s390 bug fixes for the 3.14-rc5
Hi Linus,
please pull from the 'for-linus' branch of
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux.git for-linus
to receive the following updates:
A couple of s390 bug fixes. The PCI segment boundary issue is a nasty one as it can lead to data corruption.
Gerald Schaefer (1):
s390/pci/dma: use correct segment boundary size
Heiko Carstens (1):
s390/compat: fix sys_sched_getattr compat wrapper
Ingo Tuchscherer (1):
s390/zcrypt: additional check to avoid overflow in msg-type 6 requests
Peter Oberparleiter (1):
s390/cio: Fix missing subchannels after CHPID configure on
arch/s390/kernel/compat_wrapper.S | 2 +- arch/s390/pci/pci_dma.c | 8 +++++--- drivers/s390/cio/chsc.c | 1 + drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/s390/kernel/compat_wrapper.S +1 -1
@@ -1421,5 +1421,5 @@ ENTRY(sys_sched_setattr_wrapper) ENTRY(sys_sched_getattr_wrapper) lgfr %r2,%r2 # pid_t llgtr %r3,%r3 # const char __user * - llgfr %r3,%r3 # unsigned int + llgfr %r4,%r4 # unsigned int jg sys_sched_getattr
arch/s390/pci/pci_dma.c +5 -3
@@ -206,11 +206,13 @@ static void dma_cleanup_tables(struct zpci_dev *zdev) zdev->dma_table =NULL ; } -static unsigned long __dma_alloc_iommu (struct zpci_dev *zdev,unsigned long start, -int size) +static unsigned long __dma_alloc_iommu (struct zpci_dev *zdev, +unsigned long start,int size) { -unsigned long boundary_size =0x1000000 ; +unsigned long boundary_size; + boundary_size =ALIGN (dma_get_seg_boundary (&zdev->pdev->dev) +1 , +PAGE_SIZE ) >>PAGE_SHIFT ;return iommu_area_alloc (zdev->iommu_bitmap, zdev->iommu_pages, start, size,0 , boundary_size,0 ); }
drivers/s390/cio/chsc.c +1 -0
@@ -610,6 +610,7 @@ void chsc_chp_online(struct chp_id chpid)css_wait_for_slow_path ();for_each_subchannel_staged (__s390_process_res_acc,NULL , &link); +css_schedule_reprobe (); } }
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c +23 -1
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ static int XCRB_msg_to_type6CPRB_msgX(struct zcrypt_device *zdev, }__packed * msg = ap_msg->message;int rcblen =CEIL4 (xcRB->request_control_blk_length); -int replylen; +int replylen, req_sumlen, resp_sumlen;char *req_data = ap_msg->message +sizeof (struct type6_hdr ) + rcblen;char *function_code;
@@ -321,12 +321,34 @@ static int XCRB_msg_to_type6CPRB_msgX(struct zcrypt_device *zdev, xcRB->request_data_length;if (ap_msg->length >MSGTYPE06_MAX_MSG_SIZE )return -EINVAL ; + +/* Overflow check +sum must be greater (or equal) than the largest operand */ + req_sumlen =CEIL4 (xcRB->request_control_blk_length) + + xcRB->request_data_length; +if ((CEIL4 (xcRB->request_control_blk_length) <= + xcRB->request_data_length) ? + (req_sumlen < xcRB->request_data_length) : + (req_sumlen <CEIL4 (xcRB->request_control_blk_length))) { +return -EINVAL ; + } + replylen =sizeof (struct type86_fmt2_msg ) +CEIL4 (xcRB->reply_control_blk_length) + xcRB->reply_data_length;if (replylen >MSGTYPE06_MAX_MSG_SIZE )return -EINVAL ; +/* Overflow check +sum must be greater (or equal) than the largest operand */ + resp_sumlen =CEIL4 (xcRB->reply_control_blk_length) + + xcRB->reply_data_length; +if ((CEIL4 (xcRB->reply_control_blk_length) <= xcRB->reply_data_length) ? + (resp_sumlen < xcRB->reply_data_length) : + (resp_sumlen <CEIL4 (xcRB->reply_control_blk_length))) { +return -EINVAL ; + } +/* prepare type6 header */ msg->hdr = static_type6_hdrX;memcpy (msg->hdr.agent_id , &(xcRB->agent_ID),sizeof (xcRB->agent_ID));