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late self-nomination

Ksummit-discuss Michael S. Tsirkin 3 participants 5 messages Aug 2, 2016

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Hi folks!

Likely too late, but oh well.
I would like to self-nominate for kernel summit this year.

I am the maintainer of the virtio subsystem, and within KVM, of the PC and PCI subsystems. Intelnally within Red Hat I'm a tech lead for the team handling the networking for VMs.

I would like to participate in self-hardening to see whether hypervisor extensions (like e.g. kernel guard technology) can benefit that project, in the memory model discussions as virtio is a heavy user of memory barriers and could benefit a lot e.g. from faster mb implementations. I would also like to learn more about group maintainership as we are seeing issues scaling co-maintainership with our current structure with virtio.

Cheers,

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#1 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin

Hi folks!

Likely too late, but oh well.
I would like to self-nominate for kernel summit this year.

Quoted 7 lines

I am the maintainer of the virtio subsystem, and within KVM, of the PC and PCI subsystems. Intelnally within Red Hat I'm a tech lead for the team handling the networking for VMs.

I would like to participate in self-hardening to see whether hypervisor extensions (like e.g. kernel guard technology) can benefit that project,

This isn't quite on-topic, but I suggested something that I think would be useful last year (possibly off-list -- I don't remember):

On x86 with VMX, the EPT page tables have separate R, W, and X bits. If a hypervisor were to limit the guest physical address space to the lower half (high bit always clear) and then alias all of it with the high guest physical address bit set and R clear, then the guest could use the high physical address bit as an effective R bit. That would allow PROT_WRITE, PROT_EXEC, and PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC mappings to work without granting read access.

Doing this would provide some protection against attacks that use a wild read to scan for code or data structures at otherwise unpredictable addresses or to blindly search for ROP gadgets.

#2 lore raw
Quoted 25 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 5 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin

Hi folks!

Likely too late, but oh well.
I would like to self-nominate for kernel summit this year.

Quoted 7 lines

I am the maintainer of the virtio subsystem, and within KVM, of the PC and PCI subsystems. Intelnally within Red Hat I'm a tech lead for the team handling the networking for VMs.

I would like to participate in self-hardening to see whether hypervisor extensions (like e.g. kernel guard technology) can benefit that project,

This isn't quite on-topic, but I suggested something that I think would be useful last year (possibly off-list -- I don't remember):

On x86 with VMX, the EPT page tables have separate R, W, and X bits. If a hypervisor were to limit the guest physical address space to the lower half (high bit always clear) and then alias all of it with the high guest physical address bit set and R clear, then the guest could use the high physical address bit as an effective R bit. That would allow PROT_WRITE, PROT_EXEC, and PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC mappings to work without granting read access.

Quoted 3 lines

Doing this would provide some protection against attacks that use a wild read to scan for code or data structures at otherwise unpredictable addresses or to blindly search for ROP gadgets.

Thanks - I expect we'll discuss this topic with other kvm folks quite a bit on the kvm forum end of August, as well.

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#3 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines

On x86 with VMX, the EPT page tables have separate R, W, and X bits. If a hypervisor were to limit the guest physical address space to the lower half (high bit always clear) and then alias all of it with the high guest physical address bit set and R clear, then the guest could use the high physical address bit as an effective R bit. That would allow PROT_WRITE, PROT_EXEC, and PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC mappings to work without granting read access.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Doing this would provide some protection against attacks that use a wild read to scan for code or data structures at otherwise unpredictable addresses or to blindly search for ROP gadgets.

Thanks - I expect we'll discuss this topic with other kvm folks quite a bit on the kvm forum end of August, as well.

I won't be able to attend kernel summit (I haven't nominated me for this reason) so I support Michael's presence!

Paolo

#4 lore raw
Quoted 12 lines · Paolo Bonzini
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines

On x86 with VMX, the EPT page tables have separate R, W, and X bits. If a hypervisor were to limit the guest physical address space to the lower half (high bit always clear) and then alias all of it with the high guest physical address bit set and R clear, then the guest could use the high physical address bit as an effective R bit. That would allow PROT_WRITE, PROT_EXEC, and PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC mappings to work without granting read access.

Doing this would provide some protection against attacks that use a wild read to scan for code or data structures at otherwise unpredictable addresses or to blindly search for ROP gadgets.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Thanks - I expect we'll discuss this topic with other kvm folks quite a bit on the kvm forum end of August, as well.

I won't be able to attend kernel summit (I haven't nominated me for this reason) so I support Michael's presence!

Paolo

I didn't realize. In that case I might be able to also give some kind of summary from the kvm forum as well, if there's interest.

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