iptables: ensure number of counters is >0 in do_replace()
Subsystems (4)
After improving setsockopt() coverage in trinity, I started triggering vmalloc failures pretty reliably from this code path:
warn_alloc_failed+0xe9/0x140 __vmalloc_node_range+0x1be/0x270 vzalloc+0x4b/0x50 __do_replace+0x52/0x260 [ip_tables] do_ipt_set_ctl+0x15d/0x1d0 [ip_tables] nf_setsockopt+0x65/0x90 ip_setsockopt+0x61/0xa0 raw_setsockopt+0x16/0x60 sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20 SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0
It turns out we don't validate that the num_counters field in the struct we pass in from userspace is initialized.
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +3 -0
@@ -1262,6 +1262,9 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, unsigned int len)/* overflow check */ if (tmp.num_counters >=INT_MAX /sizeof (struct xt_counters ))return -ENOMEM ; +if (tmp.num_counters ==0 ) +return -EINVAL ; + tmp.name[sizeof (tmp.name)-1 ] =0 ; newinfo =xt_alloc_table_info (tmp.size);
Florian Westphal
maintainerQuoted 24 lines · Dave Jones
After improving
setsockopt()coverage in trinity, I started triggering vmalloc failures pretty reliably from this code path:warn_alloc_failed+0xe9/0x140 __vmalloc_node_range+0x1be/0x270 vzalloc+0x4b/0x50 __do_replace+0x52/0x260 [ip_tables] do_ipt_set_ctl+0x15d/0x1d0 [ip_tables] nf_setsockopt+0x65/0x90 ip_setsockopt+0x61/0xa0 raw_setsockopt+0x16/0x60 sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20 SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0It turns out we don't validate that the
num_countersfield in the struct we pass in from userspace is initialized.Signed-off-by Dave Jones <[email protected]>net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +0
-0
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, unsigned int len) · line 1267
Quoted 6 lines
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +3
-0@@ -1262,6 +1262,9 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, unsigned int len)/* overflow check */ if (tmp.num_counters >=INT_MAX /sizeof (struct xt_counters ))return -ENOMEM ; +if (tmp.num_counters ==0 ) +return -EINVAL ; +
Good catch. Due to iptables wonderful copy-paste programming model, this also needs fixing in compat_do_replace, ip6tables, arbtables and ebtables (8 different places, ick).
Quoted 20 lines · Florian Westphal
Quoted 19 lines · Dave Jones
After improving
setsockopt()coverage in trinity, I started triggering vmalloc failures pretty reliably from this code path:warn_alloc_failed+0xe9/0x140 __vmalloc_node_range+0x1be/0x270 vzalloc+0x4b/0x50 __do_replace+0x52/0x260 [ip_tables] do_ipt_set_ctl+0x15d/0x1d0 [ip_tables] nf_setsockopt+0x65/0x90 ip_setsockopt+0x61/0xa0 raw_setsockopt+0x16/0x60 sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20 SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0It turns out we don't validate that the
num_countersfield in the struct we pass in from userspace is initialized.Signed-off-by Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Quoted 15 lines
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, unsigned int len) · line 1267
Quoted 11 lines
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +3
-0@@ -1262,6 +1262,9 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, unsigned int len)/* overflow check */ if (tmp.num_counters >=INT_MAX /sizeof (struct xt_counters ))return -ENOMEM ; +if (tmp.num_counters ==0 ) +return -EINVAL ; +Good catch. Due to iptables wonderful copy-paste programming model, this also needs fixing in
compat_do_replace, ip6tables, arbtables and ebtables (8 different places, ick).
ugh. ok, I'll fix them all up.
What's the preferred format, 8 separate patches, or 1 all-in-one diff for all instances of this bug ?
thanks,
Dave
David Miller
maintainerFrom: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 19 May 2015 19:42:52 -0400
Quoted 2 lines
What's the preferred format, 8 separate patches, or 1 all-in-one diff for all instances of this bug ?
Personally, I think you could do this in one patch.
netfilter: ensure number of counters is >0 in do_replace()
After improving setsockopt() coverage in trinity, I started triggering vmalloc failures pretty reliably from this code path:
warn_alloc_failed+0xe9/0x140 __vmalloc_node_range+0x1be/0x270 vzalloc+0x4b/0x50 __do_replace+0x52/0x260 [ip_tables] do_ipt_set_ctl+0x15d/0x1d0 [ip_tables] nf_setsockopt+0x65/0x90 ip_setsockopt+0x61/0xa0 raw_setsockopt+0x16/0x60 sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20 SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0
It turns out we don't validate that the num_counters field in the struct we pass in from userspace is initialized.
The same problem also exists in ebtables, arptables, ipv6, and the compat variants.
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c +4 -0
@@ -1117,6 +1117,8 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user,return -ENOMEM ;if (tmp.num_counters >=INT_MAX /sizeof (struct ebt_counter ))return -ENOMEM ; +if (tmp.num_counters ==0 ) +return -EINVAL ; tmp.name[sizeof (tmp.name) -1 ] =0 ;
@@ -2159,6 +2161,8 @@ static int compat_copy_ebt_replace_from_user(struct ebt_replace *repl,return -ENOMEM ;if (tmp.num_counters >=INT_MAX /sizeof (struct ebt_counter ))return -ENOMEM ; +if (tmp.num_counters ==0 ) +return -EINVAL ;memcpy (repl, &tmp, offsetof(struct ebt_replace , hook_entry));
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +6 -0
@@ -1075,6 +1075,9 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user,/* overflow check */ if (tmp.num_counters >=INT_MAX /sizeof (struct xt_counters ))return -ENOMEM ; +if (tmp.num_counters ==0 ) +return -EINVAL ; + tmp.name[sizeof (tmp.name)-1 ] =0 ; newinfo =xt_alloc_table_info (tmp.size);
@@ -1499,6 +1502,9 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user,return -ENOMEM ;if (tmp.num_counters >=INT_MAX /sizeof (struct xt_counters ))return -ENOMEM ; +if (tmp.num_counters ==0 ) +return -EINVAL ; + tmp.name[sizeof (tmp.name)-1 ] =0 ; newinfo =xt_alloc_table_info (tmp.size);
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +6 -0
@@ -1262,6 +1262,9 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, unsigned int len)/* overflow check */ if (tmp.num_counters >=INT_MAX /sizeof (struct xt_counters ))return -ENOMEM ; +if (tmp.num_counters ==0 ) +return -EINVAL ; + tmp.name[sizeof (tmp.name)-1 ] =0 ; newinfo =xt_alloc_table_info (tmp.size);
@@ -1809,6 +1812,9 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len)return -ENOMEM ;if (tmp.num_counters >=INT_MAX /sizeof (struct xt_counters ))return -ENOMEM ; +if (tmp.num_counters ==0 ) +return -EINVAL ; + tmp.name[sizeof (tmp.name)-1 ] =0 ; newinfo =xt_alloc_table_info (tmp.size);
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +6 -0
@@ -1275,6 +1275,9 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, unsigned int len)/* overflow check */ if (tmp.num_counters >=INT_MAX /sizeof (struct xt_counters ))return -ENOMEM ; +if (tmp.num_counters ==0 ) +return -EINVAL ; + tmp.name[sizeof (tmp.name)-1 ] =0 ; newinfo =xt_alloc_table_info (tmp.size);
@@ -1822,6 +1825,9 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len)return -ENOMEM ;if (tmp.num_counters >=INT_MAX /sizeof (struct xt_counters ))return -ENOMEM ; +if (tmp.num_counters ==0 ) +return -EINVAL ; + tmp.name[sizeof (tmp.name)-1 ] =0 ; newinfo =xt_alloc_table_info (tmp.size);
Re: netfilter: ensure number of counters is >0 in do_replace()
Quoted 14 lines · Dave Jones
After improving
setsockopt()coverage in trinity, I started triggering vmalloc failures pretty reliably from this code path:warn_alloc_failed+0xe9/0x140 __vmalloc_node_range+0x1be/0x270 vzalloc+0x4b/0x50 __do_replace+0x52/0x260 [ip_tables] do_ipt_set_ctl+0x15d/0x1d0 [ip_tables] nf_setsockopt+0x65/0x90 ip_setsockopt+0x61/0xa0 raw_setsockopt+0x16/0x60 sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20 SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0
Quoted 5 lines
It turns out we don't validate that the
num_countersfield in the struct we pass in from userspace is initialized.The same problem also exists in ebtables, arptables, ipv6, and the compat variants.
Applied.
This also applies to -stable kernels:
3.2.x
3.4.x
3.10.x
3.12.x
3.14.x
3.18.x
4.0.x
so after some testing and a little while, I'll pass this on.
Thanks.