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4.13.3-stable review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 3 participants 56 messages Sep 18, 2017 – Sep 19, 2017

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author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/52 ipv6: fix typo in fib6_net_exit()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 32a805baf0fb70b6dbedefcd7249ac7f580f9e3b ]

IPv6 FIB should use FIB6_TABLE_HASHSZ, not FIB_TABLE_HASHSZ.

Fixes ba1cc08d9488 ("ipv6: fix memory leak with multiple tables during netns destruction")
---
 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c +1 -1
@@ -1926,7 +1926,7 @@ static void fib6_net_exit(struct net *ne
 	rt6_ifdown(net, NULL);
 	del_timer_sync(&net->ipv6.ip6_fib_timer);
 
-	for (i = 0; i < FIB_TABLE_HASHSZ; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < FIB6_TABLE_HASHSZ; i++) {
 		struct hlist_head *head = &net->ipv6.fib_table_hash[i];
 		struct hlist_node *tmp;
 		struct fib6_table *tb;
author maintainer
#18 lore raw

PATCH 18/52 x86/fsgsbase/64: Report FSBASE and GSBASE correctly in core dumps

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>

commit 9584d98bed7a7a904d0702ad06bbcc94703cb5b4 upstream.

In ELF_COPY_CORE_REGS, we're copying from the current task, so accessing thread.fsbase and thread.gsbase makes no sense. Just read the values from the CPU registers.

In practice, the old code would have been correct most of the time simply because thread.fsbase and thread.gsbase usually matched the CPU registers.

Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc Chang Seok <[email protected]>
Cc Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h +3 -2
@@ -204,6 +204,7 @@ void set_personality_ia32(bool);
 
 #define ELF_CORE_COPY_REGS(pr_reg, regs)			\
 do {								\
+	unsigned long base;					\
 	unsigned v;						\
 	(pr_reg)[0] = (regs)->r15;				\
 	(pr_reg)[1] = (regs)->r14;				\
@@ -226,8 +227,8 @@ do {								\
 	(pr_reg)[18] = (regs)->flags;				\
 	(pr_reg)[19] = (regs)->sp;				\
 	(pr_reg)[20] = (regs)->ss;				\
-	(pr_reg)[21] = current->thread.fsbase;			\
-	(pr_reg)[22] = current->thread.gsbase;			\
+	rdmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, base); (pr_reg)[21] = base;		\
+	rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, base); (pr_reg)[22] = base;	\
 	asm("movl %%ds,%0" : "=r" (v)); (pr_reg)[23] = v;	\
 	asm("movl %%es,%0" : "=r" (v)); (pr_reg)[24] = v;	\
 	asm("movl %%fs,%0" : "=r" (v)); (pr_reg)[25] = v;	\
author maintainer
#20 lore raw

PATCH 20/52 x86/mm, mm/hwpoison: Clear PRESENT bit for kernel 1:1 mappings of poison pages

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tony Luck <[email protected]>

commit ce0fa3e56ad20f04d8252353dcd24e924abdafca upstream.

Speculative processor accesses may reference any memory that has a valid page table entry. While a speculative access won't generate a machine check, it will log the error in a machine check bank. That could cause escalation of a subsequent error since the overflow bit will be then set in the machine check bank status register.

Code has to be double-plus-tricky to avoid mentioning the 1:1 virtual address of the page we want to map out otherwise we may trigger the very problem we are trying to avoid. We use a non-canonical address that passes through the usual Linux table walking code to get to the same "pte".

Thanks to Dave Hansen for reviewing several iterations of this.

Also see:

http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=149860136413338&w=2

Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory) <[email protected]>
Cc H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h   |    4 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c |   43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/mm_inline.h        |    6 +++++
 mm/memory-failure.c              |    2 +
 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h +4 -0
@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ static inline void clear_page(void *page
 
 void copy_page(void *to, void *from);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
+#define arch_unmap_kpfn arch_unmap_kpfn
+#endif
+
 #endif	/* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c +43 -0

55 lines not on this page · raw message

include/linux/mm_inline.h +6 -0
@@ -126,4 +126,10 @@ static __always_inline enum lru_list pag
 
 #define lru_to_page(head) (list_entry((head)->prev, struct page, lru))
 
+#ifdef arch_unmap_kpfn
+extern void arch_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn);
+#else
+static __always_inline void arch_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn) { }
+#endif
+
 #endif
mm/memory-failure.c +2 -0
@@ -1146,6 +1146,8 @@ int memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, in
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	arch_unmap_kpfn(pfn);
+
 	orig_head = hpage = compound_head(p);
 	num_poisoned_pages_inc();
 

--
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Greg Kroah-Hartman

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

cover 4.13.3-stable review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.13.3 release. There are 52 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Wed Sep 20 09:08:28 UTC 2017. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.13.3-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.13.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 4.13.3-rc1

Song Liu <[email protected]>
md/raid5: release/flush io in raid5_do_work()

Shaohua Li <[email protected]>
md/raid1/10: reset bio allocated from mempool

Pan Bian <[email protected]>
xfs: use kmem_free to free return value of kmem_zalloc

Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
xfs: open code end_buffer_async_write in xfs_finish_page_writeback

Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
xfs: don't set v3 xflags for v2 inodes

Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>
xfs: fix incorrect log_flushed on fsync

Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
xfs: disable per-inode DAX flag

Brian Foster <[email protected]>
xfs: relog dirty buffers during swapext bmbt owner change

Brian Foster <[email protected]>
xfs: disallow marking previously dirty buffers as ordered

Brian Foster <[email protected]>
xfs: move bmbt owner change to last step of extent swap

Brian Foster <[email protected]>
xfs: skip bmbt block ino validation during owner change

Brian Foster <[email protected]>
xfs: don't log dirty ranges for ordered buffers

Brian Foster <[email protected]>
xfs: refactor buffer logging into buffer dirtying helper

Brian Foster <[email protected]>
xfs: ordered buffer log items are never formatted

Brian Foster <[email protected]>
xfs: remove unnecessary dirty bli format check for ordered bufs

Brian Foster <[email protected]>
xfs: open-code xfs_buf_item_dirty()

Omar Sandoval <[email protected]>
xfs: check for race with xfs_reclaim_inode() in xfs_ifree_cluster()

Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
xfs: evict all inodes involved with log redo item

Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
xfs: stop searching for free slots in an inode chunk when there are none

Brian Foster <[email protected]>
xfs: handle -EFSCORRUPTED during head/tail verification

Brian Foster <[email protected]>
xfs: fix log recovery corruption error due to tail overwrite

Brian Foster <[email protected]>
xfs: always verify the log tail during recovery

Brian Foster <[email protected]>
xfs: fix recovery failure when log record header wraps log end

Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
xfs: Properly retry failed inode items in case of error during buffer writeback

Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
xfs: Add infrastructure needed for error propagation during buffer IO failure

Eric Sandeen <[email protected]>
xfs: toggle readonly state around xfs_log_mount_finish

Eric Sandeen <[email protected]>
xfs: write unmount record for ro mounts

Dan Williams <[email protected]>
libnvdimm: fix integer overflow static analysis warning

Christophe Jaillet <[email protected]>
libnvdimm, btt: check memory allocation failure

Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
idr: remove WARN_ON_ONCE() when trying to replace negative ID

Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
fuse: allow server to run in different pid_ns

Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>
ovl: fix false positive ESTALE on lookup

Tony Luck <[email protected]>
x86/mm, mm/hwpoison: Clear PRESENT bit for kernel 1:1 mappings of poison pages

Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
x86/switch_to/64: Rewrite FS/GS switching yet again to fix AMD CPUs

Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
x86/fsgsbase/64: Report FSBASE and GSBASE correctly in core dumps

Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
x86/fsgsbase/64: Fully initialize FS and GS state in start_thread_common

Bernat, Yehezkel <[email protected]>
thunderbolt: Allow clearing the key

Bernat, Yehezkel <[email protected]>
thunderbolt: Make key root-only accessible

Bernat, Yehezkel <[email protected]>
thunderbolt: Remove superfluous check

Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
f2fs: check hot_data for roll-forward recovery

Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
f2fs: let fill_super handle roll-forward errors

Haishuang Yan <[email protected]>
ip_tunnel: fix setting ttl and tos value in collect_md mode

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
tcp: fix a request socket leak

Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
sctp: fix missing wake ups in some situations

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
ipv6: fix typo in fib6_net_exit()

Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
ipv6: fix memory leak with multiple tables during netns destruction

Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
udp: drop head states only when all skb references are gone

Xin Long <[email protected]>
ip6_gre: update mtu properly in ip6gre_err

Jason Wang <[email protected]>
vhost_net: correctly check tx avail during rx busy polling

Claudiu Manoil <[email protected]>
gianfar: Fix Tx flow control deactivation

Jesper Dangaard Brouer <[email protected]>
Revert "net: fix percpu memory leaks"

Jesper Dangaard Brouer <[email protected]>
Revert "net: use lib/percpu_counter API for fragmentation mem accounting"

-------------

Diffstat:

 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-thunderbolt |   2 +
 Makefile                                        |   4 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h                      |   5 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h                  |   4 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c                |  43 +++++
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c                    | 236 +++++++++++++-----------
 drivers/md/raid1.c                              |  19 +-
 drivers/md/raid10.c                             |  35 +++-
 drivers/md/raid5.c                              |   4 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/gianfar.c        |   2 +-
 drivers/nvdimm/btt.c                            |   2 +
 drivers/nvdimm/bus.c                            |  17 +-
 drivers/thunderbolt/switch.c                    |  20 +-
 drivers/vhost/net.c                             |   7 +-
 fs/f2fs/recovery.c                              |   4 +-
 fs/fuse/dev.c                                   |  13 +-
 fs/fuse/file.c                                  |   3 -
 fs/inode.c                                      |   1 +
 fs/internal.h                                   |   1 -
 fs/overlayfs/inode.c                            |  11 +-
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap_btree.c                  |   1 +
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c                       |  27 ++-
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.h                       |   3 +-
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_ialloc.c                      |  57 +++---
 fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c                               |  71 ++++---
 fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.c                          |  93 +++++++---
 fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c                           | 135 +++++++++-----
 fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.h                           |   5 +-
 fs/xfs/xfs_icache.c                             |  10 +-
 fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c                              |  23 ++-
 fs/xfs/xfs_inode_item.c                         |  47 ++++-
 fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c                              |  41 ++--
 fs/xfs/xfs_log.c                                |  33 +++-
 fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c                        | 155 ++++++++++------
 fs/xfs/xfs_super.c                              |   2 +-
 fs/xfs/xfs_trace.h                              |   1 -
 fs/xfs/xfs_trans.h                              |  14 +-
 fs/xfs/xfs_trans_ail.c                          |   3 +-
 fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c                          |  79 +++++---
 fs/xfs/xfs_trans_priv.h                         |  31 ++++
 include/linux/fs.h                              |   1 +
 include/linux/mm_inline.h                       |   6 +
 include/linux/skbuff.h                          |   2 +-
 include/net/inet_frag.h                         |  35 +---
 lib/idr.c                                       |   2 +-
 mm/memory-failure.c                             |   2 +
 net/core/skbuff.c                               |   9 +-
 net/ieee802154/6lowpan/reassembly.c             |  11 +-
 net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c                        |   4 +-
 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c                          |  12 +-
 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c                            |   4 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c                             |   6 +-
 net/ipv4/udp.c                                  |   5 +-
 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c                              |  25 ++-
 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c                              |   4 +-
 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c         |  12 +-
 net/ipv6/reassembly.c                           |  12 +-
 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c                             |   6 +-
 net/sctp/ulpqueue.c                             |   3 +-
 59 files changed, 918 insertions(+), 507 deletions(-)
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/52 Revert "net: use lib/percpu_counter API for fragmentation mem accounting"

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fb452a1aa3fd4034d7999e309c5466ff2d7005aa ]

This reverts commit 6d7b857d541ecd1d9bd997c97242d4ef94b19de2.

There is a bug in fragmentation codes use of the percpu_counter API, that can cause issues on systems with many CPUs.

The frag_mem_limit() just reads the global counter (fbc->count), without considering other CPUs can have upto batch size (130K) that haven't been subtracted yet. Due to the 3MBytes lower thresh limit, this become dangerous at >=24 CPUs (3*1024*1024/130000=24).

The correct API usage would be to use __percpu_counter_compare() which does the right thing, and takes into account the number of (online) CPUs and batch size, to account for this and call __percpu_counter_sum() when needed.

We choose to revert the use of the lib/percpu_counter API for frag memory accounting for several reasons:

1) On systems with CPUs > 24, the heavier fully locked __percpu_counter_sum() is always invoked, which will be more expensive than the atomic_t that is reverted to.

Given systems with more than 24 CPUs are becoming common this doesn't seem like a good option. To mitigate this, the batch size could be decreased and thresh be increased.

2) The add_frag_mem_limit+sub_frag_mem_limit pairs happen on the RX CPU, before SKBs are pushed into sockets on remote CPUs. Given NICs can only hash on L2 part of the IP-header, the NIC-RXq's will likely be limited. Thus, a fair chance that atomic add+dec happen on the same CPU.

Revert note that commit 1d6119baf061 ("net: fix percpu memory leaks") removed init_frag_mem_limit() and instead use inet_frags_init_net(). After this revert, inet_frags_uninit_net() becomes empty.

Fixes 6d7b857d541e ("net: use lib/percpu_counter API for fragmentation mem accounting")
Fixes 1d6119baf061 ("net: fix percpu memory leaks")
---
 include/net/inet_frag.h  |   30 +++++++++---------------------
 net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c |    4 +---
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
include/net/inet_frag.h +9 -21
@@ -1,14 +1,9 @@
 #ifndef __NET_FRAG_H__
 #define __NET_FRAG_H__
 
-#include <linux/percpu_counter.h>
-
 struct netns_frags {
-	/* The percpu_counter "mem" need to be cacheline aligned.
-	 *  mem.count must not share cacheline with other writers
-	 */
-	struct percpu_counter   mem ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
-
+	/* Keep atomic mem on separate cachelines in structs that include it */
+	atomic_t		mem ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
 	/* sysctls */
 	int			timeout;
 	int			high_thresh;
@@ -110,11 +105,11 @@ void inet_frags_fini(struct inet_frags *
 
 static inline int inet_frags_init_net(struct netns_frags *nf)
 {
-	return percpu_counter_init(&nf->mem, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
+	atomic_set(&nf->mem, 0);
+	return 0;
 }
 static inline void inet_frags_uninit_net(struct netns_frags *nf)
 {
-	percpu_counter_destroy(&nf->mem);
 }
 
 void inet_frags_exit_net(struct netns_frags *nf, struct inet_frags *f);
@@ -140,31 +135,24 @@ static inline bool inet_frag_evicting(st
 
 /* Memory Tracking Functions. */
 
-/* The default percpu_counter batch size is not big enough to scale to
- * fragmentation mem acct sizes.
- * The mem size of a 64K fragment is approx:
- *  (44 fragments * 2944 truesize) + frag_queue struct(200) = 129736 bytes
- */
-static unsigned int frag_percpu_counter_batch = 130000;
-
 static inline int frag_mem_limit(struct netns_frags *nf)
 {
-	return percpu_counter_read(&nf->mem);
+	return atomic_read(&nf->mem);
 }
 
 static inline void sub_frag_mem_limit(struct netns_frags *nf, int i)
 {
-	percpu_counter_add_batch(&nf->mem, -i, frag_percpu_counter_batch);
+	atomic_sub(i, &nf->mem);
 }
 
 static inline void add_frag_mem_limit(struct netns_frags *nf, int i)
 {
-	percpu_counter_add_batch(&nf->mem, i, frag_percpu_counter_batch);
+	atomic_add(i, &nf->mem);
 }
 
-static inline unsigned int sum_frag_mem_limit(struct netns_frags *nf)
+static inline int sum_frag_mem_limit(struct netns_frags *nf)
 {
-	return percpu_counter_sum_positive(&nf->mem);
+	return atomic_read(&nf->mem);
 }
 
 /* RFC 3168 support :
net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c +1 -3
@@ -234,10 +234,8 @@ evict_again:
 	cond_resched();
 
 	if (read_seqretry(&f->rnd_seqlock, seq) ||
-	    percpu_counter_sum(&nf->mem))
+	    sum_frag_mem_limit(nf))
 		goto evict_again;
-
-	percpu_counter_destroy(&nf->mem);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_frags_exit_net);
 
author maintainer
#45 lore raw

PATCH 45/52 xfs: relog dirty buffers during swapext bmbt owner change

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Brian Foster <[email protected]>

commit 2dd3d709fc4338681a3aa61658122fa8faa5a437 upstream.

The owner change bmbt scan that occurs during extent swap operations does not handle ordered buffer failures. Buffers that cannot be marked ordered must be physically logged so previously dirty ranges of the buffer can be relogged in the transaction.

Since the bmbt scan may need to process and potentially log a large number of blocks, we can't expect to complete this operation in a single transaction. Update extent swap to use a permanent transaction with enough log reservation to physically log a buffer. Update the bmbt scan to physically log any buffers that cannot be ordered and to terminate the scan with -EAGAIN. On -EAGAIN, the caller rolls the transaction and restarts the scan. Finally, update the bmbt scan helper function to skip bmbt blocks that already match the expected owner so they are not reprocessed after scan restarts.

---
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c |   26 ++++++++++++++------
 fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.c    |   57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c +18 -8
@@ -4452,10 +4452,15 @@ xfs_btree_block_change_owner(
 
 	/* modify the owner */
 	block = xfs_btree_get_block(cur, level, &bp);
-	if (cur->bc_flags & XFS_BTREE_LONG_PTRS)
+	if (cur->bc_flags & XFS_BTREE_LONG_PTRS) {
+		if (block->bb_u.l.bb_owner == cpu_to_be64(bbcoi->new_owner))
+			return 0;
 		block->bb_u.l.bb_owner = cpu_to_be64(bbcoi->new_owner);
-	else
+	} else {
+		if (block->bb_u.s.bb_owner == cpu_to_be32(bbcoi->new_owner))
+			return 0;
 		block->bb_u.s.bb_owner = cpu_to_be32(bbcoi->new_owner);
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * If the block is a root block hosted in an inode, we might not have a
@@ -4464,14 +4469,19 @@ xfs_btree_block_change_owner(
 	 * block is formatted into the on-disk inode fork. We still change it,
 	 * though, so everything is consistent in memory.
 	 */
-	if (bp) {
-		if (cur->bc_tp)
-			xfs_trans_ordered_buf(cur->bc_tp, bp);
-		else
-			xfs_buf_delwri_queue(bp, bbcoi->buffer_list);
-	} else {
+	if (!bp) {
 		ASSERT(cur->bc_flags & XFS_BTREE_ROOT_IN_INODE);
 		ASSERT(level == cur->bc_nlevels - 1);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (cur->bc_tp) {
+		if (!xfs_trans_ordered_buf(cur->bc_tp, bp)) {
+			xfs_btree_log_block(cur, bp, XFS_BB_OWNER);
+			return -EAGAIN;
+		}
+	} else {
+		xfs_buf_delwri_queue(bp, bbcoi->buffer_list);
 	}
 
 	return 0;
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.c +47 -10

85 lines not on this page · raw message

author maintainer
#47 lore raw

PATCH 47/52 xfs: fix incorrect log_flushed on fsync

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>

commit 47c7d0b19502583120c3f396c7559e7a77288a68 upstream.

When calling into _xfs_log_force{,_lsn}() with a pointer to log_flushed variable, log_flushed will be set to 1 if:
1. xlog_sync() is called to flush the active log buffer AND/OR
2. xlog_wait() is called to wait on a syncing log buffers

xfs_file_fsync() checks the value of log_flushed after _xfs_log_force_lsn() call to optimize away an explicit PREFLUSH request to the data block device after writing out all the file's pages to disk.

This optimization is incorrect in the following sequence of events:

Task A Task B
-------------------------------------------------------
xfs_file_fsync()
_xfs_log_force_lsn()

     xlog_sync()
        [submit PREFLUSH]
                           xfs_file_fsync()
                             file_write_and_wait_range()
                               [submit WRITE X]
                               [endio  WRITE X]
                             _xfs_log_force_lsn()
                               xlog_wait()
        [endio  PREFLUSH]

The write X is not guarantied to be on persistent storage when PREFLUSH request in completed, because write A was submitted after the PREFLUSH request, but xfs_file_fsync() of task A will be notified of log_flushed=1 and will skip explicit flush.

If the system crashes after fsync of task A, write X may not be present on disk after reboot.

This bug was discovered and demonstrated using Josef Bacik's dm-log-writes target, which can be used to record block io operations and then replay a subset of these operations onto the target device. The test goes something like this:
- Use fsx to execute ops of a file and record ops on log device
- Every now and then fsync the file, store md5 of file and mark the location in the log
- Then replay log onto device for each mark, mount fs and compare md5 of file to stored value

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_log.c |    7 -------
 1 file changed, 7 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_log.c +0 -7
@@ -3375,8 +3375,6 @@ maybe_sleep:
 		 */
 		if (iclog->ic_state & XLOG_STATE_IOERROR)
 			return -EIO;
-		if (log_flushed)
-			*log_flushed = 1;
 	} else {
 
 no_sleep:
@@ -3480,8 +3478,6 @@ try_again:
 
 				xlog_wait(&iclog->ic_prev->ic_write_wait,
 							&log->l_icloglock);
-				if (log_flushed)
-					*log_flushed = 1;
 				already_slept = 1;
 				goto try_again;
 			}
@@ -3515,9 +3511,6 @@ try_again:
 			 */
 			if (iclog->ic_state & XLOG_STATE_IOERROR)
 				return -EIO;
-
-			if (log_flushed)
-				*log_flushed = 1;
 		} else {		/* just return */
 			spin_unlock(&log->l_icloglock);
 		}
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/52 Revert "net: fix percpu memory leaks"

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5a63643e583b6a9789d7a225ae076fb4e603991c ]

This reverts commit 1d6119baf0610f813eb9d9580eb4fd16de5b4ceb.

After reverting commit 6d7b857d541e ("net: use lib/percpu_counter API for fragmentation mem accounting") then here is no need for this fix-up patch. As percpu_counter is no longer used, it cannot memory leak it any-longer.

Fixes 6d7b857d541e ("net: use lib/percpu_counter API for fragmentation mem accounting")
Fixes 1d6119baf061 ("net: fix percpu memory leaks")
---
 include/net/inet_frag.h                 |    7 +------
 net/ieee802154/6lowpan/reassembly.c     |   11 +++--------
 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c                  |   12 +++---------
 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c |   12 +++---------
 net/ipv6/reassembly.c                   |   12 +++---------
 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
include/net/inet_frag.h +1 -6
@@ -103,15 +103,10 @@ struct inet_frags {
 int inet_frags_init(struct inet_frags *);
 void inet_frags_fini(struct inet_frags *);
 
-static inline int inet_frags_init_net(struct netns_frags *nf)
+static inline void inet_frags_init_net(struct netns_frags *nf)
 {
 	atomic_set(&nf->mem, 0);
-	return 0;
 }
-static inline void inet_frags_uninit_net(struct netns_frags *nf)
-{
-}
-
 void inet_frags_exit_net(struct netns_frags *nf, struct inet_frags *f);
 
 void inet_frag_kill(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct inet_frags *f);
net/ieee802154/6lowpan/reassembly.c +3 -8
@@ -580,19 +580,14 @@ static int __net_init lowpan_frags_init_
 {
 	struct netns_ieee802154_lowpan *ieee802154_lowpan =
 		net_ieee802154_lowpan(net);
-	int res;
 
 	ieee802154_lowpan->frags.high_thresh = IPV6_FRAG_HIGH_THRESH;
 	ieee802154_lowpan->frags.low_thresh = IPV6_FRAG_LOW_THRESH;
 	ieee802154_lowpan->frags.timeout = IPV6_FRAG_TIMEOUT;
 
-	res = inet_frags_init_net(&ieee802154_lowpan->frags);
-	if (res)
-		return res;
-	res = lowpan_frags_ns_sysctl_register(net);
-	if (res)
-		inet_frags_uninit_net(&ieee802154_lowpan->frags);
-	return res;
+	inet_frags_init_net(&ieee802154_lowpan->frags);
+
+	return lowpan_frags_ns_sysctl_register(net);
 }
 
 static void __net_exit lowpan_frags_exit_net(struct net *net)
net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c +3 -9
@@ -844,8 +844,6 @@ static void __init ip4_frags_ctl_registe
 
 static int __net_init ipv4_frags_init_net(struct net *net)
 {
-	int res;
-
 	/* Fragment cache limits.
 	 *
 	 * The fragment memory accounting code, (tries to) account for
@@ -871,13 +869,9 @@ static int __net_init ipv4_frags_init_ne
 
 	net->ipv4.frags.max_dist = 64;
 
-	res = inet_frags_init_net(&net->ipv4.frags);
-	if (res)
-		return res;
-	res = ip4_frags_ns_ctl_register(net);
-	if (res)
-		inet_frags_uninit_net(&net->ipv4.frags);
-	return res;
+	inet_frags_init_net(&net->ipv4.frags);
+
+	return ip4_frags_ns_ctl_register(net);
 }
 
 static void __net_exit ipv4_frags_exit_net(struct net *net)
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c +3 -9
@@ -622,18 +622,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_ct_frag6_gather);
 
 static int nf_ct_net_init(struct net *net)
 {
-	int res;
-
 	net->nf_frag.frags.high_thresh = IPV6_FRAG_HIGH_THRESH;
 	net->nf_frag.frags.low_thresh = IPV6_FRAG_LOW_THRESH;
 	net->nf_frag.frags.timeout = IPV6_FRAG_TIMEOUT;
-	res = inet_frags_init_net(&net->nf_frag.frags);
-	if (res)
-		return res;
-	res = nf_ct_frag6_sysctl_register(net);
-	if (res)
-		inet_frags_uninit_net(&net->nf_frag.frags);
-	return res;
+	inet_frags_init_net(&net->nf_frag.frags);
+
+	return nf_ct_frag6_sysctl_register(net);
 }
 
 static void nf_ct_net_exit(struct net *net)
net/ipv6/reassembly.c +3 -9
@@ -714,19 +714,13 @@ static void ip6_frags_sysctl_unregister(
 
 static int __net_init ipv6_frags_init_net(struct net *net)
 {
-	int res;
-
 	net->ipv6.frags.high_thresh = IPV6_FRAG_HIGH_THRESH;
 	net->ipv6.frags.low_thresh = IPV6_FRAG_LOW_THRESH;
 	net->ipv6.frags.timeout = IPV6_FRAG_TIMEOUT;
 
-	res = inet_frags_init_net(&net->ipv6.frags);
-	if (res)
-		return res;
-	res = ip6_frags_ns_sysctl_register(net);
-	if (res)
-		inet_frags_uninit_net(&net->ipv6.frags);
-	return res;
+	inet_frags_init_net(&net->ipv6.frags);
+
+	return ip6_frags_ns_sysctl_register(net);
 }
 
 static void __net_exit ipv6_frags_exit_net(struct net *net)
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/52 gianfar: Fix Tx flow control deactivation

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Claudiu Manoil <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5d621672bc1a1e5090c1ac5432a18c79e0e13e03 ]

The wrong register is checked for the Tx flow control bit,
it should have been maccfg1 not maccfg2.
This went unnoticed for so long probably because the impact is hardly visible, not to mention the tangled code from adjust_link(). First, link flow control (i.e. handling of Rx/Tx link level pause frames) is disabled by default (needs to be enabled via 'ethtool -A'). Secondly, maccfg2 always returns 0 for tx_flow_oldval (except for a few old boards), which results in Tx flow control remaining always on once activated.

Fixes 45b679c9a3ccd9e34f28e6ec677b812a860eb8eb ("gianfar: Implement PAUSE frame generation support")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/gianfar.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/gianfar.c +1 -1
@@ -3687,7 +3687,7 @@ static noinline void gfar_update_link_st
 		u32 tempval1 = gfar_read(&regs->maccfg1);
 		u32 tempval = gfar_read(&regs->maccfg2);
 		u32 ecntrl = gfar_read(&regs->ecntrl);
-		u32 tx_flow_oldval = (tempval & MACCFG1_TX_FLOW);
+		u32 tx_flow_oldval = (tempval1 & MACCFG1_TX_FLOW);
 
 		if (phydev->duplex != priv->oldduplex) {
 			if (!(phydev->duplex))
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/52 vhost_net: correctly check tx avail during rx busy polling

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jason Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8b949bef9172ca69d918e93509a4ecb03d0355e0 ]

We check tx avail through vhost_enable_notify() in the past which is wrong since it only checks whether or not guest has filled more available buffer since last avail idx synchronization which was just done by vhost_vq_avail_empty() before. What we really want is checking pending buffers in the avail ring. Fix this by calling vhost_vq_avail_empty() instead.

This issue could be noticed by doing netperf TCP_RR benchmark as client from guest (but not host). With this fix, TCP_RR from guest to localhost restores from 1375.91 trans per sec to 55235.28 trans per sec on my laptop (Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-5600U CPU @ 2.60GHz).

Fixes 030881372460 ("vhost_net: basic polling support")
---
 drivers/vhost/net.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/vhost/net.c +6 -1
@@ -634,8 +634,13 @@ static int vhost_net_rx_peek_head_len(st
 
 		preempt_enable();
 
-		if (vhost_enable_notify(&net->dev, vq))
+		if (!vhost_vq_avail_empty(&net->dev, vq))
 			vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll);
+		else if (unlikely(vhost_enable_notify(&net->dev, vq))) {
+			vhost_disable_notify(&net->dev, vq);
+			vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll);
+		}
+
 		mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
 
 		len = peek_head_len(rvq, sk);
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/52 udp: drop head states only when all skb references are gone

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ca2c1418efe9f7fe37aa1f355efdf4eb293673ce ]

After commit 0ddf3fb2c43d ("udp: preserve skb->dst if required for IP options processing") we clear the skb head state as soon as the skb carrying them is first processed.

Since the same skb can be processed several times when MSG_PEEK is used, we can end up lacking the required head states, and eventually oopsing.

Fix this clearing the skb head state only when processing the last skb reference.

Fixes 0ddf3fb2c43d ("udp: preserve skb->dst if required for IP options processing")
---
 include/linux/skbuff.h |    2 +-
 net/core/skbuff.c      |    9 +++------
 net/ipv4/udp.c         |    5 ++++-
 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
include/linux/skbuff.h +1 -1
@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ void kfree_skb(struct sk_buff *skb);
 void kfree_skb_list(struct sk_buff *segs);
 void skb_tx_error(struct sk_buff *skb);
 void consume_skb(struct sk_buff *skb);
-void consume_stateless_skb(struct sk_buff *skb);
+void __consume_stateless_skb(struct sk_buff *skb);
 void  __kfree_skb(struct sk_buff *skb);
 extern struct kmem_cache *skbuff_head_cache;
 
net/core/skbuff.c +3 -6
@@ -753,14 +753,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(consume_skb);
  *	consume_stateless_skb - free an skbuff, assuming it is stateless
  *	@skb: buffer to free
  *
- *	Works like consume_skb(), but this variant assumes that all the head
- *	states have been already dropped.
+ *	Alike consume_skb(), but this variant assumes that this is the last
+ *	skb reference and all the head states have been already dropped
  */
-void consume_stateless_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
+void __consume_stateless_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	if (!skb_unref(skb))
-		return;
-
 	trace_consume_skb(skb);
 	if (likely(skb->head))
 		skb_release_data(skb);
net/ipv4/udp.c +4 -1
@@ -1386,12 +1386,15 @@ void skb_consume_udp(struct sock *sk, st
 		unlock_sock_fast(sk, slow);
 	}
 
+	if (!skb_unref(skb))
+		return;
+
 	/* In the more common cases we cleared the head states previously,
 	 * see __udp_queue_rcv_skb().
 	 */
 	if (unlikely(udp_skb_has_head_state(skb)))
 		skb_release_head_state(skb);
-	consume_stateless_skb(skb);
+	__consume_stateless_skb(skb);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(skb_consume_udp);
 
author maintainer
#15 lore raw

PATCH 15/52 thunderbolt: Make key root-only accessible

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bernat, Yehezkel <[email protected]>

commit 0956e41169222822d3557871fcd1d32e4fa7e934 upstream.

Non-root user may read the key back after root wrote it there. This removes read access to everyone but root.

---
 drivers/thunderbolt/switch.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/thunderbolt/switch.c +1 -1
@@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ static ssize_t key_store(struct device *
 	mutex_unlock(&switch_lock);
 	return ret;
 }
-static DEVICE_ATTR_RW(key);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(key, 0600, key_show, key_store);
 
 static ssize_t nvm_authenticate_show(struct device *dev,
 	struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
author maintainer
#16 lore raw

PATCH 16/52 thunderbolt: Allow clearing the key

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bernat, Yehezkel <[email protected]>

commit e545f0d8a54a9594fe604d67d80ca6fddf72ca59 upstream.

If secure authentication of a devices fails, either because the device already has another key uploaded, or there is some other error sending challenge to the device, and the user only wants to approve the device just once (without a new key being uploaded to the device) the current implementation does not allow this because the key cannot be cleared once set even if we allow it to be changed.

Make this scenario possible and allow clearing the key by writing empty string to the key sysfs file.

---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-thunderbolt |    2 ++
 drivers/thunderbolt/switch.c                    |   15 +++++++++++----
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-thunderbolt +2 -0
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ Contact:	[email protected]
 Description:	When a devices supports Thunderbolt secure connect it will
 		have this attribute. Writing 32 byte hex string changes
 		authorization to use the secure connection method instead.
+		Writing an empty string clears the key and regular connection
+		method can be used again.
 
 What:		/sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../device
 Date:		Sep 2017
drivers/thunderbolt/switch.c +11 -4
@@ -807,8 +807,11 @@ static ssize_t key_store(struct device *
 	struct tb_switch *sw = tb_to_switch(dev);
 	u8 key[TB_SWITCH_KEY_SIZE];
 	ssize_t ret = count;
+	bool clear = false;
 
-	if (hex2bin(key, buf, sizeof(key)))
+	if (!strcmp(buf, "\n"))
+		clear = true;
+	else if (hex2bin(key, buf, sizeof(key)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&switch_lock))
@@ -818,9 +821,13 @@ static ssize_t key_store(struct device *
 		ret = -EBUSY;
 	} else {
 		kfree(sw->key);
-		sw->key = kmemdup(key, sizeof(key), GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!sw->key)
-			ret = -ENOMEM;
+		if (clear) {
+			sw->key = NULL;
+		} else {
+			sw->key = kmemdup(key, sizeof(key), GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!sw->key)
+				ret = -ENOMEM;
+		}
 	}
 
 	mutex_unlock(&switch_lock);
author maintainer
#17 lore raw

PATCH 17/52 x86/fsgsbase/64: Fully initialize FS and GS state in start_thread_common

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>

commit 767d035d838f4fd6b5a5bbd7a3f6d293b7f65a49 upstream.

execve used to leak FSBASE and GSBASE on AMD CPUs. Fix it.

The security impact of this bug is small but not quite zero -- it could weaken ASLR when a privileged task execs a less privileged program, but only if program changed bitness across the exec, or the child binary was highly unusual or actively malicious. A child program that was compromised after the exec would not have access to the leaked base.

Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc Chang Seok <[email protected]>
Cc Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c |    9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +9 -0
@@ -229,10 +229,19 @@ start_thread_common(struct pt_regs *regs
 		    unsigned long new_sp,
 		    unsigned int _cs, unsigned int _ss, unsigned int _ds)
 {
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(regs != current_pt_regs());
+
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_BUG_NULL_SEG)) {
+		/* Loading zero below won't clear the base. */
+		loadsegment(fs, __USER_DS);
+		load_gs_index(__USER_DS);
+	}
+
 	loadsegment(fs, 0);
 	loadsegment(es, _ds);
 	loadsegment(ds, _ds);
 	load_gs_index(0);
+
 	regs->ip		= new_ip;
 	regs->sp		= new_sp;
 	regs->cs		= _cs;
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/52 ipv6: fix memory leak with multiple tables during netns destruction

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ba1cc08d9488c94cb8d94f545305688b72a2a300 ]

fib6_net_exit only frees the main and local tables. If another table was created with fib6_alloc_table, we leak it when the netns is destroyed.

Fix this in the same way ip_fib_net_exit cleans up tables, by walking through the whole hashtable of fib6_table's. We can get rid of the special cases for local and main, since they're also part of the hashtable.

Reproducer:
ip netns add x
ip -net x -6 rule add from 6003:1::/64 table 100 ip netns del x

Fixes 58f09b78b730 ("[NETNS][IPV6] ip6_fib - make it per network namespace")
---
 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c |   25 +++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c +19 -6
@@ -198,6 +198,12 @@ static void rt6_release(struct rt6_info
 	}
 }
 
+static void fib6_free_table(struct fib6_table *table)
+{
+	inetpeer_invalidate_tree(&table->tb6_peers);
+	kfree(table);
+}
+
 static void fib6_link_table(struct net *net, struct fib6_table *tb)
 {
 	unsigned int h;
@@ -1915,15 +1921,22 @@ out_timer:
 
 static void fib6_net_exit(struct net *net)
 {
+	unsigned int i;
+
 	rt6_ifdown(net, NULL);
 	del_timer_sync(&net->ipv6.ip6_fib_timer);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_MULTIPLE_TABLES
-	inetpeer_invalidate_tree(&net->ipv6.fib6_local_tbl->tb6_peers);
-	kfree(net->ipv6.fib6_local_tbl);
-#endif
-	inetpeer_invalidate_tree(&net->ipv6.fib6_main_tbl->tb6_peers);
-	kfree(net->ipv6.fib6_main_tbl);
+	for (i = 0; i < FIB_TABLE_HASHSZ; i++) {
+		struct hlist_head *head = &net->ipv6.fib_table_hash[i];
+		struct hlist_node *tmp;
+		struct fib6_table *tb;
+
+		hlist_for_each_entry_safe(tb, tmp, head, tb6_hlist) {
+			hlist_del(&tb->tb6_hlist);
+			fib6_free_table(tb);
+		}
+	}
+
 	kfree(net->ipv6.fib_table_hash);
 	kfree(net->ipv6.rt6_stats);
 }
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 9/52 sctp: fix missing wake ups in some situations

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7906b00f5cd1cd484fced7fcda892176e3202c8a ]

Commit fb586f25300f ("sctp: delay calls to sk_data_ready() as much as possible") minimized the number of wake ups that are triggered in case the association receives a packet with multiple data chunks on it and/or when io_events are enabled and then commit 0970f5b36659 ("sctp: signal sk_data_ready earlier on data chunks reception") moved the wake up to as soon as possible. It thus relies on the state machine running later to clean the flag that the event was already generated.

The issue is that there are 2 call paths that calls sctp_ulpq_tail_event() outside of the state machine, causing the flag to linger and possibly omitting a needed wake up in the sequence.

One of the call paths is when enabling SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENTS via setsockopt(SCTP_EVENTS), as noticed by Harald Welte. The other is when partial reliability triggers removal of chunks from the send queue when the application calls sendmsg().

This commit fixes it by not setting the flag in case the socket is not owned by the user, as it won't be cleaned later. This works for user-initiated calls and also for rx path processing.

Fixes fb586f25300f ("sctp: delay calls to sk_data_ready() as much as possible")
---
 net/sctp/ulpqueue.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/sctp/ulpqueue.c +2 -1
@@ -265,7 +265,8 @@ int sctp_ulpq_tail_event(struct sctp_ulp
 		sctp_ulpq_clear_pd(ulpq);
 
 	if (queue == &sk->sk_receive_queue && !sp->data_ready_signalled) {
-		sp->data_ready_signalled = 1;
+		if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
+			sp->data_ready_signalled = 1;
 		sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
 	}
 	return 1;
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 10/52 tcp: fix a request socket leak

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1f3b359f1004bd34b7b0bad70b93e3c7af92a37b ]

While the cited commit fixed a possible deadlock, it added a leak of the request socket, since reqsk_put() must be called if the BPF filter decided the ACK packet must be dropped.

Fixes d624d276d1dd ("tcp: fix possible deadlock in TCP stack vs BPF filter")
---
 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c |    6 +++---
 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c |    6 +++---
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +3 -3
@@ -1722,9 +1722,9 @@ process:
 		 */
 		sock_hold(sk);
 		refcounted = true;
-		if (tcp_filter(sk, skb))
-			goto discard_and_relse;
-		nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
+		nsk = NULL;
+		if (!tcp_filter(sk, skb))
+			nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
 		if (!nsk) {
 			reqsk_put(req);
 			goto discard_and_relse;
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +3 -3
@@ -1456,9 +1456,9 @@ process:
 		}
 		sock_hold(sk);
 		refcounted = true;
-		if (tcp_filter(sk, skb))
-			goto discard_and_relse;
-		nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
+		nsk = NULL;
+		if (!tcp_filter(sk, skb))
+			nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
 		if (!nsk) {
 			reqsk_put(req);
 			goto discard_and_relse;
author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH 11/52 ip_tunnel: fix setting ttl and tos value in collect_md mode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Haishuang Yan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0f693f1995cf002432b70f43ce73f79bf8d0b6c9 ]

ttl and tos variables are declared and assigned, but are not used in iptunnel_xmit() function.

Fixes cfc7381b3002 ("ip_tunnel: add collect_md mode to IPIP tunnel")
Cc Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
---
 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c +2 -2
@@ -618,8 +618,8 @@ void ip_md_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *s
 		ip_rt_put(rt);
 		goto tx_dropped;
 	}
-	iptunnel_xmit(NULL, rt, skb, fl4.saddr, fl4.daddr, proto, key->tos,
-		      key->ttl, df, !net_eq(tunnel->net, dev_net(dev)));
+	iptunnel_xmit(NULL, rt, skb, fl4.saddr, fl4.daddr, proto, tos, ttl,
+		      df, !net_eq(tunnel->net, dev_net(dev)));
 	return;
 tx_error:
 	dev->stats.tx_errors++;
author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH 12/52 f2fs: let fill_super handle roll-forward errors

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>

commit afd2b4da40b3b567ef8d8e6881479345a2312a03 upstream.

If we set CP_ERROR_FLAG in roll-forward error, f2fs is no longer to proceed any IOs due to f2fs_cp_error(). But, for example, if some stale data is involved on roll-forward process, we're able to get -ENOENT, getting fs stuck. If we get any error, let fill_super set SBI_NEED_FSCK and try to recover back to stable point.

---
 fs/f2fs/recovery.c |    2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/recovery.c +0 -2
@@ -599,8 +599,6 @@ out:
 	}
 
 	clear_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_POR_DOING);
-	if (err)
-		set_ckpt_flags(sbi, CP_ERROR_FLAG);
 	mutex_unlock(&sbi->cp_mutex);
 
 	/* let's drop all the directory inodes for clean checkpoint */
author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH 13/52 f2fs: check hot_data for roll-forward recovery

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>

commit 125c9fb1ccb53eb2ea9380df40f3c743f3fb2fed upstream.

We need to check HOT_DATA to truncate any previous data block when doing roll-forward recovery.

---
 fs/f2fs/recovery.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/f2fs/recovery.c +1 -1
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ static int check_index_in_prev_nodes(str
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Get the previous summary */
-	for (i = CURSEG_WARM_DATA; i <= CURSEG_COLD_DATA; i++) {
+	for (i = CURSEG_HOT_DATA; i <= CURSEG_COLD_DATA; i++) {
 		struct curseg_info *curseg = CURSEG_I(sbi, i);
 		if (curseg->segno == segno) {
 			sum = curseg->sum_blk->entries[blkoff];
author maintainer
#14 lore raw

PATCH 14/52 thunderbolt: Remove superfluous check

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bernat, Yehezkel <[email protected]>

commit 8fdd6ab36197ad891233572c57781b1f537da0ac upstream.

The key size is tested by hex2bin() already (as '\0' isn't an hex digit)

---
 drivers/thunderbolt/switch.c |    3 ---
 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
drivers/thunderbolt/switch.c +0 -3
@@ -808,9 +808,6 @@ static ssize_t key_store(struct device *
 	u8 key[TB_SWITCH_KEY_SIZE];
 	ssize_t ret = count;
 
-	if (count < 64)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
 	if (hex2bin(key, buf, sizeof(key)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/52 ip6_gre: update mtu properly in ip6gre_err

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xin Long <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5c25f30c93fdc5bf25e62101aeaae7a4f9b421b3 ]

Now when probessing ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG, ip6gre_err only subtracts the offset of gre header from mtu info. The expected mtu of gre device should also subtract gre header. Otherwise, the next packets still can't be sent out.

Jianlin found this issue when using the topo:
client(ip6gre)<---->(nic1)route(nic2)<----->(ip6gre)server

and reducing nic2's mtu, then both tcp and sctp's performance with big size data became 0.

This patch is to fix it by also subtracting grehdr (tun->tun_hlen) from mtu info when updating gre device's mtu in ip6gre_err(). It also needs to subtract ETH_HLEN if gre dev'type is ARPHRD_ETHER.

---
 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c +3 -1
@@ -432,7 +432,9 @@ static void ip6gre_err(struct sk_buff *s
 		}
 		break;
 	case ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG:
-		mtu = be32_to_cpu(info) - offset;
+		mtu = be32_to_cpu(info) - offset - t->tun_hlen;
+		if (t->dev->type == ARPHRD_ETHER)
+			mtu -= ETH_HLEN;
 		if (mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
 			mtu = IPV6_MIN_MTU;
 		t->dev->mtu = mtu;
author maintainer
#29 lore raw

PATCH 29/52 xfs: Properly retry failed inode items in case of error during buffer writeback

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>

commit d3a304b6292168b83b45d624784f973fdc1ca674 upstream.

When a buffer has been failed during writeback, the inode items into it are kept flush locked, and are never resubmitted due the flush lock, so, if any buffer fails to be written, the items in AIL are never written to disk and never unlocked.

This causes unmount operation to hang due these items flush locked in AIL, but this also causes the items in AIL to never be written back, even when the IO device comes back to normal.

I've been testing this patch with a DM-thin device, creating a filesystem larger than the real device.

When writing enough data to fill the DM-thin device, XFS receives ENOSPC errors from the device, and keep spinning on xfsaild (when 'retry forever' configuration is set).

At this point, the filesystem can not be unmounted because of the flush locked items in AIL, but worse, the items in AIL are never retried at all (once xfs_inode_item_push() will skip the items that are flush locked), even if the underlying DM-thin device is expanded to the proper size.

This patch fixes both cases, retrying any item that has been failed previously, using the infra-structure provided by the previous patch.

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c   |   28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.h   |    3 +++
 fs/xfs/xfs_inode_item.c |   47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 fs/xfs/xfs_trans.h      |    1 +
 fs/xfs/xfs_trans_ail.c  |    3 ++-
 fs/xfs/xfs_trans_priv.h |   31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 108 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c +28 -0
@@ -1234,3 +1234,31 @@ xfs_buf_iodone(
 	xfs_trans_ail_delete(ailp, lip, SHUTDOWN_CORRUPT_INCORE);
 	xfs_buf_item_free(BUF_ITEM(lip));
 }
+
+/*
+ * Requeue a failed buffer for writeback
+ *
+ * Return true if the buffer has been re-queued properly, false otherwise
+ */
+bool
+xfs_buf_resubmit_failed_buffers(
+	struct xfs_buf		*bp,
+	struct xfs_log_item	*lip,
+	struct list_head	*buffer_list)
+{
+	struct xfs_log_item	*next;
+
+	/*
+	 * Clear XFS_LI_FAILED flag from all items before resubmit
+	 *
+	 * XFS_LI_FAILED set/clear is protected by xa_lock, caller  this
+	 * function already have it acquired
+	 */
+	for (; lip; lip = next) {
+		next = lip->li_bio_list;
+		xfs_clear_li_failed(lip);
+	}
+
+	/* Add this buffer back to the delayed write list */
+	return xfs_buf_delwri_queue(bp, buffer_list);
+}
fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.h +3 -0
@@ -70,6 +70,9 @@ void	xfs_buf_attach_iodone(struct xfs_bu
 			      xfs_log_item_t *);
 void	xfs_buf_iodone_callbacks(struct xfs_buf *);
 void	xfs_buf_iodone(struct xfs_buf *, struct xfs_log_item *);
+bool	xfs_buf_resubmit_failed_buffers(struct xfs_buf *,
+					struct xfs_log_item *,
+					struct list_head *);
 
 extern kmem_zone_t	*xfs_buf_item_zone;
 
fs/xfs/xfs_inode_item.c +43 -4

95 lines not on this page · raw message

fs/xfs/xfs_trans.h +1 -0
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ typedef struct xfs_log_item {
 	struct xfs_ail			*li_ailp;	/* ptr to AIL */
 	uint				li_type;	/* item type */
 	uint				li_flags;	/* misc flags */
+	struct xfs_buf			*li_buf;	/* real buffer pointer */
 	struct xfs_log_item		*li_bio_list;	/* buffer item list */
 	void				(*li_cb)(struct xfs_buf *,
 						 struct xfs_log_item *);
fs/xfs/xfs_trans_ail.c +2 -1
@@ -687,12 +687,13 @@ xfs_trans_ail_update_bulk(
 bool
 xfs_ail_delete_one(
 	struct xfs_ail		*ailp,
-	struct xfs_log_item 	*lip)
+	struct xfs_log_item	*lip)
 {
 	struct xfs_log_item	*mlip = xfs_ail_min(ailp);
 
 	trace_xfs_ail_delete(lip, mlip->li_lsn, lip->li_lsn);
 	xfs_ail_delete(ailp, lip);
+	xfs_clear_li_failed(lip);
 	lip->li_flags &= ~XFS_LI_IN_AIL;
 	lip->li_lsn = 0;
 
fs/xfs/xfs_trans_priv.h +31 -0
@@ -164,4 +164,35 @@ xfs_trans_ail_copy_lsn(
 	*dst = *src;
 }
 #endif
+
+static inline void
+xfs_clear_li_failed(
+	struct xfs_log_item	*lip)
+{
+	struct xfs_buf	*bp = lip->li_buf;
+
+	ASSERT(lip->li_flags & XFS_LI_IN_AIL);
+	lockdep_assert_held(&lip->li_ailp->xa_lock);
+
+	if (lip->li_flags & XFS_LI_FAILED) {
+		lip->li_flags &= ~XFS_LI_FAILED;
+		lip->li_buf = NULL;
+		xfs_buf_rele(bp);
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void
+xfs_set_li_failed(
+	struct xfs_log_item	*lip,
+	struct xfs_buf		*bp)
+{
+	lockdep_assert_held(&lip->li_ailp->xa_lock);
+
+	if (!(lip->li_flags & XFS_LI_FAILED)) {
+		xfs_buf_hold(bp);
+		lip->li_flags |= XFS_LI_FAILED;
+		lip->li_buf = bp;
+	}
+}
+
 #endif	/* __XFS_TRANS_PRIV_H__ */
author maintainer
#30 lore raw

PATCH 30/52 xfs: fix recovery failure when log record header wraps log end

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Brian Foster <[email protected]>

commit 284f1c2c9bebf871861184b0e2c40fa921dd380b upstream.

The high-level log recovery algorithm consists of two loops that walk the physical log and process log records from the tail to the head. The first loop handles the case where the tail is beyond the head and processes records up to the end of the physical log. The subsequent loop processes records from the beginning of the physical log to the head.

Because log records can wrap around the end of the physical log, the first loop mentioned above must handle this case appropriately. Records are processed from in-core buffers, which means that this algorithm must split the reads of such records into two partial I/Os: 1.) from the beginning of the record to the end of the log and 2.) from the beginning of the log to the end of the record. This is further complicated by the fact that the log record header and log record data are read into independent buffers.

The current handling of each buffer correctly splits the reads when either the header or data starts before the end of the log and wraps around the end. The data read does not correctly handle the case where the prior header read wrapped or ends on the physical log end boundary. blk_no is incremented to or beyond the log end after the header read to point to the record data, but the split data read logic triggers, attempts to read from an invalid log block and ultimately causes log recovery to fail. This can be reproduced fairly reliably via xfstests tests generic/047 and generic/388 with large iclog sizes (256k) and small (10M) logs.

If the record header read has pushed beyond the end of the physical log, the subsequent data read is actually contiguous. Update the data read logic to detect the case where blk_no has wrapped, mod it against the log size to read from the correct address and issue one contiguous read for the log data buffer. The log record is processed as normal from the buffer(s), the loop exits after the current iteration and the subsequent loop picks up with the first new record after the start of the log.

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c |   18 ++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c +14 -4
@@ -5218,7 +5218,7 @@ xlog_do_recovery_pass(
 	xfs_daddr_t		*first_bad)	/* out: first bad log rec */
 {
 	xlog_rec_header_t	*rhead;
-	xfs_daddr_t		blk_no;
+	xfs_daddr_t		blk_no, rblk_no;
 	xfs_daddr_t		rhead_blk;
 	char			*offset;
 	xfs_buf_t		*hbp, *dbp;
@@ -5371,9 +5371,19 @@ xlog_do_recovery_pass(
 			bblks = (int)BTOBB(be32_to_cpu(rhead->h_len));
 			blk_no += hblks;
 
-			/* Read in data for log record */
-			if (blk_no + bblks <= log->l_logBBsize) {
-				error = xlog_bread(log, blk_no, bblks, dbp,
+			/*
+			 * Read the log record data in multiple reads if it
+			 * wraps around the end of the log. Note that if the
+			 * header already wrapped, blk_no could point past the
+			 * end of the log. The record data is contiguous in
+			 * that case.
+			 */
+			if (blk_no + bblks <= log->l_logBBsize ||
+			    blk_no >= log->l_logBBsize) {
+				/* mod blk_no in case the header wrapped and
+				 * pushed it beyond the end of the log */
+				rblk_no = do_mod(blk_no, log->l_logBBsize);
+				error = xlog_bread(log, rblk_no, bblks, dbp,
 						   &offset);
 				if (error)
 					goto bread_err2;
author maintainer
#31 lore raw

PATCH 31/52 xfs: always verify the log tail during recovery

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Brian Foster <[email protected]>

commit 5297ac1f6d7cbf45464a49b9558831f271dfc559 upstream.

Log tail verification currently only occurs when torn writes are detected at the head of the log. This was introduced because a change in the head block due to torn writes can lead to a change in the tail block (each log record header references the current tail) and the tail block should be verified before log recovery proceeds.

Tail corruption is possible outside of torn write scenarios, however. For example, partial log writes can be detected and cleared during the initial head/tail block discovery process. If the partial write coincides with a tail overwrite, the log tail is corrupted and recovery fails.

To facilitate correct handling of log tail overwites, update log recovery to always perform tail verification. This is necessary to detect potential tail overwrite conditions when torn writes may not have occurred. This changes normal (i.e., no torn writes) recovery behavior slightly to detect and return CRC related errors near the tail before actual recovery starts.

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c |   26 +++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c +3 -23
@@ -1183,31 +1183,11 @@ xlog_verify_head(
 			ASSERT(0);
 			return 0;
 		}
-
-		/*
-		 * Now verify the tail based on the updated head. This is
-		 * required because the torn writes trimmed from the head could
-		 * have been written over the tail of a previous record. Return
-		 * any errors since recovery cannot proceed if the tail is
-		 * corrupt.
-		 *
-		 * XXX: This leaves a gap in truly robust protection from torn
-		 * writes in the log. If the head is behind the tail, the tail
-		 * pushes forward to create some space and then a crash occurs
-		 * causing the writes into the previous record's tail region to
-		 * tear, log recovery isn't able to recover.
-		 *
-		 * How likely is this to occur? If possible, can we do something
-		 * more intelligent here? Is it safe to push the tail forward if
-		 * we can determine that the tail is within the range of the
-		 * torn write (e.g., the kernel can only overwrite the tail if
-		 * it has actually been pushed forward)? Alternatively, could we
-		 * somehow prevent this condition at runtime?
-		 */
-		error = xlog_verify_tail(log, *head_blk, *tail_blk);
 	}
+	if (error)
+		return error;
 
-	return error;
+	return xlog_verify_tail(log, *head_blk, *tail_blk);
 }
 
 /*
author maintainer
#32 lore raw

PATCH 32/52 xfs: fix log recovery corruption error due to tail overwrite

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Brian Foster <[email protected]>

commit 4a4f66eac4681378996a1837ad1ffec3a2e2981f upstream.

If we consider the case where the tail (T) of the log is pinned long enough for the head (H) to push and block behind the tail, we can end up blocked in the following state without enough free space (f) in the log to satisfy a transaction reservation:

	0	phys. log	N
	[-------HffT---H'--T'---]

The last good record in the log (before H) refers to T. The tail eventually pushes forward (T') leaving more free space in the log for writes to H. At this point, suppose space frees up in the log for the maximum of 8 in-core log buffers to start flushing out to the log. If this pushes the head from H to H', these next writes overwrite the previous tail T. This is safe because the items logged from T to T' have been written back and removed from the AIL.

If the next log writes (H -> H') happen to fail and result in partial records in the log, the filesystem shuts down having overwritten T with invalid data. Log recovery correctly locates H on the subsequent mount, but H still refers to the now corrupted tail T. This results in log corruption errors and recovery failure.

Since the tail overwrite results from otherwise correct runtime behavior, it is up to log recovery to try and deal with this situation. Update log recovery tail verification to run a CRC pass from the first record past the tail to the head. This facilitates error detection at T and moves the recovery tail to the first good record past H' (similar to truncating the head on torn write detection). If corruption is detected beyond the range possibly affected by the max number of iclogs, the log is legitimately corrupted and log recovery failure is expected.

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c |  108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 77 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c +77 -31
@@ -1029,61 +1029,106 @@ out_error:
 }
 
 /*
- * Check the log tail for torn writes. This is required when torn writes are
- * detected at the head and the head had to be walked back to a previous record.
- * The tail of the previous record must now be verified to ensure the torn
- * writes didn't corrupt the previous tail.
+ * Calculate distance from head to tail (i.e., unused space in the log).
+ */
+static inline int
+xlog_tail_distance(
+	struct xlog	*log,
+	xfs_daddr_t	head_blk,
+	xfs_daddr_t	tail_blk)
+{
+	if (head_blk < tail_blk)
+		return tail_blk - head_blk;
+
+	return tail_blk + (log->l_logBBsize - head_blk);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the log tail. This is particularly important when torn or incomplete
+ * writes have been detected near the front of the log and the head has been
+ * walked back accordingly.
+ *
+ * We also have to handle the case where the tail was pinned and the head
+ * blocked behind the tail right before a crash. If the tail had been pushed
+ * immediately prior to the crash and the subsequent checkpoint was only
+ * partially written, it's possible it overwrote the last referenced tail in the
+ * log with garbage. This is not a coherency problem because the tail must have
+ * been pushed before it can be overwritten, but appears as log corruption to
+ * recovery because we have no way to know the tail was updated if the
+ * subsequent checkpoint didn't write successfully.
  *
- * Return an error if CRC verification fails as recovery cannot proceed.
+ * Therefore, CRC check the log from tail to head. If a failure occurs and the
+ * offending record is within max iclog bufs from the head, walk the tail
+ * forward and retry until a valid tail is found or corruption is detected out
+ * of the range of a possible overwrite.
  */
 STATIC int
 xlog_verify_tail(
 	struct xlog		*log,
 	xfs_daddr_t		head_blk,
-	xfs_daddr_t		tail_blk)
+	xfs_daddr_t		*tail_blk,
+	int			hsize)
 {
 	struct xlog_rec_header	*thead;
 	struct xfs_buf		*bp;
 	xfs_daddr_t		first_bad;
-	int			count;
 	int			error = 0;
 	bool			wrapped;
-	xfs_daddr_t		tmp_head;
+	xfs_daddr_t		tmp_tail;
+	xfs_daddr_t		orig_tail = *tail_blk;
 
 	bp = xlog_get_bp(log, 1);
 	if (!bp)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	/*
-	 * Seek XLOG_MAX_ICLOGS + 1 records past the current tail record to get
-	 * a temporary head block that points after the last possible
-	 * concurrently written record of the tail.
+	 * Make sure the tail points to a record (returns positive count on
+	 * success).
 	 */
-	count = xlog_seek_logrec_hdr(log, head_blk, tail_blk,
-				     XLOG_MAX_ICLOGS + 1, bp, &tmp_head, &thead,
-				     &wrapped);
-	if (count < 0) {
-		error = count;
+	error = xlog_seek_logrec_hdr(log, head_blk, *tail_blk, 1, bp,
+			&tmp_tail, &thead, &wrapped);
+	if (error < 0)
 		goto out;
-	}
+	if (*tail_blk != tmp_tail)
+		*tail_blk = tmp_tail;
 
 	/*
-	 * If the call above didn't find XLOG_MAX_ICLOGS + 1 records, we ran
-	 * into the actual log head. tmp_head points to the start of the record
-	 * so update it to the actual head block.
+	 * Run a CRC check from the tail to the head. We can't just check
+	 * MAX_ICLOGS records past the tail because the tail may point to stale
+	 * blocks cleared during the search for the head/tail. These blocks are
+	 * overwritten with zero-length records and thus record count is not a
+	 * reliable indicator of the iclog state before a crash.
 	 */
-	if (count < XLOG_MAX_ICLOGS + 1)
-		tmp_head = head_blk;
-
-	/*
-	 * We now have a tail and temporary head block that covers at least
-	 * XLOG_MAX_ICLOGS records from the tail. We need to verify that these
-	 * records were completely written. Run a CRC verification pass from
-	 * tail to head and return the result.
-	 */
-	error = xlog_do_recovery_pass(log, tmp_head, tail_blk,
+	first_bad = 0;
+	error = xlog_do_recovery_pass(log, head_blk, *tail_blk,
 				      XLOG_RECOVER_CRCPASS, &first_bad);
+	while (error == -EFSBADCRC && first_bad) {
+		int	tail_distance;
+
+		/*
+		 * Is corruption within range of the head? If so, retry from
+		 * the next record. Otherwise return an error.
+		 */
+		tail_distance = xlog_tail_distance(log, head_blk, first_bad);
+		if (tail_distance > BTOBB(XLOG_MAX_ICLOGS * hsize))
+			break;
+
+		/* skip to the next record; returns positive count on success */
+		error = xlog_seek_logrec_hdr(log, head_blk, first_bad, 2, bp,
+				&tmp_tail, &thead, &wrapped);
+		if (error < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		*tail_blk = tmp_tail;
+		first_bad = 0;
+		error = xlog_do_recovery_pass(log, head_blk, *tail_blk,
+					      XLOG_RECOVER_CRCPASS, &first_bad);
+	}
 
+	if (!error && *tail_blk != orig_tail)
+		xfs_warn(log->l_mp,
+		"Tail block (0x%llx) overwrite detected. Updated to 0x%llx",
+			 orig_tail, *tail_blk);
 out:
 	xlog_put_bp(bp);
 	return error;
@@ -1187,7 +1232,8 @@ xlog_verify_head(
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
-	return xlog_verify_tail(log, *head_blk, *tail_blk);
+	return xlog_verify_tail(log, *head_blk, tail_blk,
+				be32_to_cpu((*rhead)->h_size));
 }
 
 /*
author maintainer
#21 lore raw

PATCH 21/52 ovl: fix false positive ESTALE on lookup

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>

commit 939ae4efd51c627da270af74ef069db5124cb5b0 upstream.

Commit b9ac5c274b8c ("ovl: hash overlay non-dir inodes by copy up origin") verifies that the origin lower inode stored in the overlayfs inode matched the inode of a copy up origin dentry found by lookup.

There is a false positive result in that check when lower fs does not support file handles and copy up origin cannot be followed by file handle at lookup time.

The false negative happens when finding an overlay inode in cache on a copied up overlay dentry lookup. The overlay inode still 'remembers' the copy up origin inode, but the copy up origin dentry is not available for verification.

Relax the check in case copy up origin dentry is not available.

Fixes b9ac5c274b8c ("ovl: hash overlay non-dir inodes by copy up...")
---
 fs/overlayfs/inode.c |   11 +++++++----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/overlayfs/inode.c +7 -4
@@ -576,10 +576,13 @@ static int ovl_inode_set(struct inode *i
 static bool ovl_verify_inode(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *lowerdentry,
 			     struct dentry *upperdentry)
 {
-	struct inode *lowerinode = lowerdentry ? d_inode(lowerdentry) : NULL;
-
-	/* Lower (origin) inode must match, even if NULL */
-	if (ovl_inode_lower(inode) != lowerinode)
+	/*
+	 * Allow non-NULL lower inode in ovl_inode even if lowerdentry is NULL.
+	 * This happens when finding a copied up overlay inode for a renamed
+	 * or hardlinked overlay dentry and lower dentry cannot be followed
+	 * by origin because lower fs does not support file handles.
+	 */
+	if (lowerdentry && ovl_inode_lower(inode) != d_inode(lowerdentry))
 		return false;
 
 	/*
author maintainer
#22 lore raw

PATCH 22/52 fuse: allow server to run in different pid_ns

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>

commit 5d6d3a301c4e749e04be6fcdcf4cb1ffa8bae524 upstream.

Commit 0b6e9ea041e6 ("fuse: Add support for pid namespaces") broke Sandstorm.io development tools, which have been sending FUSE file descriptors across PID namespace boundaries since early 2014.

The above patch added a check that prevented I/O on the fuse device file descriptor if the pid namespace of the reader/writer was different from the pid namespace of the mounter. With this change passing the device file descriptor to a different pid namespace simply doesn't work. The check was added because pids are transferred to/from the fuse userspace server in the namespace registered at mount time.

To fix this regression, remove the checks and do the following:

1) the pid in the request header (the pid of the task that initiated the filesystem operation) is translated to the reader's pid namespace. If a mapping doesn't exist for this pid, then a zero pid is used. Note: even if a mapping would exist between the initiator task's pid namespace and the reader's pid namespace the pid will be zero if either mapping from initator's to mounter's namespace or mapping from mounter's to reader's namespace doesn't exist.

2) The lk.pid value in setlk/setlkw requests and getlk reply is left alone. Userspace should not interpret this value anyway. Also allow the setlk/setlkw operations if the pid of the task cannot be represented in the mounter's namespace (pid being zero in that case).

Fixes 0b6e9ea041e6 ("fuse: Add support for pid namespaces")
Cc Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc Seth Forshee <[email protected]>
---
 fs/fuse/dev.c  |   13 +++++++------
 fs/fuse/file.c |    3 ---
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
fs/fuse/dev.c +7 -6
@@ -1222,9 +1222,6 @@ static ssize_t fuse_dev_do_read(struct f
 	struct fuse_in *in;
 	unsigned reqsize;
 
-	if (task_active_pid_ns(current) != fc->pid_ns)
-		return -EIO;
-
  restart:
 	spin_lock(&fiq->waitq.lock);
 	err = -EAGAIN;
@@ -1262,6 +1259,13 @@ static ssize_t fuse_dev_do_read(struct f
 
 	in = &req->in;
 	reqsize = in->h.len;
+
+	if (task_active_pid_ns(current) != fc->pid_ns) {
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		in->h.pid = pid_vnr(find_pid_ns(in->h.pid, fc->pid_ns));
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+	}
+
 	/* If request is too large, reply with an error and restart the read */
 	if (nbytes < reqsize) {
 		req->out.h.error = -EIO;
@@ -1823,9 +1827,6 @@ static ssize_t fuse_dev_do_write(struct
 	struct fuse_req *req;
 	struct fuse_out_header oh;
 
-	if (task_active_pid_ns(current) != fc->pid_ns)
-		return -EIO;
-
 	if (nbytes < sizeof(struct fuse_out_header))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
fs/fuse/file.c +0 -3
@@ -2181,9 +2181,6 @@ static int fuse_setlk(struct file *file,
 	if ((fl->fl_flags & FL_CLOSE_POSIX) == FL_CLOSE_POSIX)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (pid && pid_nr == 0)
-		return -EOVERFLOW;
-
 	fuse_lk_fill(&args, file, fl, opcode, pid_nr, flock, &inarg);
 	err = fuse_simple_request(fc, &args);
 
author maintainer
#23 lore raw

PATCH 23/52 idr: remove WARN_ON_ONCE() when trying to replace negative ID

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

commit a47f68d6a944113bdc8097db6f933c2e17c27bf9 upstream.

IDR only supports non-negative IDs. There used to be a 'WARN_ON_ONCE(id < 0)' in idr_replace(), but it was intentionally removed by commit 2e1c9b286765 ("idr: remove WARN_ON_ONCE() on negative IDs").

Then it was added back by commit 0a835c4f090a ("Reimplement IDR and IDA using the radix tree"). However it seems that adding it back was a mistake, given that some users such as drm_gem_handle_delete() (DRM_IOCTL_GEM_CLOSE) pass in a value from userspace to idr_replace(), allowing the WARN_ON_ONCE to be triggered. drm_gem_handle_delete() actually just wants idr_replace() to return an error code if the ID is not allocated, including in the case where the ID is invalid (negative).

So once again remove the bogus WARN_ON_ONCE().

This bug was found by syzkaller, which encountered the following warning:

    WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 3008 at lib/idr.c:157 idr_replace+0x1d8/0x240 lib/idr.c:157
    Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...

    CPU: 3 PID: 3008 Comm: syzkaller218828 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc4-next-20170811 #2
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
    Call Trace:
     fixup_bug+0x40/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:190
     do_trap_no_signal arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:224 [inline]
     do_trap+0x260/0x390 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:273
     do_error_trap+0x120/0x390 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:310
     do_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:323
     invalid_op+0x1e/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:930
    RIP: 0010:idr_replace+0x1d8/0x240 lib/idr.c:157
    RSP: 0018:ffff8800394bf9f8 EFLAGS: 00010297
    RAX: ffff88003c6c60c0 RBX: 1ffff10007297f43 RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8800394bfa78
    RBP: ffff8800394bfae0 R08: ffffffff82856487 R09: 0000000000000000
    R10: ffff8800394bf9a8 R11: ffff88006c8bae28 R12: ffffffffffffffff
    R13: ffff8800394bfab8 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8800394bfbc8
     drm_gem_handle_delete+0x33/0xa0 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem.c:297
     drm_gem_close_ioctl+0xa1/0xe0 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem.c:671
     drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1e7/0x2e0 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:729
     drm_ioctl+0x72e/0xa50 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:825
     vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:45 [inline]
     do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1520 fs/ioctl.c:685
     SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:700 [inline]
     SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:691
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe

Here is a C reproducer:

    #include <fcntl.h>
    #include <stddef.h>
    #include <stdint.h>
    #include <sys/ioctl.h>
    #include <drm/drm.h>

    int main(void)
    {
            int cardfd = open("/dev/dri/card0", O_RDONLY);

            ioctl(cardfd, DRM_IOCTL_GEM_CLOSE,
                  &(struct drm_gem_close) { .handle = -1 } );
    }
Fixes 0a835c4f090a ("Reimplement IDR and IDA using the radix tree")
Cc Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
---
 lib/idr.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
lib/idr.c +1 -1
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ void *idr_replace(struct idr *idr, void
 	void __rcu **slot = NULL;
 	void *entry;
 
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(id < 0))
+	if (id < 0)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(radix_tree_is_internal_node(ptr)))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
author maintainer
#24 lore raw

PATCH 24/52 libnvdimm, btt: check memory allocation failure

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christophe Jaillet <[email protected]>

commit ed36b4dba54a421ce5551638f6a9790b2c2116b1 upstream.

Check memory allocation failures and return -ENOMEM in such cases, as already done few lines below for another memory allocation.

This avoids NULL pointers dereference.

Fixes 14e494542636 ("libnvdimm, btt: BTT updates for UEFI 2.7 format")
---
 drivers/nvdimm/btt.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/nvdimm/btt.c +2 -0
@@ -1429,6 +1429,8 @@ int nvdimm_namespace_attach_btt(struct n
 	}
 
 	btt_sb = devm_kzalloc(&nd_btt->dev, sizeof(*btt_sb), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!btt_sb)
+		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	/*
 	 * If this returns < 0, that is ok as it just means there wasn't
author maintainer
#25 lore raw

PATCH 25/52 libnvdimm: fix integer overflow static analysis warning

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Williams <[email protected]>

commit 58738c495e15badd2015e19ff41f1f1ed55200bc upstream.

Dan reports:
The patch 62232e45f4a2: "libnvdimm: control (ioctl) messages for nvdimm_bus and nvdimm devices" from Jun 8, 2015, leads to the following static checker warning:

drivers/nvdimm/bus.c:1018 __nd_ioctl()
warn: integer overflows 'buf_len'

From a casual review, this seems like it might be a real bug. On the first iteration we load some data into in_env[]. On the second iteration we read a use controlled "in_size" from nd_cmd_in_size(). It can go up to UINT_MAX - 1. A high number means we will fill the whole in_env[] buffer. But we potentially keep looping and adding more to in_len so now it can be any value.

It simple enough to change, but it feels weird that we keep looping even though in_env is totally full. Shouldn't we just return an error if we don't have space for desc->in_num.

We keep looping because the size of the total input is allowed to be bigger than the 'envelope' which is a subset of the payload that tells us how much data to expect. For safety explicitly check that buf_len does not overflow which is what the checker flagged.

Fixes 62232e45f4a2: "libnvdimm: control (ioctl) messages for nvdimm_bus..."
---
 drivers/nvdimm/bus.c |   17 +++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/nvdimm/bus.c +9 -8
@@ -905,19 +905,20 @@ static int __nd_ioctl(struct nvdimm_bus
 		int read_only, unsigned int ioctl_cmd, unsigned long arg)
 {
 	struct nvdimm_bus_descriptor *nd_desc = nvdimm_bus->nd_desc;
-	size_t buf_len = 0, in_len = 0, out_len = 0;
 	static char out_env[ND_CMD_MAX_ENVELOPE];
 	static char in_env[ND_CMD_MAX_ENVELOPE];
 	const struct nd_cmd_desc *desc = NULL;
 	unsigned int cmd = _IOC_NR(ioctl_cmd);
-	unsigned int func = cmd;
-	void __user *p = (void __user *) arg;
 	struct device *dev = &nvdimm_bus->dev;
-	struct nd_cmd_pkg pkg;
+	void __user *p = (void __user *) arg;
 	const char *cmd_name, *dimm_name;
+	u32 in_len = 0, out_len = 0;
+	unsigned int func = cmd;
 	unsigned long cmd_mask;
-	void *buf;
+	struct nd_cmd_pkg pkg;
 	int rc, i, cmd_rc;
+	u64 buf_len = 0;
+	void *buf;
 
 	if (nvdimm) {
 		desc = nd_cmd_dimm_desc(cmd);
@@ -977,7 +978,7 @@ static int __nd_ioctl(struct nvdimm_bus
 
 	if (cmd == ND_CMD_CALL) {
 		func = pkg.nd_command;
-		dev_dbg(dev, "%s:%s, idx: %llu, in: %zu, out: %zu, len %zu\n",
+		dev_dbg(dev, "%s:%s, idx: %llu, in: %u, out: %u, len %llu\n",
 				__func__, dimm_name, pkg.nd_command,
 				in_len, out_len, buf_len);
 
@@ -1007,9 +1008,9 @@ static int __nd_ioctl(struct nvdimm_bus
 		out_len += out_size;
 	}
 
-	buf_len = out_len + in_len;
+	buf_len = (u64) out_len + (u64) in_len;
 	if (buf_len > ND_IOCTL_MAX_BUFLEN) {
-		dev_dbg(dev, "%s:%s cmd: %s buf_len: %zu > %d\n", __func__,
+		dev_dbg(dev, "%s:%s cmd: %s buf_len: %llu > %d\n", __func__,
 				dimm_name, cmd_name, buf_len,
 				ND_IOCTL_MAX_BUFLEN);
 		return -EINVAL;
author maintainer
#26 lore raw

PATCH 26/52 xfs: write unmount record for ro mounts

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Sandeen <[email protected]>

commit 757a69ef6cf2bf839bd4088e5609ddddd663b0c4 upstream.

There are dueling comments in the xfs code about intent for log writes when unmounting a readonly filesystem.

In xfs_mountfs, we see the intent:

/*
* Now the log is fully replayed, we can transition to full read-only
* mode for read-only mounts. This will sync all the metadata and clean
* the log so that the recovery we just performed does not have to be
* replayed again on the next mount.
*/

and it calls xfs_quiesce_attr(), but by the time we get to xfs_log_unmount_write(), it returns early for a RDONLY mount:

* Don't write out unmount record on read-only mounts.

Because of this, sequential ro mounts of a filesystem with a dirty log will replay the log each time, which seems odd.

Fix this by writing an unmount record even for RO mounts, as long as norecovery wasn't specified (don't write a clean log record if a dirty log may still be there!) and the log device is writable.

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_log.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_log.c +5 -2
@@ -812,11 +812,14 @@ xfs_log_unmount_write(xfs_mount_t *mp)
 	int		 error;
 
 	/*
-	 * Don't write out unmount record on read-only mounts.
+	 * Don't write out unmount record on norecovery mounts or ro devices.
 	 * Or, if we are doing a forced umount (typically because of IO errors).
 	 */
-	if (mp->m_flags & XFS_MOUNT_RDONLY)
+	if (mp->m_flags & XFS_MOUNT_NORECOVERY ||
+	    xfs_readonly_buftarg(log->l_mp->m_logdev_targp)) {
+		ASSERT(mp->m_flags & XFS_MOUNT_RDONLY);
 		return 0;
+	}
 
 	error = _xfs_log_force(mp, XFS_LOG_SYNC, NULL);
 	ASSERT(error || !(XLOG_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(log)));
author maintainer
#27 lore raw

PATCH 27/52 xfs: toggle readonly state around xfs_log_mount_finish

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Sandeen <[email protected]>

commit 6f4a1eefdd0ad4561543270a7fceadabcca075dd upstream.

When we do log recovery on a readonly mount, unlinked inode processing does not happen due to the readonly checks in xfs_inactive(), which are trying to prevent any I/O on a readonly mount.

This is misguided - we do I/O on readonly mounts all the time, for consistency; for example, log recovery. So do the same RDONLY flag twiddling around xfs_log_mount_finish() as we do around xfs_log_mount(), for the same reason.

This all cries out for a big rework but for now this is a simple fix to an obvious problem.

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_log.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
fs/xfs/xfs_log.c +7 -0
@@ -743,10 +743,14 @@ xfs_log_mount_finish(
 	struct xfs_mount	*mp)
 {
 	int	error = 0;
+	bool	readonly = (mp->m_flags & XFS_MOUNT_RDONLY);
 
 	if (mp->m_flags & XFS_MOUNT_NORECOVERY) {
 		ASSERT(mp->m_flags & XFS_MOUNT_RDONLY);
 		return 0;
+	} else if (readonly) {
+		/* Allow unlinked processing to proceed */
+		mp->m_flags &= ~XFS_MOUNT_RDONLY;
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -764,6 +768,9 @@ xfs_log_mount_finish(
 		xfs_log_work_queue(mp);
 	mp->m_super->s_flags &= ~MS_ACTIVE;
 
+	if (readonly)
+		mp->m_flags |= XFS_MOUNT_RDONLY;
+
 	return error;
 }
 
author maintainer
#28 lore raw

PATCH 28/52 xfs: Add infrastructure needed for error propagation during buffer IO failure

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>

commit 0b80ae6ed13169bd3a244e71169f2cc020b0c57a upstream.

With the current code, XFS never re-submit a failed buffer for IO, because the failed item in the buffer is kept in the flush locked state forever.

To be able to resubmit an log item for IO, we need a way to mark an item as failed, if, for any reason the buffer which the item belonged to failed during writeback.

Add a new log item callback to be used after an IO completion failure and make the needed clean ups.

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c |   32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 fs/xfs/xfs_trans.h    |    7 +++++--
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c +31 -1
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include "xfs_error.h"
 #include "xfs_trace.h"
 #include "xfs_log.h"
+#include "xfs_inode.h"
 
 
 kmem_zone_t	*xfs_buf_item_zone;
@@ -1054,6 +1055,31 @@ xfs_buf_do_callbacks(
 	}
 }
 
+/*
+ * Invoke the error state callback for each log item affected by the failed I/O.
+ *
+ * If a metadata buffer write fails with a non-permanent error, the buffer is
+ * eventually resubmitted and so the completion callbacks are not run. The error
+ * state may need to be propagated to the log items attached to the buffer,
+ * however, so the next AIL push of the item knows hot to handle it correctly.
+ */
+STATIC void
+xfs_buf_do_callbacks_fail(
+	struct xfs_buf		*bp)
+{
+	struct xfs_log_item	*next;
+	struct xfs_log_item	*lip = bp->b_fspriv;
+	struct xfs_ail		*ailp = lip->li_ailp;
+
+	spin_lock(&ailp->xa_lock);
+	for (; lip; lip = next) {
+		next = lip->li_bio_list;
+		if (lip->li_ops->iop_error)
+			lip->li_ops->iop_error(lip, bp);
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&ailp->xa_lock);
+}
+
 static bool
 xfs_buf_iodone_callback_error(
 	struct xfs_buf		*bp)
@@ -1123,7 +1149,11 @@ xfs_buf_iodone_callback_error(
 	if ((mp->m_flags & XFS_MOUNT_UNMOUNTING) && mp->m_fail_unmount)
 		goto permanent_error;
 
-	/* still a transient error, higher layers will retry */
+	/*
+	 * Still a transient error, run IO completion failure callbacks and let
+	 * the higher layers retry the buffer.
+	 */
+	xfs_buf_do_callbacks_fail(bp);
 	xfs_buf_ioerror(bp, 0);
 	xfs_buf_relse(bp);
 	return true;
fs/xfs/xfs_trans.h +5 -2
@@ -64,11 +64,13 @@ typedef struct xfs_log_item {
 } xfs_log_item_t;
 
 #define	XFS_LI_IN_AIL	0x1
-#define XFS_LI_ABORTED	0x2
+#define	XFS_LI_ABORTED	0x2
+#define	XFS_LI_FAILED	0x4
 
 #define XFS_LI_FLAGS \
 	{ XFS_LI_IN_AIL,	"IN_AIL" }, \
-	{ XFS_LI_ABORTED,	"ABORTED" }
+	{ XFS_LI_ABORTED,	"ABORTED" }, \
+	{ XFS_LI_FAILED,	"FAILED" }
 
 struct xfs_item_ops {
 	void (*iop_size)(xfs_log_item_t *, int *, int *);
@@ -79,6 +81,7 @@ struct xfs_item_ops {
 	void (*iop_unlock)(xfs_log_item_t *);
 	xfs_lsn_t (*iop_committed)(xfs_log_item_t *, xfs_lsn_t);
 	void (*iop_committing)(xfs_log_item_t *, xfs_lsn_t);
+	void (*iop_error)(xfs_log_item_t *, xfs_buf_t *);
 };
 
 void	xfs_log_item_init(struct xfs_mount *mp, struct xfs_log_item *item,
author maintainer
#19 lore raw

PATCH 19/52 x86/switch_to/64: Rewrite FS/GS switching yet again to fix AMD CPUs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>

commit e137a4d8f4dd2e277e355495b6b2cb241a8693c3 upstream.

Switching FS and GS is a mess, and the current code is still subtly
wrong: it assumes that "Loading a nonzero value into FS sets the index and base", which is false on AMD CPUs if the value being loaded is 1, 2, or 3.

(The current code came from commit 3e2b68d752c9 ("x86/asm, sched/x86: Rewrite the FS and GS context switch code"), which made it better but didn't fully fix it.)

Rewrite it to be much simpler and more obviously correct. This should fix it fully on AMD CPUs and shouldn't adversely affect performance.

Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc Chang Seok <[email protected]>
Cc Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c |  227 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 122 insertions(+), 105 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +122 -105
@@ -149,6 +149,123 @@ void release_thread(struct task_struct *
 	}
 }
 
+enum which_selector {
+	FS,
+	GS
+};
+
+/*
+ * Saves the FS or GS base for an outgoing thread if FSGSBASE extensions are
+ * not available.  The goal is to be reasonably fast on non-FSGSBASE systems.
+ * It's forcibly inlined because it'll generate better code and this function
+ * is hot.
+ */
+static __always_inline void save_base_legacy(struct task_struct *prev_p,
+					     unsigned short selector,
+					     enum which_selector which)
+{
+	if (likely(selector == 0)) {
+		/*
+		 * On Intel (without X86_BUG_NULL_SEG), the segment base could
+		 * be the pre-existing saved base or it could be zero.  On AMD
+		 * (with X86_BUG_NULL_SEG), the segment base could be almost
+		 * anything.
+		 *
+		 * This branch is very hot (it's hit twice on almost every
+		 * context switch between 64-bit programs), and avoiding
+		 * the RDMSR helps a lot, so we just assume that whatever
+		 * value is already saved is correct.  This matches historical
+		 * Linux behavior, so it won't break existing applications.
+		 *
+		 * To avoid leaking state, on non-X86_BUG_NULL_SEG CPUs, if we
+		 * report that the base is zero, it needs to actually be zero:
+		 * see the corresponding logic in load_seg_legacy.
+		 */
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * If the selector is 1, 2, or 3, then the base is zero on
+		 * !X86_BUG_NULL_SEG CPUs and could be anything on
+		 * X86_BUG_NULL_SEG CPUs.  In the latter case, Linux
+		 * has never attempted to preserve the base across context
+		 * switches.
+		 *
+		 * If selector > 3, then it refers to a real segment, and
+		 * saving the base isn't necessary.
+		 */
+		if (which == FS)
+			prev_p->thread.fsbase = 0;
+		else
+			prev_p->thread.gsbase = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+static __always_inline void save_fsgs(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	savesegment(fs, task->thread.fsindex);
+	savesegment(gs, task->thread.gsindex);
+	save_base_legacy(task, task->thread.fsindex, FS);
+	save_base_legacy(task, task->thread.gsindex, GS);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void loadseg(enum which_selector which,
+				    unsigned short sel)
+{
+	if (which == FS)
+		loadsegment(fs, sel);
+	else
+		load_gs_index(sel);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void load_seg_legacy(unsigned short prev_index,
+					    unsigned long prev_base,
+					    unsigned short next_index,
+					    unsigned long next_base,
+					    enum which_selector which)
+{
+	if (likely(next_index <= 3)) {
+		/*
+		 * The next task is using 64-bit TLS, is not using this
+		 * segment at all, or is having fun with arcane CPU features.
+		 */
+		if (next_base == 0) {
+			/*
+			 * Nasty case: on AMD CPUs, we need to forcibly zero
+			 * the base.
+			 */
+			if (static_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_NULL_SEG)) {
+				loadseg(which, __USER_DS);
+				loadseg(which, next_index);
+			} else {
+				/*
+				 * We could try to exhaustively detect cases
+				 * under which we can skip the segment load,
+				 * but there's really only one case that matters
+				 * for performance: if both the previous and
+				 * next states are fully zeroed, we can skip
+				 * the load.
+				 *
+				 * (This assumes that prev_base == 0 has no
+				 * false positives.  This is the case on
+				 * Intel-style CPUs.)
+				 */
+				if (likely(prev_index | next_index | prev_base))
+					loadseg(which, next_index);
+			}
+		} else {
+			if (prev_index != next_index)
+				loadseg(which, next_index);
+			wrmsrl(which == FS ? MSR_FS_BASE : MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE,
+			       next_base);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * The next task is using a real segment.  Loading the selector
+		 * is sufficient.
+		 */
+		loadseg(which, next_index);
+	}
+}
+
 int copy_thread_tls(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp,
 		unsigned long arg, struct task_struct *p, unsigned long tls)
 {
@@ -286,7 +403,6 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p,
 	struct fpu *next_fpu = &next->fpu;
 	int cpu = smp_processor_id();
 	struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(cpu_tss, cpu);
-	unsigned prev_fsindex, prev_gsindex;
 
 	switch_fpu_prepare(prev_fpu, cpu);
 
@@ -295,8 +411,7 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p,
 	 *
 	 * (e.g. xen_load_tls())
 	 */
-	savesegment(fs, prev_fsindex);
-	savesegment(gs, prev_gsindex);
+	save_fsgs(prev_p);
 
 	/*
 	 * Load TLS before restoring any segments so that segment loads
@@ -335,108 +450,10 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p,
 	if (unlikely(next->ds | prev->ds))
 		loadsegment(ds, next->ds);
 
-	/*
-	 * Switch FS and GS.
-	 *
-	 * These are even more complicated than DS and ES: they have
-	 * 64-bit bases are that controlled by arch_prctl.  The bases
-	 * don't necessarily match the selectors, as user code can do
-	 * any number of things to cause them to be inconsistent.
-	 *
-	 * We don't promise to preserve the bases if the selectors are
-	 * nonzero.  We also don't promise to preserve the base if the
-	 * selector is zero and the base doesn't match whatever was
-	 * most recently passed to ARCH_SET_FS/GS.  (If/when the
-	 * FSGSBASE instructions are enabled, we'll need to offer
-	 * stronger guarantees.)
-	 *
-	 * As an invariant,
-	 * (fsbase != 0 && fsindex != 0) || (gsbase != 0 && gsindex != 0) is
-	 * impossible.
-	 */
-	if (next->fsindex) {
-		/* Loading a nonzero value into FS sets the index and base. */
-		loadsegment(fs, next->fsindex);
-	} else {
-		if (next->fsbase) {
-			/* Next index is zero but next base is nonzero. */
-			if (prev_fsindex)
-				loadsegment(fs, 0);
-			wrmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, next->fsbase);
-		} else {
-			/* Next base and index are both zero. */
-			if (static_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_NULL_SEG)) {
-				/*
-				 * We don't know the previous base and can't
-				 * find out without RDMSR.  Forcibly clear it.
-				 */
-				loadsegment(fs, __USER_DS);
-				loadsegment(fs, 0);
-			} else {
-				/*
-				 * If the previous index is zero and ARCH_SET_FS
-				 * didn't change the base, then the base is
-				 * also zero and we don't need to do anything.
-				 */
-				if (prev->fsbase || prev_fsindex)
-					loadsegment(fs, 0);
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	/*
-	 * Save the old state and preserve the invariant.
-	 * NB: if prev_fsindex == 0, then we can't reliably learn the base
-	 * without RDMSR because Intel user code can zero it without telling
-	 * us and AMD user code can program any 32-bit value without telling
-	 * us.
-	 */
-	if (prev_fsindex)
-		prev->fsbase = 0;
-	prev->fsindex = prev_fsindex;
-
-	if (next->gsindex) {
-		/* Loading a nonzero value into GS sets the index and base. */
-		load_gs_index(next->gsindex);
-	} else {
-		if (next->gsbase) {
-			/* Next index is zero but next base is nonzero. */
-			if (prev_gsindex)
-				load_gs_index(0);
-			wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, next->gsbase);
-		} else {
-			/* Next base and index are both zero. */
-			if (static_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_NULL_SEG)) {
-				/*
-				 * We don't know the previous base and can't
-				 * find out without RDMSR.  Forcibly clear it.
-				 *
-				 * This contains a pointless SWAPGS pair.
-				 * Fixing it would involve an explicit check
-				 * for Xen or a new pvop.
-				 */
-				load_gs_index(__USER_DS);
-				load_gs_index(0);
-			} else {
-				/*
-				 * If the previous index is zero and ARCH_SET_GS
-				 * didn't change the base, then the base is
-				 * also zero and we don't need to do anything.
-				 */
-				if (prev->gsbase || prev_gsindex)
-					load_gs_index(0);
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	/*
-	 * Save the old state and preserve the invariant.
-	 * NB: if prev_gsindex == 0, then we can't reliably learn the base
-	 * without RDMSR because Intel user code can zero it without telling
-	 * us and AMD user code can program any 32-bit value without telling
-	 * us.
-	 */
-	if (prev_gsindex)
-		prev->gsbase = 0;
-	prev->gsindex = prev_gsindex;
+	load_seg_legacy(prev->fsindex, prev->fsbase,
+			next->fsindex, next->fsbase, FS);
+	load_seg_legacy(prev->gsindex, prev->gsbase,
+			next->gsindex, next->gsbase, GS);
 
 	switch_fpu_finish(next_fpu, cpu);
 
author maintainer
#34 lore raw

PATCH 34/52 xfs: stop searching for free slots in an inode chunk when there are none

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>

commit 2d32311cf19bfb8c1d2b4601974ddd951f9cfd0b upstream.

In a filesystem without finobt, the Space manager selects an AG to alloc a new inode, where xfs_dialloc_ag_inobt() will search the AG for the free slot chunk.

When the new inode is in the same AG as its parent, the btree will be searched starting on the parent's record, and then retried from the top if no slot is available beyond the parent's record.

To exit this loop though, xfs_dialloc_ag_inobt() relies on the fact that the btree must have a free slot available, once its callers relied on the agi->freecount when deciding how/where to allocate this new inode.

In the case when the agi->freecount is corrupted, showing available inodes in an AG, when in fact there is none, this becomes an infinite loop.

Add a way to stop the loop when a free slot is not found in the btree, making the function to fall into the whole AG scan which will then, be able to detect the corruption and shut the filesystem down.

As pointed by Brian, this might impact performance, giving the fact we don't reset the search distance anymore when we reach the end of the tree, giving it fewer tries before falling back to the whole AG search, but it will only affect searches that start within 10 records to the end of the tree.

---
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_ialloc.c |   55 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_ialloc.c +27 -28
@@ -1133,6 +1133,7 @@ xfs_dialloc_ag_inobt(
 	int			error;
 	int			offset;
 	int			i, j;
+	int			searchdistance = 10;
 
 	pag = xfs_perag_get(mp, agno);
 
@@ -1159,7 +1160,6 @@ xfs_dialloc_ag_inobt(
 	if (pagno == agno) {
 		int		doneleft;	/* done, to the left */
 		int		doneright;	/* done, to the right */
-		int		searchdistance = 10;
 
 		error = xfs_inobt_lookup(cur, pagino, XFS_LOOKUP_LE, &i);
 		if (error)
@@ -1220,21 +1220,9 @@ xfs_dialloc_ag_inobt(
 		/*
 		 * Loop until we find an inode chunk with a free inode.
 		 */
-		while (!doneleft || !doneright) {
+		while (--searchdistance > 0 && (!doneleft || !doneright)) {
 			int	useleft;  /* using left inode chunk this time */
 
-			if (!--searchdistance) {
-				/*
-				 * Not in range - save last search
-				 * location and allocate a new inode
-				 */
-				xfs_btree_del_cursor(tcur, XFS_BTREE_NOERROR);
-				pag->pagl_leftrec = trec.ir_startino;
-				pag->pagl_rightrec = rec.ir_startino;
-				pag->pagl_pagino = pagino;
-				goto newino;
-			}
-
 			/* figure out the closer block if both are valid. */
 			if (!doneleft && !doneright) {
 				useleft = pagino -
@@ -1278,26 +1266,37 @@ xfs_dialloc_ag_inobt(
 				goto error1;
 		}
 
-		/*
-		 * We've reached the end of the btree. because
-		 * we are only searching a small chunk of the
-		 * btree each search, there is obviously free
-		 * inodes closer to the parent inode than we
-		 * are now. restart the search again.
-		 */
-		pag->pagl_pagino = NULLAGINO;
-		pag->pagl_leftrec = NULLAGINO;
-		pag->pagl_rightrec = NULLAGINO;
-		xfs_btree_del_cursor(tcur, XFS_BTREE_NOERROR);
-		xfs_btree_del_cursor(cur, XFS_BTREE_NOERROR);
-		goto restart_pagno;
+		if (searchdistance <= 0) {
+			/*
+			 * Not in range - save last search
+			 * location and allocate a new inode
+			 */
+			xfs_btree_del_cursor(tcur, XFS_BTREE_NOERROR);
+			pag->pagl_leftrec = trec.ir_startino;
+			pag->pagl_rightrec = rec.ir_startino;
+			pag->pagl_pagino = pagino;
+
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * We've reached the end of the btree. because
+			 * we are only searching a small chunk of the
+			 * btree each search, there is obviously free
+			 * inodes closer to the parent inode than we
+			 * are now. restart the search again.
+			 */
+			pag->pagl_pagino = NULLAGINO;
+			pag->pagl_leftrec = NULLAGINO;
+			pag->pagl_rightrec = NULLAGINO;
+			xfs_btree_del_cursor(tcur, XFS_BTREE_NOERROR);
+			xfs_btree_del_cursor(cur, XFS_BTREE_NOERROR);
+			goto restart_pagno;
+		}
 	}
 
 	/*
 	 * In a different AG from the parent.
 	 * See if the most recently allocated block has any free.
 	 */
-newino:
 	if (agi->agi_newino != cpu_to_be32(NULLAGINO)) {
 		error = xfs_inobt_lookup(cur, be32_to_cpu(agi->agi_newino),
 					 XFS_LOOKUP_EQ, &i);
author maintainer
#35 lore raw

PATCH 35/52 xfs: evict all inodes involved with log redo item

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Darrick J. Wong" <[email protected]>

commit 799ea9e9c59949008770aab4e1da87f10e99dbe4 upstream.

When we introduced the bmap redo log items, we set MS_ACTIVE on the mountpoint and XFS_IRECOVERY on the inode to prevent unlinked inodes from being truncated prematurely during log recovery. This also had the effect of putting linked inodes on the lru instead of evicting them.

Unfortunately, we neglected to find all those unreferenced lru inodes and evict them after finishing log recovery, which means that we leak them if anything goes wrong in the rest of xfs_mountfs, because the lru is only cleaned out on unmount.

Therefore, evict unreferenced inodes in the lru list immediately after clearing MS_ACTIVE.

Fixes 17c12bcd30 ("xfs: when replaying bmap operations, don't let unlinked inodes get reaped")
---
 fs/inode.c         |    1 +
 fs/internal.h      |    1 -
 fs/xfs/xfs_log.c   |   12 ++++++++++++
 include/linux/fs.h |    1 +
 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/inode.c +1 -0
@@ -637,6 +637,7 @@ again:
 
 	dispose_list(&dispose);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evict_inodes);
 
 /**
  * invalidate_inodes	- attempt to free all inodes on a superblock
fs/internal.h +0 -1
@@ -132,7 +132,6 @@ static inline bool atime_needs_update_rc
 extern void inode_io_list_del(struct inode *inode);
 
 extern long get_nr_dirty_inodes(void);
-extern void evict_inodes(struct super_block *);
 extern int invalidate_inodes(struct super_block *, bool);
 
 /*
fs/xfs/xfs_log.c +12 -0
@@ -761,12 +761,24 @@ xfs_log_mount_finish(
 	 * inodes.  Turn it off immediately after recovery finishes
 	 * so that we don't leak the quota inodes if subsequent mount
 	 * activities fail.
+	 *
+	 * We let all inodes involved in redo item processing end up on
+	 * the LRU instead of being evicted immediately so that if we do
+	 * something to an unlinked inode, the irele won't cause
+	 * premature truncation and freeing of the inode, which results
+	 * in log recovery failure.  We have to evict the unreferenced
+	 * lru inodes after clearing MS_ACTIVE because we don't
+	 * otherwise clean up the lru if there's a subsequent failure in
+	 * xfs_mountfs, which leads to us leaking the inodes if nothing
+	 * else (e.g. quotacheck) references the inodes before the
+	 * mount failure occurs.
 	 */
 	mp->m_super->s_flags |= MS_ACTIVE;
 	error = xlog_recover_finish(mp->m_log);
 	if (!error)
 		xfs_log_work_queue(mp);
 	mp->m_super->s_flags &= ~MS_ACTIVE;
+	evict_inodes(mp->m_super);
 
 	if (readonly)
 		mp->m_flags |= XFS_MOUNT_RDONLY;
include/linux/fs.h +1 -0
@@ -2831,6 +2831,7 @@ static inline void lockdep_annotate_inod
 #endif
 extern void unlock_new_inode(struct inode *);
 extern unsigned int get_next_ino(void);
+extern void evict_inodes(struct super_block *sb);
 
 extern void __iget(struct inode * inode);
 extern void iget_failed(struct inode *);
author maintainer
#36 lore raw

PATCH 36/52 xfs: check for race with xfs_reclaim_inode() in xfs_ifree_cluster()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Omar Sandoval <[email protected]>

commit f2e9ad212def50bcf4c098c6288779dd97fff0f0 upstream.

After xfs_ifree_cluster() finds an inode in the radix tree and verifies that the inode number is what it expected, xfs_reclaim_inode() can swoop in and free it. xfs_ifree_cluster() will then happily continue working on the freed inode. Most importantly, it will mark the inode stale, which will probably be overwritten when the inode slab object is reallocated, but if it has already been reallocated then we can end up with an inode spuriously marked stale.

In 8a17d7ddedb4 ("xfs: mark reclaimed inodes invalid earlier") we added a second check to xfs_iflush_cluster() to detect this race, but the similar RCU lookup in xfs_ifree_cluster() needs the same treatment.

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_icache.c |   10 +++++-----
 fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c  |   23 ++++++++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_icache.c +5 -5
@@ -1124,11 +1124,11 @@ reclaim:
 	 * Because we use RCU freeing we need to ensure the inode always appears
 	 * to be reclaimed with an invalid inode number when in the free state.
 	 * We do this as early as possible under the ILOCK so that
-	 * xfs_iflush_cluster() can be guaranteed to detect races with us here.
-	 * By doing this, we guarantee that once xfs_iflush_cluster has locked
-	 * XFS_ILOCK that it will see either a valid, flushable inode that will
-	 * serialise correctly, or it will see a clean (and invalid) inode that
-	 * it can skip.
+	 * xfs_iflush_cluster() and xfs_ifree_cluster() can be guaranteed to
+	 * detect races with us here. By doing this, we guarantee that once
+	 * xfs_iflush_cluster() or xfs_ifree_cluster() has locked XFS_ILOCK that
+	 * it will see either a valid inode that will serialise correctly, or it
+	 * will see an invalid inode that it can skip.
 	 */
 	spin_lock(&ip->i_flags_lock);
 	ip->i_flags = XFS_IRECLAIM;
fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c +18 -5
@@ -2359,11 +2359,24 @@ retry:
 			 * already marked stale. If we can't lock it, back off
 			 * and retry.
 			 */
-			if (ip != free_ip &&
-			    !xfs_ilock_nowait(ip, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL)) {
-				rcu_read_unlock();
-				delay(1);
-				goto retry;
+			if (ip != free_ip) {
+				if (!xfs_ilock_nowait(ip, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL)) {
+					rcu_read_unlock();
+					delay(1);
+					goto retry;
+				}
+
+				/*
+				 * Check the inode number again in case we're
+				 * racing with freeing in xfs_reclaim_inode().
+				 * See the comments in that function for more
+				 * information as to why the initial check is
+				 * not sufficient.
+				 */
+				if (ip->i_ino != inum + i) {
+					xfs_iunlock(ip, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL);
+					continue;
+				}
 			}
 			rcu_read_unlock();
 
author maintainer
#37 lore raw

PATCH 37/52 xfs: open-code xfs_buf_item_dirty()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Brian Foster <[email protected]>

commit a4f6cf6b2b6b60ec2a05a33a32e65caa4149aa2b upstream.

It checks a single flag and has one caller. It probably isn't worth its own function.

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c  |   11 -----------
 fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.h  |    1 -
 fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c |    2 +-
 3 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 13 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c +0 -11
@@ -945,17 +945,6 @@ xfs_buf_item_log(
 }
 
 
-/*
- * Return 1 if the buffer has been logged or ordered in a transaction (at any
- * point, not just the current transaction) and 0 if not.
- */
-uint
-xfs_buf_item_dirty(
-	xfs_buf_log_item_t	*bip)
-{
-	return (bip->bli_flags & XFS_BLI_DIRTY);
-}
-
 STATIC void
 xfs_buf_item_free(
 	xfs_buf_log_item_t	*bip)
fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.h +0 -1
@@ -64,7 +64,6 @@ typedef struct xfs_buf_log_item {
 int	xfs_buf_item_init(struct xfs_buf *, struct xfs_mount *);
 void	xfs_buf_item_relse(struct xfs_buf *);
 void	xfs_buf_item_log(xfs_buf_log_item_t *, uint, uint);
-uint	xfs_buf_item_dirty(xfs_buf_log_item_t *);
 void	xfs_buf_attach_iodone(struct xfs_buf *,
 			      void(*)(struct xfs_buf *, xfs_log_item_t *),
 			      xfs_log_item_t *);
fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c +1 -1
@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ xfs_trans_brelse(xfs_trans_t	*tp,
 	if (XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(tp->t_mountp) && freed) {
 		xfs_trans_ail_remove(&bip->bli_item, SHUTDOWN_LOG_IO_ERROR);
 		xfs_buf_item_relse(bp);
-	} else if (!xfs_buf_item_dirty(bip)) {
+	} else if (!(bip->bli_flags & XFS_BLI_DIRTY)) {
 /***
 		ASSERT(bp->b_pincount == 0);
 ***/
author maintainer
#33 lore raw

PATCH 33/52 xfs: handle -EFSCORRUPTED during head/tail verification

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Brian Foster <[email protected]>

commit a4c9b34d6a17081005ec459b57b8effc08f4c731 upstream.

Torn write and tail overwrite detection both trigger only on -EFSBADCRC errors. While this is the most likely failure scenario for each condition, -EFSCORRUPTED is still possible in certain cases depending on what ends up on disk when a torn write or partial tail overwrite occurs. For example, an invalid log record h_len can lead to an -EFSCORRUPTED error when running the log recovery CRC pass.

Therefore, update log head and tail verification to trigger the associated head/tail fixups in the event of -EFSCORRUPTED errors along with -EFSBADCRC. Also, -EFSCORRUPTED can currently be returned from xlog_do_recovery_pass() before rhead_blk is initialized if the first record encountered happens to be corrupted. This leads to an incorrect 'first_bad' return value. Initialize rhead_blk earlier in the function to address that problem as well.

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c |    7 +++----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c +3 -4
@@ -1102,7 +1102,7 @@ xlog_verify_tail(
 	first_bad = 0;
 	error = xlog_do_recovery_pass(log, head_blk, *tail_blk,
 				      XLOG_RECOVER_CRCPASS, &first_bad);
-	while (error == -EFSBADCRC && first_bad) {
+	while ((error == -EFSBADCRC || error == -EFSCORRUPTED) && first_bad) {
 		int	tail_distance;
 
 		/*
@@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@ xlog_verify_head(
 	 */
 	error = xlog_do_recovery_pass(log, *head_blk, tmp_rhead_blk,
 				      XLOG_RECOVER_CRCPASS, &first_bad);
-	if (error == -EFSBADCRC) {
+	if ((error == -EFSBADCRC || error == -EFSCORRUPTED) && first_bad) {
 		/*
 		 * We've hit a potential torn write. Reset the error and warn
 		 * about it.
@@ -5257,7 +5257,7 @@ xlog_do_recovery_pass(
 	LIST_HEAD		(buffer_list);
 
 	ASSERT(head_blk != tail_blk);
-	rhead_blk = 0;
+	blk_no = rhead_blk = tail_blk;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < XLOG_RHASH_SIZE; i++)
 		INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&rhash[i]);
@@ -5335,7 +5335,6 @@ xlog_do_recovery_pass(
 	}
 
 	memset(rhash, 0, sizeof(rhash));
-	blk_no = rhead_blk = tail_blk;
 	if (tail_blk > head_blk) {
 		/*
 		 * Perform recovery around the end of the physical log.
author maintainer
#43 lore raw

PATCH 43/52 xfs: move bmbt owner change to last step of extent swap

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Brian Foster <[email protected]>

commit 6fb10d6d22094bc4062f92b9ccbcee2f54033d04 upstream.

The extent swap operation currently resets bmbt block owners before the inode forks are swapped. The bmbt buffers are marked as ordered so they do not have to be physically logged in the transaction.

This use of ordered buffers is not safe as bmbt buffers may have been previously physically logged. The bmbt owner change algorithm needs to be updated to physically log buffers that are already dirty when/if they are encountered. This means that an extent swap will eventually require multiple rolling transactions to handle large btrees. In addition, all inode related changes must be logged before the bmbt owner change scan begins and can roll the transaction for the first time to preserve fs consistency via log recovery.

In preparation for such fixes to the bmbt owner change algorithm, refactor the bmbt scan out of the extent fork swap code to the last operation before the transaction is committed. Update xfs_swap_extent_forks() to only set the inode log flags when an owner change scan is necessary. Update xfs_swap_extents() to trigger the owner change based on the inode log flags. Note that since the owner change now occurs after the extent fork swap, the inode btrees must be fixed up with the inode number of the current inode (similar to log recovery).

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.c |   44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.c +26 -18
@@ -1840,29 +1840,18 @@ xfs_swap_extent_forks(
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * Before we've swapped the forks, lets set the owners of the forks
-	 * appropriately. We have to do this as we are demand paging the btree
-	 * buffers, and so the validation done on read will expect the owner
-	 * field to be correctly set. Once we change the owners, we can swap the
-	 * inode forks.
+	 * Btree format (v3) inodes have the inode number stamped in the bmbt
+	 * block headers. We can't start changing the bmbt blocks until the
+	 * inode owner change is logged so recovery does the right thing in the
+	 * event of a crash. Set the owner change log flags now and leave the
+	 * bmbt scan as the last step.
 	 */
 	if (ip->i_d.di_version == 3 &&
-	    ip->i_d.di_format == XFS_DINODE_FMT_BTREE) {
+	    ip->i_d.di_format == XFS_DINODE_FMT_BTREE)
 		(*target_log_flags) |= XFS_ILOG_DOWNER;
-		error = xfs_bmbt_change_owner(tp, ip, XFS_DATA_FORK,
-					      tip->i_ino, NULL);
-		if (error)
-			return error;
-	}
-
 	if (tip->i_d.di_version == 3 &&
-	    tip->i_d.di_format == XFS_DINODE_FMT_BTREE) {
+	    tip->i_d.di_format == XFS_DINODE_FMT_BTREE)
 		(*src_log_flags) |= XFS_ILOG_DOWNER;
-		error = xfs_bmbt_change_owner(tp, tip, XFS_DATA_FORK,
-					      ip->i_ino, NULL);
-		if (error)
-			return error;
-	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Swap the data forks of the inodes
@@ -2092,6 +2081,25 @@ xfs_swap_extents(
 	xfs_trans_log_inode(tp, tip, target_log_flags);
 
 	/*
+	 * The extent forks have been swapped, but crc=1,rmapbt=0 filesystems
+	 * have inode number owner values in the bmbt blocks that still refer to
+	 * the old inode. Scan each bmbt to fix up the owner values with the
+	 * inode number of the current inode.
+	 */
+	if (src_log_flags & XFS_ILOG_DOWNER) {
+		error = xfs_bmbt_change_owner(tp, ip, XFS_DATA_FORK,
+					      ip->i_ino, NULL);
+		if (error)
+			goto out_trans_cancel;
+	}
+	if (target_log_flags & XFS_ILOG_DOWNER) {
+		error = xfs_bmbt_change_owner(tp, tip, XFS_DATA_FORK,
+					      tip->i_ino, NULL);
+		if (error)
+			goto out_trans_cancel;
+	}
+
+	/*
 	 * If this is a synchronous mount, make sure that the
 	 * transaction goes to disk before returning to the user.
 	 */
author maintainer
#44 lore raw

PATCH 44/52 xfs: disallow marking previously dirty buffers as ordered

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Brian Foster <[email protected]>

commit a5814bceea48ee1c57c4db2bd54b0c0246daf54a upstream.

Ordered buffers are used in situations where the buffer is not physically logged but must pass through the transaction/logging pipeline for a particular transaction. As a result, ordered buffers are not unpinned and written back until the transaction commits to the log. Ordered buffers have a strict requirement that the target buffer must not be currently dirty and resident in the log pipeline at the time it is marked ordered. If a dirty+ordered buffer is committed, the buffer is reinserted to the AIL but not physically relogged at the LSN of the associated checkpoint. The buffer log item is assigned the LSN of the latest checkpoint and the AIL effectively releases the previously logged buffer content from the active log before the buffer has been written back. If the tail pushes forward and a filesystem crash occurs while in this state, an inconsistent filesystem could result.

It is currently the caller responsibility to ensure an ordered buffer is not already dirty from a previous modification. This is unclear and error prone when not used in situations where it is guaranteed a buffer has not been previously modified (such as new metadata allocations).

To facilitate general purpose use of ordered buffers, update xfs_trans_ordered_buf() to conditionally order the buffer based on state of the log item and return the status of the result. If the bli is dirty, do not order the buffer and return false. The caller must either physically log the buffer (having acquired the appropriate log reservation) or push it from the AIL to clean it before it can be marked ordered in the current transaction.

Note that ordered buffers are currently only used in two situations:
1.) inode chunk allocation where previously logged buffers are not possible and 2.) extent swap which will be updated to handle ordered buffer failures in a separate patch.

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_trans.h     |    2 +-
 fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c |    7 +++++--
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_trans.h +1 -1
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ void		xfs_trans_bhold_release(xfs_trans_
 void		xfs_trans_binval(xfs_trans_t *, struct xfs_buf *);
 void		xfs_trans_inode_buf(xfs_trans_t *, struct xfs_buf *);
 void		xfs_trans_stale_inode_buf(xfs_trans_t *, struct xfs_buf *);
-void		xfs_trans_ordered_buf(xfs_trans_t *, struct xfs_buf *);
+bool		xfs_trans_ordered_buf(xfs_trans_t *, struct xfs_buf *);
 void		xfs_trans_dquot_buf(xfs_trans_t *, struct xfs_buf *, uint);
 void		xfs_trans_inode_alloc_buf(xfs_trans_t *, struct xfs_buf *);
 void		xfs_trans_ichgtime(struct xfs_trans *, struct xfs_inode *, int);
fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c +5 -2
@@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ xfs_trans_inode_alloc_buf(
  * transactions rather than the physical changes we make to the buffer without
  * changing writeback ordering constraints of metadata buffers.
  */
-void
+bool
 xfs_trans_ordered_buf(
 	struct xfs_trans	*tp,
 	struct xfs_buf		*bp)
@@ -734,7 +734,9 @@ xfs_trans_ordered_buf(
 	ASSERT(bp->b_transp == tp);
 	ASSERT(bip != NULL);
 	ASSERT(atomic_read(&bip->bli_refcount) > 0);
-	ASSERT(!xfs_buf_item_dirty_format(bip));
+
+	if (xfs_buf_item_dirty_format(bip))
+		return false;
 
 	bip->bli_flags |= XFS_BLI_ORDERED;
 	trace_xfs_buf_item_ordered(bip);
@@ -744,6 +746,7 @@ xfs_trans_ordered_buf(
 	 * to be marked dirty and that it has been logged.
 	 */
 	xfs_trans_dirty_buf(tp, bp);
+	return true;
 }
 
 /*
author maintainer
#38 lore raw

PATCH 38/52 xfs: remove unnecessary dirty bli format check for ordered bufs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Brian Foster <[email protected]>

commit 6453c65d3576bc3e602abb5add15f112755c08ca upstream.

xfs_buf_item_unlock() historically checked the dirty state of the buffer by manually checking the buffer log formats for dirty segments. The introduction of ordered buffers invalidated this check because ordered buffers have dirty bli's but no dirty (logged) segments. The check was updated to accommodate ordered buffers by looking at the bli state first and considering the blf only if the bli is clean.

This logic is safe but unnecessary. There is no valid case where the bli is clean yet the blf has dirty segments. The bli is set dirty whenever the blf is logged (via xfs_trans_log_buf()) and the blf is cleared in the only place BLI_DIRTY is cleared (xfs_trans_binval()).

Remove the conditional blf dirty checks and replace with an assert that should catch any discrepencies between bli and blf dirty states. Refactor the old blf dirty check into a helper function to be used by the assert.

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c |   62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
 fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.h |    1 
 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c +32 -30
@@ -575,26 +575,18 @@ xfs_buf_item_unlock(
 {
 	struct xfs_buf_log_item	*bip = BUF_ITEM(lip);
 	struct xfs_buf		*bp = bip->bli_buf;
-	bool			clean;
-	bool			aborted;
-	int			flags;
+	bool			aborted = !!(lip->li_flags & XFS_LI_ABORTED);
+	bool			hold = !!(bip->bli_flags & XFS_BLI_HOLD);
+	bool			dirty = !!(bip->bli_flags & XFS_BLI_DIRTY);
+	bool			ordered = !!(bip->bli_flags & XFS_BLI_ORDERED);
 
 	/* Clear the buffer's association with this transaction. */
 	bp->b_transp = NULL;
 
 	/*
-	 * If this is a transaction abort, don't return early.  Instead, allow
-	 * the brelse to happen.  Normally it would be done for stale
-	 * (cancelled) buffers at unpin time, but we'll never go through the
-	 * pin/unpin cycle if we abort inside commit.
-	 */
-	aborted = (lip->li_flags & XFS_LI_ABORTED) ? true : false;
-	/*
-	 * Before possibly freeing the buf item, copy the per-transaction state
-	 * so we can reference it safely later after clearing it from the
-	 * buffer log item.
+	 * The per-transaction state has been copied above so clear it from the
+	 * bli.
 	 */
-	flags = bip->bli_flags;
 	bip->bli_flags &= ~(XFS_BLI_LOGGED | XFS_BLI_HOLD | XFS_BLI_ORDERED);
 
 	/*
@@ -602,7 +594,7 @@ xfs_buf_item_unlock(
 	 * unlock the buffer and free the buf item when the buffer is unpinned
 	 * for the last time.
 	 */
-	if (flags & XFS_BLI_STALE) {
+	if (bip->bli_flags & XFS_BLI_STALE) {
 		trace_xfs_buf_item_unlock_stale(bip);
 		ASSERT(bip->__bli_format.blf_flags & XFS_BLF_CANCEL);
 		if (!aborted) {
@@ -620,20 +612,11 @@ xfs_buf_item_unlock(
 	 * regardless of whether it is dirty or not. A dirty abort implies a
 	 * shutdown, anyway.
 	 *
-	 * Ordered buffers are dirty but may have no recorded changes, so ensure
-	 * we only release clean items here.
+	 * The bli dirty state should match whether the blf has logged segments
+	 * except for ordered buffers, where only the bli should be dirty.
 	 */
-	clean = (flags & XFS_BLI_DIRTY) ? false : true;
-	if (clean) {
-		int i;
-		for (i = 0; i < bip->bli_format_count; i++) {
-			if (!xfs_bitmap_empty(bip->bli_formats[i].blf_data_map,
-				     bip->bli_formats[i].blf_map_size)) {
-				clean = false;
-				break;
-			}
-		}
-	}
+	ASSERT((!ordered && dirty == xfs_buf_item_dirty_format(bip)) ||
+	       (ordered && dirty && !xfs_buf_item_dirty_format(bip)));
 
 	/*
 	 * Clean buffers, by definition, cannot be in the AIL. However, aborted
@@ -652,11 +635,11 @@ xfs_buf_item_unlock(
 			ASSERT(XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(lip->li_mountp));
 			xfs_trans_ail_remove(lip, SHUTDOWN_LOG_IO_ERROR);
 			xfs_buf_item_relse(bp);
-		} else if (clean)
+		} else if (!dirty)
 			xfs_buf_item_relse(bp);
 	}
 
-	if (!(flags & XFS_BLI_HOLD))
+	if (!hold)
 		xfs_buf_relse(bp);
 }
 
@@ -945,6 +928,25 @@ xfs_buf_item_log(
 }
 
 
+/*
+ * Return true if the buffer has any ranges logged/dirtied by a transaction,
+ * false otherwise.
+ */
+bool
+xfs_buf_item_dirty_format(
+	struct xfs_buf_log_item	*bip)
+{
+	int			i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < bip->bli_format_count; i++) {
+		if (!xfs_bitmap_empty(bip->bli_formats[i].blf_data_map,
+			     bip->bli_formats[i].blf_map_size))
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
 STATIC void
 xfs_buf_item_free(
 	xfs_buf_log_item_t	*bip)
fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.h +1 -0
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ typedef struct xfs_buf_log_item {
 int	xfs_buf_item_init(struct xfs_buf *, struct xfs_mount *);
 void	xfs_buf_item_relse(struct xfs_buf *);
 void	xfs_buf_item_log(xfs_buf_log_item_t *, uint, uint);
+bool	xfs_buf_item_dirty_format(struct xfs_buf_log_item *);
 void	xfs_buf_attach_iodone(struct xfs_buf *,
 			      void(*)(struct xfs_buf *, xfs_log_item_t *),
 			      xfs_log_item_t *);
author maintainer
#39 lore raw

PATCH 39/52 xfs: ordered buffer log items are never formatted

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Brian Foster <[email protected]>

commit e9385cc6fb7edf23702de33a2dc82965d92d9392 upstream.

Ordered buffers pass through the logging infrastructure without ever being written to the log. The way this works is that the ordered buffer status is transferred to the log vector at commit time via the ->iop_size() callback. In xlog_cil_insert_format_items(), ordered log vectors bypass ->iop_format() processing altogether.

Therefore it is unnecessary for xfs_buf_item_format() to handle ordered buffers. Remove the unnecessary logic and assert that an ordered buffer never reaches this point.

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c |   12 ++----------
 fs/xfs/xfs_trace.h    |    1 -
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c +2 -10
@@ -323,6 +323,8 @@ xfs_buf_item_format(
 	ASSERT((bip->bli_flags & XFS_BLI_STALE) ||
 	       (xfs_blft_from_flags(&bip->__bli_format) > XFS_BLFT_UNKNOWN_BUF
 	        && xfs_blft_from_flags(&bip->__bli_format) < XFS_BLFT_MAX_BUF));
+	ASSERT(!(bip->bli_flags & XFS_BLI_ORDERED) ||
+	       (bip->bli_flags & XFS_BLI_STALE));
 
 
 	/*
@@ -347,16 +349,6 @@ xfs_buf_item_format(
 		bip->bli_flags &= ~XFS_BLI_INODE_BUF;
 	}
 
-	if ((bip->bli_flags & (XFS_BLI_ORDERED|XFS_BLI_STALE)) ==
-							XFS_BLI_ORDERED) {
-		/*
-		 * The buffer has been logged just to order it.  It is not being
-		 * included in the transaction commit, so don't format it.
-		 */
-		trace_xfs_buf_item_format_ordered(bip);
-		return;
-	}
-
 	for (i = 0; i < bip->bli_format_count; i++) {
 		xfs_buf_item_format_segment(bip, lv, &vecp, offset,
 					    &bip->bli_formats[i]);
fs/xfs/xfs_trace.h +0 -1
@@ -517,7 +517,6 @@ DEFINE_BUF_ITEM_EVENT(xfs_buf_item_size)
 DEFINE_BUF_ITEM_EVENT(xfs_buf_item_size_ordered);
 DEFINE_BUF_ITEM_EVENT(xfs_buf_item_size_stale);
 DEFINE_BUF_ITEM_EVENT(xfs_buf_item_format);
-DEFINE_BUF_ITEM_EVENT(xfs_buf_item_format_ordered);
 DEFINE_BUF_ITEM_EVENT(xfs_buf_item_format_stale);
 DEFINE_BUF_ITEM_EVENT(xfs_buf_item_ordered);
 DEFINE_BUF_ITEM_EVENT(xfs_buf_item_pin);
author maintainer
#40 lore raw

PATCH 40/52 xfs: refactor buffer logging into buffer dirtying helper

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Brian Foster <[email protected]>

commit 9684010d38eccda733b61106765e9357cf436f65 upstream.

xfs_trans_log_buf() is responsible for logging the dirty segments of a buffer along with setting all of the necessary state on the transaction, buffer, bli, etc., to ensure that the associated items are marked as dirty and prepared for I/O. We have a couple use cases that need to to dirty a buffer in a transaction without actually logging dirty ranges of the buffer. One existing use case is ordered buffers, which are currently logged with arbitrary ranges to accomplish this even though the content of ordered buffers is never written to the log. Another pending use case is to relog an already dirty buffer across rolled transactions within the deferred operations infrastructure. This is required to prevent a held (XFS_BLI_HOLD) buffer from pinning the tail of the log.

Refactor xfs_trans_log_buf() into a new function that contains all of the logic responsible to dirty the transaction, lidp, buffer and bli. This new function can be used in the future for the use cases outlined above. This patch does not introduce functional changes.

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_trans.h     |    4 +++-
 fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c |   46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_trans.h +3 -1
@@ -217,7 +217,9 @@ void		xfs_trans_dquot_buf(xfs_trans_t *,
 void		xfs_trans_inode_alloc_buf(xfs_trans_t *, struct xfs_buf *);
 void		xfs_trans_ichgtime(struct xfs_trans *, struct xfs_inode *, int);
 void		xfs_trans_ijoin(struct xfs_trans *, struct xfs_inode *, uint);
-void		xfs_trans_log_buf(xfs_trans_t *, struct xfs_buf *, uint, uint);
+void		xfs_trans_log_buf(struct xfs_trans *, struct xfs_buf *, uint,
+				  uint);
+void		xfs_trans_dirty_buf(struct xfs_trans *, struct xfs_buf *);
 void		xfs_trans_log_inode(xfs_trans_t *, struct xfs_inode *, uint);
 
 void		xfs_extent_free_init_defer_op(void);
fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c +30 -16

78 lines not on this page · raw message

author maintainer
#41 lore raw

PATCH 41/52 xfs: dont log dirty ranges for ordered buffers

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Brian Foster <[email protected]>

commit 8dc518dfa7dbd079581269e51074b3c55a65a880 upstream.

Ordered buffers are attached to transactions and pushed through the logging infrastructure just like normal buffers with the exception that they are not actually written to the log. Therefore, we don't need to log dirty ranges of ordered buffers. xfs_trans_log_buf() is called on ordered buffers to set up all of the dirty state on the transaction, buffer and log item and prepare the buffer for I/O.

Now that xfs_trans_dirty_buf() is available, call it from xfs_trans_ordered_buf() so the latter is now mutually exclusive with xfs_trans_log_buf(). This reflects the implementation of ordered buffers and helps eliminate confusion over the need to log ranges of ordered buffers just to set up internal log state.

---
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c  |    6 ++----
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_ialloc.c |    2 --
 fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c     |   26 ++++++++++++++------------
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c +2 -4
@@ -4464,12 +4464,10 @@ xfs_btree_block_change_owner(
 	 * though, so everything is consistent in memory.
 	 */
 	if (bp) {
-		if (cur->bc_tp) {
+		if (cur->bc_tp)
 			xfs_trans_ordered_buf(cur->bc_tp, bp);
-			xfs_btree_log_block(cur, bp, XFS_BB_OWNER);
-		} else {
+		else
 			xfs_buf_delwri_queue(bp, bbcoi->buffer_list);
-		}
 	} else {
 		ASSERT(cur->bc_flags & XFS_BTREE_ROOT_IN_INODE);
 		ASSERT(level == cur->bc_nlevels - 1);
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_ialloc.c +0 -2
@@ -378,8 +378,6 @@ xfs_ialloc_inode_init(
 				 * transaction and pin the log appropriately.
 				 */
 				xfs_trans_ordered_buf(tp, fbuf);
-				xfs_trans_log_buf(tp, fbuf, 0,
-						  BBTOB(fbuf->b_length) - 1);
 			}
 		} else {
 			fbuf->b_flags |= XBF_DONE;
fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c +14 -12
@@ -560,16 +560,12 @@ xfs_trans_log_buf(
 	struct xfs_buf_log_item	*bip = bp->b_fspriv;
 
 	ASSERT(first <= last && last < BBTOB(bp->b_length));
+	ASSERT(!(bip->bli_flags & XFS_BLI_ORDERED));
 
 	xfs_trans_dirty_buf(tp, bp);
 
-	/*
-	 * If we have an ordered buffer we are not logging any dirty range but
-	 * it still needs to be marked dirty and that it has been logged.
-	 */
 	trace_xfs_trans_log_buf(bip);
-	if (!(bip->bli_flags & XFS_BLI_ORDERED))
-		xfs_buf_item_log(bip, first, last);
+	xfs_buf_item_log(bip, first, last);
 }
 
 
@@ -722,12 +718,11 @@ xfs_trans_inode_alloc_buf(
 }
 
 /*
- * Mark the buffer as ordered for this transaction. This means
- * that the contents of the buffer are not recorded in the transaction
- * but it is tracked in the AIL as though it was. This allows us
- * to record logical changes in transactions rather than the physical
- * changes we make to the buffer without changing writeback ordering
- * constraints of metadata buffers.
+ * Mark the buffer as ordered for this transaction. This means that the contents
+ * of the buffer are not recorded in the transaction but it is tracked in the
+ * AIL as though it was. This allows us to record logical changes in
+ * transactions rather than the physical changes we make to the buffer without
+ * changing writeback ordering constraints of metadata buffers.
  */
 void
 xfs_trans_ordered_buf(
@@ -739,9 +734,16 @@ xfs_trans_ordered_buf(
 	ASSERT(bp->b_transp == tp);
 	ASSERT(bip != NULL);
 	ASSERT(atomic_read(&bip->bli_refcount) > 0);
+	ASSERT(!xfs_buf_item_dirty_format(bip));
 
 	bip->bli_flags |= XFS_BLI_ORDERED;
 	trace_xfs_buf_item_ordered(bip);
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't log a dirty range of an ordered buffer but it still needs
+	 * to be marked dirty and that it has been logged.
+	 */
+	xfs_trans_dirty_buf(tp, bp);
 }
 
 /*
author maintainer
#42 lore raw

PATCH 42/52 xfs: skip bmbt block ino validation during owner change

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Brian Foster <[email protected]>

commit 99c794c639a65cc7b74f30a674048fd100fe9ac8 upstream.

Extent swap uses xfs_btree_visit_blocks() to fix up bmbt block owners on v5 (!rmapbt) filesystems. The bmbt scan uses xfs_btree_lookup_get_block() to read bmbt blocks which verifies the current owner of the block against the parent inode of the bmbt. This works during extent swap because the bmbt owners are updated to the opposite inode number before the inode extent forks are swapped.

The modified bmbt blocks are marked as ordered buffers which allows everything to commit in a single transaction. If the transaction commits to the log and the system crashes such that recovery of the extent swap is required, log recovery restarts the bmbt scan to fix up any bmbt blocks that may have not been written back before the crash. The log recovery bmbt scan occurs after the inode forks have been swapped, however. This causes the bmbt block owner verification to fail, leads to log recovery failure and requires xfs_repair to zap the log to recover.

Define a new invalid inode owner flag to inform the btree block lookup mechanism that the current inode may be invalid with respect to the current owner of the bmbt block. Set this flag on the cursor used for change owner scans to allow this operation to work at runtime and during log recovery.

Fixes bb3be7e7c ("xfs: check for bogus values in btree block headers")
---
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap_btree.c |    1 +
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c      |    1 +
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.h      |    3 ++-
 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap_btree.c +1 -0
@@ -858,6 +858,7 @@ xfs_bmbt_change_owner(
 	cur = xfs_bmbt_init_cursor(ip->i_mount, tp, ip, whichfork);
 	if (!cur)
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	cur->bc_private.b.flags |= XFS_BTCUR_BPRV_INVALID_OWNER;
 
 	error = xfs_btree_change_owner(cur, new_owner, buffer_list);
 	xfs_btree_del_cursor(cur, error ? XFS_BTREE_ERROR : XFS_BTREE_NOERROR);
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c +1 -0
@@ -1791,6 +1791,7 @@ xfs_btree_lookup_get_block(
 
 	/* Check the inode owner since the verifiers don't. */
 	if (xfs_sb_version_hascrc(&cur->bc_mp->m_sb) &&
+	    !(cur->bc_private.b.flags & XFS_BTCUR_BPRV_INVALID_OWNER) &&
 	    (cur->bc_flags & XFS_BTREE_LONG_PTRS) &&
 	    be64_to_cpu((*blkp)->bb_u.l.bb_owner) !=
 			cur->bc_private.b.ip->i_ino)
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.h +2 -1
@@ -233,7 +233,8 @@ typedef struct xfs_btree_cur
 			short		forksize;	/* fork's inode space */
 			char		whichfork;	/* data or attr fork */
 			char		flags;		/* flags */
-#define	XFS_BTCUR_BPRV_WASDEL	1			/* was delayed */
+#define	XFS_BTCUR_BPRV_WASDEL		(1<<0)		/* was delayed */
+#define	XFS_BTCUR_BPRV_INVALID_OWNER	(1<<1)		/* for ext swap */
 		} b;
 	}		bc_private;	/* per-btree type data */
 } xfs_btree_cur_t;
author maintainer
#48 lore raw

PATCH 48/52 xfs: dont set v3 xflags for v2 inodes

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>

commit dd60687ee541ca3f6df8758f38e6f22f57c42a37 upstream.

Reject attempts to set XFLAGS that correspond to di_flags2 inode flags if the inode isn't a v3 inode, because di_flags2 only exists on v3.

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c |   38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c +25 -13
@@ -931,16 +931,15 @@ xfs_ioc_fsgetxattr(
 	return 0;
 }
 
-STATIC void
-xfs_set_diflags(
+STATIC uint16_t
+xfs_flags2diflags(
 	struct xfs_inode	*ip,
 	unsigned int		xflags)
 {
-	unsigned int		di_flags;
-	uint64_t		di_flags2;
-
 	/* can't set PREALLOC this way, just preserve it */
-	di_flags = (ip->i_d.di_flags & XFS_DIFLAG_PREALLOC);
+	uint16_t		di_flags =
+		(ip->i_d.di_flags & XFS_DIFLAG_PREALLOC);
+
 	if (xflags & FS_XFLAG_IMMUTABLE)
 		di_flags |= XFS_DIFLAG_IMMUTABLE;
 	if (xflags & FS_XFLAG_APPEND)
@@ -970,19 +969,24 @@ xfs_set_diflags(
 		if (xflags & FS_XFLAG_EXTSIZE)
 			di_flags |= XFS_DIFLAG_EXTSIZE;
 	}
-	ip->i_d.di_flags = di_flags;
 
-	/* diflags2 only valid for v3 inodes. */
-	if (ip->i_d.di_version < 3)
-		return;
+	return di_flags;
+}
+
+STATIC uint64_t
+xfs_flags2diflags2(
+	struct xfs_inode	*ip,
+	unsigned int		xflags)
+{
+	uint64_t		di_flags2 =
+		(ip->i_d.di_flags2 & XFS_DIFLAG2_REFLINK);
 
-	di_flags2 = (ip->i_d.di_flags2 & XFS_DIFLAG2_REFLINK);
 	if (xflags & FS_XFLAG_DAX)
 		di_flags2 |= XFS_DIFLAG2_DAX;
 	if (xflags & FS_XFLAG_COWEXTSIZE)
 		di_flags2 |= XFS_DIFLAG2_COWEXTSIZE;
 
-	ip->i_d.di_flags2 = di_flags2;
+	return di_flags2;
 }
 
 STATIC void
@@ -1023,6 +1027,7 @@ xfs_ioctl_setattr_xflags(
 	struct fsxattr		*fa)
 {
 	struct xfs_mount	*mp = ip->i_mount;
+	uint64_t		di_flags2;
 
 	/* Can't change realtime flag if any extents are allocated. */
 	if ((ip->i_d.di_nextents || ip->i_delayed_blks) &&
@@ -1053,7 +1058,14 @@ xfs_ioctl_setattr_xflags(
 	    !capable(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	xfs_set_diflags(ip, fa->fsx_xflags);
+	/* diflags2 only valid for v3 inodes. */
+	di_flags2 = xfs_flags2diflags2(ip, fa->fsx_xflags);
+	if (di_flags2 && ip->i_d.di_version < 3)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ip->i_d.di_flags = xfs_flags2diflags(ip, fa->fsx_xflags);
+	ip->i_d.di_flags2 = di_flags2;
+
 	xfs_diflags_to_linux(ip);
 	xfs_trans_ichgtime(tp, ip, XFS_ICHGTIME_CHG);
 	xfs_trans_log_inode(tp, ip, XFS_ILOG_CORE);
author maintainer
#49 lore raw

PATCH 49/52 xfs: open code end_buffer_async_write in xfs_finish_page_writeback

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>

commit 8353a814f2518dcfa79a5bb77afd0e7dfa391bb1 upstream.

Our loop in xfs_finish_page_writeback, which iterates over all buffer heads in a page and then calls end_buffer_async_write, which also iterates over all buffers in the page to check if any I/O is in flight is not only inefficient, but also potentially dangerous as end_buffer_async_write can cause the page and all buffers to be freed.

Replace it with a single loop that does the work of end_buffer_async_write on a per-page basis.

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c |   71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c +47 -24
@@ -85,11 +85,11 @@ xfs_find_bdev_for_inode(
  * associated buffer_heads, paying attention to the start and end offsets that
  * we need to process on the page.
  *
- * Landmine Warning: bh->b_end_io() will call end_page_writeback() on the last
- * buffer in the IO. Once it does this, it is unsafe to access the bufferhead or
- * the page at all, as we may be racing with memory reclaim and it can free both
- * the bufferhead chain and the page as it will see the page as clean and
- * unused.
+ * Note that we open code the action in end_buffer_async_write here so that we
+ * only have to iterate over the buffers attached to the page once.  This is not
+ * only more efficient, but also ensures that we only calls end_page_writeback
+ * at the end of the iteration, and thus avoids the pitfall of having the page
+ * and buffers potentially freed after every call to end_buffer_async_write.
  */
 static void
 xfs_finish_page_writeback(
@@ -97,29 +97,44 @@ xfs_finish_page_writeback(
 	struct bio_vec		*bvec,
 	int			error)
 {
-	unsigned int		end = bvec->bv_offset + bvec->bv_len - 1;
-	struct buffer_head	*head, *bh, *next;
+	struct buffer_head	*head = page_buffers(bvec->bv_page), *bh = head;
+	bool			busy = false;
 	unsigned int		off = 0;
-	unsigned int		bsize;
+	unsigned long		flags;
 
 	ASSERT(bvec->bv_offset < PAGE_SIZE);
 	ASSERT((bvec->bv_offset & (i_blocksize(inode) - 1)) == 0);
-	ASSERT(end < PAGE_SIZE);
+	ASSERT(bvec->bv_offset + bvec->bv_len <= PAGE_SIZE);
 	ASSERT((bvec->bv_len & (i_blocksize(inode) - 1)) == 0);
 
-	bh = head = page_buffers(bvec->bv_page);
-
-	bsize = bh->b_size;
+	local_irq_save(flags);
+	bit_spin_lock(BH_Uptodate_Lock, &head->b_state);
 	do {
-		if (off > end)
-			break;
-		next = bh->b_this_page;
-		if (off < bvec->bv_offset)
-			goto next_bh;
-		bh->b_end_io(bh, !error);
-next_bh:
-		off += bsize;
-	} while ((bh = next) != head);
+		if (off >= bvec->bv_offset &&
+		    off < bvec->bv_offset + bvec->bv_len) {
+			ASSERT(buffer_async_write(bh));
+			ASSERT(bh->b_end_io == NULL);
+
+			if (error) {
+				mark_buffer_write_io_error(bh);
+				clear_buffer_uptodate(bh);
+				SetPageError(bvec->bv_page);
+			} else {
+				set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
+			}
+			clear_buffer_async_write(bh);
+			unlock_buffer(bh);
+		} else if (buffer_async_write(bh)) {
+			ASSERT(buffer_locked(bh));
+			busy = true;
+		}
+		off += bh->b_size;
+	} while ((bh = bh->b_this_page) != head);
+	bit_spin_unlock(BH_Uptodate_Lock, &head->b_state);
+	local_irq_restore(flags);
+
+	if (!busy)
+		end_page_writeback(bvec->bv_page);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -133,8 +148,10 @@ xfs_destroy_ioend(
 	int			error)
 {
 	struct inode		*inode = ioend->io_inode;
-	struct bio		*last = ioend->io_bio;
-	struct bio		*bio, *next;
+	struct bio		*bio = &ioend->io_inline_bio;
+	struct bio		*last = ioend->io_bio, *next;
+	u64			start = bio->bi_iter.bi_sector;
+	bool			quiet = bio_flagged(bio, BIO_QUIET);
 
 	for (bio = &ioend->io_inline_bio; bio; bio = next) {
 		struct bio_vec	*bvec;
@@ -155,6 +172,11 @@ xfs_destroy_ioend(
 
 		bio_put(bio);
 	}
+
+	if (unlikely(error && !quiet)) {
+		xfs_err_ratelimited(XFS_I(inode)->i_mount,
+			"writeback error on sector %llu", start);
+	}
 }
 
 /*
@@ -423,7 +445,8 @@ xfs_start_buffer_writeback(
 	ASSERT(!buffer_delay(bh));
 	ASSERT(!buffer_unwritten(bh));
 
-	mark_buffer_async_write(bh);
+	bh->b_end_io = NULL;
+	set_buffer_async_write(bh);
 	set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
 	clear_buffer_dirty(bh);
 }
author maintainer
#50 lore raw

PATCH 50/52 xfs: use kmem_free to free return value of kmem_zalloc

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pan Bian <[email protected]>

commit 6c370590cfe0c36bcd62d548148aa65c984540b7 upstream.

In function xfs_test_remount_options(), kfree() is used to free memory allocated by kmem_zalloc(). But it is better to use kmem_free().

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_super.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_super.c +1 -1
@@ -1220,7 +1220,7 @@ xfs_test_remount_options(
 	tmp_mp->m_super = sb;
 	error = xfs_parseargs(tmp_mp, options);
 	xfs_free_fsname(tmp_mp);
-	kfree(tmp_mp);
+	kmem_free(tmp_mp);
 
 	return error;
 }
author maintainer
#51 lore raw

PATCH 51/52 md/raid1/10: reset bio allocated from mempool

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shaohua Li <[email protected]>

commit 208410b546207cfc4c832635fa46419cfa86b4cd upstream.

Data allocated from mempool doesn't always get initialized, this happens when the data is reused instead of fresh allocation. In the raid1/10 case, we must reinitialize the bios.

Fixes f0250618361d(md: raid10: don't use bio's vec table to manage resync pages)
Fixes 98d30c5812c3(md: raid1: don't use bio's vec table to manage resync pages)
Cc Ming Lei <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/md/raid1.c  |   19 ++++++++++++++++++-
 drivers/md/raid10.c |   35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/md/raid1.c +18 -1
@@ -2564,6 +2564,23 @@ static int init_resync(struct r1conf *co
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static struct r1bio *raid1_alloc_init_r1buf(struct r1conf *conf)
+{
+	struct r1bio *r1bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r1buf_pool, GFP_NOIO);
+	struct resync_pages *rps;
+	struct bio *bio;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = conf->poolinfo->raid_disks; i--; ) {
+		bio = r1bio->bios[i];
+		rps = bio->bi_private;
+		bio_reset(bio);
+		bio->bi_private = rps;
+	}
+	r1bio->master_bio = NULL;
+	return r1bio;
+}
+
 /*
  * perform a "sync" on one "block"
  *
@@ -2649,7 +2666,7 @@ static sector_t raid1_sync_request(struc
 
 	bitmap_cond_end_sync(mddev->bitmap, sector_nr,
 		mddev_is_clustered(mddev) && (sector_nr + 2 * RESYNC_SECTORS > conf->cluster_sync_high));
-	r1_bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r1buf_pool, GFP_NOIO);
+	r1_bio = raid1_alloc_init_r1buf(conf);
 
 	raise_barrier(conf, sector_nr);
 
drivers/md/raid10.c +32 -3
@@ -2798,6 +2798,35 @@ static int init_resync(struct r10conf *c
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static struct r10bio *raid10_alloc_init_r10buf(struct r10conf *conf)
+{
+	struct r10bio *r10bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r10buf_pool, GFP_NOIO);
+	struct rsync_pages *rp;
+	struct bio *bio;
+	int nalloc;
+	int i;
+
+	if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_SYNC, &conf->mddev->recovery) ||
+	    test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RESHAPE, &conf->mddev->recovery))
+		nalloc = conf->copies; /* resync */
+	else
+		nalloc = 2; /* recovery */
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nalloc; i++) {
+		bio = r10bio->devs[i].bio;
+		rp = bio->bi_private;
+		bio_reset(bio);
+		bio->bi_private = rp;
+		bio = r10bio->devs[i].repl_bio;
+		if (bio) {
+			rp = bio->bi_private;
+			bio_reset(bio);
+			bio->bi_private = rp;
+		}
+	}
+	return r10bio;
+}
+
 /*
  * perform a "sync" on one "block"
  *
@@ -3027,7 +3056,7 @@ static sector_t raid10_sync_request(stru
 				atomic_inc(&mreplace->nr_pending);
 			rcu_read_unlock();
 
-			r10_bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r10buf_pool, GFP_NOIO);
+			r10_bio = raid10_alloc_init_r10buf(conf);
 			r10_bio->state = 0;
 			raise_barrier(conf, rb2 != NULL);
 			atomic_set(&r10_bio->remaining, 0);
@@ -3236,7 +3265,7 @@ static sector_t raid10_sync_request(stru
 		}
 		if (sync_blocks < max_sync)
 			max_sync = sync_blocks;
-		r10_bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r10buf_pool, GFP_NOIO);
+		r10_bio = raid10_alloc_init_r10buf(conf);
 		r10_bio->state = 0;
 
 		r10_bio->mddev = mddev;
@@ -4360,7 +4389,7 @@ static sector_t reshape_request(struct m
 
 read_more:
 	/* Now schedule reads for blocks from sector_nr to last */
-	r10_bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r10buf_pool, GFP_NOIO);
+	r10_bio = raid10_alloc_init_r10buf(conf);
 	r10_bio->state = 0;
 	raise_barrier(conf, sectors_done != 0);
 	atomic_set(&r10_bio->remaining, 0);
author maintainer
#52 lore raw

PATCH 52/52 md/raid5: release/flush io in raid5_do_work()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Song Liu <[email protected]>

commit 9c72a18e46ebe0f09484cce8ebf847abdab58498 upstream.

In raid5, there are scenarios where some ios are deferred to a later time, and some IO need a flush to complete. To make sure we make progress with these IOs, we need to call the following functions:

    flush_deferred_bios(conf);
    r5l_flush_stripe_to_raid(conf->log);

Both of these functions are called in raid5d(), but missing in raid5_do_work(). As a result, these functions are not called when multi-threading (group_thread_cnt > 0) is enabled. This patch adds calls to these function to raid5_do_work().

Note for stable branches:

r5l_flush_stripe_to_raid(conf->log) is need for 4.4+ flush_deferred_bios(conf) is only needed for 4.11+

---
 drivers/md/raid5.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/md/raid5.c +4 -0
@@ -6235,6 +6235,10 @@ static void raid5_do_work(struct work_st
 
 	spin_unlock_irq(&conf->device_lock);
 
+	flush_deferred_bios(conf);
+
+	r5l_flush_stripe_to_raid(conf->log);
+
 	async_tx_issue_pending_all();
 	blk_finish_plug(&plug);
 
author maintainer
#46 lore raw

PATCH 46/52 xfs: disable per-inode DAX flag

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>

commit 742d84290739ae908f1b61b7d17ea382c8c0073a upstream.

Currently flag switching can be used to easily crash the kernel. Disable the per-inode DAX flag until that is sorted out.

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c +2 -1
@@ -1008,11 +1008,12 @@ xfs_diflags_to_linux(
 		inode->i_flags |= S_NOATIME;
 	else
 		inode->i_flags &= ~S_NOATIME;
+#if 0	/* disabled until the flag switching races are sorted out */
 	if (xflags & FS_XFLAG_DAX)
 		inode->i_flags |= S_DAX;
 	else
 		inode->i_flags &= ~S_DAX;
-
+#endif
 }
 
 static int
#53 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.13.3 release. There are 52 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Wed Sep 20 09:08:28 UTC 2017. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Build results:

	total: 145 pass: 145 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 122 pass: 122 fail: 0

Details are available at http://kerneltests.org/builders.

Guenter

#54 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.13.3 release. There are 52 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Wed Sep 20 09:08:28 UTC 2017. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 9 lines
	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.13.3-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.13.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah

author maintainer
#55 lore raw
Quoted 15 lines · Shuah Khan
Quoted 14 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.13.3 release. There are 52 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Wed Sep 20 09:08:28 UTC 2017. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.13.3-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.13.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines

thanks,

greg k-h

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

Thanks for testing all of these and letting me know.

greg k-h