3.17.8-stable review

NOTE, this is the LAST 3.17-stable kernel to be released, you should move to 3.18 by now, as 3.17 is end-of-life after this release.

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.17.8 release. There are 73 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Fri Jan 9 02:15:36 UTC 2015. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/stable-review/patch-3.17.8-rc1.gz

and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 3.17.8-rc1

Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Btrfs: fix fs corruption on transaction abort if device supports discard

Liu Bo <[email protected]>
Btrfs: fix loop writing of async reclaim

Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
Btrfs: make sure logged extents complete in the current transaction V3

Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
Btrfs: do not move em to modified list when unpinning

David Sterba <[email protected]>
btrfs: fix wrong accounting of raid1 data profile in statfs

Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
Btrfs: make sure we wait on logged extents when fsycning two subvols

Michael Halcrow <[email protected]>
eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine

Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
eCryptfs: Force RO mount when encrypted view is enabled

Jan Kara <[email protected]>
udf: Check component length before reading it

Jan Kara <[email protected]>
udf: Verify symlink size before loading it

Jan Kara <[email protected]>
udf: Verify i_size when loading inode

Jan Kara <[email protected]>
udf: Check path length when reading symlink

Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
exit: pidns: alloc_pid() leaks pid_namespace if child_reaper is exiting

Jan Kara <[email protected]>
ncpfs: return proper error from NCP_IOC_SETROOT ioctl

Rabin Vincent <[email protected]>
crypto: af_alg - fix backlog handling

Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
audit: restore AUDIT_LOGINUID unset ABI

Paul Moore <[email protected]>
audit: don't attempt to lookup PIDs when changing PID filtering audit rules

Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
audit: use supplied gfp_mask from audit_buffer in kauditd_send_multicast_skb

Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
userns: Unbreak the unprivileged remount tests

Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
userns: Allow setting gid_maps without privilege when setgroups is disabled

Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis

Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
userns: Rename id_map_mutex to userns_state_mutex

Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
userns: Only allow the creator of the userns unprivileged mappings

Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid mapping

Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings

Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished

Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
userns: Document what the invariant required for safe unprivileged mappings.

Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
groups: Consolidate the setgroups permission checks

Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
umount: Disallow unprivileged mount force

Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
mnt: Update unprivileged remount test

Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
mnt: Implicitly add MNT_NODEV on remount when it was implicitly added by mount

Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
thermal: Fix error path in thermal_init()

Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
mnt: Fix a memory stomp in umount

Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
mac80211: free management frame keys when removing station

Andreas Müller <[email protected]>
mac80211: fix multicast LED blinking and counter

Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
KEYS: Fix stale key registration at error path

Jan Kara <[email protected]>
isofs: Fix unchecked printing of ER records

Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
x86/tls: Don't validate lm in set_thread_area() after all

Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
x86/asm/traps: Disable tracing and kprobes in fixup_bad_iret and sync_regs

Uwe Kleine-König <[email protected]>
ARM: mvebu: fix ordering in Armada 370 .dtsi

Thomas Petazzoni <[email protected]>
ARM: mvebu: disable I/O coherency on non-SMP situations on Armada 370/375/38x/XP

Thomas Petazzoni <[email protected]>
ARM: mvebu: make the coherency_ll.S functions work with no coherency fabric

Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]>
ARM: tegra: Re-add removed SoC id macro to tegra_resume()

Thierry Reding <[email protected]>
drm/tegra: gem: dumb: pitch and size are outputs

Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
arm64: Add COMPAT_HWCAP_LPAE

Hante Meuleman <[email protected]>
brcmfmac: Fix bitmap malloc bug in msgbuf.

Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
dm thin: fix a race in thin_dtr

Joe Thornber <[email protected]>
dm thin: fix missing out-of-data-space to write mode transition if blocks are released

Joe Thornber <[email protected]>
dm thin: fix inability to discard blocks when in out-of-data-space mode

Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
dm space map metadata: fix sm_bootstrap_get_nr_blocks()

Joe Thornber <[email protected]>
dm cache: fix spurious cell_defer when dealing with partial block at end of device

Joe Thornber <[email protected]>
dm cache: dirty flag was mistakenly being cleared when promoting via overwrite

Joe Thornber <[email protected]>
dm cache: only use overwrite optimisation for promotion when in writeback mode

Milan Broz <[email protected]>
dm crypt: use memzero_explicit for on-stack buffer

Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
dm bufio: fix memleak when using a dm_buffer's inline bio

Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
dcache: fix kmemcheck warning in switch_names

Peng Tao <[email protected]>
nfs41: fix nfs4_proc_layoutget error handling

Jan Kara <[email protected]>
f2fs: fix possible data corruption in f2fs_write_begin()

Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
scsi: correct return values for .eh_abort_handler implementations

Markus Pargmann <[email protected]>
regulator: anatop: Set default voltage selector for vddpu

[email protected] <[email protected]>
megaraid_sas: corrected return of wait_event from abort frame path

Peter Guo <[email protected]>
mmc: sdhci-pci-o2micro: Fix Dell E5440 issue

Baruch Siach <[email protected]>
mmc: block: add newline to sysfs display of force_ro

Ulf Hansson <[email protected]>
mmc: omap_hsmmc: Fix UHS card with DDR50 support

James Hogan <[email protected]>
mmc: dw_mmc: avoid write to CDTHRCTL on older versions

Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <[email protected]>
mfd: tc6393xb: Fail ohci suspend if full state restore is required

Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>
mfd: twl4030-power: Fix regression with missing compatible flag

NeilBrown <[email protected]>
md/bitmap: always wait for writes on unplug.

Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
x86, kvm: Clear paravirt_enabled on KVM guests for espfix32's benefit

Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
x86_64, switch_to(): Load TLS descriptors before switching DS and ES

Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
x86/tls: Disallow unusual TLS segments

Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
x86/tls: Validate TLS entries to protect espfix

Jan Kara <[email protected]>
isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries

-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                           |   4 +-
 arch/arm/boot/dts/armada-370.dtsi                  |  10 +-
 arch/arm/mach-mvebu/coherency.c                    |  44 +++--
 arch/arm/mach-mvebu/coherency_ll.S                 |  21 ++-
 arch/arm/mach-tegra/reset-handler.S                |   1 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h                     |   1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c                          |   3 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c                    |   2 +-
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ldt.h                    |   7 +
 arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c                              |   9 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c                         |   1 -
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c                       | 101 +++++++---
 arch/x86/kernel/tls.c                              |  39 ++++
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c                            |   5 +-
 crypto/af_alg.c                                    |   3 +
 drivers/gpu/drm/tegra/gem.c                        |  10 +-
 drivers/md/bitmap.c                                |  16 +-
 drivers/md/dm-bufio.c                              |  20 +-
 drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c                       |  17 +-
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c                              |   2 +-
 drivers/md/dm-thin.c                               |  30 ++-
 drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-metadata.c |   4 +-
 drivers/mfd/tc6393xb.c                             |  13 +-
 drivers/mfd/twl4030-power.c                        |   3 +
 drivers/mmc/card/block.c                           |   2 +-
 drivers/mmc/host/dw_mmc.c                          |   7 +
 drivers/mmc/host/omap_hsmmc.c                      |   4 +-
 drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pci-o2micro.c               |   2 -
 drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmfmac/msgbuf.c   |   1 +
 drivers/regulator/anatop-regulator.c               |   8 +
 drivers/scsi/NCR5380.c                             |  12 +-
 drivers/scsi/aha1740.c                             |   2 +-
 drivers/scsi/atari_NCR5380.c                       |   2 +-
 drivers/scsi/esas2r/esas2r_main.c                  |   2 +-
 drivers/scsi/megaraid.c                            |   8 +-
 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c          |   2 +-
 drivers/scsi/sun3_NCR5380.c                        |  10 +-
 drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c                     |   4 +-
 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c                                 |  26 ++-
 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c                             |  27 ++-
 fs/btrfs/extent_map.c                              |   2 -
 fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c                            |   9 +-
 fs/btrfs/ordered-data.h                            |   8 +-
 fs/btrfs/super.c                                   |   2 +-
 fs/btrfs/transaction.c                             |  33 ++++
 fs/btrfs/transaction.h                             |   2 +
 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c                                |   6 +-
 fs/dcache.c                                        |   2 +
 fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c                               |   1 -
 fs/ecryptfs/file.c                                 |  12 --
 fs/ecryptfs/main.c                                 |  16 +-
 fs/f2fs/data.c                                     |  24 ++-
 fs/isofs/rock.c                                    |   9 +
 fs/namespace.c                                     |  13 +-
 fs/ncpfs/ioctl.c                                   |   1 -
 fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c                                  |   6 +-
 fs/proc/base.c                                     |  53 ++++++
 fs/udf/dir.c                                       |   3 +-
 fs/udf/inode.c                                     |  14 ++
 fs/udf/namei.c                                     |   3 +-
 fs/udf/symlink.c                                   |  57 ++++--
 fs/udf/udfdecl.h                                   |   3 +-
 fs/udf/unicode.c                                   |  28 +--
 include/linux/audit.h                              |   4 +
 include/linux/cred.h                               |   1 +
 include/linux/user_namespace.h                     |  12 ++
 kernel/audit.c                                     |   8 +-
 kernel/auditfilter.c                               |  23 +--
 kernel/groups.c                                    |  11 +-
 kernel/pid.c                                       |   2 +
 kernel/uid16.c                                     |   2 +-
 kernel/user.c                                      |   1 +
 kernel/user_namespace.c                            | 122 +++++++++++-
 net/mac80211/key.c                                 |   2 +-
 net/mac80211/rx.c                                  |  11 +-
 security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c           |   5 +-
 .../selftests/mount/unprivileged-remount-test.c    | 204 +++++++++++++++++----
 77 files changed, 929 insertions(+), 271 deletions(-)

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

commit f54e18f1b831c92f6512d2eedb224cd63d607d3d upstream.

Rock Ridge extensions define so called Continuation Entries (CE) which define where is further space with Rock Ridge data. Corrupted isofs image can contain arbitrarily long chain of these, including a one containing loop and thus causing kernel to end in an infinite loop when traversing these entries.

Limit the traversal to 32 entries which should be more than enough space to store all the Rock Ridge data.

---
 fs/isofs/rock.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ struct rock_state {
 	int cont_size;
 	int cont_extent;
 	int cont_offset;
+	int cont_loops;
 	struct inode *inode;
 };
 

@@ -73,6 +74,9 @@ static void init_rock_state(struct rock_
 	rs->inode = inode;
 }
 
+/* Maximum number of Rock Ridge continuation entries */
+#define RR_MAX_CE_ENTRIES 32
+
 /*
  * Returns 0 if the caller should continue scanning, 1 if the scan must end
  * and -ve on error.

@@ -105,6 +109,8 @@ static int rock_continue(struct rock_sta
 			goto out;
 		}
 		ret = -EIO;
+		if (++rs->cont_loops >= RR_MAX_CE_ENTRIES)
+			goto out;
 		bh = sb_bread(rs->inode->i_sb, rs->cont_extent);
 		if (bh) {
 			memcpy(rs->buffer, bh->b_data + rs->cont_offset,

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>

commit 41bdc78544b8a93a9c6814b8bbbfef966272abbe upstream.

Installing a 16-bit RW data segment into the GDT defeats espfix. AFAICT this will not affect glibc, Wine, or dosemu at all.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/tls.c |   23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)

@@ -27,6 +27,21 @@ static int get_free_idx(void)
 	return -ESRCH;
 }
 
+static bool tls_desc_okay(const struct user_desc *info)
+{
+	if (LDT_empty(info))
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * espfix is required for 16-bit data segments, but espfix
+	 * only works for LDT segments.
+	 */
+	if (!info->seg_32bit)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 static void set_tls_desc(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
 			 const struct user_desc *info, int n)
 {

@@ -66,6 +81,9 @@ int do_set_thread_area(struct task_struc
 	if (copy_from_user(&info, u_info, sizeof(info)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
+	if (!tls_desc_okay(&info))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (idx == -1)
 		idx = info.entry_number;
 

@@ -192,6 +210,7 @@ int regset_tls_set(struct task_struct *t
 {
 	struct user_desc infobuf[GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES];
 	const struct user_desc *info;
+	int i;
 
 	if (pos >= GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES * sizeof(struct user_desc) ||
 	    (pos % sizeof(struct user_desc)) != 0 ||

@@ -205,6 +224,10 @@ int regset_tls_set(struct task_struct *t
 	else
 		info = infobuf;
 
+	for (i = 0; i < count / sizeof(struct user_desc); i++)
+		if (!tls_desc_okay(info + i))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
 	set_tls_desc(target,
 		     GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + (pos / sizeof(struct user_desc)),
 		     info, count / sizeof(struct user_desc));

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>

commit 0e58af4e1d2166e9e33375a0f121e4867010d4f8 upstream.

Users have no business installing custom code segments into the GDT, and segments that are not present but are otherwise valid are a historical source of interesting attacks.

For completeness, block attempts to set the L bit. (Prior to this patch, the L bit would have been silently dropped.)

This is an ABI break. I've checked glibc, musl, and Wine, and none of them look like they'll have any trouble.

Note to stable maintainers: this is a hardening patch that fixes no known bugs. Given the possibility of ABI issues, this probably shouldn't be backported quickly.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/tls.c |   22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)

@@ -39,6 +39,28 @@ static bool tls_desc_okay(const struct u
 	if (!info->seg_32bit)
 		return false;
 
+	/* Only allow data segments in the TLS array. */
+	if (info->contents > 1)
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Non-present segments with DPL 3 present an interesting attack
+	 * surface.  The kernel should handle such segments correctly,
+	 * but TLS is very difficult to protect in a sandbox, so prevent
+	 * such segments from being created.
+	 *
+	 * If userspace needs to remove a TLS entry, it can still delete
+	 * it outright.
+	 */
+	if (info->seg_not_present)
+		return false;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/* The L bit makes no sense for data. */
+	if (info->lm)
+		return false;
+#endif
+
 	return true;
 }
 

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>

commit f647d7c155f069c1a068030255c300663516420e upstream.

Otherwise, if buggy user code points DS or ES into the TLS array, they would be corrupted after a context switch.

This also significantly improves the comments and documents some gotchas in the code.

Before this patch, the both tests below failed. With this patch, the es test passes, although the gsbase test still fails.

----- begin es test -----

/*
* Copyright (c) 2014 Andy Lutomirski
* GPL v2
*/

static unsigned short GDT3(int idx)

{
	return (idx << 3) | 3;
}

static int create_tls(int idx, unsigned int base)

{
	struct user_desc desc = {
		.entry_number    = idx,
		.base_addr       = base,
		.limit           = 0xfffff,
		.seg_32bit       = 1,
		.contents        = 0, /* Data, grow-up */
		.read_exec_only  = 0,
		.limit_in_pages  = 1,
		.seg_not_present = 0,
		.useable         = 0,
	};

	if (syscall(SYS_set_thread_area, &desc) != 0)
		err(1, "set_thread_area");

	return desc.entry_number;
}

int main()

{
	int idx = create_tls(-1, 0);
	printf("Allocated GDT index %d\n", idx);

	unsigned short orig_es;
	asm volatile ("mov %%es,%0" : "=rm" (orig_es));

	int errors = 0;
	int total = 1000;
	for (int i = 0; i < total; i++) {
		asm volatile ("mov %0,%%es" : : "rm" (GDT3(idx)));
		usleep(100);

		unsigned short es;
		asm volatile ("mov %%es,%0" : "=rm" (es));
		asm volatile ("mov %0,%%es" : : "rm" (orig_es));
		if (es != GDT3(idx)) {
			if (errors == 0)
				printf("[FAIL]\tES changed from 0x%hx to 0x%hx\n",
				       GDT3(idx), es);
			errors++;
		}
	}

	if (errors) {
		printf("[FAIL]\tES was corrupted %d/%d times\n", errors, total);
		return 1;
	} else {
		printf("[OK]\tES was preserved\n");
		return 0;
	}
}

----- end es test -----

----- begin gsbase test -----

/*
* gsbase.c, a gsbase test
* Copyright (c) 2014 Andy Lutomirski
* GPL v2
*/

static unsigned char *testptr, *testptr2;

static unsigned char read_gs_testvals(void)

{
	unsigned char ret;
	asm volatile ("movb %%gs:%1, %0" : "=r" (ret) : "m" (*testptr));
	return ret;
}

int main()

{
	int errors = 0;

	testptr = mmap((void *)0x200000000UL, 1, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
		       MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
	if (testptr == MAP_FAILED)
		err(1, "mmap");

	testptr2 = mmap((void *)0x300000000UL, 1, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
		       MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
	if (testptr2 == MAP_FAILED)
		err(1, "mmap");

	*testptr = 0;
	*testptr2 = 1;

	if (syscall(SYS_arch_prctl, ARCH_SET_GS,
		    (unsigned long)testptr2 - (unsigned long)testptr) != 0)
		err(1, "ARCH_SET_GS");

	usleep(100);

	if (read_gs_testvals() == 1) {
		printf("[OK]\tARCH_SET_GS worked\n");
	} else {
		printf("[FAIL]\tARCH_SET_GS failed\n");
		errors++;
	}

	asm volatile ("mov %0,%%gs" : : "r" (0));

	if (read_gs_testvals() == 0) {
		printf("[OK]\tWriting 0 to gs worked\n");
	} else {
		printf("[FAIL]\tWriting 0 to gs failed\n");
		errors++;
	}

	usleep(100);

	if (read_gs_testvals() == 0) {
		printf("[OK]\tgsbase is still zero\n");
	} else {
		printf("[FAIL]\tgsbase was corrupted\n");
		errors++;
	}

	return errors == 0 ? 0 : 1;
}

----- end gsbase test -----

---
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c |  101 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 73 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

@@ -286,24 +286,9 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p,
 
 	fpu = switch_fpu_prepare(prev_p, next_p, cpu);
 
-	/*
-	 * Reload esp0, LDT and the page table pointer:
-	 */
+	/* Reload esp0 and ss1. */
 	load_sp0(tss, next);
 
-	/*
-	 * Switch DS and ES.
-	 * This won't pick up thread selector changes, but I guess that is ok.
-	 */
-	savesegment(es, prev->es);
-	if (unlikely(next->es | prev->es))
-		loadsegment(es, next->es);
-
-	savesegment(ds, prev->ds);
-	if (unlikely(next->ds | prev->ds))
-		loadsegment(ds, next->ds);
-
-
 	/* We must save %fs and %gs before load_TLS() because
 	 * %fs and %gs may be cleared by load_TLS().
 	 *

@@ -312,41 +297,101 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p,
 	savesegment(fs, fsindex);
 	savesegment(gs, gsindex);
 
+	/*
+	 * Load TLS before restoring any segments so that segment loads
+	 * reference the correct GDT entries.
+	 */
 	load_TLS(next, cpu);
 
 	/*
-	 * Leave lazy mode, flushing any hypercalls made here.
-	 * This must be done before restoring TLS segments so
-	 * the GDT and LDT are properly updated, and must be
-	 * done before math_state_restore, so the TS bit is up
-	 * to date.
+	 * Leave lazy mode, flushing any hypercalls made here.  This
+	 * must be done after loading TLS entries in the GDT but before
+	 * loading segments that might reference them, and and it must
+	 * be done before math_state_restore, so the TS bit is up to
+	 * date.
 	 */
 	arch_end_context_switch(next_p);
 
+	/* Switch DS and ES.
+	 *
+	 * Reading them only returns the selectors, but writing them (if
+	 * nonzero) loads the full descriptor from the GDT or LDT.  The
+	 * LDT for next is loaded in switch_mm, and the GDT is loaded
+	 * above.
+	 *
+	 * We therefore need to write new values to the segment
+	 * registers on every context switch unless both the new and old
+	 * values are zero.
+	 *
+	 * Note that we don't need to do anything for CS and SS, as
+	 * those are saved and restored as part of pt_regs.
+	 */
+	savesegment(es, prev->es);
+	if (unlikely(next->es | prev->es))
+		loadsegment(es, next->es);
+
+	savesegment(ds, prev->ds);
+	if (unlikely(next->ds | prev->ds))
+		loadsegment(ds, next->ds);
+
 	/*
 	 * Switch FS and GS.
 	 *
-	 * Segment register != 0 always requires a reload.  Also
-	 * reload when it has changed.  When prev process used 64bit
-	 * base always reload to avoid an information leak.
+	 * These are even more complicated than FS and GS: they have
+	 * 64-bit bases are that controlled by arch_prctl.  Those bases
+	 * only differ from the values in the GDT or LDT if the selector
+	 * is 0.
+	 *
+	 * Loading the segment register resets the hidden base part of
+	 * the register to 0 or the value from the GDT / LDT.  If the
+	 * next base address zero, writing 0 to the segment register is
+	 * much faster than using wrmsr to explicitly zero the base.
+	 *
+	 * The thread_struct.fs and thread_struct.gs values are 0
+	 * if the fs and gs bases respectively are not overridden
+	 * from the values implied by fsindex and gsindex.  They
+	 * are nonzero, and store the nonzero base addresses, if
+	 * the bases are overridden.
+	 *
+	 * (fs != 0 && fsindex != 0) || (gs != 0 && gsindex != 0) should
+	 * be impossible.
+	 *
+	 * Therefore we need to reload the segment registers if either
+	 * the old or new selector is nonzero, and we need to override
+	 * the base address if next thread expects it to be overridden.
+	 *
+	 * This code is unnecessarily slow in the case where the old and
+	 * new indexes are zero and the new base is nonzero -- it will
+	 * unnecessarily write 0 to the selector before writing the new
+	 * base address.
+	 *
+	 * Note: This all depends on arch_prctl being the only way that
+	 * user code can override the segment base.  Once wrfsbase and
+	 * wrgsbase are enabled, most of this code will need to change.
 	 */
 	if (unlikely(fsindex | next->fsindex | prev->fs)) {
 		loadsegment(fs, next->fsindex);
+
 		/*
-		 * Check if the user used a selector != 0; if yes
-		 *  clear 64bit base, since overloaded base is always
-		 *  mapped to the Null selector
+		 * If user code wrote a nonzero value to FS, then it also
+		 * cleared the overridden base address.
+		 *
+		 * XXX: if user code wrote 0 to FS and cleared the base
+		 * address itself, we won't notice and we'll incorrectly
+		 * restore the prior base address next time we reschdule
+		 * the process.
 		 */
 		if (fsindex)
 			prev->fs = 0;
 	}
-	/* when next process has a 64bit base use it */
 	if (next->fs)
 		wrmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, next->fs);
 	prev->fsindex = fsindex;
 
 	if (unlikely(gsindex | next->gsindex | prev->gs)) {
 		load_gs_index(next->gsindex);
+
+		/* This works (and fails) the same way as fsindex above. */
 		if (gsindex)
 			prev->gs = 0;
 	}

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>

commit 29fa6825463c97e5157284db80107d1bfac5d77b upstream.

paravirt_enabled has the following effects:

- Disables the F00F bug workaround warning. There is no F00F bug workaround any more because Linux's standard IDT handling already works around the F00F bug, but the warning still exists. This is only cosmetic, and, in any event, there is no such thing as KVM on a CPU with the F00F bug.

- Disables 32-bit APM BIOS detection. On a KVM paravirt system, there should be no APM BIOS anyway.

- Disables tboot. I think that the tboot code should check the CPUID hypervisor bit directly if it matters.

- paravirt_enabled disables espfix32. espfix32 should *not* be disabled under KVM paravirt.

The last point is the purpose of this patch. It fixes a leak of the high 16 bits of the kernel stack address on 32-bit KVM paravirt guests. Fixes CVE-2014-8134.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c      |    9 ++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c |    1 -
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -282,7 +282,14 @@ NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_async_page_fault);
 static void __init paravirt_ops_setup(void)
 {
 	pv_info.name = "KVM";
-	pv_info.paravirt_enabled = 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM isn't paravirt in the sense of paravirt_enabled.  A KVM
+	 * guest kernel works like a bare metal kernel with additional
+	 * features, and paravirt_enabled is about features that are
+	 * missing.
+	 */
+	pv_info.paravirt_enabled = 0;
 
 	if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_NOP_IO_DELAY))
 		pv_cpu_ops.io_delay = kvm_io_delay;

@@ -263,7 +263,6 @@ void __init kvmclock_init(void)
 #endif
 	kvm_get_preset_lpj();
 	clocksource_register_hz(&kvm_clock, NSEC_PER_SEC);
-	pv_info.paravirt_enabled = 1;
 	pv_info.name = "KVM";
 
 	if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT))

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: NeilBrown <[email protected]>

commit 4b5060ddae2b03c5387321fafc089d242225697a upstream.

If two threads call bitmap_unplug at the same time, then one might schedule all the writes, and the other might decide that it doesn't need to wait. But really it does.

It rarely hurts to wait when it isn't absolutely necessary, and the current code doesn't really focus on 'absolutely necessary' anyway. So just wait always.

This can potentially lead to data corruption if a crash happens at an awkward time and data was written before the bitmap was updated. It is very unlikely, but this should go to -stable just to be safe. Appropriate for any -stable.

---
 drivers/md/bitmap.c |   16 ++++++----------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

@@ -879,7 +879,6 @@ void bitmap_unplug(struct bitmap *bitmap
 {
 	unsigned long i;
 	int dirty, need_write;
-	int wait = 0;
 
 	if (!bitmap || !bitmap->storage.filemap ||
 	    test_bit(BITMAP_STALE, &bitmap->flags))

@@ -897,16 +896,13 @@ void bitmap_unplug(struct bitmap *bitmap
 			clear_page_attr(bitmap, i, BITMAP_PAGE_PENDING);
 			write_page(bitmap, bitmap->storage.filemap[i], 0);
 		}
-		if (dirty)
-			wait = 1;
-	}
-	if (wait) { /* if any writes were performed, we need to wait on them */
-		if (bitmap->storage.file)
-			wait_event(bitmap->write_wait,
-				   atomic_read(&bitmap->pending_writes)==0);
-		else
-			md_super_wait(bitmap->mddev);
 	}
+	if (bitmap->storage.file)
+		wait_event(bitmap->write_wait,
+			   atomic_read(&bitmap->pending_writes)==0);
+	else
+		md_super_wait(bitmap->mddev);
+
 	if (test_bit(BITMAP_WRITE_ERROR, &bitmap->flags))
 		bitmap_file_kick(bitmap);
 }

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>

commit 1b9b46d05f887aec418b3a5f4f55abf79316fcda upstream.

Commit e7cd1d1eb16f ("mfd: twl4030-power: Add generic reset configuration") accidentally removed the compatible flag for "ti,twl4030-power" that should be there as documented in the binding.

If "ti,twl4030-power" only the poweroff configuration is done by the driver.

---
 drivers/mfd/twl4030-power.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -828,6 +828,9 @@ static struct twl4030_power_data osc_off
 
 static struct of_device_id twl4030_power_of_match[] = {
 	{
+		.compatible = "ti,twl4030-power",
+	},
+	{
 		.compatible = "ti,twl4030-power-reset",
 		.data = &omap3_reset,
 	},

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <[email protected]>

commit 1a5fb99de4850cba710d91becfa2c65653048589 upstream.

Some boards with TC6393XB chip require full state restore during system resume thanks to chip's VCC being cut off during suspend (Sharp SL-6000 tosa is one of them). Failing to do so would result in ohci Oops on resume due to internal memory contentes being changed. Fail ohci suspend on tc6393xb is full state restore is required.

Recommended workaround is to unbind tmio-ohci driver before suspend and rebind it after resume.

---
 drivers/mfd/tc6393xb.c |   13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -263,6 +263,17 @@ static int tc6393xb_ohci_disable(struct
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int tc6393xb_ohci_suspend(struct platform_device *dev)
+{
+	struct tc6393xb_platform_data *tcpd = dev_get_platdata(dev->dev.parent);
+
+	/* We can't properly store/restore OHCI state, so fail here */
+	if (tcpd->resume_restore)
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	return tc6393xb_ohci_disable(dev);
+}
+
 static int tc6393xb_fb_enable(struct platform_device *dev)
 {
 	struct tc6393xb *tc6393xb = dev_get_drvdata(dev->dev.parent);

@@ -403,7 +414,7 @@ static struct mfd_cell tc6393xb_cells[]
 		.num_resources = ARRAY_SIZE(tc6393xb_ohci_resources),
 		.resources = tc6393xb_ohci_resources,
 		.enable = tc6393xb_ohci_enable,
-		.suspend = tc6393xb_ohci_disable,
+		.suspend = tc6393xb_ohci_suspend,
 		.resume = tc6393xb_ohci_enable,
 		.disable = tc6393xb_ohci_disable,
 	},

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: James Hogan <[email protected]>

commit 66dfd10173159cafa9cb0d39936b8daeaab8e3e0 upstream.

Commit f1d2736c8156 (mmc: dw_mmc: control card read threshold) added dw_mci_ctrl_rd_thld() with an unconditional write to the CDTHRCTL register at offset 0x100. However before version 240a, the FIFO region started at 0x100, so the write messes with the FIFO and completely breaks the driver.

If the version id < 240A, return early from dw_mci_ctl_rd_thld() so as not to hit this problem.

---
 drivers/mmc/host/dw_mmc.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

@@ -624,6 +624,13 @@ static void dw_mci_ctrl_rd_thld(struct d
 
 	WARN_ON(!(data->flags & MMC_DATA_READ));
 
+	/*
+	 * CDTHRCTL doesn't exist prior to 240A (in fact that register offset is
+	 * in the FIFO region, so we really shouldn't access it).
+	 */
+	if (host->verid < DW_MMC_240A)
+		return;
+
 	if (host->timing != MMC_TIMING_MMC_HS200 &&
 	    host->timing != MMC_TIMING_UHS_SDR104)
 		goto disable;

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ulf Hansson <[email protected]>

commit 903101a83949d6fc77c092cef07e9c1e10c07e46 upstream.

The commit, mmc: omap: clarify DDR timing mode between SD-UHS and eMMC, switched omap_hsmmc to support MMC DDR mode instead of UHS DDR50 mode.

Add UHS DDR50 mode again and this time let's also keep the MMC DDR mode.

---
 drivers/mmc/host/omap_hsmmc.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -609,6 +609,7 @@ static void omap_hsmmc_set_clock(struct
 	 */
 	if ((mmc_slot(host).features & HSMMC_HAS_HSPE_SUPPORT) &&
 	    (ios->timing != MMC_TIMING_MMC_DDR52) &&
+	    (ios->timing != MMC_TIMING_UHS_DDR50) &&
 	    ((OMAP_HSMMC_READ(host->base, CAPA) & HSS) == HSS)) {
 		regval = OMAP_HSMMC_READ(host->base, HCTL);
 		if (clkdiv && (clk_get_rate(host->fclk)/clkdiv) > 25000000)

@@ -628,7 +629,8 @@ static void omap_hsmmc_set_bus_width(str
 	u32 con;
 
 	con = OMAP_HSMMC_READ(host->base, CON);
-	if (ios->timing == MMC_TIMING_MMC_DDR52)
+	if (ios->timing == MMC_TIMING_MMC_DDR52 ||
+	    ios->timing == MMC_TIMING_UHS_DDR50)
 		con |= DDR;	/* configure in DDR mode */
 	else
 		con &= ~DDR;

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Baruch Siach <[email protected]>

commit 0031a98a85e9fca282624bfc887f9531b2768396 upstream.

Make force_ro consistent with other sysfs entries.

---
 drivers/mmc/card/block.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static ssize_t force_ro_show(struct devi
 	int ret;
 	struct mmc_blk_data *md = mmc_blk_get(dev_to_disk(dev));
 
-	ret = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d",
+	ret = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
 		       get_disk_ro(dev_to_disk(dev)) ^
 		       md->read_only);
 	mmc_blk_put(md);

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peter Guo <[email protected]>

commit 6380ea099cdd46d7377b6fbec0291cf2aa387bad upstream.

Fix Dell E5440 when reboot Linux, can't find o2micro sd host chip issue.

---
 drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pci-o2micro.c |    2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

@@ -127,8 +127,6 @@ void sdhci_pci_o2_fujin2_pci_init(struct
 		return;
 	scratch_32 &= ~((1 << 21) | (1 << 30));
 
-	/* Set RTD3 function disabled */
-	scratch_32 |= ((1 << 29) | (1 << 28));
 	pci_write_config_dword(chip->pdev, O2_SD_FUNC_REG3, scratch_32);
 
 	/* Set L1 Entrance Timer */

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>

commit 170c238701ec38b1829321b17c70671c101bac55 upstream.

Corrected wait_event() call which was waiting for wrong completion status (0xFF).

---
 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ megasas_issue_blocked_abort_cmd(struct m
 		cpu_to_le32(upper_32_bits(cmd_to_abort->frame_phys_addr));
 
 	cmd->sync_cmd = 1;
-	cmd->cmd_status = 0xFF;
+	cmd->cmd_status = ENODATA;
 
 	instance->instancet->issue_dcmd(instance, cmd);
 

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Markus Pargmann <[email protected]>

commit fe08be3ec8672ed92b3ed1b85810df9fa0f98931 upstream.

The code reads the default voltage selector from its register. If the bootloader disables the regulator, the default voltage selector will be 0 which results in faulty behaviour of this regulator driver.

This patch sets a default voltage selector for vddpu if it is not set in the register.

---
 drivers/regulator/anatop-regulator.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

@@ -283,6 +283,14 @@ static int anatop_regulator_probe(struct
 			sreg->sel = 0;
 			sreg->bypass = true;
 		}
+
+		/*
+		 * In case vddpu was disabled by the bootloader, we need to set
+		 * a sane default until imx6-cpufreq was probed and changes the
+		 * voltage to the correct value. In this case we set 1.25V.
+		 */
+		if (!sreg->sel && !strcmp(sreg->name, "vddpu"))
+			sreg->sel = 22;
 	} else {
 		rdesc->ops = &anatop_rops;
 	}

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>

commit b6c92b7e0af575e2b8b05bdf33633cf9e1661cbf upstream.

The .eh_abort_handler needs to return SUCCESS, FAILED, or FAST_IO_FAIL. So fixup all callers to adhere to this requirement.

---
 drivers/scsi/NCR5380.c            |   12 ++++++------
 drivers/scsi/aha1740.c            |    2 +-
 drivers/scsi/atari_NCR5380.c      |    2 +-
 drivers/scsi/esas2r/esas2r_main.c |    2 +-
 drivers/scsi/megaraid.c           |    8 ++++----
 drivers/scsi/sun3_NCR5380.c       |   10 +++++-----
 6 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

@@ -2647,14 +2647,14 @@ static void NCR5380_dma_complete(NCR5380
  *
  * Purpose : abort a command
  *
- * Inputs : cmd - the Scsi_Cmnd to abort, code - code to set the 
- *      host byte of the result field to, if zero DID_ABORTED is 
+ * Inputs : cmd - the Scsi_Cmnd to abort, code - code to set the
+ *      host byte of the result field to, if zero DID_ABORTED is
  *      used.
  *
- * Returns : 0 - success, -1 on failure.
+ * Returns : SUCCESS - success, FAILED on failure.
  *
- *	XXX - there is no way to abort the command that is currently 
- *	connected, you have to wait for it to complete.  If this is 
+ *	XXX - there is no way to abort the command that is currently
+ *	connected, you have to wait for it to complete.  If this is
  *	a problem, we could implement longjmp() / setjmp(), setjmp()
  *	called where the loop started in NCR5380_main().
  *

@@ -2704,7 +2704,7 @@ static int NCR5380_abort(Scsi_Cmnd * cmd
  * aborted flag and get back into our main loop.
  */
 
-		return 0;
+		return SUCCESS;
 	}
 #endif
 

@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ static int aha1740_eh_abort_handler (Scs
  * quiet as possible...
  */
 
-	return 0;
+	return SUCCESS;
 }
 
 static struct scsi_host_template aha1740_template = {

@@ -2607,7 +2607,7 @@ static void NCR5380_reselect(struct Scsi
  *	host byte of the result field to, if zero DID_ABORTED is
  *	used.
  *
- * Returns : 0 - success, -1 on failure.
+ * Returns : SUCCESS - success, FAILED on failure.
  *
  * XXX - there is no way to abort the command that is currently
  *	 connected, you have to wait for it to complete.  If this is

@@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ int esas2r_eh_abort(struct scsi_cmnd *cm
 
 		cmd->scsi_done(cmd);
 
-		return 0;
+		return SUCCESS;
 	}
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&a->queue_lock, flags);

@@ -1945,7 +1945,7 @@ megaraid_abort_and_reset(adapter_t *adap
 	     cmd->device->id, (u32)cmd->device->lun);
 
 	if(list_empty(&adapter->pending_list))
-		return FALSE;
+		return FAILED;
 
 	list_for_each_safe(pos, next, &adapter->pending_list) {
 

@@ -1968,7 +1968,7 @@ megaraid_abort_and_reset(adapter_t *adap
 					(aor==SCB_ABORT) ? "ABORTING":"RESET",
 					scb->idx);
 
-				return FALSE;
+				return FAILED;
 			}
 			else {
 

@@ -1993,12 +1993,12 @@ megaraid_abort_and_reset(adapter_t *adap
 				list_add_tail(SCSI_LIST(cmd),
 						&adapter->completed_list);
 
-				return TRUE;
+				return SUCCESS;
 			}
 		}
 	}
 
-	return FALSE;
+	return FAILED;
 }
 
 static inline int

@@ -2590,15 +2590,15 @@ static void NCR5380_reselect (struct Scs
  * Purpose : abort a command
  *
  * Inputs : cmd - the struct scsi_cmnd to abort, code - code to set the
- * 	host byte of the result field to, if zero DID_ABORTED is 
+ *	host byte of the result field to, if zero DID_ABORTED is
  *	used.
  *
- * Returns : 0 - success, -1 on failure.
+ * Returns : SUCCESS - success, FAILED on failure.
  *
- * XXX - there is no way to abort the command that is currently 
- * 	 connected, you have to wait for it to complete.  If this is 
+ * XXX - there is no way to abort the command that is currently
+ *	 connected, you have to wait for it to complete.  If this is
  *	 a problem, we could implement longjmp() / setjmp(), setjmp()
- * 	 called where the loop started in NCR5380_main().
+ *	 called where the loop started in NCR5380_main().
  */
 
 static int NCR5380_abort(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

commit 9234f3190bf8b25b11b105191d408ac50a107948 upstream.

f2fs_write_begin() doesn't initialize the 'dn' variable if the inode has inline data. However it uses its contents to decide whether it should just zero out the page or load data to it. Thus if we are unlucky we can zero out page contents instead of loading inline data into a page.

---
 fs/f2fs/data.c |   24 +++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

@@ -1002,21 +1002,19 @@ inline_data:
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (dn.data_blkaddr == NEW_ADDR) {
+	if (f2fs_has_inline_data(inode)) {
+		err = f2fs_read_inline_data(inode, page);
+		if (err) {
+			page_cache_release(page);
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	} else if (dn.data_blkaddr == NEW_ADDR) {
 		zero_user_segment(page, 0, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE);
 	} else {
-		if (f2fs_has_inline_data(inode)) {
-			err = f2fs_read_inline_data(inode, page);
-			if (err) {
-				page_cache_release(page);
-				goto fail;
-			}
-		} else {
-			err = f2fs_submit_page_bio(sbi, page, dn.data_blkaddr,
-							READ_SYNC);
-			if (err)
-				goto fail;
-		}
+		err = f2fs_submit_page_bio(sbi, page, dn.data_blkaddr,
+					   READ_SYNC);
+		if (err)
+			goto fail;
 
 		lock_page(page);
 		if (unlikely(!PageUptodate(page))) {

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peng Tao <[email protected]>

commit 4bd5a980de87d2b5af417485bde97b8eb3d6cf6a upstream.

nfs4_layoutget_release() drops layout hdr refcnt. Grab the refcnt early so that it is safe to call .release in case nfs4_alloc_pages fails.

---
 fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -7692,6 +7692,9 @@ nfs4_proc_layoutget(struct nfs4_layoutge
 
 	dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
 
+	/* nfs4_layoutget_release calls pnfs_put_layout_hdr */
+	pnfs_get_layout_hdr(NFS_I(inode)->layout);
+
 	lgp->args.layout.pages = nfs4_alloc_pages(max_pages, gfp_flags);
 	if (!lgp->args.layout.pages) {
 		nfs4_layoutget_release(lgp);

@@ -7704,9 +7707,6 @@ nfs4_proc_layoutget(struct nfs4_layoutge
 	lgp->res.seq_res.sr_slot = NULL;
 	nfs4_init_sequence(&lgp->args.seq_args, &lgp->res.seq_res, 0);
 
-	/* nfs4_layoutget_release calls pnfs_put_layout_hdr */
-	pnfs_get_layout_hdr(NFS_I(inode)->layout);
-
 	task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
 	if (IS_ERR(task))
 		return ERR_CAST(task);

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>

commit 08d4f7722268755ee34ed1c9e8afee7dfff022bb upstream.

This patch fixes kmemcheck warning in switch_names. The function switch_names swaps inline names of two dentries. It swaps full arrays d_iname, no matter how many bytes are really used by the strings. Reading data beyond string ends results in kmemcheck warning.

We fix the bug by marking both arrays as fully initialized.

---
 fs/dcache.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -2407,6 +2407,8 @@ static void switch_names(struct dentry *
 			 */
 			unsigned int i;
 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!IS_ALIGNED(DNAME_INLINE_LEN, sizeof(long)));
+			kmemcheck_mark_initialized(dentry->d_iname, DNAME_INLINE_LEN);
+			kmemcheck_mark_initialized(target->d_iname, DNAME_INLINE_LEN);
 			if (!exchange) {
 				memcpy(dentry->d_iname, target->d_name.name,
 						target->d_name.len + 1);

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Darrick J. Wong" <[email protected]>

commit 445559cdcb98a141f5de415b94fd6eaccab87e6d upstream.

When dm-bufio sets out to use the bio built into a struct dm_buffer to issue an IO, it needs to call bio_reset after it's done with the bio so that we can free things attached to the bio such as the integrity payload. Therefore, inject our own endio callback to take care of the bio_reset after calling submit_io's end_io callback.

Test case:
1. modprobe scsi_debug delay=0 dif=1 dix=199 ato=1 dev_size_mb=300
2. Set up a dm-bufio client, e.g. dm-verity, on the scsi_debug device
3. Repeatedly read metadata and watch kmalloc-192 leak!

---
 drivers/md/dm-bufio.c |   20 +++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -532,6 +532,19 @@ static void use_dmio(struct dm_buffer *b
 		end_io(&b->bio, r);
 }
 
+static void inline_endio(struct bio *bio, int error)
+{
+	bio_end_io_t *end_fn = bio->bi_private;
+
+	/*
+	 * Reset the bio to free any attached resources
+	 * (e.g. bio integrity profiles).
+	 */
+	bio_reset(bio);
+
+	end_fn(bio, error);
+}
+
 static void use_inline_bio(struct dm_buffer *b, int rw, sector_t block,
 			   bio_end_io_t *end_io)
 {

@@ -543,7 +556,12 @@ static void use_inline_bio(struct dm_buf
 	b->bio.bi_max_vecs = DM_BUFIO_INLINE_VECS;
 	b->bio.bi_iter.bi_sector = block << b->c->sectors_per_block_bits;
 	b->bio.bi_bdev = b->c->bdev;
-	b->bio.bi_end_io = end_io;
+	b->bio.bi_end_io = inline_endio;
+	/*
+	 * Use of .bi_private isn't a problem here because
+	 * the dm_buffer's inline bio is local to bufio.
+	 */
+	b->bio.bi_private = end_io;
 
 	/*
 	 * We assume that if len >= PAGE_SIZE ptr is page-aligned.

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Milan Broz <[email protected]>

commit 1a71d6ffe18c0d0f03fc8531949cc8ed41d702ee upstream.

Use memzero_explicit to cleanup sensitive data allocated on stack to prevent the compiler from optimizing and removing memset() calls.

---
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ static int crypt_iv_tcw_whitening(struct
 	for (i = 0; i < ((1 << SECTOR_SHIFT) / 8); i++)
 		crypto_xor(data + i * 8, buf, 8);
 out:
-	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+	memzero_explicit(buf, sizeof(buf));
 	return r;
 }
 

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Joe Thornber <[email protected]>

commit f29a3147e251d7ae20d3194ff67f109d71e501b4 upstream.

Overwrite causes the cache block and origin blocks to diverge, which is only allowed in writeback mode.

---
 drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1070,7 +1070,8 @@ static void issue_copy(struct dm_cache_m
 
 		avoid = is_discarded_oblock(cache, mg->new_oblock);
 
-		if (!avoid && bio_writes_complete_block(cache, bio)) {
+		if (writeback_mode(&cache->features) &&
+		    !avoid && bio_writes_complete_block(cache, bio)) {
 			issue_overwrite(mg, bio);
 			return;
 		}

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Joe Thornber <[email protected]>

commit 1e32134a5a404e80bfb47fad8a94e9bbfcbdacc5 upstream.

If the incoming bio is a WRITE and completely covers a block then we don't bother to do any copying for a promotion operation. Once this is done the cache block and origin block will be different, so we need to set it to 'dirty'.

---
 drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c |   10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -951,10 +951,14 @@ static void migration_success_post_commi
 		}
 
 	} else {
-		clear_dirty(cache, mg->new_oblock, mg->cblock);
-		if (mg->requeue_holder)
+		if (mg->requeue_holder) {
+			clear_dirty(cache, mg->new_oblock, mg->cblock);
 			cell_defer(cache, mg->new_ocell, true);
-		else {
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * The block was promoted via an overwrite, so it's dirty.
+			 */
+			set_dirty(cache, mg->new_oblock, mg->cblock);
 			bio_endio(mg->new_ocell->holder, 0);
 			cell_defer(cache, mg->new_ocell, false);
 		}

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Joe Thornber <[email protected]>

commit f824a2af3dfbbb766c02e19df21f985bceadf0ee upstream.

We never bother caching a partial block that is at the back end of the origin device. No cell ever gets locked, but the calling code was assuming it was and trying to release it.

Now the code only releases if the cell has been set to a non NULL value.

---
 drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -2554,11 +2554,11 @@ static int __cache_map(struct cache *cac
 static int cache_map(struct dm_target *ti, struct bio *bio)
 {
 	int r;
-	struct dm_bio_prison_cell *cell;
+	struct dm_bio_prison_cell *cell = NULL;
 	struct cache *cache = ti->private;
 
 	r = __cache_map(cache, bio, &cell);
-	if (r == DM_MAPIO_REMAPPED) {
+	if (r == DM_MAPIO_REMAPPED && cell) {
 		inc_ds(cache, bio, cell);
 		cell_defer(cache, cell, false);
 	}

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>

commit c1c6156fe4d4577444b769d7edd5dd503e57bbc9 upstream.

This function isn't right and it causes a static checker warning:

	drivers/md/dm-thin.c:3016 maybe_resize_data_dev()
	error: potentially using uninitialized 'sb_data_size'.

It should set "*count" and return zero on success the same as the sm_metadata_get_nr_blocks() function does earlier.

---
 drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-metadata.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -564,7 +564,9 @@ static int sm_bootstrap_get_nr_blocks(st
 {
 	struct sm_metadata *smm = container_of(sm, struct sm_metadata, sm);
 
-	return smm->ll.nr_blocks;
+	*count = smm->ll.nr_blocks;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int sm_bootstrap_get_nr_free(struct dm_space_map *sm, dm_block_t *count)

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Joe Thornber <[email protected]>

commit 45ec9bd0fd7abf8705e7cf12205ff69fe9d51181 upstream.

When the pool was in PM_OUT_OF_SPACE mode its process_prepared_discard function pointer was incorrectly being set to process_prepared_discard_passdown rather than process_prepared_discard.

This incorrect function pointer meant the discard was being passed down, but not effecting the mapping. As such any discard that was issued, in an attempt to reclaim blocks, would not successfully free data space.

---
 drivers/md/dm-thin.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1824,7 +1824,7 @@ static void set_pool_mode(struct pool *p
 		pool->process_bio = process_bio_read_only;
 		pool->process_discard = process_discard;
 		pool->process_prepared_mapping = process_prepared_mapping;
-		pool->process_prepared_discard = process_prepared_discard_passdown;
+		pool->process_prepared_discard = process_prepared_discard;
 
 		if (!pool->pf.error_if_no_space && no_space_timeout)
 			queue_delayed_work(pool->wq, &pool->no_space_timeout, no_space_timeout);

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Joe Thornber <[email protected]>

commit 2c43fd26e46734430122b8d2ad3024bb532df3ef upstream.

Discard bios and thin device deletion have the potential to release data blocks. If the thin-pool is in out-of-data-space mode, and blocks were released, transition the thin-pool back to full write mode.

The correct time to do this is just after the thin-pool metadata commit. It cannot be done before the commit because the space maps will not allow immediate reuse of the data blocks in case there's a rollback following power failure.

---
 drivers/md/dm-thin.c |   22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -990,6 +990,24 @@ static void schedule_external_copy(struc
 		schedule_zero(tc, virt_block, data_dest, cell, bio);
 }
 
+static void set_pool_mode(struct pool *pool, enum pool_mode new_mode);
+
+static void check_for_space(struct pool *pool)
+{
+	int r;
+	dm_block_t nr_free;
+
+	if (get_pool_mode(pool) != PM_OUT_OF_DATA_SPACE)
+		return;
+
+	r = dm_pool_get_free_block_count(pool->pmd, &nr_free);
+	if (r)
+		return;
+
+	if (nr_free)
+		set_pool_mode(pool, PM_WRITE);
+}
+
 /*
  * A non-zero return indicates read_only or fail_io mode.
  * Many callers don't care about the return value.

@@ -1004,6 +1022,8 @@ static int commit(struct pool *pool)
 	r = dm_pool_commit_metadata(pool->pmd);
 	if (r)
 		metadata_operation_failed(pool, "dm_pool_commit_metadata", r);
+	else
+		check_for_space(pool);
 
 	return r;
 }

@@ -1022,8 +1042,6 @@ static void check_low_water_mark(struct
 	}
 }
 
-static void set_pool_mode(struct pool *pool, enum pool_mode new_mode);
-
 static int alloc_data_block(struct thin_c *tc, dm_block_t *result)
 {
 	int r;

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>

commit 17181fb7a0c3a279196c0eeb2caba65a1519614b upstream.

As long as struct thin_c is in the list, anyone can grab a reference of it. Consequently, we must wait for the reference count to drop to zero *after* we remove the structure from the list, not before.

---
 drivers/md/dm-thin.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -3266,14 +3266,14 @@ static void thin_dtr(struct dm_target *t
 	struct thin_c *tc = ti->private;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
-	thin_put(tc);
-	wait_for_completion(&tc->can_destroy);
-
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&tc->pool->lock, flags);
 	list_del_rcu(&tc->list);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tc->pool->lock, flags);
 	synchronize_rcu();
 
+	thin_put(tc);
+	wait_for_completion(&tc->can_destroy);
+
 	mutex_lock(&dm_thin_pool_table.mutex);
 
 	__pool_dec(tc->pool);

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hante Meuleman <[email protected]>

commit 333c2aa029b847051a2db76a6ca59f699a520030 upstream.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmfmac/msgbuf.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -1282,6 +1282,7 @@ int brcmf_proto_msgbuf_attach(struct brc
 	}
 	INIT_WORK(&msgbuf->txflow_work, brcmf_msgbuf_txflow_worker);
 	count = BITS_TO_LONGS(if_msgbuf->nrof_flowrings);
+	count = count * sizeof(unsigned long);
 	msgbuf->flow_map = kzalloc(count, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!msgbuf->flow_map)
 		goto fail;

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>

commit 7d57511d2dba03a8046c8b428dd9192a4bfc1e73 upstream.

Commit a469abd0f868 (ARM: elf: add new hwcap for identifying atomic ldrd/strd instructions) introduces HWCAP_ELF for 32-bit ARM applications. As LPAE is always present on arm64, report the corresponding compat HWCAP to user space.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h |    1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c      |    3 ++-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #define COMPAT_HWCAP_IDIVA	(1 << 17)
 #define COMPAT_HWCAP_IDIVT	(1 << 18)
 #define COMPAT_HWCAP_IDIV	(COMPAT_HWCAP_IDIVA|COMPAT_HWCAP_IDIVT)
+#define COMPAT_HWCAP_LPAE	(1 << 20)
 #define COMPAT_HWCAP_EVTSTRM	(1 << 21)
 
 #define COMPAT_HWCAP2_AES	(1 << 0)

@@ -72,7 +72,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(elf_hwcap);
 				 COMPAT_HWCAP_FAST_MULT|COMPAT_HWCAP_EDSP|\
 				 COMPAT_HWCAP_TLS|COMPAT_HWCAP_VFP|\
 				 COMPAT_HWCAP_VFPv3|COMPAT_HWCAP_VFPv4|\
-				 COMPAT_HWCAP_NEON|COMPAT_HWCAP_IDIV)
+				 COMPAT_HWCAP_NEON|COMPAT_HWCAP_IDIV|\
+				 COMPAT_HWCAP_LPAE)
 unsigned int compat_elf_hwcap __read_mostly = COMPAT_ELF_HWCAP_DEFAULT;
 unsigned int compat_elf_hwcap2 __read_mostly;
 #endif

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thierry Reding <[email protected]>

commit dc6057ecb39edb34b0461ca55382094410bd257a upstream.

When creating a dumb buffer object using the DRM_IOCTL_MODE_CREATE_DUMB IOCTL, only the width, height, bpp and flags parameters are inputs. The caller is not guaranteed to zero out or set handle, pitch and size, so the driver must not treat these values as possible inputs.

Fixes a bug where running the Weston compositor on Tegra DRM would cause an attempt to allocate a 3 GiB framebuffer to be allocated.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/tegra/gem.c |   10 +++-------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

@@ -259,16 +259,12 @@ void tegra_bo_free_object(struct drm_gem
 int tegra_bo_dumb_create(struct drm_file *file, struct drm_device *drm,
 			 struct drm_mode_create_dumb *args)
 {
-	int min_pitch = DIV_ROUND_UP(args->width * args->bpp, 8);
+	unsigned int min_pitch = DIV_ROUND_UP(args->width * args->bpp, 8);
 	struct tegra_drm *tegra = drm->dev_private;
 	struct tegra_bo *bo;
 
-	min_pitch = round_up(min_pitch, tegra->pitch_align);
-	if (args->pitch < min_pitch)
-		args->pitch = min_pitch;
-
-	if (args->size < args->pitch * args->height)
-		args->size = args->pitch * args->height;
+	args->pitch = round_up(min_pitch, tegra->pitch_align);
+	args->size = args->pitch * args->height;
 
 	bo = tegra_bo_create_with_handle(file, drm, args->size, 0,
 					 &args->handle);

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]>

commit e4a680099a6e97ecdbb81081cff9e4a489a4dc44 upstream.

Commit d127e9c ("ARM: tegra: make tegra_resume can work with current and later chips") removed tegra_get_soc_id macro leaving used cpu register corrupted after branching to v7_invalidate_l1() and as result causing execution of unintended code on tegra20. Possibly it was expected that r6 would be SoC id func argument since common cpu reset handler is setting r6 before branching to tegra_resume(), but neither tegra20_lp1_reset() nor tegra30_lp1_reset() aren't setting r6 register before jumping to resume function. Fix it by re-adding macro.

---
 arch/arm/mach-tegra/reset-handler.S |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ ENTRY(tegra_resume)
  THUMB(	it	ne )
 	bne	cpu_resume			@ no
 
+	tegra_get_soc_id TEGRA_APB_MISC_BASE, r6
 	/* Are we on Tegra20? */
 	cmp	r6, #TEGRA20
 	beq	1f				@ Yes

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Petazzoni <[email protected]>

commit 30cdef97107370a7f63ab5d80fd2de30540750c8 upstream.

The ll_add_cpu_to_smp_group(), ll_enable_coherency() and ll_disable_coherency() are used on Armada XP to control the coherency fabric. However, they make the assumption that the coherency fabric is always available, which is currently a correct assumption but will no longer be true with a followup commit that disables the usage of the coherency fabric when the conditions are not met to use it.

Therefore, this commit modifies those functions so that they check the return value of ll_get_coherency_base(), and if the return value is 0, they simply return without configuring anything in the coherency fabric.

The ll_get_coherency_base() function is also modified to properly return 0 when the function is called with the MMU disabled. In this case, it normally returns the physical address of the coherency fabric, but we now check if the virtual address is 0, and if that's case, return a physical address of 0 to indicate that the coherency fabric is not enabled.

---
 arch/arm/mach-mvebu/coherency_ll.S |   21 +++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -24,7 +24,10 @@
 #include <asm/cp15.h>
 
 	.text
-/* Returns the coherency base address in r1 (r0 is untouched) */
+/*
+ * Returns the coherency base address in r1 (r0 is untouched), or 0 if
+ * the coherency fabric is not enabled.
+ */
 ENTRY(ll_get_coherency_base)
 	mrc	p15, 0, r1, c1, c0, 0
 	tst	r1, #CR_M @ Check MMU bit enabled

@@ -32,8 +35,13 @@ ENTRY(ll_get_coherency_base)
 
 	/*
 	 * MMU is disabled, use the physical address of the coherency
-	 * base address.
+	 * base address. However, if the coherency fabric isn't mapped
+	 * (i.e its virtual address is zero), it means coherency is
+	 * not enabled, so we return 0.
 	 */
+	ldr	r1, =coherency_base
+	cmp	r1, #0
+	beq	2f
 	adr	r1, 3f
 	ldr	r3, [r1]
 	ldr	r1, [r1, r3]

@@ -85,6 +93,9 @@ ENTRY(ll_add_cpu_to_smp_group)
 	 */
 	mov 	r0, lr
 	bl	ll_get_coherency_base
+	/* Bail out if the coherency is not enabled */
+	cmp	r1, #0
+	reteq	r0
 	bl	ll_get_coherency_cpumask
 	mov 	lr, r0
 	add	r0, r1, #ARMADA_XP_CFB_CFG_REG_OFFSET

@@ -107,6 +118,9 @@ ENTRY(ll_enable_coherency)
 	 */
 	mov r0, lr
 	bl	ll_get_coherency_base
+	/* Bail out if the coherency is not enabled */
+	cmp	r1, #0
+	reteq	r0
 	bl	ll_get_coherency_cpumask
 	mov lr, r0
 	add	r0, r1, #ARMADA_XP_CFB_CTL_REG_OFFSET

@@ -131,6 +145,9 @@ ENTRY(ll_disable_coherency)
 	 */
 	mov 	r0, lr
 	bl	ll_get_coherency_base
+	/* Bail out if the coherency is not enabled */
+	cmp	r1, #0
+	reteq	r0
 	bl	ll_get_coherency_cpumask
 	mov 	lr, r0
 	add	r0, r1, #ARMADA_XP_CFB_CTL_REG_OFFSET

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Petazzoni <[email protected]>

commit e55355453600a33bb5ca4f71f2d7214875f3b061 upstream.

Enabling the hardware I/O coherency on Armada 370, Armada 375, Armada 38x and Armada XP requires a certain number of conditions:

- On Armada 370, the cache policy must be set to write-allocate.

- On Armada 375, 38x and XP, the cache policy must be set to write-allocate, the pages must be mapped with the shareable attribute, and the SMP bit must be set

Currently, on Armada XP, when CONFIG_SMP is enabled, those conditions are met. However, when Armada XP is used in a !CONFIG_SMP kernel, none of these conditions are met. With Armada 370, the situation is worse:
since the processor is single core, regardless of whether CONFIG_SMP or !CONFIG_SMP is used, the cache policy will be set to write-back by the kernel and not write-allocate.

Since solving this problem turns out to be quite complicated, and we don't want to let users with a mainline kernel known to have infrequent but existing data corruptions, this commit proposes to simply disable hardware I/O coherency in situations where it is known not to work.

And basically, the is_smp() function of the kernel tells us whether it is OK to enable hardware I/O coherency or not, so this commit slightly refactors the coherency_type() function to return COHERENCY_FABRIC_TYPE_NONE when is_smp() is false, or the appropriate type of the coherency fabric in the other case.

Thanks to this, the I/O coherency fabric will no longer be used at all in !CONFIG_SMP configurations. It will continue to be used in CONFIG_SMP configurations on Armada XP, Armada 375 and Armada 38x (which are multiple cores processors), but will no longer be used on Armada 370 (which is a single core processor).

In the process, it simplifies the implementation of the coherency_type() function, and adds a missing call to of_node_put().

---
 arch/arm/mach-mvebu/coherency.c |   46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

@@ -361,25 +361,41 @@ static int coherency_type(void)
 {
 	struct device_node *np;
 	const struct of_device_id *match;
+	int type;
+
+	/*
+	 * The coherency fabric is needed:
+	 * - For coherency between processors on Armada XP, so only
+	 *   when SMP is enabled.
+	 * - For coherency between the processor and I/O devices, but
+	 *   this coherency requires many pre-requisites (write
+	 *   allocate cache policy, shareable pages, SMP bit set) that
+	 *   are only meant in SMP situations.
+	 *
+	 * Note that this means that on Armada 370, there is currently
+	 * no way to use hardware I/O coherency, because even when
+	 * CONFIG_SMP is enabled, is_smp() returns false due to the
+	 * Armada 370 being a single-core processor. To lift this
+	 * limitation, we would have to find a way to make the cache
+	 * policy set to write-allocate (on all Armada SoCs), and to
+	 * set the shareable attribute in page tables (on all Armada
+	 * SoCs except the Armada 370). Unfortunately, such decisions
+	 * are taken very early in the kernel boot process, at a point
+	 * where we don't know yet on which SoC we are running.
+
+	 */
+	if (!is_smp())
+		return COHERENCY_FABRIC_TYPE_NONE;
 
 	np = of_find_matching_node_and_match(NULL, of_coherency_table, &match);
-	if (np) {
-		int type = (int) match->data;
+	if (!np)
+		return COHERENCY_FABRIC_TYPE_NONE;
+
+	type = (int) match->data;
 
-		/* Armada 370/XP coherency works in both UP and SMP */
-		if (type == COHERENCY_FABRIC_TYPE_ARMADA_370_XP)
-			return type;
-
-		/* Armada 375 coherency works only on SMP */
-		else if (type == COHERENCY_FABRIC_TYPE_ARMADA_375 && is_smp())
-			return type;
-
-		/* Armada 380 coherency works only on SMP */
-		else if (type == COHERENCY_FABRIC_TYPE_ARMADA_380 && is_smp())
-			return type;
-	}
+	of_node_put(np);
 
-	return COHERENCY_FABRIC_TYPE_NONE;
+	return type;
 }
 
 int coherency_available(void)

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>

commit 7ddc6a2199f1da405a2fb68c40db8899b1a8cd87 upstream.

These functions can be executed on the int3 stack, so kprobes are dangerous. Tracing is probably a bad idea, too.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_int3);
  * for scheduling or signal handling. The actual stack switch is done in
  * entry.S
  */
-asmlinkage __visible struct pt_regs *sync_regs(struct pt_regs *eregs)
+asmlinkage __visible notrace struct pt_regs *sync_regs(struct pt_regs *eregs)
 {
 	struct pt_regs *regs = eregs;
 	/* Did already sync */

@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ struct bad_iret_stack {
 	struct pt_regs regs;
 };
 
-asmlinkage __visible
+asmlinkage __visible notrace
 struct bad_iret_stack *fixup_bad_iret(struct bad_iret_stack *s)
 {
 	/*

@@ -436,6 +436,7 @@ struct bad_iret_stack *fixup_bad_iret(st
 	BUG_ON(!user_mode_vm(&new_stack->regs));
 	return new_stack;
 }
+NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(fixup_bad_iret);
 #endif
 
 /*

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>

commit 3fb2f4237bb452eb4e98f6a5dbd5a445b4fed9d0 upstream.

It turns out that there's a lurking ABI issue. GCC, when compiling this in a 32-bit program:

struct user_desc desc = {
	.entry_number    = idx,
	.base_addr       = base,
	.limit           = 0xfffff,
	.seg_32bit       = 1,
	.contents        = 0, /* Data, grow-up */
	.read_exec_only  = 0,
	.limit_in_pages  = 1,
	.seg_not_present = 0,
	.useable         = 0,
};

will leave .lm uninitialized. This means that anything in the kernel that reads user_desc.lm for 32-bit tasks is unreliable.

Revert the .lm check in set_thread_area(). The value never did anything in the first place.

---
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ldt.h |    7 +++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/tls.c           |    6 ------
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

@@ -28,6 +28,13 @@ struct user_desc {
 	unsigned int  seg_not_present:1;
 	unsigned int  useable:1;
 #ifdef __x86_64__
+	/*
+	 * Because this bit is not present in 32-bit user code, user
+	 * programs can pass uninitialized values here.  Therefore, in
+	 * any context in which a user_desc comes from a 32-bit program,
+	 * the kernel must act as though lm == 0, regardless of the
+	 * actual value.
+	 */
 	unsigned int  lm:1;
 #endif
 };

@@ -55,12 +55,6 @@ static bool tls_desc_okay(const struct u
 	if (info->seg_not_present)
 		return false;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-	/* The L bit makes no sense for data. */
-	if (info->lm)
-		return false;
-#endif
-
 	return true;
 }
 

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

commit 4e2024624e678f0ebb916e6192bd23c1f9fdf696 upstream.

We didn't check length of rock ridge ER records before printing them. Thus corrupted isofs image can cause us to access and print some memory behind the buffer with obvious consequences.

---
 fs/isofs/rock.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -362,6 +362,9 @@ repeat:
 			rs.cont_size = isonum_733(rr->u.CE.size);
 			break;
 		case SIG('E', 'R'):
+			/* Invalid length of ER tag id? */
+			if (rr->u.ER.len_id + offsetof(struct rock_ridge, u.ER.data) > rr->len)
+				goto out;
 			ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock = 1;
 			printk(KERN_DEBUG "ISO 9660 Extensions: ");
 			{

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

commit b26bdde5bb27f3f900e25a95e33a0c476c8c2c48 upstream.

When loading encrypted-keys module, if the last check of aes_get_sizes() in init_encrypted() fails, the driver just returns an error without unregistering its key type. This results in the stale entry in the list. In addition to memory leaks, this leads to a kernel crash when registering a new key type later.

This patch fixes the problem by swapping the calls of aes_get_sizes() and register_key_type(), and releasing resources properly at the error paths.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=908163

---
 security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1018,10 +1018,13 @@ static int __init init_encrypted(void)
 	ret = encrypted_shash_alloc();
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
+	ret = aes_get_sizes();
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
 	ret = register_key_type(&key_type_encrypted);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out;
-	return aes_get_sizes();
+	return 0;
 out:
 	encrypted_shash_release();
 	return ret;

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>

commit 28a9bc68124c319b2b3dc861e80828a8865fd1ba upstream.

When writing the code to allow per-station GTKs, I neglected to take into account the management frame keys (index 4 and 5) when freeing the station and only added code to free the first four data frame keys.

Fix this by iterating the array of keys over the right length.

---
 net/mac80211/key.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ void ieee80211_free_sta_keys(struct ieee
 	int i;
 
 	mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx);
-	for (i = 0; i < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sta->gtk); i++) {
 		key = key_mtx_dereference(local, sta->gtk[i]);
 		if (!key)
 			continue;

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

commit c297abfdf15b4480704d6b566ca5ca9438b12456 upstream.

While reviewing the code of umount_tree I realized that when we append to a preexisting unmounted list we do not change pprev of the former first item in the list.

Which means later in namespace_unlock hlist_del_init(&mnt->mnt_hash) on the former first item of the list will stomp unmounted.first leaving it set to some random mount point which we are likely to free soon.

This isn't likely to hit, but if it does I don't know how anyone could track it down.

[ This happened because we don't have all the same operations for
hlist's as we do for normal doubly-linked lists. In particular, list_splice() is easy on our standard doubly-linked lists, while hlist_splice() doesn't exist and needs both start/end entries of the hlist. And commit 38129a13e6e7 incorrectly open-coded that missing hlist_splice().

We should think about making these kinds of "mindless" conversions
easier to get right by adding the missing hlist helpers - Linus ]

---
 fs/namespace.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -1286,6 +1286,8 @@ void umount_tree(struct mount *mnt, int
 	}
 	if (last) {
 		last->mnt_hash.next = unmounted.first;
+		if (unmounted.first)
+			unmounted.first->pprev = &last->mnt_hash.next;
 		unmounted.first = tmp_list.first;
 		unmounted.first->pprev = &unmounted.first;
 	}

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>

commit 9d367e5e7b05c71a8c1ac4e9b6e00ba45a79f2fc upstream.

thermal_unregister_governors() and class_unregister() were being called in the wrong order.

---
 drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1824,10 +1824,10 @@ static int __init thermal_init(void)
 
 exit_netlink:
 	genetlink_exit();
-unregister_governors:
-	thermal_unregister_governors();
 unregister_class:
 	class_unregister(&thermal_class);
+unregister_governors:
+	thermal_unregister_governors();
 error:
 	idr_destroy(&thermal_tz_idr);
 	idr_destroy(&thermal_cdev_idr);

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

commit 3e1866410f11356a9fd869beb3e95983dc79c067 upstream.

Now that remount is properly enforcing the rule that you can't remove nodev at least sandstorm.io is breaking when performing a remount.

It turns out that there is an easy intuitive solution implicitly add nodev on remount when nodev was implicitly added on mount.

---
 fs/namespace.c |    8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1957,7 +1957,13 @@ static int do_remount(struct path *path,
 	}
 	if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NODEV) &&
 	    !(mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV)) {
-		return -EPERM;
+		/* Was the nodev implicitly added in mount? */
+		if ((mnt->mnt_ns->user_ns != &init_user_ns) &&
+		    !(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT)) {
+			mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV;
+		} else {
+			return -EPERM;
+		}
 	}
 	if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NOSUID) &&
 	    !(mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)) {

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

commit 4a44a19b470a886997d6647a77bb3e38dcbfa8c5 upstream.

- MNT_NODEV should be irrelevant except when reading back mount flags, no longer specify MNT_NODEV on remount.

- Test MNT_NODEV on devpts where it is meaningful even for unprivileged mounts.

- Add a test to verify that remount of a prexisting mount with the same flags is allowed and does not change those flags.

- Cleanup up the definitions of MS_REC, MS_RELATIME, MS_STRICTATIME that are used when the code is built in an environment without them.

- Correct the test error messages when tests fail. There were not 5 tests that tested MS_RELATIME.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/mount/unprivileged-remount-test.c |  172 +++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 142 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/mount.h>
 #include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/vfs.h>
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>

@@ -32,11 +34,14 @@
 # define CLONE_NEWPID 0x20000000
 #endif
 
+#ifndef MS_REC
+# define MS_REC 16384
+#endif
 #ifndef MS_RELATIME
-#define MS_RELATIME (1 << 21)
+# define MS_RELATIME (1 << 21)
 #endif
 #ifndef MS_STRICTATIME
-#define MS_STRICTATIME (1 << 24)
+# define MS_STRICTATIME (1 << 24)
 #endif
 
 static void die(char *fmt, ...)

@@ -87,6 +92,45 @@ static void write_file(char *filename, c
 	}
 }
 
+static int read_mnt_flags(const char *path)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct statvfs stat;
+	int mnt_flags;
+
+	ret = statvfs(path, &stat);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		die("statvfs of %s failed: %s\n",
+			path, strerror(errno));
+	}
+	if (stat.f_flag & ~(ST_RDONLY | ST_NOSUID | ST_NODEV | \
+			ST_NOEXEC | ST_NOATIME | ST_NODIRATIME | ST_RELATIME | \
+			ST_SYNCHRONOUS | ST_MANDLOCK)) {
+		die("Unrecognized mount flags\n");
+	}
+	mnt_flags = 0;
+	if (stat.f_flag & ST_RDONLY)
+		mnt_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
+	if (stat.f_flag & ST_NOSUID)
+		mnt_flags |= MS_NOSUID;
+	if (stat.f_flag & ST_NODEV)
+		mnt_flags |= MS_NODEV;
+	if (stat.f_flag & ST_NOEXEC)
+		mnt_flags |= MS_NOEXEC;
+	if (stat.f_flag & ST_NOATIME)
+		mnt_flags |= MS_NOATIME;
+	if (stat.f_flag & ST_NODIRATIME)
+		mnt_flags |= MS_NODIRATIME;
+	if (stat.f_flag & ST_RELATIME)
+		mnt_flags |= MS_RELATIME;
+	if (stat.f_flag & ST_SYNCHRONOUS)
+		mnt_flags |= MS_SYNCHRONOUS;
+	if (stat.f_flag & ST_MANDLOCK)
+		mnt_flags |= ST_MANDLOCK;
+
+	return mnt_flags;
+}
+
 static void create_and_enter_userns(void)
 {
 	uid_t uid;

@@ -118,7 +162,8 @@ static void create_and_enter_userns(void
 }
 
 static
-bool test_unpriv_remount(int mount_flags, int remount_flags, int invalid_flags)
+bool test_unpriv_remount(const char *fstype, const char *mount_options,
+			 int mount_flags, int remount_flags, int invalid_flags)
 {
 	pid_t child;
 

@@ -151,9 +196,11 @@ bool test_unpriv_remount(int mount_flags
 			strerror(errno));
 	}
 
-	if (mount("testing", "/tmp", "ramfs", mount_flags, NULL) != 0) {
-		die("mount of /tmp failed: %s\n",
-			strerror(errno));
+	if (mount("testing", "/tmp", fstype, mount_flags, mount_options) != 0) {
+		die("mount of %s with options '%s' on /tmp failed: %s\n",
+		    fstype,
+		    mount_options? mount_options : "",
+		    strerror(errno));
 	}
 
 	create_and_enter_userns();

@@ -181,62 +228,127 @@ bool test_unpriv_remount(int mount_flags
 
 static bool test_unpriv_remount_simple(int mount_flags)
 {
-	return test_unpriv_remount(mount_flags, mount_flags, 0);
+	return test_unpriv_remount("ramfs", NULL, mount_flags, mount_flags, 0);
 }
 
 static bool test_unpriv_remount_atime(int mount_flags, int invalid_flags)
 {
-	return test_unpriv_remount(mount_flags, mount_flags, invalid_flags);
+	return test_unpriv_remount("ramfs", NULL, mount_flags, mount_flags,
+				   invalid_flags);
+}
+
+static bool test_priv_mount_unpriv_remount(void)
+{
+	pid_t child;
+	int ret;
+	const char *orig_path = "/dev";
+	const char *dest_path = "/tmp";
+	int orig_mnt_flags, remount_mnt_flags;
+
+	child = fork();
+	if (child == -1) {
+		die("fork failed: %s\n",
+			strerror(errno));
+	}
+	if (child != 0) { /* parent */
+		pid_t pid;
+		int status;
+		pid = waitpid(child, &status, 0);
+		if (pid == -1) {
+			die("waitpid failed: %s\n",
+				strerror(errno));
+		}
+		if (pid != child) {
+			die("waited for %d got %d\n",
+				child, pid);
+		}
+		if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
+			die("child did not terminate cleanly\n");
+		}
+		return WEXITSTATUS(status) == EXIT_SUCCESS ? true : false;
+	}
+
+	orig_mnt_flags = read_mnt_flags(orig_path);
+
+	create_and_enter_userns();
+	ret = unshare(CLONE_NEWNS);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		die("unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) failed: %s\n",
+			strerror(errno));
+	}
+
+	ret = mount(orig_path, dest_path, "bind", MS_BIND | MS_REC, NULL);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		die("recursive bind mount of %s onto %s failed: %s\n",
+			orig_path, dest_path, strerror(errno));
+	}
+
+	ret = mount(dest_path, dest_path, "none",
+		    MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND | orig_mnt_flags , NULL);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		/* system("cat /proc/self/mounts"); */
+		die("remount of /tmp failed: %s\n",
+		    strerror(errno));
+	}
+
+	remount_mnt_flags = read_mnt_flags(dest_path);
+	if (orig_mnt_flags != remount_mnt_flags) {
+		die("Mount flags unexpectedly changed during remount of %s originally mounted on %s\n",
+			dest_path, orig_path);
+	}
+	exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
 }
 
 int main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
-	if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_RDONLY|MS_NODEV)) {
+	if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_RDONLY)) {
 		die("MS_RDONLY malfunctions\n");
 	}
-	if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_NODEV)) {
+	if (!test_unpriv_remount("devpts", "newinstance", MS_NODEV, MS_NODEV, 0)) {
 		die("MS_NODEV malfunctions\n");
 	}
-	if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV)) {
+	if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_NOSUID)) {
 		die("MS_NOSUID malfunctions\n");
 	}
-	if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV)) {
+	if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_NOEXEC)) {
 		die("MS_NOEXEC malfunctions\n");
 	}
-	if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_RELATIME|MS_NODEV,
-				       MS_NOATIME|MS_NODEV))
+	if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_RELATIME,
+				       MS_NOATIME))
 	{
 		die("MS_RELATIME malfunctions\n");
 	}
-	if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODEV,
-				       MS_NOATIME|MS_NODEV))
+	if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_STRICTATIME,
+				       MS_NOATIME))
 	{
 		die("MS_STRICTATIME malfunctions\n");
 	}
-	if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_NOATIME|MS_NODEV,
-				       MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODEV))
+	if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_NOATIME,
+				       MS_STRICTATIME))
 	{
-		die("MS_RELATIME malfunctions\n");
+		die("MS_NOATIME malfunctions\n");
 	}
-	if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_RELATIME|MS_NODIRATIME|MS_NODEV,
-				       MS_NOATIME|MS_NODEV))
+	if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_RELATIME|MS_NODIRATIME,
+				       MS_NOATIME))
 	{
-		die("MS_RELATIME malfunctions\n");
+		die("MS_RELATIME|MS_NODIRATIME malfunctions\n");
 	}
-	if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODIRATIME|MS_NODEV,
-				       MS_NOATIME|MS_NODEV))
+	if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODIRATIME,
+				       MS_NOATIME))
 	{
-		die("MS_RELATIME malfunctions\n");
+		die("MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODIRATIME malfunctions\n");
 	}
-	if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_NOATIME|MS_NODIRATIME|MS_NODEV,
-				       MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODEV))
+	if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_NOATIME|MS_NODIRATIME,
+				       MS_STRICTATIME))
 	{
-		die("MS_RELATIME malfunctions\n");
+		die("MS_NOATIME|MS_DIRATIME malfunctions\n");
 	}
-	if (!test_unpriv_remount(MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODEV, MS_NODEV,
-				 MS_NOATIME|MS_NODEV))
+	if (!test_unpriv_remount("ramfs", NULL, MS_STRICTATIME, 0, MS_NOATIME))
 	{
 		die("Default atime malfunctions\n");
 	}
+	if (!test_priv_mount_unpriv_remount()) {
+		die("Mount flags unexpectedly changed after remount\n");
+	}
 	return EXIT_SUCCESS;
 }

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

commit b2f5d4dc38e034eecb7987e513255265ff9aa1cf upstream.

Forced unmount affects not just the mount namespace but the underlying superblock as well. Restrict forced unmount to the global root user for now. Otherwise it becomes possible a user in a less privileged mount namespace to force the shutdown of a superblock of a filesystem in a more privileged mount namespace, allowing a DOS attack on root.

---
 fs/namespace.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -1432,6 +1432,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(umount, char __user *, n
 		goto dput_and_out;
 	if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
 		goto dput_and_out;
+	retval = -EPERM;
+	if (flags & MNT_FORCE && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		goto dput_and_out;
 
 	retval = do_umount(mnt, flags);
 dput_and_out:

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

commit 7ff4d90b4c24a03666f296c3d4878cd39001e81e upstream.

Today there are 3 instances of setgroups and due to an oversight their permission checking has diverged. Add a common function so that they may all share the same permission checking code.

This corrects the current oversight in the current permission checks and adds a helper to avoid this in the future.

A user namespace security fix will update this new helper, shortly.

---
 arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c |    2 +-
 include/linux/cred.h            |    1 +
 kernel/groups.c                 |    9 ++++++++-
 kernel/uid16.c                  |    2 +-
 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(s390_setgroups16,
 	struct group_info *group_info;
 	int retval;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SETGID))
+	if (!may_setgroups())
 		return -EPERM;
 	if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;

@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ extern void groups_free(struct group_inf
 extern int set_current_groups(struct group_info *);
 extern void set_groups(struct cred *, struct group_info *);
 extern int groups_search(const struct group_info *, kgid_t);
+extern bool may_setgroups(void);
 
 /* access the groups "array" with this macro */
 #define GROUP_AT(gi, i) \

@@ -213,6 +213,13 @@ out:
 	return i;
 }
 
+bool may_setgroups(void)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
+
+	return ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SETGID);
+}
+
 /*
  *	SMP: Our groups are copy-on-write. We can set them safely
  *	without another task interfering.

@@ -223,7 +230,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setgroups, int, gidsetsi
 	struct group_info *group_info;
 	int retval;
 
-	if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETGID))
+	if (!may_setgroups())
 		return -EPERM;
 	if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;

@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setgroups16, int, gidset
 	struct group_info *group_info;
 	int retval;
 
-	if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETGID))
+	if (!may_setgroups())
 		return -EPERM;
 	if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

commit 0542f17bf2c1f2430d368f44c8fcf2f82ec9e53e upstream.

The rule is simple. Don't allow anything that wouldn't be allowed without unprivileged mappings.

It was previously overlooked that establishing gid mappings would allow dropping groups and potentially gaining permission to files and directories that had lesser permissions for a specific group than for all other users.

This is the rule needed to fix CVE-2014-8989 and prevent any other security issues with new_idmap_permitted.

The reason for this rule is that the unix permission model is old and there are programs out there somewhere that take advantage of every little corner of it. So allowing a uid or gid mapping to be established without privielge that would allow anything that would not be allowed without that mapping will result in expectations from some code somewhere being violated. Violated expectations about the behavior of the OS is a long way to say a security issue.

---
 kernel/user_namespace.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -812,7 +812,9 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const st
 				struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,
 				struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
 {
-	/* Allow mapping to your own filesystem ids */
+	/* Don't allow mappings that would allow anything that wouldn't
+	 * be allowed without the establishment of unprivileged mappings.
+	 */
 	if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1)) {
 		u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first;
 		if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) {

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

commit 273d2c67c3e179adb1e74f403d1e9a06e3f841b5 upstream.

setgroups is unique in not needing a valid mapping before it can be called, in the case of setgroups(0, NULL) which drops all supplemental groups.

The design of the user namespace assumes that CAP_SETGID can not actually be used until a gid mapping is established. Therefore add a helper function to see if the user namespace gid mapping has been established and call that function in the setgroups permission check.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2014-8989, being able to drop groups without privilege using user namespaces.

---
 include/linux/user_namespace.h |    5 +++++
 kernel/groups.c                |    4 +++-
 kernel/user_namespace.c        |   14 ++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ extern const struct seq_operations proc_
 extern ssize_t proc_uid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern ssize_t proc_gid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
+extern bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns);
 #else
 
 static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)

@@ -87,6 +88,10 @@ static inline void put_user_ns(struct us
 {
 }
 
+static inline bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+	return true;
+}
 #endif
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_USER_H */

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
 /* init to 2 - one for init_task, one to ensure it is never freed */

@@ -217,7 +218,8 @@ bool may_setgroups(void)
 {
 	struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
 
-	return ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SETGID);
+	return ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SETGID) &&
+		userns_may_setgroups(user_ns);
 }
 
 /*

@@ -843,6 +843,20 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const st
 	return false;
 }
 
+bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+	bool allowed;
+
+	mutex_lock(&id_map_mutex);
+	/* It is not safe to use setgroups until a gid mapping in
+	 * the user namespace has been established.
+	 */
+	allowed = ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0;
+	mutex_unlock(&id_map_mutex);
+
+	return allowed;
+}
+
 static void *userns_get(struct task_struct *task)
 {
 	struct user_namespace *user_ns;

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

commit be7c6dba2332cef0677fbabb606e279ae76652c3 upstream.

As any gid mapping will allow and must allow for backwards compatibility dropping groups don't allow any gid mappings to be established without CAP_SETGID in the parent user namespace.

For a small class of applications this change breaks userspace and removes useful functionality. This small class of applications includes tools/testing/selftests/mount/unprivilged-remount-test.c

Most of the removed functionality will be added back with the addition of a one way knob to disable setgroups. Once setgroups is disabled setting the gid_map becomes as safe as setting the uid_map.

For more common applications that set the uid_map and the gid_map with privilege this change will have no affect.

This is part of a fix for CVE-2014-8989.

---
 kernel/user_namespace.c |    4 ----
 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)

@@ -821,10 +821,6 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const st
 			kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
 			if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->fsuid))
 				return true;
-		} else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
-			kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id);
-			if (gid_eq(gid, file->f_cred->fsgid))
-				return true;
 		}
 	}
 

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

commit 80dd00a23784b384ccea049bfb3f259d3f973b9d upstream.

setresuid allows the euid to be set to any of uid, euid, suid, and fsuid. Therefor it is safe to allow an unprivileged user to map their euid and use CAP_SETUID privileged with exactly that uid, as no new credentials can be obtained.

I can not find a combination of existing system calls that allows setting uid, euid, suid, and fsuid from the fsuid making the previous use of fsuid for allowing unprivileged mappings a bug.

This is part of a fix for CVE-2014-8989.

---
 kernel/user_namespace.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -819,7 +819,7 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const st
 		u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first;
 		if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) {
 			kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
-			if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->fsuid))
+			if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->euid))
 				return true;
 		}
 	}

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

commit f95d7918bd1e724675de4940039f2865e5eec5fe upstream.

If you did not create the user namespace and are allowed to write to uid_map or gid_map you should already have the necessary privilege in the parent user namespace to establish any mapping you want so this will not affect userspace in practice.

Limiting unprivileged uid mapping establishment to the creator of the user namespace makes it easier to verify all credentials obtained with the uid mapping can be obtained without the uid mapping without privilege.

Limiting unprivileged gid mapping establishment (which is temporarily absent) to the creator of the user namespace also ensures that the combination of uid and gid can already be obtained without privilege.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2014-8989.

---
 kernel/user_namespace.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -812,14 +812,16 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const st
 				struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,
 				struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
 {
+	const struct cred *cred = file->f_cred;
 	/* Don't allow mappings that would allow anything that wouldn't
 	 * be allowed without the establishment of unprivileged mappings.
 	 */
-	if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1)) {
+	if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1) &&
+	    uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) {
 		u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first;
 		if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) {
 			kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
-			if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->euid))
+			if (uid_eq(uid, cred->euid))
 				return true;
 		}
 	}

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

commit f0d62aec931e4ae3333c797d346dc4f188f454ba upstream.

Generalize id_map_mutex so it can be used for more state of a user namespace.

---
 kernel/user_namespace.c |   14 ++++++--------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
 
 static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly;
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
 
 static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
 				struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,

@@ -583,9 +584,6 @@ static bool mappings_overlap(struct uid_
 	return false;
 }
 
-
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(id_map_mutex);
-
 static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 			 size_t count, loff_t *ppos,
 			 int cap_setid,

@@ -602,7 +600,7 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *fi
 	ssize_t ret = -EINVAL;
 
 	/*
-	 * The id_map_mutex serializes all writes to any given map.
+	 * The userns_state_mutex serializes all writes to any given map.
 	 *
 	 * Any map is only ever written once.
 	 *

@@ -620,7 +618,7 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *fi
 	 * order and smp_rmb() is guaranteed that we don't have crazy
 	 * architectures returning stale data.
 	 */
-	mutex_lock(&id_map_mutex);
+	mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
 
 	ret = -EPERM;
 	/* Only allow one successful write to the map */

@@ -750,7 +748,7 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *fi
 	*ppos = count;
 	ret = count;
 out:
-	mutex_unlock(&id_map_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
 	if (page)
 		free_page(page);
 	return ret;

@@ -845,12 +843,12 @@ bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct u
 {
 	bool allowed;
 
-	mutex_lock(&id_map_mutex);
+	mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
 	/* It is not safe to use setgroups until a gid mapping in
 	 * the user namespace has been established.
 	 */
 	allowed = ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0;
-	mutex_unlock(&id_map_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
 
 	return allowed;
 }

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

commit 9cc46516ddf497ea16e8d7cb986ae03a0f6b92f8 upstream.

- Expose the knob to user space through a proc file /proc/<pid>/setgroups

A value of "deny" means the setgroups system call is disabled in the current processes user namespace and can not be enabled in the future in this user namespace.

A value of "allow" means the segtoups system call is enabled.

- Descendant user namespaces inherit the value of setgroups from their parents.

- A proc file is used (instead of a sysctl) as sysctls currently do not allow checking the permissions at open time.

- Writing to the proc file is restricted to before the gid_map for the user namespace is set.

This ensures that disabling setgroups at a user namespace level will never remove the ability to call setgroups from a process that already has that ability.

A process may opt in to the setgroups disable for itself by creating, entering and configuring a user namespace or by calling setns on an existing user namespace with setgroups disabled. Processes without privileges already can not call setgroups so this is a noop. Prodcess with privilege become processes without privilege when entering a user namespace and as with any other path to dropping privilege they would not have the ability to call setgroups. So this remains within the bounds of what is possible without a knob to disable setgroups permanently in a user namespace.

---
 fs/proc/base.c                 |   53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/user_namespace.h |    7 +++
 kernel/user.c                  |    1 
 kernel/user_namespace.c        |   85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 146 insertions(+)

@@ -2493,6 +2493,57 @@ static const struct file_operations proc
 	.llseek		= seq_lseek,
 	.release	= proc_id_map_release,
 };
+
+static int proc_setgroups_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *ns = NULL;
+	struct task_struct *task;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = -ESRCH;
+	task = get_proc_task(inode);
+	if (task) {
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		ns = get_user_ns(task_cred_xxx(task, user_ns));
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		put_task_struct(task);
+	}
+	if (!ns)
+		goto err;
+
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
+		ret = -EACCES;
+		if (!ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+			goto err_put_ns;
+	}
+
+	ret = single_open(file, &proc_setgroups_show, ns);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_put_ns;
+
+	return 0;
+err_put_ns:
+	put_user_ns(ns);
+err:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int proc_setgroups_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
+	struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
+	int ret = single_release(inode, file);
+	put_user_ns(ns);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations proc_setgroups_operations = {
+	.open		= proc_setgroups_open,
+	.write		= proc_setgroups_write,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek		= seq_lseek,
+	.release	= proc_setgroups_release,
+};
 #endif /* CONFIG_USER_NS */
 
 static int proc_pid_personality(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,

@@ -2601,6 +2652,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_
 	REG("uid_map",    S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_uid_map_operations),
 	REG("gid_map",    S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_gid_map_operations),
 	REG("projid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_projid_map_operations),
+	REG("setgroups",  S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_setgroups_operations),
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
 	REG("timers",	  S_IRUGO, proc_timers_operations),

@@ -2944,6 +2996,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_s
 	REG("uid_map",    S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_uid_map_operations),
 	REG("gid_map",    S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_gid_map_operations),
 	REG("projid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_projid_map_operations),
+	REG("setgroups",  S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_setgroups_operations),
 #endif
 };
 

@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ struct uid_gid_map {	/* 64 bytes -- 1 ca
 	} extent[UID_GID_MAP_MAX_EXTENTS];
 };
 
+#define USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED 1UL
+
+#define USERNS_INIT_FLAGS USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED
+
 struct user_namespace {
 	struct uid_gid_map	uid_map;
 	struct uid_gid_map	gid_map;

@@ -27,6 +31,7 @@ struct user_namespace {
 	kuid_t			owner;
 	kgid_t			group;
 	unsigned int		proc_inum;
+	unsigned long		flags;
 
 	/* Register of per-UID persistent keyrings for this namespace */
 #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS

@@ -63,6 +68,8 @@ extern const struct seq_operations proc_
 extern ssize_t proc_uid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern ssize_t proc_gid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
+extern ssize_t proc_setgroups_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
+extern int proc_setgroups_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
 extern bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns);
 #else
 

@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ struct user_namespace init_user_ns = {
 	.owner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
 	.group = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
 	.proc_inum = PROC_USER_INIT_INO,
+	.flags = USERNS_INIT_FLAGS,
 #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
 	.persistent_keyring_register_sem =
 	__RWSEM_INITIALIZER(init_user_ns.persistent_keyring_register_sem),

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

commit 66d2f338ee4c449396b6f99f5e75cd18eb6df272 upstream.

Now that setgroups can be disabled and not reenabled, setting gid_map without privielge can now be enabled when setgroups is disabled.

This restores most of the functionality that was lost when unprivileged setting of gid_map was removed. Applications that use this functionality will need to check to see if they use setgroups or init_groups, and if they don't they can be fixed by simply disabling setgroups before writing to gid_map.

---
 kernel/user_namespace.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -826,6 +826,11 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const st
 			kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
 			if (uid_eq(uid, cred->euid))
 				return true;
+		} else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
+			kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id);
+			if (!(ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED) &&
+			    gid_eq(gid, cred->egid))
+				return true;
 		}
 	}
 

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

commit db86da7cb76f797a1a8b445166a15cb922c6ff85 upstream.

A security fix in caused the way the unprivileged remount tests were using user namespaces to break. Tweak the way user namespaces are being used so the test works again.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/mount/unprivileged-remount-test.c |   32 ++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -53,17 +53,14 @@ static void die(char *fmt, ...)
 	exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
 }
 
-static void write_file(char *filename, char *fmt, ...)
+static void vmaybe_write_file(bool enoent_ok, char *filename, char *fmt, va_list ap)
 {
 	char buf[4096];
 	int fd;
 	ssize_t written;
 	int buf_len;
-	va_list ap;
 
-	va_start(ap, fmt);
 	buf_len = vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, ap);
-	va_end(ap);
 	if (buf_len < 0) {
 		die("vsnprintf failed: %s\n",
 		    strerror(errno));

@@ -74,6 +71,8 @@ static void write_file(char *filename, c
 
 	fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY);
 	if (fd < 0) {
+		if ((errno == ENOENT) && enoent_ok)
+			return;
 		die("open of %s failed: %s\n",
 		    filename, strerror(errno));
 	}

@@ -92,6 +91,26 @@ static void write_file(char *filename, c
 	}
 }
 
+static void maybe_write_file(char *filename, char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	vmaybe_write_file(true, filename, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+
+}
+
+static void write_file(char *filename, char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	vmaybe_write_file(false, filename, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+
+}
+
 static int read_mnt_flags(const char *path)
 {
 	int ret;

@@ -144,13 +163,10 @@ static void create_and_enter_userns(void
 			strerror(errno));
 	}
 
+	maybe_write_file("/proc/self/setgroups", "deny");
 	write_file("/proc/self/uid_map", "0 %d 1", uid);
 	write_file("/proc/self/gid_map", "0 %d 1", gid);
 
-	if (setgroups(0, NULL) != 0) {
-		die("setgroups failed: %s\n",
-			strerror(errno));
-	}
 	if (setgid(0) != 0) {
 		die ("setgid(0) failed %s\n",
 			strerror(errno));

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>

commit 54dc77d974a50147d6639dac6f59cb2c29207161 upstream.

Eric Paris explains: Since kauditd_send_multicast_skb() gets called in audit_log_end(), which can come from any context (aka even a sleeping context) GFP_KERNEL can't be used. Since the audit_buffer knows what context it should use, pass that down and use that.

See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/12/16/542

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slab.c:2849

in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 885, name: sulogin
2 locks held by sulogin/885:
#0: (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff91152e30>] prepare_bprm_creds+0x28/0x8b #1: (tty_files_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff9123e787>] selinux_bprm_committing_creds+0x55/0x22b

CPU: 1 PID: 885 Comm: sulogin Not tainted 3.18.0-next-20141216 #30
Hardware name: Dell Inc. Latitude E6530/07Y85M, BIOS A15 06/20/2014
  ffff880223744f10 ffff88022410f9b8 ffffffff916ba529 0000000000000375
  ffff880223744f10 ffff88022410f9e8 ffffffff91063185 0000000000000006
  0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff88022410fa38
Call Trace:
  [<ffffffff916ba529>] dump_stack+0x50/0xa8
  [<ffffffff91063185>] ___might_sleep+0x1b6/0x1be
  [<ffffffff910632a6>] __might_sleep+0x119/0x128
  [<ffffffff91140720>] cache_alloc_debugcheck_before.isra.45+0x1d/0x1f
  [<ffffffff91141d81>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x43/0x1c9
  [<ffffffff914e148d>] __alloc_skb+0x42/0x1a3
  [<ffffffff914e2b62>] skb_copy+0x3e/0xa3
  [<ffffffff910c263e>] audit_log_end+0x83/0x100
  [<ffffffff9123b8d3>] ? avc_audit_pre_callback+0x103/0x103
  [<ffffffff91252a73>] common_lsm_audit+0x441/0x450
  [<ffffffff9123c163>] slow_avc_audit+0x63/0x67
  [<ffffffff9123c42c>] avc_has_perm+0xca/0xe3
  [<ffffffff9123dc2d>] inode_has_perm+0x5a/0x65
  [<ffffffff9123e7ca>] selinux_bprm_committing_creds+0x98/0x22b
  [<ffffffff91239e64>] security_bprm_committing_creds+0xe/0x10
  [<ffffffff911515e6>] install_exec_creds+0xe/0x79
  [<ffffffff911974cf>] load_elf_binary+0xe36/0x10d7
  [<ffffffff9115198e>] search_binary_handler+0x81/0x18c
  [<ffffffff91153376>] do_execveat_common.isra.31+0x4e3/0x7b7
  [<ffffffff91153669>] do_execve+0x1f/0x21
  [<ffffffff91153967>] SyS_execve+0x25/0x29
  [<ffffffff916c61a9>] stub_execve+0x69/0xa0

---
 kernel/audit.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ static void kauditd_send_skb(struct sk_b
  * This function doesn't consume an skb as might be expected since it has to
  * copy it anyways.
  */
-static void kauditd_send_multicast_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
+static void kauditd_send_multicast_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t gfp_mask)
 {
 	struct sk_buff		*copy;
 	struct audit_net	*aunet = net_generic(&init_net, audit_net_id);

@@ -448,11 +448,11 @@ static void kauditd_send_multicast_skb(s
 	 * no reason for new multicast clients to continue with this
 	 * non-compliance.
 	 */
-	copy = skb_copy(skb, GFP_KERNEL);
+	copy = skb_copy(skb, gfp_mask);
 	if (!copy)
 		return;
 
-	nlmsg_multicast(sock, copy, 0, AUDIT_NLGRP_READLOG, GFP_KERNEL);
+	nlmsg_multicast(sock, copy, 0, AUDIT_NLGRP_READLOG, gfp_mask);
 }
 
 /*

@@ -1959,7 +1959,7 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *
 	} else {
 		struct nlmsghdr *nlh = nlmsg_hdr(ab->skb);
 
-		kauditd_send_multicast_skb(ab->skb);
+		kauditd_send_multicast_skb(ab->skb, ab->gfp_mask);
 
 		/*
 		 * The original kaudit unicast socket sends up messages with

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

commit 3640dcfa4fd00cd91d88bb86250bdb496f7070c0 upstream.

Commit f1dc4867 ("audit: anchor all pid references in the initial pid namespace") introduced a find_vpid() call when adding/removing audit rules with PID/PPID filters; unfortunately this is problematic as find_vpid() only works if there is a task with the associated PID alive on the system. The following commands demonstrate a simple reproducer.

	# auditctl -D
	# auditctl -l
	# autrace /bin/true
	# auditctl -l

This patch resolves the problem by simply using the PID provided by the user without any additional validation, e.g. no calls to check to see if the task/PID exists.

---
 kernel/auditfilter.c |   13 -------------
 1 file changed, 13 deletions(-)

@@ -433,19 +433,6 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to
 			f->val = 0;
 		}
 
-		if ((f->type == AUDIT_PID) || (f->type == AUDIT_PPID)) {
-			struct pid *pid;
-			rcu_read_lock();
-			pid = find_vpid(f->val);
-			if (!pid) {
-				rcu_read_unlock();
-				err = -ESRCH;
-				goto exit_free;
-			}
-			f->val = pid_nr(pid);
-			rcu_read_unlock();
-		}
-
 		err = audit_field_valid(entry, f);
 		if (err)
 			goto exit_free;

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>

commit 041d7b98ffe59c59fdd639931dea7d74f9aa9a59 upstream.

A regression was caused by commit 780a7654cee8:
audit: Make testing for a valid loginuid explicit.
(which in turn attempted to fix a regression caused by e1760bd)

When audit_krule_to_data() fills in the rules to get a listing, there was a missing clause to convert back from AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET to AUDIT_LOGINUID.

This broke userspace by not returning the same information that was sent and expected.

The rule:
auditctl -a exit,never -F auid=-1
gives:
auditctl -l
LIST_RULES: exit,never f24=0 syscall=all
when it should give:

		LIST_RULES: exit,never auid=-1 (0xffffffff) syscall=all

Tag it so that it is reported the same way it was set. Create a new private flags audit_krule field (pflags) to store it that won't interact with the public one from the API.

---
 include/linux/audit.h |    4 ++++
 kernel/auditfilter.c  |   10 ++++++++++
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)

@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ struct sk_buff;
 
 struct audit_krule {
 	int			vers_ops;
+	u32			pflags;
 	u32			flags;
 	u32			listnr;
 	u32			action;

@@ -64,6 +65,9 @@ struct audit_krule {
 	u64			prio;
 };
 
+/* Flag to indicate legacy AUDIT_LOGINUID unset usage */
+#define AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY		0x1
+
 struct audit_field {
 	u32				type;
 	u32				val;

@@ -431,6 +431,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to
 		if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f->val == AUDIT_UID_UNSET)) {
 			f->type = AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET;
 			f->val = 0;
+			entry->rule.pflags |= AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY;
 		}
 
 		err = audit_field_valid(entry, f);

@@ -606,6 +607,13 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_kru
 			data->buflen += data->values[i] =
 				audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->filterkey);
 			break;
+		case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
+			if (krule->pflags & AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY && !f->val) {
+				data->fields[i] = AUDIT_LOGINUID;
+				data->values[i] = AUDIT_UID_UNSET;
+				break;
+			}
+			/* fallthrough if set */
 		default:
 			data->values[i] = f->val;
 		}

@@ -622,6 +630,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct aud
 	int i;
 
 	if (a->flags != b->flags ||
+	    a->pflags != b->pflags ||
 	    a->listnr != b->listnr ||
 	    a->action != b->action ||
 	    a->field_count != b->field_count)

@@ -740,6 +749,7 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(stru
 	new = &entry->rule;
 	new->vers_ops = old->vers_ops;
 	new->flags = old->flags;
+	new->pflags = old->pflags;
 	new->listnr = old->listnr;
 	new->action = old->action;
 	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Rabin Vincent <[email protected]>

commit 7e77bdebff5cb1e9876c561f69710b9ab8fa1f7e upstream.

If a request is backlogged, it's complete() handler will get called
twice: once with -EINPROGRESS, and once with the final error code.

af_alg's complete handler, unlike other users, does not handle the -EINPROGRESS but instead always completes the completion that recvmsg() is waiting on. This can lead to a return to user space while the request is still pending in the driver. If userspace closes the sockets before the requests are handled by the driver, this will lead to use-after-frees (and potential crashes) in the kernel due to the tfm having been freed.

The crashes can be easily reproduced (for example) by reducing the max queue length in cryptod.c and running the following (from
http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html) on AES-NI capable hardware:

 $ while true; do kcapi -x 1 -e -c '__ecb-aes-aesni' \
    -k 00000000000000000000000000000000 \
    -p 00000000000000000000000000000000 >/dev/null & done

---
 crypto/af_alg.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -449,6 +449,9 @@ void af_alg_complete(struct crypto_async
 {
 	struct af_alg_completion *completion = req->data;
 
+	if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
+		return;
+
 	completion->err = err;
 	complete(&completion->completion);
 }

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

commit a682e9c28cac152e6e54c39efcf046e0c8cfcf63 upstream.

If some error happens in NCP_IOC_SETROOT ioctl, the appropriate error return value is then (in most cases) just overwritten before we return. This can result in reporting success to userspace although error happened.

This bug was introduced by commit 2e54eb96e2c8 ("BKL: Remove BKL from ncpfs"). Propagate the errors correctly.

Coverity id: 1226925.

---
 fs/ncpfs/ioctl.c |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

@@ -447,7 +447,6 @@ static long __ncp_ioctl(struct inode *in
 						result = -EIO;
 					}
 				}
-				result = 0;
 			}
 			mutex_unlock(&server->root_setup_lock);
 

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>

commit 24c037ebf5723d4d9ab0996433cee4f96c292a4d upstream.

alloc_pid() does get_pid_ns() beforehand but forgets to put_pid_ns() if it fails because disable_pid_allocation() was called by the exiting child_reaper.

We could simply move get_pid_ns() down to successful return, but this fix tries to be as trivial as possible.

---
 kernel/pid.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -341,6 +341,8 @@ out:
 
 out_unlock:
 	spin_unlock_irq(&pidmap_lock);
+	put_pid_ns(ns);
+
 out_free:
 	while (++i <= ns->level)
 		free_pidmap(pid->numbers + i);

3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

commit 0e5cc9a40ada6046e6bc3bdfcd0c0d7e4b706b14 upstream.

Symlink reading code does not check whether the resulting path fits into the page provided by the generic code. This isn't as easy as just checking the symlink size because of various encoding conversions we perform on path. So we have to check whether there is still enough space in the buffer on the fly.

---
 fs/udf/dir.c     |    3 ++-
 fs/udf/namei.c   |    3 ++-
 fs/udf/symlink.c |   31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 fs/udf/udfdecl.h |    3 ++-
 fs/udf/unicode.c |   28 ++++++++++++++++------------
 5 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

@@ -167,7 +167,8 @@ static int udf_readdir(struct file *file
 			continue;
 		}
 
-		flen = udf_get_filename(dir->i_sb, nameptr, fname, lfi);
+		flen = udf_get_filename(dir->i_sb, nameptr, lfi, fname,
+					UDF_NAME_LEN);
 		if (!flen)
 			continue;
 

@@ -233,7 +233,8 @@ static struct fileIdentDesc *udf_find_en
 		if (!lfi)
 			continue;
 
-		flen = udf_get_filename(dir->i_sb, nameptr, fname, lfi);
+		flen = udf_get_filename(dir->i_sb, nameptr, lfi, fname,
+					UDF_NAME_LEN);
 		if (flen && udf_match(flen, fname, child->len, child->name))
 			goto out_ok;
 	}

@@ -30,13 +30,16 @@
 #include <linux/buffer_head.h>
 #include "udf_i.h"
 
-static void udf_pc_to_char(struct super_block *sb, unsigned char *from,
-			   int fromlen, unsigned char *to)
+static int udf_pc_to_char(struct super_block *sb, unsigned char *from,
+			  int fromlen, unsigned char *to, int tolen)
 {
 	struct pathComponent *pc;
 	int elen = 0;
+	int comp_len;
 	unsigned char *p = to;
 
+	/* Reserve one byte for terminating \0 */
+	tolen--;
 	while (elen < fromlen) {
 		pc = (struct pathComponent *)(from + elen);
 		switch (pc->componentType) {

@@ -49,22 +52,37 @@ static void udf_pc_to_char(struct super_
 				break;
 			/* Fall through */
 		case 2:
+			if (tolen == 0)
+				return -ENAMETOOLONG;
 			p = to;
 			*p++ = '/';
+			tolen--;
 			break;
 		case 3:
+			if (tolen < 3)
+				return -ENAMETOOLONG;
 			memcpy(p, "../", 3);
 			p += 3;
+			tolen -= 3;
 			break;
 		case 4:
+			if (tolen < 2)
+				return -ENAMETOOLONG;
 			memcpy(p, "./", 2);
 			p += 2;
+			tolen -= 2;
 			/* that would be . - just ignore */
 			break;
 		case 5:
-			p += udf_get_filename(sb, pc->componentIdent, p,
-					      pc->lengthComponentIdent);
+			comp_len = udf_get_filename(sb, pc->componentIdent,
+						    pc->lengthComponentIdent,
+						    p, tolen);
+			p += comp_len;
+			tolen -= comp_len;
+			if (tolen == 0)
+				return -ENAMETOOLONG;
 			*p++ = '/';
+			tolen--;
 			break;
 		}
 		elen += sizeof(struct pathComponent) + pc->lengthComponentIdent;