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4.0.1-stable review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 3 participants 11 messages Apr 26, 2015 – Apr 27, 2015 Stable branch

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#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/7 bnx2x: Fix busy_poll vs netpoll

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 074975d0374333f656c48487aa046a21a9b9d7a1 ]

Commit 9a2620c877454 ("bnx2x: prevent WARN during driver unload") switched the napi/busy_lock locking mechanism from spin_lock() into spin_lock_bh(), breaking inter-operability with netconsole, as netpoll disables interrupts prior to calling our napi mechanism.

This switches the driver into using atomic assignments instead of the spinlock mechanisms previously employed.

Based on initial patch from Yuval Mintz & Ariel Elior

I basically added softirq starvation avoidance, and mixture of atomic operations, plain writes and barriers.

Note this slightly reduces the overhead for this driver when no busy_poll sockets are in use.

Fixes 9a2620c877454 ("bnx2x: prevent WARN during driver unload")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x.h     |  135 ++++++++----------------
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c |    9 -
 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x.h +50 -85
@@ -531,20 +531,8 @@ struct bnx2x_fastpath {
 	struct napi_struct	napi;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL
-	unsigned int state;
-#define BNX2X_FP_STATE_IDLE		      0
-#define BNX2X_FP_STATE_NAPI		(1 << 0)    /* NAPI owns this FP */
-#define BNX2X_FP_STATE_POLL		(1 << 1)    /* poll owns this FP */
-#define BNX2X_FP_STATE_DISABLED		(1 << 2)
-#define BNX2X_FP_STATE_NAPI_YIELD	(1 << 3)    /* NAPI yielded this FP */
-#define BNX2X_FP_STATE_POLL_YIELD	(1 << 4)    /* poll yielded this FP */
-#define BNX2X_FP_OWNED	(BNX2X_FP_STATE_NAPI | BNX2X_FP_STATE_POLL)
-#define BNX2X_FP_YIELD	(BNX2X_FP_STATE_NAPI_YIELD | BNX2X_FP_STATE_POLL_YIELD)
-#define BNX2X_FP_LOCKED	(BNX2X_FP_OWNED | BNX2X_FP_STATE_DISABLED)
-#define BNX2X_FP_USER_PEND (BNX2X_FP_STATE_POLL | BNX2X_FP_STATE_POLL_YIELD)
-	/* protect state */
-	spinlock_t lock;
-#endif /* CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL */
+	unsigned long		busy_poll_state;
+#endif
 
 	union host_hc_status_block	status_blk;
 	/* chip independent shortcuts into sb structure */
@@ -619,104 +607,83 @@ struct bnx2x_fastpath {
 #define bnx2x_fp_qstats(bp, fp)	(&((bp)->fp_stats[(fp)->index].eth_q_stats))
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL
-static inline void bnx2x_fp_init_lock(struct bnx2x_fastpath *fp)
+
+enum bnx2x_fp_state {
+	BNX2X_STATE_FP_NAPI	= BIT(0), /* NAPI handler owns the queue */
+
+	BNX2X_STATE_FP_NAPI_REQ_BIT = 1, /* NAPI would like to own the queue */
+	BNX2X_STATE_FP_NAPI_REQ = BIT(1),
+
+	BNX2X_STATE_FP_POLL_BIT = 2,
+	BNX2X_STATE_FP_POLL     = BIT(2), /* busy_poll owns the queue */
+
+	BNX2X_STATE_FP_DISABLE_BIT = 3, /* queue is dismantled */
+};
+
+static inline void bnx2x_fp_busy_poll_init(struct bnx2x_fastpath *fp)
 {
-	spin_lock_init(&fp->lock);
-	fp->state = BNX2X_FP_STATE_IDLE;
+	WRITE_ONCE(fp->busy_poll_state, 0);
 }
 
 /* called from the device poll routine to get ownership of a FP */
 static inline bool bnx2x_fp_lock_napi(struct bnx2x_fastpath *fp)
 {
-	bool rc = true;
+	unsigned long prev, old = READ_ONCE(fp->busy_poll_state);
 
-	spin_lock_bh(&fp->lock);
-	if (fp->state & BNX2X_FP_LOCKED) {
-		WARN_ON(fp->state & BNX2X_FP_STATE_NAPI);
-		fp->state |= BNX2X_FP_STATE_NAPI_YIELD;
-		rc = false;
-	} else {
-		/* we don't care if someone yielded */
-		fp->state = BNX2X_FP_STATE_NAPI;
+	while (1) {
+		switch (old) {
+		case BNX2X_STATE_FP_POLL:
+			/* make sure bnx2x_fp_lock_poll() wont starve us */
+			set_bit(BNX2X_STATE_FP_NAPI_REQ_BIT,
+				&fp->busy_poll_state);
+			/* fallthrough */
+		case BNX2X_STATE_FP_POLL | BNX2X_STATE_FP_NAPI_REQ:
+			return false;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+		prev = cmpxchg(&fp->busy_poll_state, old, BNX2X_STATE_FP_NAPI);
+		if (unlikely(prev != old)) {
+			old = prev;
+			continue;
+		}
+		return true;
 	}
-	spin_unlock_bh(&fp->lock);
-	return rc;
 }
 
-/* returns true is someone tried to get the FP while napi had it */
-static inline bool bnx2x_fp_unlock_napi(struct bnx2x_fastpath *fp)
+static inline void bnx2x_fp_unlock_napi(struct bnx2x_fastpath *fp)
 {
-	bool rc = false;
-
-	spin_lock_bh(&fp->lock);
-	WARN_ON(fp->state &
-		(BNX2X_FP_STATE_POLL | BNX2X_FP_STATE_NAPI_YIELD));
-
-	if (fp->state & BNX2X_FP_STATE_POLL_YIELD)
-		rc = true;
-
-	/* state ==> idle, unless currently disabled */
-	fp->state &= BNX2X_FP_STATE_DISABLED;
-	spin_unlock_bh(&fp->lock);
-	return rc;
+	smp_wmb();
+	fp->busy_poll_state = 0;
 }
 
 /* called from bnx2x_low_latency_poll() */
 static inline bool bnx2x_fp_lock_poll(struct bnx2x_fastpath *fp)
 {
-	bool rc = true;
-
-	spin_lock_bh(&fp->lock);
-	if ((fp->state & BNX2X_FP_LOCKED)) {
-		fp->state |= BNX2X_FP_STATE_POLL_YIELD;
-		rc = false;
-	} else {
-		/* preserve yield marks */
-		fp->state |= BNX2X_FP_STATE_POLL;
-	}
-	spin_unlock_bh(&fp->lock);
-	return rc;
+	return cmpxchg(&fp->busy_poll_state, 0, BNX2X_STATE_FP_POLL) == 0;
 }
 
-/* returns true if someone tried to get the FP while it was locked */
-static inline bool bnx2x_fp_unlock_poll(struct bnx2x_fastpath *fp)
+static inline void bnx2x_fp_unlock_poll(struct bnx2x_fastpath *fp)
 {
-	bool rc = false;
-
-	spin_lock_bh(&fp->lock);
-	WARN_ON(fp->state & BNX2X_FP_STATE_NAPI);
-
-	if (fp->state & BNX2X_FP_STATE_POLL_YIELD)
-		rc = true;
-
-	/* state ==> idle, unless currently disabled */
-	fp->state &= BNX2X_FP_STATE_DISABLED;
-	spin_unlock_bh(&fp->lock);
-	return rc;
+	smp_mb__before_atomic();
+	clear_bit(BNX2X_STATE_FP_POLL_BIT, &fp->busy_poll_state);
 }
 
-/* true if a socket is polling, even if it did not get the lock */
+/* true if a socket is polling */
 static inline bool bnx2x_fp_ll_polling(struct bnx2x_fastpath *fp)
 {
-	WARN_ON(!(fp->state & BNX2X_FP_OWNED));
-	return fp->state & BNX2X_FP_USER_PEND;
+	return READ_ONCE(fp->busy_poll_state) & BNX2X_STATE_FP_POLL;
 }
 
 /* false if fp is currently owned */
 static inline bool bnx2x_fp_ll_disable(struct bnx2x_fastpath *fp)
 {
-	int rc = true;
-
-	spin_lock_bh(&fp->lock);
-	if (fp->state & BNX2X_FP_OWNED)
-		rc = false;
-	fp->state |= BNX2X_FP_STATE_DISABLED;
-	spin_unlock_bh(&fp->lock);
+	set_bit(BNX2X_STATE_FP_DISABLE_BIT, &fp->busy_poll_state);
+	return !bnx2x_fp_ll_polling(fp);
 
-	return rc;
 }
 #else
-static inline void bnx2x_fp_init_lock(struct bnx2x_fastpath *fp)
+static inline void bnx2x_fp_busy_poll_init(struct bnx2x_fastpath *fp)
 {
 }
 
@@ -725,9 +692,8 @@ static inline bool bnx2x_fp_lock_napi(st
 	return true;
 }
 
-static inline bool bnx2x_fp_unlock_napi(struct bnx2x_fastpath *fp)
+static inline void bnx2x_fp_unlock_napi(struct bnx2x_fastpath *fp)
 {
-	return false;
 }
 
 static inline bool bnx2x_fp_lock_poll(struct bnx2x_fastpath *fp)
@@ -735,9 +701,8 @@ static inline bool bnx2x_fp_lock_poll(st
 	return false;
 }
 
-static inline bool bnx2x_fp_unlock_poll(struct bnx2x_fastpath *fp)
+static inline void bnx2x_fp_unlock_poll(struct bnx2x_fastpath *fp)
 {
-	return false;
 }
 
 static inline bool bnx2x_fp_ll_polling(struct bnx2x_fastpath *fp)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c +5 -4
@@ -1849,7 +1849,7 @@ static void bnx2x_napi_enable_cnic(struc
 	int i;
 
 	for_each_rx_queue_cnic(bp, i) {
-		bnx2x_fp_init_lock(&bp->fp[i]);
+		bnx2x_fp_busy_poll_init(&bp->fp[i]);
 		napi_enable(&bnx2x_fp(bp, i, napi));
 	}
 }
@@ -1859,7 +1859,7 @@ static void bnx2x_napi_enable(struct bnx
 	int i;
 
 	for_each_eth_queue(bp, i) {
-		bnx2x_fp_init_lock(&bp->fp[i]);
+		bnx2x_fp_busy_poll_init(&bp->fp[i]);
 		napi_enable(&bnx2x_fp(bp, i, napi));
 	}
 }
@@ -3191,9 +3191,10 @@ static int bnx2x_poll(struct napi_struct
 			}
 		}
 
+		bnx2x_fp_unlock_napi(fp);
+
 		/* Fall out from the NAPI loop if needed */
-		if (!bnx2x_fp_unlock_napi(fp) &&
-		    !(bnx2x_has_rx_work(fp) || bnx2x_has_tx_work(fp))) {
+		if (!(bnx2x_has_rx_work(fp) || bnx2x_has_tx_work(fp))) {
 
 			/* No need to update SB for FCoE L2 ring as long as
 			 * it's connected to the default SB and the SB
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 7/7 fs: take i_mutex during prepare_binprm for set[ug]id executables

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>

commit 8b01fc86b9f425899f8a3a8fc1c47d73c2c20543 upstream.

This prevents a race between chown() and execve(), where chowning a setuid-user binary to root would momentarily make the binary setuid root.

This patch was mostly written by Linus Torvalds.

---
 fs/exec.c |   76 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
fs/exec.c +48 -28
@@ -1265,6 +1265,53 @@ static void check_unsafe_exec(struct lin
 	spin_unlock(&p->fs->lock);
 }
 
+static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct inode *inode;
+	unsigned int mode;
+	kuid_t uid;
+	kgid_t gid;
+
+	/* clear any previous set[ug]id data from a previous binary */
+	bprm->cred->euid = current_euid();
+	bprm->cred->egid = current_egid();
+
+	if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
+		return;
+
+	if (task_no_new_privs(current))
+		return;
+
+	inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
+	mode = READ_ONCE(inode->i_mode);
+	if (!(mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID)))
+		return;
+
+	/* Be careful if suid/sgid is set */
+	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
+
+	/* reload atomically mode/uid/gid now that lock held */
+	mode = inode->i_mode;
+	uid = inode->i_uid;
+	gid = inode->i_gid;
+	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
+
+	/* We ignore suid/sgid if there are no mappings for them in the ns */
+	if (!kuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, uid) ||
+		 !kgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, gid))
+		return;
+
+	if (mode & S_ISUID) {
+		bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+		bprm->cred->euid = uid;
+	}
+
+	if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) {
+		bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+		bprm->cred->egid = gid;
+	}
+}
+
 /*
  * Fill the binprm structure from the inode.
  * Check permissions, then read the first 128 (BINPRM_BUF_SIZE) bytes
@@ -1273,36 +1320,9 @@ static void check_unsafe_exec(struct lin
  */
 int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
-	umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
 	int retval;
 
-
-	/* clear any previous set[ug]id data from a previous binary */
-	bprm->cred->euid = current_euid();
-	bprm->cred->egid = current_egid();
-
-	if (!(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) &&
-	    !task_no_new_privs(current) &&
-	    kuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_uid) &&
-	    kgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_gid)) {
-		/* Set-uid? */
-		if (mode & S_ISUID) {
-			bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
-			bprm->cred->euid = inode->i_uid;
-		}
-
-		/* Set-gid? */
-		/*
-		 * If setgid is set but no group execute bit then this
-		 * is a candidate for mandatory locking, not a setgid
-		 * executable.
-		 */
-		if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) {
-			bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
-			bprm->cred->egid = inode->i_gid;
-		}
-	}
+	bprm_fill_uid(bprm);
 
 	/* fill in binprm security blob */
 	retval = security_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/7 udptunnels: Call handle_offloads after inserting vlan tag.

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jesse Gross <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b736a623bd099cdf5521ca9bd03559f3bc7fa31c ]

handle_offloads() calls skb_reset_inner_headers() to store the layer pointers to the encapsulated packet. However, we currently push the vlag tag (if there is one) onto the packet afterwards. This changes the MAC header for the encapsulated packet but it is not reflected in skb->inner_mac_header, which breaks GSO and drivers which attempt to use this for encapsulation offloads.

Fixes 1eaa8178 ("vxlan: Add tx-vlan offload support.")
---
 drivers/net/vxlan.c |   20 ++++++++++----------
 net/ipv4/geneve.c   |    8 ++++----
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
drivers/net/vxlan.c +10 -10
@@ -1713,12 +1713,6 @@ static int vxlan6_xmit_skb(struct dst_en
 		}
 	}
 
-	skb = iptunnel_handle_offloads(skb, udp_sum, type);
-	if (IS_ERR(skb)) {
-		err = -EINVAL;
-		goto err;
-	}
-
 	skb_scrub_packet(skb, xnet);
 
 	min_headroom = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dst->dev) + dst->header_len
@@ -1738,6 +1732,12 @@ static int vxlan6_xmit_skb(struct dst_en
 		goto err;
 	}
 
+	skb = iptunnel_handle_offloads(skb, udp_sum, type);
+	if (IS_ERR(skb)) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
 	vxh = (struct vxlanhdr *) __skb_push(skb, sizeof(*vxh));
 	vxh->vx_flags = htonl(VXLAN_HF_VNI);
 	vxh->vx_vni = md->vni;
@@ -1798,10 +1798,6 @@ int vxlan_xmit_skb(struct rtable *rt, st
 		}
 	}
 
-	skb = iptunnel_handle_offloads(skb, udp_sum, type);
-	if (IS_ERR(skb))
-		return PTR_ERR(skb);
-
 	min_headroom = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev) + rt->dst.header_len
 			+ VXLAN_HLEN + sizeof(struct iphdr)
 			+ (skb_vlan_tag_present(skb) ? VLAN_HLEN : 0);
@@ -1817,6 +1813,10 @@ int vxlan_xmit_skb(struct rtable *rt, st
 	if (WARN_ON(!skb))
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	skb = iptunnel_handle_offloads(skb, udp_sum, type);
+	if (IS_ERR(skb))
+		return PTR_ERR(skb);
+
 	vxh = (struct vxlanhdr *) __skb_push(skb, sizeof(*vxh));
 	vxh->vx_flags = htonl(VXLAN_HF_VNI);
 	vxh->vx_vni = md->vni;
net/ipv4/geneve.c +4 -4
@@ -113,10 +113,6 @@ int geneve_xmit_skb(struct geneve_sock *
 	int min_headroom;
 	int err;
 
-	skb = udp_tunnel_handle_offloads(skb, csum);
-	if (IS_ERR(skb))
-		return PTR_ERR(skb);
-
 	min_headroom = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev) + rt->dst.header_len
 			+ GENEVE_BASE_HLEN + opt_len + sizeof(struct iphdr)
 			+ (skb_vlan_tag_present(skb) ? VLAN_HLEN : 0);
@@ -131,6 +127,10 @@ int geneve_xmit_skb(struct geneve_sock *
 	if (unlikely(!skb))
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	skb = udp_tunnel_handle_offloads(skb, csum);
+	if (IS_ERR(skb))
+		return PTR_ERR(skb);
+
 	gnvh = (struct genevehdr *)__skb_push(skb, sizeof(*gnvh) + opt_len);
 	geneve_build_header(gnvh, tun_flags, vni, opt_len, opt);
 

Greg Kroah-Hartman

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

cover 4.0.1-stable review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.0.1 release. There are 7 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Tue Apr 28 11:59:35 UTC 2015. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/stable-review/patch-4.0.1-rc1.gz

and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 4.0.1-rc1

Jann Horn <[email protected]>
fs: take i_mutex during prepare_binprm for set[ug]id executables

Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
skbuff: Do not scrub skb mark within the same name space

Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Revert "net: Reset secmark when scrubbing packet"

Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
bpf: fix verifier memory corruption

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
bnx2x: Fix busy_poll vs netpoll

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

    tcp: tcp_make_synack() should clear skb->tstamp

Jesse Gross <[email protected]>
udptunnels: Call handle_offloads after inserting vlan tag.

-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                        |   4 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x.h     | 137 +++++++++---------------
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c |   9 +-
 drivers/net/vxlan.c                             |  20 ++--
 fs/exec.c                                       |  76 ++++++++-----
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                           |   3 +-
 net/core/skbuff.c                               |  10 +-
 net/ipv4/geneve.c                               |   8 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c                           |   2 +
 9 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 139 deletions(-)
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/7 tcp: tcp_make_synack() should clear skb->tstamp

4.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b50edd7812852d989f2ef09dcfc729690f54a42d ]

I noticed tcpdump was giving funky timestamps for locally generated SYNACK messages on loopback interface.

11:42:46.938990 IP 127.0.0.1.48245 > 127.0.0.2.23850: S 945476042:945476042(0) win 43690 <mss 65495,nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale 7>

20:28:58.502209 IP 127.0.0.2.23850 > 127.0.0.1.48245: S 3160535375:3160535375(0) ack 945476043 win 43690 <mss 65495,nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale 7>

This is because we need to clear skb->tstamp before entering lower stack, otherwise net_timestamp_check() does not set skb->tstamp.

Fixes 7faee5c0d514 ("tcp: remove TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->when")
---
 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +2 -0
@@ -2929,6 +2929,8 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(struct s
 	}
 #endif
 
+	/* Do not fool tcpdump (if any), clean our debris */
+	skb->tstamp.tv64 = 0;
 	return skb;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_make_synack);
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/7 bpf: fix verifier memory corruption

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c3de6317d748e23b9e46ba36e10483728d00d144 ]

Due to missing bounds check the DAG pass of the BPF verifier can corrupt the memory which can cause random crashes during program loading:

[8.449451] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffffffffff
[8.451293] IP: [<ffffffff811de33d>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x8d/0x2f0
[8.452329] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[8.452329] Call Trace:
[8.452329]  [<ffffffff8116cc82>] bpf_check+0x852/0x2000
[8.452329]  [<ffffffff8116b7e4>] bpf_prog_load+0x1e4/0x310
[8.452329]  [<ffffffff811b190f>] ? might_fault+0x5f/0xb0
[8.452329]  [<ffffffff8116c206>] SyS_bpf+0x806/0xa30
Fixes f1bca824dabb ("bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier")
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +2 -1
@@ -1380,7 +1380,8 @@ peek_stack:
 			/* tell verifier to check for equivalent states
 			 * after every call and jump
 			 */
-			env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
+			if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
+				env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
 		} else {
 			/* conditional jump with two edges */
 			ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/7 Revert "net: Reset secmark when scrubbing packet"

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4c0ee414e877b899f7fc80aafb98d9425c02797f ]

This patch reverts commit b8fb4e0648a2ab3734140342002f68fb0c7d1602 because the secmark must be preserved even when a packet crosses namespace boundaries. The reason is that security labels apply to the system as a whole and is not per-namespace.

---
 net/core/skbuff.c |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
net/core/skbuff.c +0 -1
@@ -4178,7 +4178,6 @@ void skb_scrub_packet(struct sk_buff *sk
 	skb_dst_drop(skb);
 	skb->mark = 0;
 	skb_sender_cpu_clear(skb);
-	skb_init_secmark(skb);
 	secpath_reset(skb);
 	nf_reset(skb);
 	nf_reset_trace(skb);
#7 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.0.1 release. There are 7 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Tue Apr 28 11:59:35 UTC 2015. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Build results:

	total: 124 pass: 124 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 30 pass: 30 fail: 0

Details are available at http://server.roeck-us.net:8010/builders.

Guenter

author maintainer
#8 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Guenter Roeck
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.0.1 release. There are 7 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Tue Apr 28 11:59:35 UTC 2015. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Quoted 6 lines

Build results:

	total: 124 pass: 124 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 30 pass: 30 fail: 0

Details are available at http://server.roeck-us.net:8010/builders.

Thanks for letting me know about all of these.

greg k-h

#9 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.0.1 release. There are 7 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Tue Apr 28 11:59:35 UTC 2015. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Quoted 8 lines

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/stable-review/patch-4.0.1-rc1.gz

and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

-- Shuah

Signature · 5 lines
Shuah Khan
Sr. Linux Kernel Developer
Open Source Innovation Group
Samsung Research America (Silicon Valley)
[email protected] | (970) 217-8978
author maintainer
#10 lore raw
Quoted 13 lines · Shuah Khan
Quoted 12 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.0.1 release. There are 7 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Tue Apr 28 11:59:35 UTC 2015. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/stable-review/patch-4.0.1-rc1.gz

and the diffstat can be found below.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines

thanks,

greg k-h

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

Thanks for testing all 4 of these and letting me know.

greg k-h