pstore: honor dmesg_restrict sysctl on dmesg dumps
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 pstore: honor dmesg_restrict sysctl on dmesg dumps
When the kernel.dmesg_restrict restriction is in place, only users with CAP_SYSLOG should be able to access crash dumps (like: attacker is trying to exploit a bug, watchdog reboots, attacker can happily read crash dumps and logs).
This puts the restriction on console-* types as well as sensitive information could have been leaked there.
Other log types are unaffected.
--- fs/pstore/inode.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/syslog.h | 1 + kernel/printk/printk.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/pstore/inode.c +22 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@#include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/syslog.h> #include "internal.h"
@@ -120,6 +121,18 @@ static const struct seq_operations pstore_ftrace_seq_ops = { .show = pstore_ftrace_seq_show, }; +static int pstore_check_syslog_permissions (struct pstore_private *ps) +{ +switch (ps->type) { +case PSTORE_TYPE_DMESG : +case PSTORE_TYPE_CONSOLE : +return check_syslog_permissions (SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL , +SYSLOG_FROM_READER ); +default : +return 0 ; + } +} +static ssize_t pstore_file_read (struct file *file,char __user *userbuf,size_t count,loff_t *ppos) {
@@ -138,6 +151,10 @@ static int pstore_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)int err;const struct seq_operations *sops =NULL ; + err =pstore_check_syslog_permissions (ps); +if (err) +return err; +if (ps->type ==PSTORE_TYPE_FTRACE ) sops = &pstore_ftrace_seq_ops;
@@ -174,6 +191,11 @@ static const struct file_operations pstore_file_operations = {static int pstore_unlink (struct inode *dir,struct dentry *dentry) {struct pstore_private *p = dentry->d_inode->i_private; +int err; + + err =pstore_check_syslog_permissions (p); +if (err) +return err;if (p->psi->erase) p->psi->erase(p->type, p->id, p->count,
include/linux/syslog.h +1 -0
@@ -48,5 +48,6 @@#define SYSLOG_FROM_PROC 1int do_syslog (int type,char __user *buf,int count,bool from_file); +int check_syslog_permissions (int type,bool from_file);#endif /* _LINUX_SYSLOG_H */
kernel/printk/printk.c +1 -1
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ static int syslog_action_restricted(int type) type !=SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER ; } -static int check_syslog_permissions (int type,bool from_file) +int check_syslog_permissions (int type,bool from_file) {/* * If this is from /proc/kmsg and we've already opened it, then we've
Signature · 1 line
2.1.1
Quoted 11 lines · Sebastian Schmidt
When the kernel.dmesg_restrict restriction is in place, only users with
CAP_SYSLOGshould be able to access crash dumps (like: attacker is trying to exploit a bug, watchdog reboots, attacker can happily read crash dumps and logs).This puts the restriction on console-* types as well as sensitive information could have been leaked there.
Other log types are unaffected.
Signed-off-by Sebastian Schmidt <[email protected]>
This looks sensible to me; thanks!
-Kees
Quoted 87 lines
--- fs/pstore/inode.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/syslog.h | 1 + kernel/printk/printk.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)fs/pstore/inode.c +22
-0@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@#include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/syslog.h> #include "internal.h" @@ -120,6 +121,18 @@ static const struct seq_operations pstore_ftrace_seq_ops = { .show = pstore_ftrace_seq_show, }; +static int pstore_check_syslog_permissions (struct pstore_private *ps) +{ +switch (ps->type) { +case PSTORE_TYPE_DMESG : +case PSTORE_TYPE_CONSOLE : +return check_syslog_permissions (SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL , +SYSLOG_FROM_READER ); +default : +return 0 ; + } +} +static ssize_t pstore_file_read (struct file *file,char __user *userbuf,size_t count,loff_t *ppos) {@@ -138,6 +151,10 @@ static int pstore_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)int err;const struct seq_operations *sops =NULL ; + err =pstore_check_syslog_permissions (ps); +if (err) +return err; +if (ps->type ==PSTORE_TYPE_FTRACE ) sops = &pstore_ftrace_seq_ops;@@ -174,6 +191,11 @@ static const struct file_operations pstore_file_operations = {static int pstore_unlink (struct inode *dir,struct dentry *dentry) {struct pstore_private *p = dentry->d_inode->i_private; +int err; + + err =pstore_check_syslog_permissions (p); +if (err) +return err;if (p->psi->erase) p->psi->erase(p->type, p->id, p->count,include/linux/syslog.h +1
-0@@ -48,5 +48,6 @@#define SYSLOG_FROM_PROC 1int do_syslog (int type,char __user *buf,int count,bool from_file); +int check_syslog_permissions (int type,bool from_file);#endif /* _LINUX_SYSLOG_H */ kernel/printk/printk.c +1
-2@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ static int syslog_action_restricted(int type) type !=SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER ; } -static int check_syslog_permissions (int type,bool from_file) +int check_syslog_permissions (int type,bool from_file) {/* * If this is from /proc/kmsg and we've already opened it, then we've -- 2.1.1
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Chrome OS Security