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x86, kaslr: fix module lock ordering problem

PATCH In review Kees Cook 2 participants 2 messages Mar 10, 2014 – Mar 24, 2014 x86

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Kees Cook

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 x86, kaslr: fix module lock ordering problem

There was a potential lock ordering problem with the module kASLR patch ("x86, kaslr: randomize module base load address"). This patch removes the usage of the module_mutex and creates a new mutex to protect the module base address offset value.

Chain exists of:
  text_mutex --> kprobe_insn_slots.mutex --> module_mutex
[    0.515561]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[    0.515561]
[    0.515561]        CPU0                    CPU1
[    0.515561]        ----                    ----
[    0.515561]   lock(module_mutex);
[    0.515561]                                lock(kprobe_insn_slots.mutex);
[    0.515561]                                lock(module_mutex);
[    0.515561]   lock(text_mutex);
[    0.515561]
[    0.515561]  *** DEADLOCK ***
---
 arch/x86/kernel/module.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/module.c +5 -2
index 49483137371f..e69f9882bf95 100644
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ do {							\
 static unsigned long module_load_offset;
 static int randomize_modules = 1;
 
+/* Mutex protects the module_load_offset. */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(module_kaslr_mutex);
+
 static int __init parse_nokaslr(char *p)
 {
 	randomize_modules = 0;
@@ -58,7 +61,7 @@ early_param("nokaslr", parse_nokaslr);
 static unsigned long int get_module_load_offset(void)
 {
 	if (randomize_modules) {
-		mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
+		mutex_lock(&module_kaslr_mutex);
 		/*
 		 * Calculate the module_load_offset the first time this
 		 * code is called. Once calculated it stays the same until
@@ -67,7 +70,7 @@ static unsigned long int get_module_load_offset(void)
 		if (module_load_offset == 0)
 			module_load_offset =
 				(get_random_int() % 1024 + 1) * PAGE_SIZE;
-		mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
+		mutex_unlock(&module_kaslr_mutex);
 	}
 	return module_load_offset;
 }
Signature · 6 lines
1.7.9.5


-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 19 lines · Kees Cook

There was a potential lock ordering problem with the module kASLR patch ("x86, kaslr: randomize module base load address"). This patch removes the usage of the module_mutex and creates a new mutex to protect the module base address offset value.

Chain exists of:
  text_mutex --> kprobe_insn_slots.mutex --> module_mutex
[    0.515561]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[    0.515561]
[    0.515561]        CPU0                    CPU1
[    0.515561]        ----                    ----
[    0.515561]   lock(module_mutex);
[    0.515561]                                lock(kprobe_insn_slots.mutex);
[    0.515561]                                lock(module_mutex);
[    0.515561]   lock(text_mutex);
[    0.515561]
[    0.515561]  *** DEADLOCK ***
Quoted 3 lines

Thanks for fix that ! :)

Quoted 37 lines
---
 arch/x86/kernel/module.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/module.c +5 -2
index 49483137371f..e69f9882bf95 100644
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ do {							\
 static unsigned long module_load_offset;
 static int randomize_modules = 1;
 
+/* Mutex protects the module_load_offset. */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(module_kaslr_mutex);
+
 static int __init parse_nokaslr(char *p)
 {
 	randomize_modules = 0;
@@ -58,7 +61,7 @@ early_param("nokaslr", parse_nokaslr);
 static unsigned long int get_module_load_offset(void)
 {
 	if (randomize_modules) {
-		mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
+		mutex_lock(&module_kaslr_mutex);
 		/*
 		 * Calculate the module_load_offset the first time this
 		 * code is called. Once calculated it stays the same until
@@ -67,7 +70,7 @@ static unsigned long int get_module_load_offset(void)
 		if (module_load_offset == 0)
 			module_load_offset =
 				(get_random_int() % 1024 + 1) * PAGE_SIZE;
-		mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
+		mutex_unlock(&module_kaslr_mutex);
 	}
 	return module_load_offset;
 }
Signature · 4 lines
Masami HIRAMATSU
IT Management Research Dept. Linux Technology Center
Hitachi, Ltd., Yokohama Research Laboratory
E-mail: [email protected]