving other CPUs indefinitely throttled. If +* isolation is really required, the user will turn the throttle +* off to kill the perturbations it causes anyway. Meanwhile, +* this maintains functionality for boot and/or troubleshooting. +*/ +if (rt_b == &root_task_group.rt_bandwidth) + span = cpu_online_mask; +#endif for_each_cpu (i, span) {int enqueue =0 ;struct rt_rq *rt_rq =sched_rt_period_rt_rq (rt_b, i);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 26/30 sched: Unthrottle rt runqueues in __disable_runtime()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Peter Boonstoppel <[email protected]>
commit a4c96ae319b8047f62dedbe1eac79e321c185749 upstream.
migrate_tasks() uses _pick_next_task_rt() to get tasks from the real-time runqueues to be migrated. When rt_rq is throttled _pick_next_task_rt() won't return anything, in which case migrate_tasks() can't move all threads over and gets stuck in an infinite loop.
Instead unthrottle rt runqueues before migrating tasks.
Additionally: move unthrottle_offline_cfs_rqs() to rq_offline_fair()
--- kernel/sched/core.c | 3 --- kernel/sched/fair.c | 7 +++++-- kernel/sched/rt.c | 1 + kernel/sched/sched.h | 1 - 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
kernel/sched/core.c +0 -3
@@ -5301,9 +5301,6 @@ static void migrate_tasks(unsigned int d*/ rq->stop =NULL ; -/* Ensure any throttled groups are reachable by pick_next_task */ -unthrottle_offline_cfs_rqs (rq); -for ( ; ; ) {/* * There's this thread running, bail when that's the only
kernel/sched/fair.c +5 -2
@@ -2071,7 +2071,7 @@ static void destroy_cfs_bandwidth(structhrtimer_cancel (&cfs_b->slack_timer); } -void unthrottle_offline_cfs_rqs (struct rq *rq) +static void unthrottle_offline_cfs_rqs (struct rq *rq) {struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq;
@@ -2125,7 +2125,7 @@ static inline struct cfs_bandwidth *tg_c return NULL; }static inline void destroy_cfs_bandwidth (struct cfs_bandwidth *cfs_b) {} -void unthrottle_offline_cfs_rqs (struct rq *rq) {} +static inline void unthrottle_offline_cfs_rqs (struct rq *rq) {}#endif /* CONFIG_CFS_BANDWIDTH */
@@ -5171,6 +5171,9 @@ static void rq_online_fair(struct rq *rqstatic void rq_offline_fair (struct rq *rq) {update_sysctl (); + +/* Ensure any throttled groups are reachable by pick_next_task */ +unthrottle_offline_cfs_rqs (rq); }#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
kernel/sched/rt.c +1 -0
@@ -685,6 +685,7 @@ balanced:* runtime - in which case borrowing doesn't make sense. */ rt_rq->rt_runtime =RUNTIME_INF ; + rt_rq->rt_throttled =0 ;raw_spin_unlock (&rt_rq->rt_runtime_lock);raw_spin_unlock (&rt_b->rt_runtime_lock); }
kernel/sched/sched.h +0 -1
@@ -1138,7 +1138,6 @@ extern void print_rt_stats(struct seq_fiextern void init_cfs_rq (struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq);extern void init_rt_rq (struct rt_rq *rt_rq,struct rq *rq); -extern void unthrottle_offline_cfs_rqs (struct rq *rq);extern void cfs_bandwidth_usage_inc (void );extern void cfs_bandwidth_usage_dec (void );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 27/30 sched/rt: Avoid updating RT entry timeout twice within one tick period
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
commit 57d2aa00dcec67afa52478730f2b524521af14fb upstream.
The issue below was found in 2.6.34-rt rather than mainline rt kernel, but the issue still exists upstream as well.
So please let me describe how it was noticed on 2.6.34-rt:
On this version, each softirq has its own thread, it means there is at least one RT FIFO task per cpu. The priority of these tasks is set to 49 by default. If user launches an RT FIFO task with priority lower than 49 of softirq RT tasks, it's possible there are two RT FIFO tasks enqueued one cpu runqueue at one moment. By current strategy of balancing RT tasks, when it comes to RT tasks, we really need to put them off to a CPU that they can run on as soon as possible. Even if it means a bit of cache line flushing, we want RT tasks to be run with the least latency.
When the user RT FIFO task which just launched before is running, the sched timer tick of the current cpu happens. In this tick period, the timeout value of the user RT task will be updated once. Subsequently, we try to wake up one softirq RT task on its local cpu. As the priority of current user RT task is lower than the softirq RT task, the current task will be preempted by the higher priority softirq RT task. Before preemption, we check to see if current can readily move to a different cpu. If so, we will reschedule to allow the RT push logic to try to move current somewhere else. Whenever the woken softirq RT task runs, it first tries to migrate the user FIFO RT task over to a cpu that is running a task of lesser priority. If migration is done, it will send a reschedule request to the found cpu by IPI interrupt. Once the target cpu responds the IPI interrupt, it will pick the migrated user RT task to preempt its current task. When the user RT task is running on the new cpu, the sched timer tick of the cpu fires. So it will tick the user RT task again. This also means the RT task timeout value will be updated again. As the migration may be done in one tick period, it means the user RT task timeout value will be updated twice within one tick.
If we set a limit on the amount of cpu time for the user RT task by setrlimit(RLIMIT_RTTIME), the SIGXCPU signal should be posted upon reaching the soft limit.
But exactly when the SIGXCPU signal should be sent depends on the RT task timeout value. In fact the timeout mechanism of sending the SIGXCPU signal assumes the RT task timeout is increased once every tick.
However, currently the timeout value may be added twice per tick. So it results in the SIGXCPU signal being sent earlier than expected.
To solve this issue, we prevent the timeout value from increasing twice within one tick time by remembering the jiffies value of last updating the timeout. As long as the RT task's jiffies is different with the global jiffies value, we allow its timeout to be updated.
--- include/linux/sched.h | 1 + kernel/sched/rt.c | 6 +++++- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/sched.h +1 -0
@@ -1237,6 +1237,7 @@ struct sched_entity {struct sched_rt_entity {struct list_head run_list;unsigned long timeout; +unsigned long watchdog_stamp;unsigned int time_slice;int nr_cpus_allowed;
kernel/sched/rt.c +5 -1
@@ -2002,7 +2002,11 @@ static void watchdog(struct rq *rq, struif (soft !=RLIM_INFINITY ) {unsigned long next; - p->rt.timeout++; +if (p->rt.watchdog_stamp != jiffies) { + p->rt.timeout++; + p->rt.watchdog_stamp = jiffies; + } + next =DIV_ROUND_UP (min (soft, hard),USEC_PER_SEC /HZ );if (p->rt.timeout > next) p->cputime_expires.sched_exp = p->se.sum_exec_runtime;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 28/30 rtc-cmos: Add an alarm disable quirk
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
commit d5a1c7e3fc38d9c7d629e1e47f32f863acbdec3d upstream.
41c7f7424259f ("rtc: Disable the alarm in the hardware (v2)") added the functionality to disable the RTC wake alarm when shutting down the box.
However, there are at least two b0rked BIOSes we know about:
https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=812592
https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=805740
where, when wakeup alarm is enabled in the BIOS, the machine reboots automatically right after shutdown, regardless of what wakeup time is programmed.
Bisecting the issue lead to this patch so disable its functionality with a DMI quirk only for those boxes.
--- drivers/rtc/rtc-cmos.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-cmos.c +51 -1
@@ -34,11 +34,11 @@#include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/platform_device.h> -#include <linux/mod_devicetable.h> #include <linux/log2.h> #include <linux/pm.h> #include <linux/of.h> #include <linux/of_platform.h> +#include <linux/dmi.h> /* this is for "generic access to PC-style RTC" using CMOS_READ/CMOS_WRITE */ #include <asm-generic/rtc.h>
@@ -377,6 +377,51 @@ static int cmos_set_alarm(struct devicereturn 0 ; } +/* +* Do not disable RTC alarm on shutdown - workaround for b0rked BIOSes. +*/ +static bool alarm_disable_quirk; + +static int __init set_alarm_disable_quirk (const struct dmi_system_id *id) +{ + alarm_disable_quirk = true; +pr_info ("rtc-cmos: BIOS has alarm-disable quirk. " ); +pr_info ("RTC alarms disabled\n" ); +return 0 ; +} + +static const struct dmi_system_id rtc_quirks[]__initconst = { +/* https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=805740 */ + { + .callback = set_alarm_disable_quirk, + .ident ="IBM Truman" , + .matches = { +DMI_MATCH (DMI_SYS_VENDOR ,"TOSHIBA" ), +DMI_MATCH (DMI_PRODUCT_NAME ,"4852570" ), + }, + }, +/* https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=812592 */ + { + .callback = set_alarm_disable_quirk, + .ident ="Gigabyte GA-990XA-UD3" , + .matches = { +DMI_MATCH (DMI_SYS_VENDOR , +"Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd." ), +DMI_MATCH (DMI_PRODUCT_NAME ,"GA-990XA-UD3" ), + }, + }, +/* http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/1604474 */ + { + .callback = set_alarm_disable_quirk, + .ident ="Toshiba Satellite L300" , + .matches = { +DMI_MATCH (DMI_SYS_VENDOR ,"TOSHIBA" ), +DMI_MATCH (DMI_PRODUCT_NAME ,"Satellite L300" ), + }, + }, + {} +}; +static int cmos_alarm_irq_enable (struct device *dev,unsigned int enabled) {struct cmos_rtc *cmos =dev_get_drvdata (dev);
@@ -385,6 +430,9 @@ static int cmos_alarm_irq_enable(structif (!is_valid_irq (cmos->irq))return -EINVAL ; +if (alarm_disable_quirk) +return 0 ; +spin_lock_irqsave (&rtc_lock, flags);if (enabled)
@@ -1166,6 +1214,8 @@ static int __init cmos_init(void) platform_driver_registered = true; } +dmi_check_system (rtc_quirks); +if (retval ==0 )return 0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 29/30 timekeeping: Avoid possible deadlock from clock_was_set_delayed
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: John Stultz <[email protected]>
commit 6fdda9a9c5db367130cf32df5d6618d08b89f46a upstream.
As part of normal operaions, the hrtimer subsystem frequently calls into the timekeeping code, creating a locking order of
hrtimer locks -> timekeeping locks
clock_was_set_delayed() was suppoed to allow us to avoid deadlocks between the timekeeping the hrtimer subsystem, so that we could notify the hrtimer subsytem the time had changed while holding the timekeeping locks. This was done by scheduling delayed work that would run later once we were out of the timekeeing code.
But unfortunately the lock chains are complex enoguh that in scheduling delayed work, we end up eventually trying to grab an hrtimer lock.
Sasha Levin noticed this in testing when the new seqlock lockdep enablement triggered the following (somewhat abrieviated) message:
[ 251.100221] ======================================================
[ 251.100221] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
[ 251.100221] 3.13.0-rc2-next-20131206-sasha-00005-g8be2375-dirty #4053 Not tainted
[ 251.101967] -------------------------------------------------------
[ 251.101967] kworker/10:1/4506 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 251.101967] (timekeeper_seq){----..}, at: [<ffffffff81160e96>] retrigger_next_event+0x56/0x70
[ 251.101967]
[ 251.101967] but task is already holding lock:
[ 251.101967] (hrtimer_bases.lock#11){-.-...}, at: [<ffffffff81160e7c>] retrigger_next_event+0x3c/0x70
[ 251.101967]
[ 251.101967] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 251.101967]
[ 251.101967]
[ 251.101967] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 251.101967]-> #5 (hrtimer_bases.lock#11){-.-...}:
[snipped]
-> #4 (&rt_b->rt_runtime_lock){-.-...}:
[snipped]
-> #3 (&rq->lock){-.-.-.}:
[snipped]
-> #2 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.-.}:
[snipped]
-> #1 (&(&pool->lock)->rlock){-.-...}:
[ 251.101967] [<ffffffff81194803>] validate_chain+0x6c3/0x7b0
[ 251.101967] [<ffffffff81194d9d>] __lock_acquire+0x4ad/0x580
[ 251.101967] [<ffffffff81194ff2>] lock_acquire+0x182/0x1d0
[ 251.101967] [<ffffffff84398500>] _raw_spin_lock+0x40/0x80
[ 251.101967] [<ffffffff81153e69>] __queue_work+0x1a9/0x3f0
[ 251.101967] [<ffffffff81154168>] queue_work_on+0x98/0x120
[ 251.101967] [<ffffffff81161351>] clock_was_set_delayed+0x21/0x30
[ 251.101967] [<ffffffff811c4bd1>] do_adjtimex+0x111/0x160
[ 251.101967] [<ffffffff811e2711>] compat_sys_adjtimex+0x41/0x70
[ 251.101967] [<ffffffff843a4b49>] ia32_sysret+0x0/0x5
[ 251.101967]
-> #0 (timekeeper_seq){----..}:
[snipped]
[ 251.101967] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 251.101967]
[ 251.101967] Chain exists of:
timekeeper_seq --> &rt_b->rt_runtime_lock --> hrtimer_bases.lock#11[ 251.101967] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 251.101967]
[ 251.101967] CPU0 CPU1
[ 251.101967] ---- ----
[ 251.101967] lock(hrtimer_bases.lock#11);
[ 251.101967] lock(&rt_b->rt_runtime_lock);
[ 251.101967] lock(hrtimer_bases.lock#11);
[ 251.101967] lock(timekeeper_seq);
[ 251.101967]
[ 251.101967] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 251.101967]
[ 251.101967] 3 locks held by kworker/10:1/4506:
[ 251.101967] #0: (events){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81154960>] process_one_work+0x200/0x530
[ 251.101967] #1: (hrtimer_work){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81154960>] process_one_work+0x200/0x530
[ 251.101967] #2: (hrtimer_bases.lock#11){-.-...}, at: [<ffffffff81160e7c>] retrigger_next_event+0x3c/0x70
[ 251.101967]
[ 251.101967] stack backtrace:
[ 251.101967] CPU: 10 PID: 4506 Comm: kworker/10:1 Not tainted 3.13.0-rc2-next-20131206-sasha-00005-g8be2375-dirty #4053
[ 251.101967] Workqueue: events clock_was_set_workSo the best solution is to avoid calling clock_was_set_delayed() while holding the timekeeping lock, and instead using a flag variable to decide if we should call clock_was_set() once we've released the locks.
This works for the case here, where the do_adjtimex() was the deadlock trigger point. Unfortuantely, in update_wall_time() we still hold the jiffies lock, which would deadlock with the ipi triggered by clock_was_set(), preventing us from calling it even after we drop the timekeeping lock. So instead call clock_was_set_delayed() at that point.
--- kernel/time/timekeeping.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
kernel/time/timekeeping.c +8 -4
@@ -988,7 +988,8 @@ static void timekeeping_adjust(s64 offse* * Returns the unconsumed cycles. */ -static cycle_t logarithmic_accumulation (cycle_t offset,int shift) +static cycle_t logarithmic_accumulation (cycle_t offset,int shift, +unsigned int *clock_set) {u64 nsecps = (u64 )NSEC_PER_SEC << timekeeper.shift;u64 raw_nsecs;
@@ -1010,7 +1011,7 @@ static cycle_t logarithmic_accumulation( timekeeper.xtime.tv_sec += leap; timekeeper.wall_to_monotonic.tv_sec -= leap;if (leap) -clock_was_set_delayed (); + *clock_set =1 ; }/* Accumulate raw time */
@@ -1042,6 +1043,7 @@ static void update_wall_time(void)struct clocksource *clock;cycle_t offset;int shift =0 , maxshift; +unsigned int clock_set =0 ;unsigned long flags;write_seqlock_irqsave (&timekeeper.lock, flags);
@@ -1077,7 +1079,7 @@ static void update_wall_time(void) maxshift = (64 - (ilog2 (ntp_tick_length ())+1 )) -1 ; shift =min (shift, maxshift);while (offset >= timekeeper.cycle_interval) { - offset =logarithmic_accumulation (offset, shift); + offset =logarithmic_accumulation (offset, shift, &clock_set);if (offset < timekeeper.cycle_interval<<shift) shift--; }
@@ -1131,7 +1133,7 @@ static void update_wall_time(void) timekeeper.xtime.tv_sec += leap; timekeeper.wall_to_monotonic.tv_sec -= leap;if (leap) -clock_was_set_delayed (); + clock_set =1 ; }timekeeping_update (false);
@@ -1139,6 +1141,8 @@ static void update_wall_time(void) out:write_sequnlock_irqrestore (&timekeeper.lock, flags); +if (clock_set) +clock_was_set_delayed (); }/**
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 30/30 3.4.y: timekeeping: fix 32-bit overflow in get_monotonic_boottime
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Colin Cross <[email protected]>
fixed upstream in v3.6 by ec145babe754f9ea1079034a108104b6001e001c
get_monotonic_boottime adds three nanonsecond values stored in longs, followed by an s64. If the long values are all close to 1e9 the first three additions can overflow and become negative when added to the s64. Cast the first value to s64 so that all additions are 64 bit.
[jstultz: Fished this out of the AOSP commong.git tree. This was fixed upstream in v3.6 by ec145babe754f9ea1079034a108104b6001e001c]
--- kernel/time/timekeeping.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/time/timekeeping.c +1 -1
@@ -1197,7 +1197,7 @@ void get_monotonic_boottime(struct times }while (read_seqretry (&timekeeper.lock, seq));set_normalized_timespec (ts, ts->tv_sec + tomono.tv_sec + sleep.tv_sec, - ts->tv_nsec + tomono.tv_nsec + sleep.tv_nsec + nsecs); + (s64 )ts->tv_nsec + tomono.tv_nsec + sleep.tv_nsec + nsecs); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (get_monotonic_boottime);
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.4.80 release. There are 30 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu Feb 13 18:46:37 UTC 2014. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Build results:
total: 119 pass: 97 skipped: 18 fail: 4
qemu tests all passed.
Results are as expected.
Details are available at http://server.roeck-us.net:8010/builders.
Guenter
Quoted 16 lines · Guenter Roeck
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.4.80 release. There are 30 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu Feb 13 18:46:37 UTC 2014. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Build results:
total: 119 pass: 97 skipped: 18 fail: 4qemu tests all passed.
Results are as expected.
Quoted 10 lines
Details are available at http://server.roeck-us.net:8010/builders.
Guenter
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Worked fine on all my test systems. Compile tests and boot tests passed. No dmesg regressions: emerg, crit, alert, err are clean. No regressions in warn.
-- Shuah
Signature · 4 lines
Shuah Khan Senior Linux Kernel Developer - Open Source Group Samsung Research America(Silicon Valley) [email protected] | (970) 672-0658