X.509: Fix determination of self-signedness
Subsystems (2)
David Howells
maintainerPATCH 1/1 X.509: Fix determination of self-signedness
Fix determination of whether an X.509 certificate is self-signed or not.
It is currently assumed that a cert is self-signed if has no authorityKeyIdentifier or the authorityKeyIdentifier matches the subjectKeyIdentifier. However, it is possible to encounter a certificate that has neither AKID not SKID but is not self-signed.
This symptoms of this show up as an attempt to load a certificate failing with -ERANGE or -EBADMSG, produced from the RSA module when the result of calculating "m = s^e mod n" is checked.
To fix this, don't check to see if a certificate is self-signed if the Issuer and Subject names differ.
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +8 -3
@@ -313,9 +313,14 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) cert->pub->id_type =PKEY_ID_X509 ;/* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */ -if ((!cert->akid_skid && !cert->akid_id) || -asymmetric_key_id_same (cert->skid, cert->akid_skid) || -asymmetric_key_id_same (cert->id, cert->akid_id)) { +if ((!cert->akid_skid && !cert->akid_id)) { +if (cert->raw_issuer_size == cert->raw_subject_size && +memcmp (cert->raw_issuer, cert->raw_subject, + cert->raw_subject_size) ==0 ) + goto self_signed; + }else if (asymmetric_key_id_same (cert->skid, cert->akid_skid) || +asymmetric_key_id_same (cert->id, cert->akid_id)) { +self_signed: ret =x509_check_signature (cert->pub, cert);/* self-signed */ if (ret <0 ) goto error_free_cert;
Quoted 11 lines · David Howells
Fix determination of whether an X.509 certificate is self-signed or not.
It is currently assumed that a cert is self-signed if has no authorityKeyIdentifier or the authorityKeyIdentifier matches the subjectKeyIdentifier. However, it is possible to encounter a certificate that has neither AKID not SKID but is not self-signed.
This symptoms of this show up as an attempt to load a certificate failing with
-ERANGEor-EBADMSG, produced from the RSA module when the result of calculating "m = s^e mod n" is checked.
Quoted 5 lines
To fix this, don't check to see if a certificate is self-signed if the Issuer and Subject names differ.
Signed-off-by David Howells <[email protected]>cc David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Should this also be Cc'd to stable?
josh
Quoted 28 lines
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +8
-3@@ -313,9 +313,14 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) cert->pub->id_type =PKEY_ID_X509 ;/* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */ -if ((!cert->akid_skid && !cert->akid_id) || -asymmetric_key_id_same (cert->skid, cert->akid_skid) || -asymmetric_key_id_same (cert->id, cert->akid_id)) { +if ((!cert->akid_skid && !cert->akid_id)) { +if (cert->raw_issuer_size == cert->raw_subject_size && +memcmp (cert->raw_issuer, cert->raw_subject, + cert->raw_subject_size) ==0 ) + goto self_signed; + }else if (asymmetric_key_id_same (cert->skid, cert->akid_skid) || +asymmetric_key_id_same (cert->id, cert->akid_id)) { +self_signed: ret =x509_check_signature (cert->pub, cert);/* self-signed */ if (ret <0 ) goto error_free_cert;
David Howells
maintainerQuoted 1 line · Josh Boyer
Should this also be Cc'd to stable?
Argh. Probably.
David