VDSO randomization not very random
Hello,
I already reported this into your bugzilla, however Greg KH told me it might be a better idea to post it here:
With current Linux kernels it seems the address randomization for loading the vdso library is not that random and can easily be bruteforced.
This can easily be demonstrated. Get libvdso address from one executable:
$ ldd /usr/bin/less|grep vdso linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007fff73bfe000)
Now run ldd mutliple times and check if the same address appears:
c=0; while (true); do let c=c+1; ldd /usr/bin/less|grep 0x00007fff73bfe000; [ "$?" == 0 ] && echo $c; done
It usually takes only a few seconds and around 1000-2000 tries until the loading address is repeated (note that results may vary, it seems the randomization is biased, some values repeat more often than others).
This information is mostly from this blog entry:
http://v0ids3curity.blogspot.in/2014/12/return-to-vdso-using-elf-auxiliary.html
And here's a thread on oss-security discussing the issue:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/12/09/10
The latest version of paxtest added a check for this that guesses the randomness of vdso:
https://grsecurity.net/~spender/paxtest-0.9.13.tar.gz $ ./randvdso
VDSO randomisation test : 11 quality bits (guessed)
Bugzilla entry:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89591
cu,
Signature · 5 lines
Hanno Böck http://hboeck.de/ mail/jabber: [email protected] GPG: BBB51E42
Hi Hanno,
Quoted 27 lines · Hanno Böck
Hello,
I already reported this into your bugzilla, however Greg KH told me it might be a better idea to post it here:
With current Linux kernels it seems the address randomization for loading the vdso library is not that random and can easily be bruteforced.
This can easily be demonstrated. Get libvdso address from one executable:
$ ldd /usr/bin/less|grep vdso linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007fff73bfe000)Now run ldd mutliple times and check if the same address appears:
c=0; while (true); do let c=c+1; ldd /usr/bin/less|grep0x00007fff73bfe000; [ "$?" == 0 ] && echo $c; doneIt usually takes only a few seconds and around 1000-2000 tries until the loading address is repeated (note that results may vary, it seems the randomization is biased, some values repeat more often than others).
This information is mostly from this blog entry:
http://v0ids3curity.blogspot.in/2014/12/return-to-vdso-using-elf-auxiliary.html
And here's a thread on oss-security discussing the issue:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/12/09/10
Quoted 7 lines
The latest version of paxtest added a check for this that guesses the randomness of vdso:
https://grsecurity.net/~spender/paxtest-0.9.13.tar.gz $ ./randvdso
VDSO randomisation test : 11 quality bits (guessed)Bugzilla entry:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89591
I'm hoping this will get addressed as part of the discussion around the "ASLRv3" patches. PIE (as well as VDSO) randomization has been a per-arch implementation, and it would be best to unify this in a common high-entropy solution.
I think the problem with VDSO right now is that it is randomized in relationship to the stack, rather than being randomized on its own.
-Kees
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Chrome OS Security
Quoted 38 lines · Kees Cook
Hi Hanno,
Quoted 27 lines · Hanno Böck
Hello,
I already reported this into your bugzilla, however Greg KH told me it might be a better idea to post it here:
With current Linux kernels it seems the address randomization for loading the vdso library is not that random and can easily be bruteforced.
This can easily be demonstrated. Get libvdso address from one executable:
$ ldd /usr/bin/less|grep vdso linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007fff73bfe000)Now run ldd mutliple times and check if the same address appears:
c=0; while (true); do let c=c+1; ldd /usr/bin/less|grep0x00007fff73bfe000; [ "$?" == 0 ] && echo $c; doneIt usually takes only a few seconds and around 1000-2000 tries until the loading address is repeated (note that results may vary, it seems the randomization is biased, some values repeat more often than others).
This information is mostly from this blog entry:
http://v0ids3curity.blogspot.in/2014/12/return-to-vdso-using-elf-auxiliary.html
And here's a thread on oss-security discussing the issue:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/12/09/10Quoted 7 lines
The latest version of paxtest added a check for this that guesses the randomness of vdso:
https://grsecurity.net/~spender/paxtest-0.9.13.tar.gz $ ./randvdso
VDSO randomisation test : 11 quality bits (guessed)Bugzilla entry:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89591
Quoted 8 lines
I'm hoping this will get addressed as part of the discussion around the "ASLRv3" patches. PIE (as well as VDSO) randomization has been a per-arch implementation, and it would be best to unify this in a common high-entropy solution.
I think the problem with VDSO right now is that it is randomized in relationship to the stack, rather than being randomized on its own.
As far as I'm concerned, the vdso can go wherever the kernel wants to put it, so long as it doesn't conflict with any real-world non-PIE binaries.
--Andy
Quoted 5 lines
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
Signature · 2 lines
Andy Lutomirski AMA Capital Management, LLC