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x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection

PATCH Superseded Kees Cook 1 participant 2 messages Jul 25, 2017 – Aug 2, 2017

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Kees Cook

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PATCH v9 1/1 x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection

This implements refcount_t overflow protection on x86 without a noticeable performance impact, though without the fuller checking of REFCOUNT_FULL. This is done by duplicating the existing atomic_t refcount implementation but with normally a single instruction added to detect if the refcount has gone negative (e.g. wrapped past INT_MAX or below zero). When detected, the handler saturates the refcount_t to INT_MIN / 2. With this overflow protection, the erroneous reference release that would follow a wrap back to zero is blocked from happening, avoiding the class of refcount-overflow use-after-free vulnerabilities entirely.

Only the overflow case of refcounting can be perfectly protected, since it can be detected and stopped before the reference is freed and left to be abused by an attacker. There isn't a way to block early decrements, and while REFCOUNT_FULL stops increment-from-zero cases (which would be the state _after_ an early decrement and stops potential double-free conditions), this fast implementation does not, since it would require the more expensive cmpxchg loops. Since the overflow case is much more common (e.g. missing a "put" during an error path), this protection provides real-world protection. For example, the two public refcount overflow use-after-free exploits published in 2016 would have been rendered unexploitable:

http://perception-point.io/2016/01/14/analysis-and-exploitation-of-a-linux-kernel-vulnerability-cve-2016-0728/

http://cyseclabs.com/page?n=02012016

This implementation does, however, notice an unchecked decement to zero (i.e. caller used refcount_dec() instead of refcount_dec_and_test() and it resulted in a zero). Decrements under zero are noticed (since they will have resulted in a negative value), though this only indicates that a use-after-free may have already happened. Such notifications are likely avoidable by an attacker that has already exploited a use-after-free vulnerability, but it's better to have them reported than allow such conditions to remain universally silent.

On first overflow detection, the refcount value is reset to INT_MIN / 2 (which serves as a saturation value) and a report and stack trace are produced. When operations detect only negative value results (such as changing an already saturated value), saturation still happens but no notification is performed (since the value was already saturated).

On the matter of races, since the entire range beyond INT_MAX but before 0 is negative, every operation at INT_MIN / 2 will trap, leaving no overflow-only race condition.

As for performance, this implementation adds a single "js" instruction to the regular execution flow of a copy of the standard atomic_t refcount operations. (The non-"and_test" refcount_dec() function, which is uncommon in regular refcount design patterns, has an additional "jz" instruction to detect reaching exactly zero.) Since this is a forward jump, it is by default the non-predicted path, which will be reinforced by dynamic branch prediction. The result is this protection having virtually no measurable change in performance over standard atomic_t operations. The error path, located in .text.unlikely, saves the refcount location and then uses UD0 to fire a refcount exception handler, which resets the refcount, handles reporting, and returns to regular execution. This keeps the changes to .text size minimal, avoiding return jumps and open-coded calls to the error reporting routine.

Example assembly comparison:

refcount_inc before
.text:
ffffffff81546149: f0 ff 45 f4 lock incl -0xc(%rbp)

refcount_inc after
.text:

ffffffff81546149:       f0 ff 45 f4             lock incl -0xc(%rbp)
ffffffff8154614d:       0f 88 80 d5 17 00       js     ffffffff816c36d3
...
.text.unlikely:
ffffffff816c36d3:       48 8d 4d f4             lea    -0xc(%rbp),%rcx
ffffffff816c36d7:       0f ff                   (bad)

These are the cycle counts comparing a loop of refcount_inc() from 1 to INT_MAX and back down to 0 (via refcount_dec_and_test()), between unprotected refcount_t (atomic_t), fully protected REFCOUNT_FULL (refcount_t-full), and this overflow-protected refcount (refcount_t-fast):

2147483646 refcount_inc()s and 2147483647 refcount_dec_and_test()s:
cycles protections
atomic_t 82249267387 none
refcount_t-fast 82211446892 overflow, untested dec-to-zero
refcount_t-full 144814735193 overflow, untested dec-to-zero, inc-from-zero

This code is a modified version of the x86 PAX_REFCOUNT atomic_t overflow defense from the last public patch of PaX/grsecurity, based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Thanks to PaX Team for various suggestions for improvement for repurposing this code to be a refcount-only protection.

---
v9:
- revert inc/add_not_zero() implementation to v6 -- perf same; hw.likun

v8:
- spelling fixes/rephrasings of Kconfig and comments; mingo
- fix style nits; mingo

v7:
- add unreachable annotation; josh
- improve inc/add_not_zero code
- drop process killing (either we catch it or we don't)
- refactor error report into WARN

v6:
- use single saturation value (INT_MIN / 2)
- detect refcount_dec() to zero and saturate

v5:
- add unchecked atomic_t implementation when !CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL
- use "leal" again, as in v3 for more flexible reset handling
- provide better underflow detection, with saturation

v4:
- switch to js from jns to gain static branch prediction benefits
- use .text.unlikely for js target, effectively making handler __cold
- use UD0 with refcount exception handler instead of int 0x81
- Kconfig defaults on when arch has support

v3:
- drop named text sections until we need to distinguish sizes/directions
- reset value immediately instead of passing back to handler
- drop needless export; josh

v2:
- fix instruction pointer decrement bug; thejh
- switch to js; pax-team
- improve commit log

---
 arch/Kconfig                    |  12 +++++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h      |   6 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h | 109 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/mm/extable.c           |  42 ++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/kernel.h          |   7 +++
 include/linux/refcount.h        |   4 ++
 kernel/panic.c                  |  12 +++++
 8 files changed, 193 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h
arch/Kconfig +12 -0
index 21d0089117fe..2520ca5b42eb 100644
@@ -931,6 +931,18 @@ config STRICT_MODULE_RWX
 config ARCH_WANT_RELAX_ORDER
 	bool
 
+config ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT
+	bool
+	help
+	  An architecture selects this when it has implemented refcount_t
+	  using open coded assembly primitives that provide an optimized
+	  refcount_t implementation, possibly at the expense of some full
+	  refcount state checks of CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL=y.
+
+	  The refcount overflow check behavior, however, must be retained.
+	  Catching overflows is the primary security concern for protecting
+	  against bugs in reference counts.
+
 config REFCOUNT_FULL
 	bool "Perform full reference count validation at the expense of speed"
 	help
arch/x86/Kconfig +1 -0
index 781521b7cf9e..73574c91e857 100644
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ config X86
 	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV			if X86_64
 	select ARCH_HAS_MMIO_FLUSH
 	select ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API		if X86_64
+	select ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT
 	select ARCH_HAS_UACCESS_FLUSHCACHE	if X86_64
 	select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY
 	select ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN
arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h +6 -0
index 7a9df3beb89b..676ee5807d86 100644
@@ -74,6 +74,9 @@
 # define _ASM_EXTABLE_EX(from, to)				\
 	_ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to, ex_handler_ext)
 
+# define _ASM_EXTABLE_REFCOUNT(from, to)			\
+	_ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to, ex_handler_refcount)
+
 # define _ASM_NOKPROBE(entry)					\
 	.pushsection "_kprobe_blacklist","aw" ;			\
 	_ASM_ALIGN ;						\
@@ -123,6 +126,9 @@
 # define _ASM_EXTABLE_EX(from, to)				\
 	_ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to, ex_handler_ext)
 
+# define _ASM_EXTABLE_REFCOUNT(from, to)			\
+	_ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to, ex_handler_refcount)
+
 /* For C file, we already have NOKPROBE_SYMBOL macro */
 #endif
 
arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h new file +109 -0

109 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/mm/extable.c +42 -0

48 lines not on this page · raw message

include/linux/kernel.h +7 -0
index bd6d96cf80b1..6607225d0ea4 100644
@@ -277,6 +277,13 @@ extern int oops_may_print(void);
 void do_exit(long error_code) __noreturn;
 void complete_and_exit(struct completion *, long) __noreturn;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT
+void refcount_error_report(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *err);
+#else
+static inline void refcount_error_report(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *err)
+{ }
+#endif
+
 /* Internal, do not use. */
 int __must_check _kstrtoul(const char *s, unsigned int base, unsigned long *res);
 int __must_check _kstrtol(const char *s, unsigned int base, long *res);
include/linux/refcount.h +4 -0
index 591792c8e5b0..48b7c9c68c4d 100644
@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ extern __must_check bool refcount_sub_and_test(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r);
 extern __must_check bool refcount_dec_and_test(refcount_t *r);
 extern void refcount_dec(refcount_t *r);
 #else
+# ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT
+#  include <asm/refcount.h>
+# else
 static inline __must_check bool refcount_add_not_zero(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r)
 {
 	return atomic_add_unless(&r->refs, i, 0);
@@ -87,6 +90,7 @@ static inline void refcount_dec(refcount_t *r)
 {
 	atomic_dec(&r->refs);
 }
+# endif /* !CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT */
 #endif /* CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL */
 
 extern __must_check bool refcount_dec_if_one(refcount_t *r);
kernel/panic.c +12 -0
index a58932b41700..bdd18afa19a4 100644
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 #include <linux/nmi.h>
 #include <linux/console.h>
 #include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
 
 #define PANIC_TIMER_STEP 100
 #define PANIC_BLINK_SPD 18
@@ -601,6 +602,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_fail);
 
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT
+void refcount_error_report(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *err)
+{
+	WARN_RATELIMIT(1, "refcount_t %s at %pB in %s[%d], uid/euid: %u/%u\n",
+		err, (void *)instruction_pointer(regs),
+		current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
+		from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, current_uid()),
+		from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, current_euid()));
+}
+#endif
+
 core_param(panic, panic_timeout, int, 0644);
 core_param(pause_on_oops, pause_on_oops, int, 0644);
 core_param(panic_on_warn, panic_on_warn, int, 0644);
Signature · 6 lines
2.7.4


-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
author
#1 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Kees Cook

This implements refcount_t overflow protection on x86 without a noticeable performance impact, though without the fuller checking of REFCOUNT_FULL. This is done by duplicating the existing atomic_t refcount implementation but with normally a single instruction added to detect if the refcount has gone negative (e.g. wrapped past INT_MAX or below zero). When detected, the handler saturates the refcount_t to INT_MIN / 2. With this overflow protection, the erroneous reference release that would follow a wrap back to zero is blocked from happening, avoiding the class of refcount-overflow use-after-free vulnerabilities entirely.

Hi Ingo,

Friendly ping. Is there anything remaining for this patch to go into -tip?

Thanks!

-Kees

Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook
Pixel Security