3.14.1-stable review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.14.1 release. There are 23 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun Apr 13 16:11:46 UTC 2014. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/stable-review/patch-3.14.1-rc1.gz

and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 3.14.1-rc1

Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
crypto: ghash-clmulni-intel - use C implementation for setkey()

Finn Thain <[email protected]>
m68k: Skip futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() test

Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
futex: Allow architectures to skip futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() test

Vineet Gupta <[email protected]>
ARC: [nsimosci] Unbork console

Mischa Jonker <[email protected]>
ARC: [nsimosci] Change .dts to use generic 8250 UART

Eyal Shapira <[email protected]>
iwlwifi: mvm: rs: fix search cycle rules

Gilles Chanteperdrix <[email protected]>
net/at91_ether: avoid NULL pointer dereference

Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
rds: prevent dereference of a NULL device in rds_iw_laddr_check

Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
isdnloop: several buffer overflows

YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <[email protected]>
isdnloop: Validate NUL-terminated strings from user.

Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
net: vxlan: fix crash when interface is created with no group

Daniel Pieczko <[email protected]>

    Call efx_set_channels() before efx->type->dimension_resources()

Wei Liu <[email protected]>
xen-netback: disable rogue vif in kthread context

Pablo Neira <[email protected]>
netlink: don't compare the nul-termination in nla_strcmp

Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
ipv6: some ipv6 statistic counters failed to disable bh

Paul Durrant <[email protected]>
xen-netback: BUG_ON in xenvif_rx_action() not catching overflow

Paul Durrant <[email protected]>
xen-netback: worse-case estimate in xenvif_rx_action is underestimating

Paul Durrant <[email protected]>
xen-netback: remove pointless clause from if statement

Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
futex: avoid race between requeue and wake

Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
x86/efi: Make efi virtual runtime map passing more robust

Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
x86, pageattr: Export page unmapping interface

Paul Moore <[email protected]>
selinux: correctly label /proc inodes in use before the policy is loaded

Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Revert "ALSA: hda - Increment default stream numbers for AMD HDMI controllers"

-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                   |  4 +-
 arch/arc/boot/dts/nsimosci.dts             | 12 ++--
 arch/arc/configs/nsimosci_defconfig        |  1 +
 arch/m68k/Kconfig                          |  1 +
 arch/s390/Kconfig                          |  1 +
 arch/x86/crypto/ghash-clmulni-intel_asm.S  | 29 ---------
 arch/x86/crypto/ghash-clmulni-intel_glue.c | 14 ++++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h                 |  3 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h       |  2 +
 arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c                     | 44 +++++++++----
 arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c                | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_32.c             |  7 ++-
 arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c             | 32 +++++++++-
 drivers/isdn/isdnloop/isdnloop.c           | 23 ++++---
 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/at91_ether.c  |  3 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c            |  7 +++
 drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/efx.c             |  3 +-
 drivers/net/vxlan.c                        |  6 +-
 drivers/net/wireless/iwlwifi/mvm/rs.c      | 36 +++++------
 drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h           |  5 ++
 drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c        | 11 ++++
 drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c          | 49 +++++++++++++--
 include/linux/futex.h                      |  4 ++
 init/Kconfig                               |  7 +++
 kernel/futex.c                             | 42 +++++++++----
 lib/nlattr.c                               | 10 ++-
 net/ipv6/icmp.c                            |  2 +-
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c                      |  4 +-
 net/ipv6/mcast.c                           | 11 ++--
 net/ipv6/ping.c                            |  4 +-
 net/rds/iw.c                               |  3 +-
 security/selinux/hooks.c                   | 36 ++++++++---
 sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c                  |  4 +-
 33 files changed, 370 insertions(+), 149 deletions(-)

3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>

commit 8ceee72808d1ae3fb191284afc2257a2be964725 upstream.

The GHASH setkey() function uses SSE registers but fails to call kernel_fpu_begin()/kernel_fpu_end(). Instead of adding these calls, and then having to deal with the restriction that they cannot be called from interrupt context, move the setkey() implementation to the C domain.

Note that setkey() does not use any particular SSE features and is not expected to become a performance bottleneck.

---
 arch/x86/crypto/ghash-clmulni-intel_asm.S  |   29 -----------------------------
 arch/x86/crypto/ghash-clmulni-intel_glue.c |   14 +++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)

@@ -24,10 +24,6 @@
 .align 16
 .Lbswap_mask:
 	.octa 0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
-.Lpoly:
-	.octa 0xc2000000000000000000000000000001
-.Ltwo_one:
-	.octa 0x00000001000000000000000000000001
 
 #define DATA	%xmm0
 #define SHASH	%xmm1

@@ -134,28 +130,3 @@ ENTRY(clmul_ghash_update)
 .Lupdate_just_ret:
 	ret
 ENDPROC(clmul_ghash_update)
-
-/*
- * void clmul_ghash_setkey(be128 *shash, const u8 *key);
- *
- * Calculate hash_key << 1 mod poly
- */
-ENTRY(clmul_ghash_setkey)
-	movaps .Lbswap_mask, BSWAP
-	movups (%rsi), %xmm0
-	PSHUFB_XMM BSWAP %xmm0
-	movaps %xmm0, %xmm1
-	psllq $1, %xmm0
-	psrlq $63, %xmm1
-	movaps %xmm1, %xmm2
-	pslldq $8, %xmm1
-	psrldq $8, %xmm2
-	por %xmm1, %xmm0
-	# reduction
-	pshufd $0b00100100, %xmm2, %xmm1
-	pcmpeqd .Ltwo_one, %xmm1
-	pand .Lpoly, %xmm1
-	pxor %xmm1, %xmm0
-	movups %xmm0, (%rdi)
-	ret
-ENDPROC(clmul_ghash_setkey)

@@ -30,8 +30,6 @@ void clmul_ghash_mul(char *dst, const be
 void clmul_ghash_update(char *dst, const char *src, unsigned int srclen,
 			const be128 *shash);
 
-void clmul_ghash_setkey(be128 *shash, const u8 *key);
-
 struct ghash_async_ctx {
 	struct cryptd_ahash *cryptd_tfm;
 };

@@ -58,13 +56,23 @@ static int ghash_setkey(struct crypto_sh
 			const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
 {
 	struct ghash_ctx *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm);
+	be128 *x = (be128 *)key;
+	u64 a, b;
 
 	if (keylen != GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE) {
 		crypto_shash_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	clmul_ghash_setkey(&ctx->shash, key);
+	/* perform multiplication by 'x' in GF(2^128) */
+	a = be64_to_cpu(x->a);
+	b = be64_to_cpu(x->b);
+
+	ctx->shash.a = (__be64)((b << 1) | (a >> 63));
+	ctx->shash.b = (__be64)((a << 1) | (b >> 63));
+
+	if (a >> 63)
+		ctx->shash.b ^= cpu_to_be64(0xc2);
 
 	return 0;
 }

3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Finn Thain <[email protected]>

commit e571c58f313d35c56e0018470e3375ddd1fd320e upstream.

Skip the futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() test in futex_init(). It causes a fatal exception on 68030 (and presumably 68020 also).

---
 arch/m68k/Kconfig |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ config M68K
 	select FPU if MMU
 	select ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
 	select ARCH_USES_GETTIMEOFFSET if MMU && !COLDFIRE
+	select HAVE_FUTEX_CMPXCHG if MMU && FUTEX
 	select HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC
 	select MODULES_USE_ELF_REL
 	select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA

3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

This reverts commit 7546abfb8e1f9933b549f05898377e9444ee4cb2.

The commit [7546abfb: ALSA: hda - Increment default stream numbers for AMD HDMI controllers] introduced a regression where the AMD HDMI playback streams don't work properly. As the simplest fix, this patch reverts that commit.

The upstream code has been changed largely and already contains another fix (by changing the stream assignment order), this revert should be applied only to 3.14 kernel where the regression was introduced.

Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=77002

---

Greg, there is no upstream commit id due to the reason describe in the above. It's a simple revert, so please take as is.

thanks,

Takashi

 sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -297,9 +297,9 @@ enum { SDI0, SDI1, SDI2, SDI3, SDO0, SDO
 #define ULI_NUM_CAPTURE		5
 #define ULI_NUM_PLAYBACK	6
 
-/* ATI HDMI may have up to 8 playbacks and 0 capture */
+/* ATI HDMI has 1 playback and 0 capture */
 #define ATIHDMI_NUM_CAPTURE	0
-#define ATIHDMI_NUM_PLAYBACK	8
+#define ATIHDMI_NUM_PLAYBACK	1
 
 /* TERA has 4 playback and 3 capture */
 #define TERA_NUM_CAPTURE	3

3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

commit f64410ec665479d7b4b77b7519e814253ed0f686 upstream.

This patch is based on an earlier patch by Eric Paris, he describes the problem below:

"If an inode is accessed before policy load it will get placed on a
list of inodes to be initialized after policy load. After policy load we call inode_doinit() which calls inode_doinit_with_dentry() on all inodes accessed before policy load. In the case of inodes in procfs that means we'll end up at the bottom where it does:

     /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
     isec->sid = sbsec->sid;

     if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
             if (opt_dentry) {
                     isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(...)
                     rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
                                               isec->sclass,
                                               &sid);
                     if (rc)
                             goto out_unlock;
                     isec->sid = sid;
             }
     }

Since opt_dentry is null, we'll never call selinux_proc_get_sid() and will leave the inode labeled with the label on the superblock. I believe a fix would be to mimic the behavior of xattrs. Look for an alias of the inode. If it can't be found, just leave the inode uninitialized (and pick it up later) if it can be found, we should be able to call selinux_proc_get_sid() ..."

On a system exhibiting this problem, you will notice a lot of files in /proc with the generic "proc_t" type (at least the ones that were accessed early in the boot), for example:

   # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
   system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax

However, with this patch in place we see the expected result:

   # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
   system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax

---
 security/selinux/hooks.c |   36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

@@ -1418,15 +1418,33 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(stru
 		isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
 
 		if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
-			if (opt_dentry) {
-				isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
-				rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
-							  isec->sclass,
-							  &sid);
-				if (rc)
-					goto out_unlock;
-				isec->sid = sid;
-			}
+			/* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
+			 * procfs inodes */
+			if (opt_dentry)
+				/* Called from d_instantiate or
+				 * d_splice_alias. */
+				dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
+			else
+				/* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
+				 * find a dentry. */
+				dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+			/*
+			 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
+			 * before the policy is loaded.  When we load policy we
+			 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
+			 * sbsec->isec_head list.  No reason to complain as
+			 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
+			 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
+			 * could be used again by userspace.
+			 */
+			if (!dentry)
+				goto out_unlock;
+			isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+			rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, &sid);
+			dput(dentry);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out_unlock;
+			isec->sid = sid;
 		}
 		break;
 	}

3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>

commit 42a5477251f0e0f33ad5f6a95c48d685ec03191e upstream.

We will use it in efi so expose it.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h |    2 +
 arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c               |   44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

@@ -385,6 +385,8 @@ extern pte_t *lookup_address(unsigned lo
 extern phys_addr_t slow_virt_to_phys(void *__address);
 extern int kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd_t *pgd, u64 pfn, unsigned long address,
 				   unsigned numpages, unsigned long page_flags);
+void kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd(pgd_t *root, unsigned long address,
+			       unsigned numpages);
 #endif	/* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PGTABLE_DEFS_H */

3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>

commit b7b898ae0c0a82489511a1ce1b35f26215e6beb5 upstream.

Currently, running SetVirtualAddressMap() and passing the physical address of the virtual map array was working only by a lucky coincidence because the memory was present in the EFI page table too. Until Toshi went and booted this on a big HP box - the krealloc() manner of resizing the memmap we're doing did allocate from such physical addresses which were not mapped anymore and boom:

http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

One way to take care of that issue is to reimplement the krealloc thing but with pages. We start with contiguous pages of order 1, i.e. 2 pages, and when we deplete that memory (shouldn't happen all that often but you know firmware) we realloc the next power-of-two pages.

Having the pages, it is much more handy and easy to map them into the EFI page table with the already existing mapping code which we're using for building the virtual mappings.

Thanks to Toshi Kani and Matt for the great debugging help.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h     |    3 -
 arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c    |   99 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_32.c |    7 ++
 arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c |   32 ++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

@@ -130,7 +130,8 @@ extern void efi_memory_uc(u64 addr, unsi
 extern void __init efi_map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md);
 extern void __init efi_map_region_fixed(efi_memory_desc_t *md);
 extern void efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(void);
-extern void efi_setup_page_tables(void);
+extern int efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages);
+extern void efi_cleanup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages);
 extern void __init old_map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md);
 extern void __init runtime_code_page_mkexec(void);
 extern void __init efi_runtime_mkexec(void);

@@ -40,7 +40,12 @@
 static unsigned long efi_rt_eflags;
 
 void efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(void) {}
-void efi_setup_page_tables(void) {}
+void __init efi_dump_pagetable(void) {}
+int efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+void efi_cleanup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages) {}
 
 void __init efi_map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md)
 {

@@ -137,12 +137,38 @@ void efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(void)
 		sizeof(pgd_t) * num_pgds);
 }
 
-void efi_setup_page_tables(void)
+int efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
 {
+	pgd_t *pgd;
+
+	if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
+		return 0;
+
 	efi_scratch.efi_pgt = (pgd_t *)(unsigned long)real_mode_header->trampoline_pgd;
+	pgd = __va(efi_scratch.efi_pgt);
+
+	/*
+	 * It can happen that the physical address of new_memmap lands in memory
+	 * which is not mapped in the EFI page table. Therefore we need to go
+	 * and ident-map those pages containing the map before calling
+	 * phys_efi_set_virtual_address_map().
+	 */
+	if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pa_memmap, pa_memmap, num_pages, _PAGE_NX)) {
+		pr_err("Error ident-mapping new memmap (0x%lx)!\n", pa_memmap);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	efi_scratch.use_pgd = true;
+
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void efi_cleanup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
+{
+	pgd_t *pgd = (pgd_t *)__va(real_mode_header->trampoline_pgd);
 
-	if (!efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
-		efi_scratch.use_pgd = true;
+	kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pa_memmap, num_pages);
 }
 
 static void __init __map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md, u64 va)

3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

commit 69cd9eba38867a493a043bb13eb9b33cad5f1a9a upstream.

Jan Stancek reported:
"pthread_cond_broadcast/4-1.c testcase from openposix testsuite (LTP)
occasionally fails, because some threads fail to wake up.

Testcase creates 5 threads, which are all waiting on same condition. Main thread then calls pthread_cond_broadcast() without holding mutex, which calls:

      futex(uaddr1, FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PRIVATE, 1, 2147483647, uaddr2, ..)

This immediately wakes up single thread A, which unlocks mutex and tries to wake up another thread:

futex(uaddr2, FUTEX_WAKE_PRIVATE, 1)

If thread A manages to call futex_wake() before any waiters are requeued for uaddr2, no other thread is woken up"

The ordering constraints for the hash bucket waiter counting are that the waiter counts have to be incremented _before_ getting the spinlock (because the spinlock acts as part of the memory barrier), but the "requeue" operation didn't honor those rules, and nobody had even thought about that case.

This fairly simple patch just increments the waiter count for the target hash bucket (hb2) when requeing a futex before taking the locks. It then decrements them again after releasing the lock - the code that actually moves the futex(es) between hash buckets will do the additional required waiter count housekeeping.

---
 kernel/futex.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -1450,6 +1450,7 @@ retry:
 	hb2 = hash_futex(&key2);
 
 retry_private:
+	hb_waiters_inc(hb2);
 	double_lock_hb(hb1, hb2);
 
 	if (likely(cmpval != NULL)) {

@@ -1459,6 +1460,7 @@ retry_private:
 
 		if (unlikely(ret)) {
 			double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
+			hb_waiters_dec(hb2);
 
 			ret = get_user(curval, uaddr1);
 			if (ret)

@@ -1508,6 +1510,7 @@ retry_private:
 			break;
 		case -EFAULT:
 			double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
+			hb_waiters_dec(hb2);
 			put_futex_key(&key2);
 			put_futex_key(&key1);
 			ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr2);

@@ -1517,6 +1520,7 @@ retry_private:
 		case -EAGAIN:
 			/* The owner was exiting, try again. */
 			double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
+			hb_waiters_dec(hb2);
 			put_futex_key(&key2);
 			put_futex_key(&key1);
 			cond_resched();

@@ -1592,6 +1596,7 @@ retry_private:
 
 out_unlock:
 	double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
+	hb_waiters_dec(hb2);
 
 	/*
 	 * drop_futex_key_refs() must be called outside the spinlocks. During

3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paul Durrant <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0576eddf24df716d8570ef8ca11452a9f98eaab2 ]

This patch removes a test in start_new_rx_buffer() that checks whether a copy operation is less than MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET in length, since MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET is defined to be PAGE_SIZE and the only caller of start_new_rx_buffer() already limits copy operations to PAGE_SIZE or less.

---
 drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -192,8 +192,8 @@ static bool start_new_rx_buffer(int offs
 	 * into multiple copies tend to give large frags their
 	 * own buffers as before.
 	 */
-	if ((offset + size > MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET) &&
-	    (size <= MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET) && offset && !head)
+	BUG_ON(size > MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET);
+	if ((offset + size > MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET) && offset && !head)
 		return true;
 
 	return false;

3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paul Durrant <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a02eb4732cf975d7fc71b6d1a71c058c9988b949 ]

The worse-case estimate for skb ring slot usage in xenvif_rx_action() fails to take fragment page_offset into account. The page_offset does, however, affect the number of times the fragmentation code calls start_new_rx_buffer() (i.e. consume another slot) and the worse-case should assume that will always return true. This patch adds the page_offset into the DIV_ROUND_UP for each frag.

Unfortunately some frontends aggressively limit the number of requests they post into the shared ring so to avoid an estimate that is 'too' pessimal it is capped at MAX_SKB_FRAGS.

---
 drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c |   21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -493,9 +493,28 @@ static void xenvif_rx_action(struct xenv
 						PAGE_SIZE);
 		for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; i++) {
 			unsigned int size;
+			unsigned int offset;
+
 			size = skb_frag_size(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i]);
-			max_slots_needed += DIV_ROUND_UP(size, PAGE_SIZE);
+			offset = skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i].page_offset;
+
+			/* For a worse-case estimate we need to factor in
+			 * the fragment page offset as this will affect the
+			 * number of times xenvif_gop_frag_copy() will
+			 * call start_new_rx_buffer().
+			 */
+			max_slots_needed += DIV_ROUND_UP(offset + size,
+							 PAGE_SIZE);
 		}
+
+		/* To avoid the estimate becoming too pessimal for some
+		 * frontends that limit posted rx requests, cap the estimate
+		 * at MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
+		 */
+		if (max_slots_needed > MAX_SKB_FRAGS)
+			max_slots_needed = MAX_SKB_FRAGS;
+
+		/* We may need one more slot for GSO metadata */
 		if (skb_is_gso(skb) &&
 		   (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV4 ||
 		    skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV6))

3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paul Durrant <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1425c7a4e8d3d2eebf308bcbdc3fa3c1247686b4 ]

The BUG_ON to catch ring overflow in xenvif_rx_action() makes the assumption that meta_slots_used == ring slots used. This is not necessarily the case for GSO packets, because the non-prefix GSO protocol consumes one more ring slot than meta-slot for the 'extra_info'. This patch changes the test to actually check ring slots.

---
 drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c |    8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -482,6 +482,8 @@ static void xenvif_rx_action(struct xenv
 
 	while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&vif->rx_queue)) != NULL) {
 		RING_IDX max_slots_needed;
+		RING_IDX old_req_cons;
+		RING_IDX ring_slots_used;
 		int i;
 
 		/* We need a cheap worse case estimate for the number of

@@ -530,8 +532,12 @@ static void xenvif_rx_action(struct xenv
 			vif->rx_last_skb_slots = 0;
 
 		sco = (struct skb_cb_overlay *)skb->cb;
+
+		old_req_cons = vif->rx.req_cons;
 		sco->meta_slots_used = xenvif_gop_skb(skb, &npo);
-		BUG_ON(sco->meta_slots_used > max_slots_needed);
+		ring_slots_used = vif->rx.req_cons - old_req_cons;
+
+		BUG_ON(ring_slots_used > max_slots_needed);
 
 		__skb_queue_tail(&rxq, skb);
 	}

3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 43a43b6040165f7b40b5b489fe61a4cb7f8c4980 ]

After commit c15b1ccadb323ea ("ipv6: move DAD and addrconf_verify processing to workqueue") some counters are now updated in process context and thus need to disable bh before doing so, otherwise deadlocks can happen on 32-bit archs. Fabio Estevam noticed this while while mounting a NFS volume on an ARM board.

As a compensation for missing this I looked after the other *_STATS_BH and found three other calls which need updating:

1) icmp6_send: ip6_fragment -> icmpv6_send -> icmp6_send (error handling)
2) ip6_push_pending_frames: rawv6_sendmsg -> rawv6_push_pending_frames -> ... (only in case of icmp protocol with raw sockets in error handling)
3) ping6_v6_sendmsg (error handling)

---
 net/ipv6/icmp.c       |    2 +-
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c |    4 ++--
 net/ipv6/mcast.c      |   11 ++++++-----
 net/ipv6/ping.c       |    4 ++--
 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ static void icmp6_send(struct sk_buff *s
 			      np->tclass, NULL, &fl6, (struct rt6_info *)dst,
 			      MSG_DONTWAIT, np->dontfrag);
 	if (err) {
-		ICMP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTERRORS);
+		ICMP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTERRORS);
 		ip6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
 	} else {
 		err = icmpv6_push_pending_frames(sk, &fl6, &tmp_hdr,

@@ -1566,8 +1566,8 @@ int ip6_push_pending_frames(struct sock
 	if (proto == IPPROTO_ICMPV6) {
 		struct inet6_dev *idev = ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb));
 
-		ICMP6MSGOUT_INC_STATS_BH(net, idev, icmp6_hdr(skb)->icmp6_type);
-		ICMP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTMSGS);
+		ICMP6MSGOUT_INC_STATS(net, idev, icmp6_hdr(skb)->icmp6_type);
+		ICMP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTMSGS);
 	}
 
 	err = ip6_local_out(skb);

@@ -1620,11 +1620,12 @@ static void mld_sendpack(struct sk_buff
 		      dst_output);
 out:
 	if (!err) {
-		ICMP6MSGOUT_INC_STATS_BH(net, idev, ICMPV6_MLD2_REPORT);
-		ICMP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTMSGS);
-		IP6_UPD_PO_STATS_BH(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTMCAST, payload_len);
-	} else
-		IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
+		ICMP6MSGOUT_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMPV6_MLD2_REPORT);
+		ICMP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTMSGS);
+		IP6_UPD_PO_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTMCAST, payload_len);
+	} else {
+		IP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
+	}
 
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return;

@@ -182,8 +182,8 @@ int ping_v6_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb,
 			      MSG_DONTWAIT, np->dontfrag);
 
 	if (err) {
-		ICMP6_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), rt->rt6i_idev,
-				   ICMP6_MIB_OUTERRORS);
+		ICMP6_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), rt->rt6i_idev,
+				ICMP6_MIB_OUTERRORS);
 		ip6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
 	} else {
 		err = icmpv6_push_pending_frames(sk, &fl6,

3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pablo Neira <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8b7b932434f5eee495b91a2804f5b64ebb2bc835 ]

nla_strcmp compares the string length plus one, so it's implicitly including the nul-termination in the comparison.

int nla_strcmp(const struct nlattr *nla, const char *str)

 {
        int len = strlen(str) + 1;
        ...
                d = memcmp(nla_data(nla), str, len);

However, if NLA_STRING is used, userspace can send us a string without the nul-termination. This is a problem since the string comparison will not match as the last byte may be not the nul-termination.

Fix this by skipping the comparison of the nul-termination if the attribute data is nul-terminated. Suggested by Thomas Graf.

---
 lib/nlattr.c |   10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -303,9 +303,15 @@ int nla_memcmp(const struct nlattr *nla,
  */
 int nla_strcmp(const struct nlattr *nla, const char *str)
 {
-	int len = strlen(str) + 1;
-	int d = nla_len(nla) - len;
+	int len = strlen(str);
+	char *buf = nla_data(nla);
+	int attrlen = nla_len(nla);
+	int d;
 
+	if (attrlen > 0 && buf[attrlen - 1] == '\0')
+		attrlen--;
+
+	d = attrlen - len;
 	if (d == 0)
 		d = memcmp(nla_data(nla), str, len);
 

3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wei Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e9d8b2c2968499c1f96563e6522c56958d5a1d0d ]

When netback discovers frontend is sending malformed packet it will disables the interface which serves that frontend.

However disabling a network interface involving taking a mutex which cannot be done in softirq context, so we need to defer this process to kthread context.

This patch does the following:
1. introduce a flag to indicate the interface is disabled.
2. check that flag in TX path, don't do any work if it's true.
3. check that flag in RX path, turn off that interface if it's true.

The reason to disable it in RX path is because RX uses kthread. After this change the behavior of netback is still consistent -- it won't do any TX work for a rogue frontend, and the interface will be eventually turned off.

Also change a "continue" to "break" after xenvif_fatal_tx_err, as it doesn't make sense to continue processing packets if frontend is rogue.

This is a fix for XSA-90.

---
 drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h    |    5 +++++
 drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c |   11 +++++++++++
 drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c   |   16 ++++++++++++++--
 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -113,6 +113,11 @@ struct xenvif {
 	domid_t          domid;
 	unsigned int     handle;
 
+	/* Is this interface disabled? True when backend discovers
+	 * frontend is rogue.
+	 */
+	bool disabled;
+
 	/* Use NAPI for guest TX */
 	struct napi_struct napi;
 	/* When feature-split-event-channels = 0, tx_irq = rx_irq. */

@@ -62,6 +62,15 @@ static int xenvif_poll(struct napi_struc
 	struct xenvif *vif = container_of(napi, struct xenvif, napi);
 	int work_done;
 
+	/* This vif is rogue, we pretend we've there is nothing to do
+	 * for this vif to deschedule it from NAPI. But this interface
+	 * will be turned off in thread context later.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(vif->disabled)) {
+		napi_complete(napi);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	work_done = xenvif_tx_action(vif, budget);
 
 	if (work_done < budget) {

@@ -321,6 +330,8 @@ struct xenvif *xenvif_alloc(struct devic
 	vif->ip_csum = 1;
 	vif->dev = dev;
 
+	vif->disabled = false;
+
 	vif->credit_bytes = vif->remaining_credit = ~0UL;
 	vif->credit_usec  = 0UL;
 	init_timer(&vif->credit_timeout);

@@ -680,7 +680,8 @@ static void xenvif_tx_err(struct xenvif
 static void xenvif_fatal_tx_err(struct xenvif *vif)
 {
 	netdev_err(vif->dev, "fatal error; disabling device\n");
-	xenvif_carrier_off(vif);
+	vif->disabled = true;
+	xenvif_kick_thread(vif);
 }
 
 static int xenvif_count_requests(struct xenvif *vif,

@@ -1151,7 +1152,7 @@ static unsigned xenvif_tx_build_gops(str
 				   vif->tx.sring->req_prod, vif->tx.req_cons,
 				   XEN_NETIF_TX_RING_SIZE);
 			xenvif_fatal_tx_err(vif);
-			continue;
+			break;
 		}
 
 		work_to_do = RING_HAS_UNCONSUMED_REQUESTS(&vif->tx);

@@ -1573,7 +1574,18 @@ int xenvif_kthread(void *data)
 	while (!kthread_should_stop()) {
 		wait_event_interruptible(vif->wq,
 					 rx_work_todo(vif) ||
+					 vif->disabled ||
 					 kthread_should_stop());
+
+		/* This frontend is found to be rogue, disable it in
+		 * kthread context. Currently this is only set when
+		 * netback finds out frontend sends malformed packet,
+		 * but we cannot disable the interface in softirq
+		 * context so we defer it here.
+		 */
+		if (unlikely(vif->disabled && netif_carrier_ok(vif->dev)))
+			xenvif_carrier_off(vif);
+
 		if (kthread_should_stop())
 			break;
 

3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Pieczko <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 52ad762b85ed7947ec9eff6b036eb985352f6874 ]

When using the "separate_tx_channels=1" module parameter, the TX queues are initially numbered starting from the first TX-only channel number (after all the RX-only channels). efx_set_channels() renumbers the queues so that they are indexed from zero.

On EF10, the TX queues need to be relabelled in this way before calling the dimension_resources NIC type operation, otherwise the TX queue PIO buffers can be linked to the wrong VIs when using "separate_tx_channels=1".

Added comments to explain UC/WC mappings for PIO buffers

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c |    7 +++++++
 drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/efx.c  |    3 ++-
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -565,10 +565,17 @@ static int efx_ef10_dimension_resources(
 	 * several of each (in fact that's the only option if host
 	 * page size is >4K).  So we may allocate some extra VIs just
 	 * for writing PIO buffers through.
+	 *
+	 * The UC mapping contains (min_vis - 1) complete VIs and the
+	 * first half of the next VI.  Then the WC mapping begins with
+	 * the second half of this last VI.
 	 */
 	uc_mem_map_size = PAGE_ALIGN((min_vis - 1) * EFX_VI_PAGE_SIZE +
 				     ER_DZ_TX_PIOBUF);
 	if (nic_data->n_piobufs) {
+		/* pio_write_vi_base rounds down to give the number of complete
+		 * VIs inside the UC mapping.
+		 */
 		pio_write_vi_base = uc_mem_map_size / EFX_VI_PAGE_SIZE;
 		wc_mem_map_size = (PAGE_ALIGN((pio_write_vi_base +
 					       nic_data->n_piobufs) *

@@ -1603,6 +1603,8 @@ static int efx_probe_nic(struct efx_nic
 	if (rc)
 		goto fail1;
 
+	efx_set_channels(efx);
+
 	rc = efx->type->dimension_resources(efx);
 	if (rc)
 		goto fail2;

@@ -1613,7 +1615,6 @@ static int efx_probe_nic(struct efx_nic
 		efx->rx_indir_table[i] =
 			ethtool_rxfh_indir_default(i, efx->rss_spread);
 
-	efx_set_channels(efx);
 	netif_set_real_num_tx_queues(efx->net_dev, efx->n_tx_channels);
 	netif_set_real_num_rx_queues(efx->net_dev, efx->n_rx_channels);
 

3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5933a7bbb5de66482ea8aa874a7ebaf8e67603c4 ]

If the vxlan interface is created without explicit group definition, there are corner cases which may cause kernel panic.

For instance, in the following scenario:

node A:

$ ip link add dev vxlan42  address 2c:c2:60:00:10:20 type vxlan id 42
$ ip addr add dev vxlan42 10.0.0.1/24
$ ip link set up dev vxlan42
$ arp -i vxlan42 -s 10.0.0.2 2c:c2:60:00:01:02
$ bridge fdb add dev vxlan42 to 2c:c2:60:00:01:02 dst <IPv4 address>
$ ping 10.0.0.2

node B:

$ ip link add dev vxlan42 address 2c:c2:60:00:01:02 type vxlan id 42
$ ip addr add dev vxlan42 10.0.0.2/24
$ ip link set up dev vxlan42
$ arp -i vxlan42 -s 10.0.0.1 2c:c2:60:00:10:20

node B crashes:

vxlan42: 2c:c2:60:00:10:20 migrated from 4011:eca4:c0a8:6466:c0a8:6415:8e09:2118 to (invalid address)
vxlan42: 2c:c2:60:00:10:20 migrated from 4011:eca4:c0a8:6466:c0a8:6415:8e09:2118 to (invalid address)

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000046
 IP: [<ffffffff8143c459>] ip6_route_output+0x58/0x82
 PGD 7bd89067 PUD 7bd4e067 PMD 0
 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 3.14.0-rc8-hvx-xen-00019-g97a5221-dirty #154
 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
 task: ffff88007c774f50 ti: ffff88007c79c000 task.ti: ffff88007c79c000
 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8143c459>]  [<ffffffff8143c459>] ip6_route_output+0x58/0x82
 RSP: 0018:ffff88007fd03668  EFLAGS: 00010282
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff8186a000 RCX: 0000000000000040
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88007b0e4a80 RDI: ffff88007fd03754
 RBP: ffff88007fd03688 R08: ffff88007b0e4a80 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 0200000a0100000a R11: 0001002200000000 R12: ffff88007fd03740
 R13: ffff88007b0e4a80 R14: ffff88007b0e4a80 R15: ffff88007bba0c50
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
 CR2: 0000000000000046 CR3: 000000007bb60000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
 Stack:
  0000000000000000 ffff88007fd037a0 ffffffff8186a000 ffff88007fd03740
  ffff88007fd036c8 ffffffff814320bb 0000000000006e49 ffff88007b8b7360
  ffff88007bdbf200 ffff88007bcbc000 ffff88007b8b7000 ffff88007b8b7360
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>
  [<ffffffff814320bb>] ip6_dst_lookup_tail+0x2d/0xa4
  [<ffffffff814322a5>] ip6_dst_lookup+0x10/0x12
  [<ffffffff81323b4e>] vxlan_xmit_one+0x32a/0x68c
  [<ffffffff814a325a>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x12/0x14
  [<ffffffff8104c551>] ? lock_timer_base.isra.23+0x26/0x4b
  [<ffffffff8132451a>] vxlan_xmit+0x66a/0x6a8
  [<ffffffff8141a365>] ? ipt_do_table+0x35f/0x37e
  [<ffffffff81204ba2>] ? selinux_ip_postroute+0x41/0x26e
  [<ffffffff8139d0c1>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x2ce/0x3ce
  [<ffffffff8139d491>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x2d0/0x392
  [<ffffffff813b380f>] ? eth_header+0x28/0xb5
  [<ffffffff8139d569>] dev_queue_xmit+0xb/0xd
  [<ffffffff813a5aa6>] neigh_resolve_output+0x134/0x152
  [<ffffffff813db741>] ip_finish_output2+0x236/0x299
  [<ffffffff813dc074>] ip_finish_output+0x98/0x9d
  [<ffffffff813dc749>] ip_output+0x62/0x67
  [<ffffffff813da9f2>] dst_output+0xf/0x11
  [<ffffffff813dc11c>] ip_local_out+0x1b/0x1f
  [<ffffffff813dcf1b>] ip_send_skb+0x11/0x37
  [<ffffffff813dcf70>] ip_push_pending_frames+0x2f/0x33
  [<ffffffff813ff732>] icmp_push_reply+0x106/0x115
  [<ffffffff813ff9e4>] icmp_reply+0x142/0x164
  [<ffffffff813ffb3b>] icmp_echo.part.16+0x46/0x48
  [<ffffffff813c1d30>] ? nf_iterate+0x43/0x80
  [<ffffffff813d8037>] ? xfrm4_policy_check.constprop.11+0x52/0x52
  [<ffffffff813ffb62>] icmp_echo+0x25/0x27
  [<ffffffff814005f7>] icmp_rcv+0x1d2/0x20a
  [<ffffffff813d8037>] ? xfrm4_policy_check.constprop.11+0x52/0x52
  [<ffffffff813d810d>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xd6/0x14f
  [<ffffffff813d8037>] ? xfrm4_policy_check.constprop.11+0x52/0x52
  [<ffffffff813d7fde>] NF_HOOK.constprop.10+0x4c/0x53
  [<ffffffff813d82bf>] ip_local_deliver+0x4a/0x4f
  [<ffffffff813d7f7b>] ip_rcv_finish+0x253/0x26a
  [<ffffffff813d7d28>] ? inet_add_protocol+0x3e/0x3e
  [<ffffffff813d7fde>] NF_HOOK.constprop.10+0x4c/0x53
  [<ffffffff813d856a>] ip_rcv+0x2a6/0x2ec
  [<ffffffff8139a9a0>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x43e/0x478
  [<ffffffff812a346f>] ? virtqueue_poll+0x16/0x27
  [<ffffffff8139aa2f>] __netif_receive_skb+0x55/0x5a
  [<ffffffff8139aaaa>] process_backlog+0x76/0x12f
  [<ffffffff8139add8>] net_rx_action+0xa2/0x1ab
  [<ffffffff81047847>] __do_softirq+0xca/0x1d1
  [<ffffffff81047ace>] irq_exit+0x3e/0x85
  [<ffffffff8100b98b>] do_IRQ+0xa9/0xc4
  [<ffffffff814a37ad>] common_interrupt+0x6d/0x6d
  <EOI>
  [<ffffffff810378db>] ? native_safe_halt+0x6/0x8
  [<ffffffff810110c7>] default_idle+0x9/0xd
  [<ffffffff81011694>] arch_cpu_idle+0x13/0x1c
  [<ffffffff8107480d>] cpu_startup_entry+0xbc/0x137
  [<ffffffff8102e741>] start_secondary+0x1a0/0x1a5
 Code: 24 14 e8 f1 e5 01 00 31 d2 a8 32 0f 95 c2 49 8b 44 24 2c 49 0b 44 24 24 74 05 83 ca 04 eb 1c 4d 85 ed 74 17 49 8b 85 a8 02 00 00 <66> 8b 40 46 66 c1 e8 07 83 e0 07 c1 e0 03 09 c2 4c 89 e6 48 89
 RIP  [<ffffffff8143c459>] ip6_route_output+0x58/0x82
  RSP <ffff88007fd03668>
 CR2: 0000000000000046
 ---[ end trace 4612329caab37efd ]---

When vxlan interface is created without explicit group definition, the default_dst protocol family is initialiazed to AF_UNSPEC and the driver assumes IPv4 configuration. On the other side, the default_dst protocol family is used to differentiate between IPv4 and IPv6 cases and, since, AF_UNSPEC != AF_INET, the processing takes the IPv6 path.

Making the IPv4 assumption explicit by settting default_dst protocol family to AF_INET4 and preventing mixing of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in snooped fdb entries fixes the corner case crashes.

---
 drivers/net/vxlan.c |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -871,6 +871,9 @@ static int vxlan_fdb_add(struct ndmsg *n
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
+	if (vxlan->default_dst.remote_ip.sa.sa_family != ip.sa.sa_family)
+		return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+
 	spin_lock_bh(&vxlan->hash_lock);
 	err = vxlan_fdb_create(vxlan, addr, &ip, ndm->ndm_state, flags,
 			       port, vni, ifindex, ndm->ndm_flags);

@@ -2612,9 +2615,10 @@ static int vxlan_newlink(struct net *net
 	vni = nla_get_u32(data[IFLA_VXLAN_ID]);
 	dst->remote_vni = vni;
 
+	/* Unless IPv6 is explicitly requested, assume IPv4 */
+	dst->remote_ip.sa.sa_family = AF_INET;
 	if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_GROUP]) {
 		dst->remote_ip.sin.sin_addr.s_addr = nla_get_be32(data[IFLA_VXLAN_GROUP]);
-		dst->remote_ip.sa.sa_family = AF_INET;
 	} else if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_GROUP6]) {
 		if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6))
 			return -EPFNOSUPPORT;

3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 77bc6bed7121936bb2e019a8c336075f4c8eef62 ]

Return -EINVAL unless all of user-given strings are correctly NUL-terminated.

---
 drivers/isdn/isdnloop/isdnloop.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

@@ -1070,6 +1070,12 @@ isdnloop_start(isdnloop_card *card, isdn
 		return -EBUSY;
 	if (copy_from_user((char *) &sdef, (char *) sdefp, sizeof(sdef)))
 		return -EFAULT;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+		if (!memchr(sdef.num[i], 0, sizeof(sdef.num[i])))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&card->isdnloop_lock, flags);
 	switch (sdef.ptype) {
 	case ISDN_PTYPE_EURO:

3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7563487cbf865284dcd35e9ef5a95380da046737 ]

There are three buffer overflows addressed in this patch.

1) In isdnloop_fake_err() we add an 'E' to a 60 character string and then copy it into a 60 character buffer. I have made the destination buffer 64 characters and I'm changed the sprintf() to a snprintf().

2) In isdnloop_parse_cmd(), p points to a 6 characters into a 60 character buffer so we have 54 characters. The ->eazlist[] is 11 characters long. I have modified the code to return if the source buffer is too long.

3) In isdnloop_command() the cbuf[] array was 60 characters long but the max length of the string then can be up to 79 characters. I made the cbuf array 80 characters long and changed the sprintf() to snprintf(). I also removed the temporary "dial" buffer and changed it to use "p" directly.

Unfortunately, we pass the "cbuf" string from isdnloop_command() to isdnloop_writecmd() which truncates anything over 60 characters to make it fit in card->omsg[]. (It can accept values up to 255 characters so long as there is a '\n' character every 60 characters). For now I have just fixed the memory corruption bug and left the other problems in this driver alone.

---
 drivers/isdn/isdnloop/isdnloop.c |   17 +++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -518,9 +518,9 @@ static isdnloop_stat isdnloop_cmd_table[
 static void
 isdnloop_fake_err(isdnloop_card *card)
 {
-	char buf[60];
+	char buf[64];
 
-	sprintf(buf, "E%s", card->omsg);
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "E%s", card->omsg);
 	isdnloop_fake(card, buf, -1);
 	isdnloop_fake(card, "NAK", -1);
 }

@@ -903,6 +903,8 @@ isdnloop_parse_cmd(isdnloop_card *card)
 	case 7:
 		/* 0x;EAZ */
 		p += 3;
+		if (strlen(p) >= sizeof(card->eazlist[0]))
+			break;
 		strcpy(card->eazlist[ch - 1], p);
 		break;
 	case 8:

@@ -1133,7 +1135,7 @@ isdnloop_command(isdn_ctrl *c, isdnloop_
 {
 	ulong a;
 	int i;
-	char cbuf[60];
+	char cbuf[80];
 	isdn_ctrl cmd;
 	isdnloop_cdef cdef;
 

@@ -1198,7 +1200,6 @@ isdnloop_command(isdn_ctrl *c, isdnloop_
 			break;
 		if ((c->arg & 255) < ISDNLOOP_BCH) {
 			char *p;
-			char dial[50];
 			char dcode[4];
 
 			a = c->arg;

@@ -1210,10 +1211,10 @@ isdnloop_command(isdn_ctrl *c, isdnloop_
 			} else
 				/* Normal Dial */
 				strcpy(dcode, "CAL");
-			strcpy(dial, p);
-			sprintf(cbuf, "%02d;D%s_R%s,%02d,%02d,%s\n", (int) (a + 1),
-				dcode, dial, c->parm.setup.si1,
-				c->parm.setup.si2, c->parm.setup.eazmsn);
+			snprintf(cbuf, sizeof(cbuf),
+				 "%02d;D%s_R%s,%02d,%02d,%s\n", (int) (a + 1),
+				 dcode, p, c->parm.setup.si1,
+				 c->parm.setup.si2, c->parm.setup.eazmsn);
 			i = isdnloop_writecmd(cbuf, strlen(cbuf), 0, card);
 		}
 		break;

3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bf39b4247b8799935ea91d90db250ab608a58e50 ]

Binding might result in a NULL device which is later dereferenced without checking.

---
 net/rds/iw.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -239,7 +239,8 @@ static int rds_iw_laddr_check(__be32 add
 	ret = rdma_bind_addr(cm_id, (struct sockaddr *)&sin);
 	/* due to this, we will claim to support IB devices unless we
 	   check node_type. */
-	if (ret || cm_id->device->node_type != RDMA_NODE_RNIC)
+	if (ret || !cm_id->device ||
+	    cm_id->device->node_type != RDMA_NODE_RNIC)
 		ret = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
 
 	rdsdebug("addr %pI4 ret %d node type %d\n",

3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Gilles Chanteperdrix <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c293fb785bdda64d88f197e6758a3c16ae83e569 ]

The at91_ether driver calls macb_mii_init passing a 'struct macb' structure whose tx_clk member is initialized to 0. However, macb_handle_link_change() expects tx_clk to be the result of a call to clk_get, and so IS_ERR(tx_clk) to be true if the clock is invalid. This causes an oops when booting Linux 3.14 on the csb637 board. The following changes avoids this.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/at91_ether.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -342,6 +342,9 @@ static int __init at91ether_probe(struct
 	}
 	clk_enable(lp->pclk);
 
+	lp->hclk = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
+	lp->tx_clk = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
+
 	/* Install the interrupt handler */
 	dev->irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
 	res = devm_request_irq(&pdev->dev, dev->irq, at91ether_interrupt, 0, dev->name, dev);

3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eyal Shapira <[email protected]>

commit 8930b05090acd321b1fc7c642528c697cb105c42 upstream.

We should explore all possible columns when searching to be as resilient as possible to changing conditions. This fixes for example a scenario where even after a sudden creation of rssi difference between the 2 antennas we would keep doing MIMO at a low rate instead of switching to SISO at a higher rate using the better antenna which was the optimal configuration.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/iwlwifi/mvm/rs.c |   36 +++++++++++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

@@ -211,9 +211,9 @@ static const struct rs_tx_column rs_tx_c
 		.next_columns = {
 			RS_COLUMN_LEGACY_ANT_B,
 			RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_A,
+			RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_B,
 			RS_COLUMN_MIMO2,
-			RS_COLUMN_INVALID,
-			RS_COLUMN_INVALID,
+			RS_COLUMN_MIMO2_SGI,
 		},
 	},
 	[RS_COLUMN_LEGACY_ANT_B] = {

@@ -221,10 +221,10 @@ static const struct rs_tx_column rs_tx_c
 		.ant = ANT_B,
 		.next_columns = {
 			RS_COLUMN_LEGACY_ANT_A,
+			RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_A,
 			RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_B,
 			RS_COLUMN_MIMO2,
-			RS_COLUMN_INVALID,
-			RS_COLUMN_INVALID,
+			RS_COLUMN_MIMO2_SGI,
 		},
 	},
 	[RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_A] = {

@@ -234,8 +234,8 @@ static const struct rs_tx_column rs_tx_c
 			RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_B,
 			RS_COLUMN_MIMO2,
 			RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_A_SGI,
-			RS_COLUMN_INVALID,
-			RS_COLUMN_INVALID,
+			RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_B_SGI,
+			RS_COLUMN_MIMO2_SGI,
 		},
 		.checks = {
 			rs_siso_allow,

@@ -248,8 +248,8 @@ static const struct rs_tx_column rs_tx_c
 			RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_A,
 			RS_COLUMN_MIMO2,
 			RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_B_SGI,
-			RS_COLUMN_INVALID,
-			RS_COLUMN_INVALID,
+			RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_A_SGI,
+			RS_COLUMN_MIMO2_SGI,
 		},
 		.checks = {
 			rs_siso_allow,

@@ -263,8 +263,8 @@ static const struct rs_tx_column rs_tx_c
 			RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_B_SGI,
 			RS_COLUMN_MIMO2_SGI,
 			RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_A,
-			RS_COLUMN_INVALID,
-			RS_COLUMN_INVALID,
+			RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_B,
+			RS_COLUMN_MIMO2,
 		},
 		.checks = {
 			rs_siso_allow,

@@ -279,8 +279,8 @@ static const struct rs_tx_column rs_tx_c
 			RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_A_SGI,
 			RS_COLUMN_MIMO2_SGI,
 			RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_B,
-			RS_COLUMN_INVALID,
-			RS_COLUMN_INVALID,
+			RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_A,
+			RS_COLUMN_MIMO2,
 		},
 		.checks = {
 			rs_siso_allow,

@@ -292,10 +292,10 @@ static const struct rs_tx_column rs_tx_c
 		.ant = ANT_AB,
 		.next_columns = {
 			RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_A,
+			RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_B,
+			RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_A_SGI,
+			RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_B_SGI,
 			RS_COLUMN_MIMO2_SGI,
-			RS_COLUMN_INVALID,
-			RS_COLUMN_INVALID,
-			RS_COLUMN_INVALID,
 		},
 		.checks = {
 			rs_mimo_allow,

@@ -307,10 +307,10 @@ static const struct rs_tx_column rs_tx_c
 		.sgi = true,
 		.next_columns = {
 			RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_A_SGI,
+			RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_B_SGI,
+			RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_A,
+			RS_COLUMN_SISO_ANT_B,
 			RS_COLUMN_MIMO2,
-			RS_COLUMN_INVALID,
-			RS_COLUMN_INVALID,
-			RS_COLUMN_INVALID,
 		},
 		.checks = {
 			rs_mimo_allow,

3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mischa Jonker <[email protected]>

commit 6eda477b3c54b8236868c8784e5e042ff14244f0 upstream.

The Synopsys APB DW UART has a couple of special features that are not in the System C model. In 3.8, the 8250_dw driver didn't really use these features, but from 3.9 onwards, the 8250_dw driver has become incompatible with our model.

---
 arch/arc/boot/dts/nsimosci.dts |    7 +++----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 
 / {
 	compatible = "snps,nsimosci";
-	clock-frequency = <80000000>;	/* 80 MHZ */
+	clock-frequency = <20000000>;	/* 20 MHZ */
 	#address-cells = <1>;
 	#size-cells = <1>;
 	interrupt-parent = <&intc>;

@@ -44,15 +44,14 @@
 		};
 
 		uart0: serial@c0000000 {
-			compatible = "snps,dw-apb-uart";
+			compatible = "ns8250";
 			reg = <0xc0000000 0x2000>;
 			interrupts = <11>;
-			#clock-frequency = <80000000>;
 			clock-frequency = <3686400>;
 			baud = <115200>;
 			reg-shift = <2>;
 			reg-io-width = <4>;
-			status = "okay";
+			no-loopback-test = <1>;
 		};
 
 		pgu0: pgu@c9000000 {

3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vineet Gupta <[email protected]>

commit 61fb4bfc010b0d2940f7fd87acbce6a0f03217cb upstream.

Despite the switch to right UART driver (prev patch), serial console still doesn't work due to missing CONFIG_SERIAL_OF_PLATFORM

Also fix the default cmdline in DT to not refer to out-of-tree ARC framebuffer driver for console.

---
 arch/arc/boot/dts/nsimosci.dts      |    5 ++++-
 arch/arc/configs/nsimosci_defconfig |    1 +
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -17,7 +17,10 @@
 	interrupt-parent = <&intc>;
 
 	chosen {
-		bootargs = "console=tty0 consoleblank=0";
+		/* this is for console on PGU */
+		/* bootargs = "console=tty0 consoleblank=0"; */
+		/* this is for console on serial */
+		bootargs = "earlycon=uart8250,mmio32,0xc0000000,115200n8 console=ttyS0,115200n8 consoleblank=0 debug";
 	};
 
 	aliases {

@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ CONFIG_SERIO_ARC_PS2=y
 CONFIG_SERIAL_8250=y
 CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE=y
 CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_DW=y
+CONFIG_SERIAL_OF_PLATFORM=y
 CONFIG_SERIAL_ARC=y
 CONFIG_SERIAL_ARC_CONSOLE=y
 # CONFIG_HW_RANDOM is not set

3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>

commit 03b8c7b623c80af264c4c8d6111e5c6289933666 upstream.

If an architecture has futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() implemented and there is no runtime check necessary, allow to skip the test within futex_init().

This allows to get rid of some code which would always give the same result, and also allows the compiler to optimize a couple of if statements away.

---
 arch/s390/Kconfig     |    1 +
 include/linux/futex.h |    4 ++++
 init/Kconfig          |    7 +++++++
 kernel/futex.c        |   37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ config S390
 	select HAVE_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
 	select HAVE_FUNCTION_TRACER
 	select HAVE_FUNCTION_TRACE_MCOUNT_TEST
+	select HAVE_FUTEX_CMPXCHG if FUTEX
 	select HAVE_KERNEL_BZIP2
 	select HAVE_KERNEL_GZIP
 	select HAVE_KERNEL_LZ4

@@ -55,7 +55,11 @@ union futex_key {
 #ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
 extern void exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr);
 extern void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr);
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_FUTEX_CMPXCHG
+#define futex_cmpxchg_enabled 1
+#else
 extern int futex_cmpxchg_enabled;
+#endif
 #else
 static inline void exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr)
 {

@@ -1387,6 +1387,13 @@ config FUTEX
 	  support for "fast userspace mutexes".  The resulting kernel may not
 	  run glibc-based applications correctly.
 
+config HAVE_FUTEX_CMPXCHG
+	bool
+	help
+	  Architectures should select this if futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic()
+	  is implemented and always working. This removes a couple of runtime
+	  checks.
+
 config EPOLL
 	bool "Enable eventpoll support" if EXPERT
 	default y

@@ -157,7 +157,9 @@
  * enqueue.
  */
 
+#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_FUTEX_CMPXCHG
 int __read_mostly futex_cmpxchg_enabled;
+#endif
 
 /*
  * Futex flags used to encode options to functions and preserve them across

@@ -2880,9 +2882,28 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE6(futex, u32 __user *, uad
 	return do_futex(uaddr, op, val, tp, uaddr2, val2, val3);
 }
 
-static int __init futex_init(void)
+static void __init futex_detect_cmpxchg(void)
 {
+#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_FUTEX_CMPXCHG
 	u32 curval;
+
+	/*
+	 * This will fail and we want it. Some arch implementations do
+	 * runtime detection of the futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic()
+	 * functionality. We want to know that before we call in any
+	 * of the complex code paths. Also we want to prevent
+	 * registration of robust lists in that case. NULL is
+	 * guaranteed to fault and we get -EFAULT on functional
+	 * implementation, the non-functional ones will return
+	 * -ENOSYS.
+	 */
+	if (cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, NULL, 0, 0) == -EFAULT)
+		futex_cmpxchg_enabled = 1;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int __init futex_init(void)
+{
 	unsigned int futex_shift;
 	unsigned long i;
 

@@ -2898,18 +2919,8 @@ static int __init futex_init(void)
 					       &futex_shift, NULL,
 					       futex_hashsize, futex_hashsize);
 	futex_hashsize = 1UL << futex_shift;
-	/*
-	 * This will fail and we want it. Some arch implementations do
-	 * runtime detection of the futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic()
-	 * functionality. We want to know that before we call in any
-	 * of the complex code paths. Also we want to prevent
-	 * registration of robust lists in that case. NULL is
-	 * guaranteed to fault and we get -EFAULT on functional
-	 * implementation, the non-functional ones will return
-	 * -ENOSYS.
-	 */
-	if (cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, NULL, 0, 0) == -EFAULT)
-		futex_cmpxchg_enabled = 1;
+
+	futex_detect_cmpxchg();
 
 	for (i = 0; i < futex_hashsize; i++) {
 		atomic_set(&futex_queues[i].waiters, 0);

Build results:

    total: 126 pass: 121 skipped: 4 fail: 1

Failing build is powerpc:allmodconfig. Error log:

arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S: Assembler messages:
arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S:1312: Error: attempt to move .org backwards make[1]: *** [arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.o] Error 1

Qemu tests all passed. Results match the build results from 3.14, and are therefore as expected.

Details are available at http://server.roeck-us.net:8010/builders.

Guenter

Compiled and booted on my test systems. No dmesg regressions.

-- Shuah

Shuah Khan
Senior Linux Kernel Developer - Open Source Group
Samsung Research America(Silicon Valley)
[email protected] | (970) 672-0658

Thanks for testing all 3 of these and letting me know.

greg k-h

Thanks for testing all 3 of these and letting me know.

greg k-h

At Fri, 11 Apr 2014 17:46:55 -0600,

All 3.10.37-rc1, 3.13.10-rc1, and 3.14.1-rc1 passed my test.

- Test Cases:
- Build this kernel.
- Boot this kernel.
- Build the latest mainline kernel with this kernel.

- Test Tool:
https://github.com/satoru-takeuchi/test-linux-stable

- Test Result (kernel .config, ktest config and test log):
http://satoru-takeuchi.org/test-linux-stable/results/<version>-<test datetime>.tar.xz

- Build Environment:
- OS: Debian Jessy x86_64
- CPU: Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2400 CPU @ 3.10GHz x 4
- memory: 8GB

- Test Target Environment:
- Debian Jessy x86_64 (KVM guest on the Build Environment)
- # of vCPU: 2
- memory: 2GB

Thanks,
Satoru

Thanks for testing and letting me know.

greg k-h