Linux 3.18.73
Greg KH
maintainerI'm announcing the release of the 3.18.73 kernel.
All users of the 3.18 kernel series must upgrade.
The updated 3.18.y git tree can be found at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git linux-3.18.y
and can be browsed at the normal kernel.org git web browser:
http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git;a=summary
thanks,
greg k-h
------------
Makefile | 2 - arch/arm/xen/mm.c | 1 arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 1 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_vio.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++------------- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/mobility.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kernel/i387.c | 11 +++++++ arch/x86/kernel/xsave.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 5 +++ block/bsg-lib.c | 1 drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 4 +- drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 11 +++++-- drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_iscsi.c | 2 - drivers/video/fbdev/aty/atyfb_base.c | 2 - drivers/xen/swiotlb-xen.c | 19 ++++++++++++ fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 4 ++ fs/cifs/cifsfs.c | 2 - fs/cifs/connect.c | 8 +++++ fs/cifs/file.c | 7 ++++ fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c | 17 +++++++---- fs/read_write.c | 4 +- include/linux/key.h | 2 + include/xen/swiotlb-xen.h | 5 +++ kernel/trace/trace.c | 12 +++++-- net/mac80211/offchannel.c | 2 + net/wireless/nl80211.c | 3 + security/keys/internal.h | 2 - security/keys/key.c | 2 + security/keys/keyctl.c | 5 +++ security/keys/keyring.c | 37 ++++++++++++------------ security/keys/process_keys.c | 8 +++-- 30 files changed, 172 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
Andreas Gruenbacher (1):
vfs: Return -ENXIO for negative SEEK_HOLE / SEEK_DATA offsets
Arnd Bergmann (1):
fix xen_swiotlb_dma_mmap prototype
Avraham Stern (1):
mac80211: flush hw_roc_start work before cancelling the ROC
Bo Yan (1):
tracing: Erase irqsoff trace with empty write
Christoph Hellwig (1):
bsg-lib: don't free job in bsg_prepare_job
Eric Biggers (4):
KEYS: fix writing past end of user-supplied buffer in keyring_read()
KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings
KEYS: prevent KEYCTL_READ on negative key
x86/fpu: Don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
Greg Kroah-Hartman (1):
Linux 3.18.73
Jim Mattson (1):
kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
LEROY Christophe (1):
crypto: talitos - fix sha224
Marc Zyngier (1):
arm64: Make sure SPsel is always set
Nicolai Stange (1):
PCI: Fix race condition with driver_override
Paul Mackerras (1):
KVM: PPC: Book3S: Fix race and leak in kvm_vm_ioctl_create_spapr_tce()
Shu Wang (2):
cifs: release cifs root_cred after exit_cifs
cifs: release auth_key.response for reconnect.
Stefano Stabellini (1):
swiotlb-xen: implement xen_swiotlb_dma_mmap callback
Steve French (2):
SMB: Validate negotiate (to protect against downgrade) even if signing off
SMB3: Don't ignore O_SYNC/O_DSYNC and O_DIRECT flags
Tahsin Erdogan (1):
tracing: Fix trace_pipe behavior for instance traces
Tyrel Datwyler (1):
powerpc/pseries: Fix parent_dn reference leak in add_dt_node()
Vladis Dronov (2):
nl80211: check for the required netlink attributes presence
video: fbdev: aty: do not leak uninitialized padding in clk to userspace
Xin Long (1):
scsi: scsi_transport_iscsi: fix the issue that iscsi_if_rx doesn't parse nlmsg properly
satoru takeuchi (1):
btrfs: prevent to set invalid default subvolid
Greg KH
maintainerMakefile +1 -1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ VERSION = 3 PATCHLEVEL = 18 -SUBLEVEL = 72 +SUBLEVEL = 73 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Diseased Newt
arch/arm/xen/mm.c +1 -0
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ static struct dma_map_ops xen_swiotlb_dma_ops = { .unmap_page = xen_swiotlb_unmap_page, .dma_supported = xen_swiotlb_dma_supported, .set_dma_mask = xen_swiotlb_set_dma_mask, + .mmap = xen_swiotlb_dma_mmap, };int __init xen_mm_init (void )
arch/arm64/kernel/head.S +1 -0
@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ ENDPROC(stext) * booted in EL1 or EL2 respectively. */ ENTRY(el2_setup) + msr SPsel, #1 // We want to use SP_EL{1,2} mrs x0, CurrentEL cmp x0, #CurrentEL_EL2 b.ne 1f
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_vio.c +27 -19
72 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/mobility.c +3 -1
@@ -225,8 +225,10 @@ static int add_dt_node(__be32 parent_phandle, __be32 drc_index)return -ENOENT ; dn =dlpar_configure_connector (drc_index, parent_dn); -if (!dn) +if (!dn) { +of_node_put (parent_dn);return -ENOENT ; + } rc =dlpar_attach_node (dn);if (rc)
arch/x86/kernel/i387.c +11 -0
@@ -388,11 +388,22 @@ int xstateregs_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset, xsave_hdr = &target->thread.fpu.state->xsave.xsave_hdr; xsave_hdr->xstate_bv &= pcntxt_mask; + +/* xcomp_bv must be 0 when using uncompacted format */ +if (!ret && xsave_hdr->xcomp_bv) + ret = -EINVAL ; +/* * These bits must be zero. */ memset (xsave_hdr->reserved,0 ,48 ); +/* +* In case of failure, mark all states as init: +*/ +if (ret) +fpu_finit (&target->thread.fpu); +return ret; }
arch/x86/kernel/xsave.c +3 -1
@@ -394,7 +394,9 @@ int __restore_xstate_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)drop_fpu (tsk);if (__copy_from_user (&fpu->state->xsave, buf_fx, state_size) || -__copy_from_user (&env, buf,sizeof (env))) { +__copy_from_user (&env, buf,sizeof (env)) || + (state_size > offsetof(struct xsave_struct , xsave_hdr) && + fpu->state->xsave.xsave_hdr.xcomp_bv)) {fpu_finit (fpu); err =-1 ; }else {
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +5 -0
@@ -8275,6 +8275,11 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)vmcs_write64 (VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR ,page_to_phys (vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page));vmcs_write32 (TPR_THRESHOLD , vmcs12->tpr_threshold); + }else { +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + exec_control |=CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING | +CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING ; +#endif }/*
block/bsg-lib.c +0 -1
@@ -147,7 +147,6 @@ static int bsg_create_job(struct device *dev, struct request *req) failjob_rls_rqst_payload:kfree (job->request_payload.sg_list); failjob_rls_job: -kfree (job);return -ENOMEM ; }
drivers/crypto/talitos.c +2 -2
@@ -1581,9 +1581,9 @@ static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc, req_ctx->swinit =0 ; }else { desc->ptr[1 ] = zero_entry; -/* Indicate next op is not the first. */ - req_ctx->first =0 ; } +/* Indicate next op is not the first. */ + req_ctx->first =0 ;/* HMAC key */ if (ctx->keylen)
drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c +9 -2
@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ static ssize_t driver_override_store(struct device *dev, const char *buf, size_t count) {struct pci_dev *pdev =to_pci_dev (dev); -char *driver_override, *old = pdev->driver_override, *cp; +char *driver_override, *old, *cp;/* We need to keep extra room for a newline */ if (count >= (PAGE_SIZE -1 ))
@@ -527,12 +527,15 @@ static ssize_t driver_override_store(struct device *dev,if (cp) *cp ='\0' ; +device_lock (dev); + old = pdev->driver_override;if (strlen (driver_override)) { pdev->driver_override = driver_override; }else {kfree (driver_override); pdev->driver_override =NULL ; } +device_unlock (dev);kfree (old);
@@ -543,8 +546,12 @@ static ssize_t driver_override_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(dev); +ssize_t len; -return snprintf (buf,PAGE_SIZE ,"%s\n" , pdev->driver_override); +device_lock (dev); + len =snprintf (buf,PAGE_SIZE ,"%s\n" , pdev->driver_override); +device_unlock (dev); +return len; }static DEVICE_ATTR_RW (driver_override);
drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_iscsi.c +1 -1
@@ -3693,7 +3693,7 @@ iscsi_if_rx(struct sk_buff *skb)uint32_t group; nlh =nlmsg_hdr (skb); -if (nlh->nlmsg_len <sizeof (*nlh) || +if (nlh->nlmsg_len <sizeof (*nlh) +sizeof (*ev) || skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len) {break ; }
drivers/video/fbdev/aty/atyfb_base.c +1 -1
@@ -1852,7 +1852,7 @@ static int atyfb_ioctl(struct fb_info *info, u_int cmd, u_long arg)#if defined(DEBUG ) && defined(CONFIG_FB_ATY_CT )case ATYIO_CLKR :if (M64_HAS (INTEGRATED )) { -struct atyclk clk; +struct atyclk clk = {0 };union aty_pll *pll = &par->pll;u32 dsp_config = pll->ct.dsp_config;u32 dsp_on_off = pll->ct.dsp_on_off;
drivers/xen/swiotlb-xen.c +19 -0
@@ -684,3 +684,22 @@ xen_swiotlb_set_dma_mask(struct device *dev, u64 dma_mask)return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xen_swiotlb_set_dma_mask); + +/* +* Create userspace mapping for the DMA-coherent memory. +* This function should be called with the pages from the current domain only, +* passing pages mapped from other domains would lead to memory corruption. +*/ +int +xen_swiotlb_dma_mmap (struct device *dev,struct vm_area_struct *vma, +void *cpu_addr,dma_addr_t dma_addr,size_t size, +struct dma_attrs *attrs) +{ +#if defined(CONFIG_ARM ) || defined(CONFIG_ARM64 ) +if (__generic_dma_ops (dev)->mmap) +return __generic_dma_ops (dev)->mmap (dev, vma, cpu_addr, + dma_addr, size, attrs); +#endif +return dma_common_mmap (dev, vma, cpu_addr, dma_addr, size); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xen_swiotlb_dma_mmap);
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +4 -0
@@ -3963,6 +3963,10 @@ static long btrfs_ioctl_default_subvol(struct file *file, void __user *argp) ret =PTR_ERR (new_root); goto out; } +if (!is_fstree (new_root->objectid)) { + ret = -ENOENT ; + goto out; + } path =btrfs_alloc_path ();if (!path) {
fs/cifs/cifsfs.c +1 -1
@@ -1311,7 +1311,7 @@ exit_cifs(void)exit_cifs_idmap ();#endif #ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL -unregister_key_type (&cifs_spnego_key_type); +exit_cifs_spnego ();#endif cifs_destroy_request_bufs ();cifs_destroy_mids ();
fs/cifs/connect.c +8 -0
@@ -3958,6 +3958,14 @@ cifs_setup_session(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses,cifs_dbg (FYI ,"Security Mode: 0x%x Capabilities: 0x%x TimeAdjust: %d\n" , server->sec_mode, server->capabilities, server->timeAdj); +if (ses->auth_key.response) { +cifs_dbg (VFS ,"Free previous auth_key.response = %p\n" , + ses->auth_key.response); +kfree (ses->auth_key.response); + ses->auth_key.response =NULL ; + ses->auth_key.len =0 ; + } +if (server->ops->sess_setup) rc = server->ops->sess_setup (xid, ses, nls_info);
fs/cifs/file.c +7 -0
@@ -225,6 +225,13 @@ cifs_nt_open(char *full_path, struct inode *inode, struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb,if (backup_cred (cifs_sb)) create_options |=CREATE_OPEN_BACKUP_INTENT ; +/* O_SYNC also has bit for O_DSYNC so following check picks up either */ +if (f_flags &O_SYNC ) + create_options |=CREATE_WRITE_THROUGH ; + +if (f_flags &O_DIRECT ) + create_options |=CREATE_NO_BUFFER ; + oparms.tcon = tcon; oparms.cifs_sb = cifs_sb; oparms.desired_access = desired_access;
fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c +12 -5
@@ -453,15 +453,22 @@ int smb3_validate_negotiate(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon)/* * validation ioctl must be signed, so no point sending this if we -* can not sign it. We could eventually change this to selectively +* can not sign it (ie are not known user). Even if signing is not +* required (enabled but not negotiated), in those cases we selectively * sign just this, the first and only signed request on a connection. -* This is good enough for now since a user who wants better security -* would also enable signing on the mount. Having validation of -* negotiate info for signed connections helps reduce attack vectors +* Having validation of negotiate info helps reduce attack vectors. */ -if (tcon->ses->server->sign == false) +if (tcon->ses->session_flags &SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_GUEST )return 0 ;/* validation requires signing */ +if (tcon->ses->user_name ==NULL ) { +cifs_dbg (FYI ,"Can't validate negotiate: null user mount\n" ); +return 0 ;/* validation requires signing */ + } + +if (tcon->ses->session_flags &SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_NULL ) +cifs_dbg (VFS ,"Unexpected null user (anonymous) auth flag sent by server\n" ); + vneg_inbuf.Capabilities =cpu_to_le32 (tcon->ses->server->vals->req_capabilities); memcpy(vneg_inbuf.Guid, tcon->ses->server->client_guid,
fs/read_write.c +2 -2
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ generic_file_llseek_size(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence,* In the generic case the entire file is data, so as long as * offset isn't at the end of the file then the offset is data. */ -if (offset >= eof) +if ((unsigned long long )offset >= eof)return -ENXIO ;break ;case SEEK_HOLE :
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ generic_file_llseek_size(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence,* There is a virtual hole at the end of the file, so as long as * offset isn't i_size or larger, return i_size. */ -if (offset >= eof) +if ((unsigned long long )offset >= eof)return -ENXIO ; offset = eof;break ;
include/linux/key.h +2 -0
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ struct key {#define KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY 9/* set if keyring only accepts links to trusted keys */ #define KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN 10/* set if key is builtin */ #define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL 11/* set if key can be invalidated by root without permission */ +#define KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING 12/* set if key is a user or user session keyring */ /* the key type and key description string * - the desc is used to match a key against search criteria
@@ -223,6 +224,7 @@ extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type,#define KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN 0x0001/* add to quota, permit even if overrun */ #define KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA 0x0002/* not in quota */ #define KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED 0x0004/* Key should be flagged as trusted */ +#define KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING 0x0010/* allocating a user or user session keyring */ extern void key_revoke (struct key *key);extern void key_invalidate (struct key *key);
include/xen/swiotlb-xen.h +5 -0
@@ -58,4 +58,9 @@ xen_swiotlb_dma_supported(struct device *hwdev, u64 mask);extern int xen_swiotlb_set_dma_mask (struct device *dev,u64 dma_mask); + +extern int +xen_swiotlb_dma_mmap (struct device *dev,struct vm_area_struct *vma, +void *cpu_addr,dma_addr_t dma_addr,size_t size, +struct dma_attrs *attrs);#endif /* __LINUX_SWIOTLB_XEN_H */
kernel/trace/trace.c +9 -3
@@ -3168,11 +3168,17 @@ static int tracing_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)/* If this file was open for write, then erase contents */ if ((file->f_mode &FMODE_WRITE ) && (file->f_flags &O_TRUNC )) {int cpu =tracing_get_cpu (inode); +struct trace_buffer *trace_buf = &tr->trace_buffer; + +#ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE +if (tr->current_trace->print_max) + trace_buf = &tr->max_buffer; +#endif if (cpu ==RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS ) -tracing_reset_online_cpus (&tr->trace_buffer); +tracing_reset_online_cpus (trace_buf);else -tracing_reset (&tr->trace_buffer, cpu); +tracing_reset (trace_buf, cpu); }if (file->f_mode &FMODE_READ ) {
@@ -4430,7 +4436,7 @@ static int tracing_wait_pipe(struct file *filp)* * iter->pos will be 0 if we haven't read anything. */ -if (!tracing_is_on () && iter->pos) +if (!tracer_tracing_is_on (iter->tr) && iter->pos)break ;mutex_unlock (&iter->mutex);
net/mac80211/offchannel.c +2 -0
@@ -469,6 +469,8 @@ void ieee80211_roc_purge(struct ieee80211_local *local,struct ieee80211_roc_work *roc, *tmp;LIST_HEAD (tmp_list); +flush_work (&local->hw_roc_start); +mutex_lock (&local->mtx);list_for_each_entry_safe (roc, tmp, &local->roc_list, list) {if (sdata && roc->sdata != sdata)
net/wireless/nl80211.c +3 -0
@@ -9006,6 +9006,9 @@ static int nl80211_set_rekey_data(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)if (err)return err; +if (!tb[NL80211_REKEY_DATA_REPLAY_CTR ] || !tb[NL80211_REKEY_DATA_KEK ] || + !tb[NL80211_REKEY_DATA_KCK ]) +return -EINVAL ;if (nla_len (tb[NL80211_REKEY_DATA_REPLAY_CTR ]) !=NL80211_REPLAY_CTR_LEN )return -ERANGE ;if (nla_len (tb[NL80211_REKEY_DATA_KEK ]) !=NL80211_KEK_LEN )
security/keys/internal.h +1 -1
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,extern key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings (struct keyring_search_context *ctx);extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings (struct keyring_search_context *ctx); -extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name (const char *name,bool skip_perm_check); +extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name (const char *name,bool uid_keyring);extern int install_user_keyrings (void );extern int install_thread_keyring_to_cred (struct cred *);
security/keys/key.c +2 -0
@@ -298,6 +298,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc, key->flags |=1 <<KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA ;if (flags &KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED ) key->flags |=1 <<KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED ; +if (flags &KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING ) + key->flags |=1 <<KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING ;#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING key->magic =KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC ;
security/keys/keyctl.c +5 -0
@@ -744,6 +744,11 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) key =key_ref_to_ptr (key_ref); +if (test_bit (KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE , &key->flags)) { + ret = -ENOKEY ; + goto error2; + } +/* see if we can read it directly */ ret =key_permission (key_ref,KEY_NEED_READ );if (ret ==0 )
security/keys/keyring.c +19 -18
@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m) }struct keyring_read_iterator_context { -size_t qty; +size_t buflen;size_t count;key_serial_t __user *buffer; };
@@ -428,9 +428,9 @@ static int keyring_read_iterator(const void *object, void *data)int ret;kenter ("{%s,%d},,{%zu/%zu}" , - key->type->name, key->serial, ctx->count, ctx->qty); + key->type->name, key->serial, ctx->count, ctx->buflen); -if (ctx->count >= ctx->qty) +if (ctx->count >= ctx->buflen)return 1 ; ret =put_user (key->serial, ctx->buffer);
@@ -465,16 +465,12 @@ static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring,return 0 ;/* Calculate how much data we could return */ - ctx.qty = nr_keys *sizeof (key_serial_t); -if (!buffer || !buflen) -return ctx.qty; - -if (buflen > ctx.qty) - ctx.qty = buflen; +return nr_keys *sizeof (key_serial_t);/* Copy the IDs of the subscribed keys into the buffer */ ctx.buffer = (key_serial_t __user *)buffer; + ctx.buflen = buflen; ctx.count =0 ; ret =assoc_array_iterate (&keyring->keys, keyring_read_iterator, &ctx);if (ret <0 ) {
@@ -965,15 +961,15 @@ found:/* * Find a keyring with the specified name. * -* All named keyrings in the current user namespace are searched, provided they -* grant Search permission directly to the caller (unless this check is -* skipped). Keyrings whose usage points have reached zero or who have been -* revoked are skipped. +* Only keyrings that have nonzero refcount, are not revoked, and are owned by a +* user in the current user namespace are considered. If @uid_keyring is %true, +* the keyring additionally must have been allocated as a user or user session +* keyring; otherwise, it must grant Search permission directly to the caller. * * Returns a pointer to the keyring with the keyring's refcount having being * incremented on success. -ENOKEY is returned if a key could not be found. */ -struct key *find_keyring_by_name (const char *name,bool skip_perm_check) +struct key *find_keyring_by_name (const char *name,bool uid_keyring) {struct key *keyring;int bucket;
@@ -1001,10 +997,15 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check)if (strcmp (keyring->description, name) !=0 )continue ; -if (!skip_perm_check && -key_permission (make_key_ref (keyring,0 ), -KEY_NEED_SEARCH ) <0 ) -continue ; +if (uid_keyring) { +if (!test_bit (KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING , + &keyring->flags)) +continue ; + }else { +if (key_permission (make_key_ref (keyring,0 ), +KEY_NEED_SEARCH ) <0 ) +continue ; + }/* we've got a match but we might end up racing with * key_cleanup() if the keyring is currently 'dead'
security/keys/process_keys.c +6 -2
@@ -76,7 +76,9 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void)if (IS_ERR (uid_keyring)) { uid_keyring =keyring_alloc (buf, user->uid,INVALID_GID , cred, user_keyring_perm, -KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA ,NULL ); +KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING | +KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA , +NULL );if (IS_ERR (uid_keyring)) { ret =PTR_ERR (uid_keyring); goto error;
@@ -92,7 +94,9 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void) session_keyring =keyring_alloc (buf, user->uid,INVALID_GID , cred, user_keyring_perm, -KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA ,NULL ); +KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING | +KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA , +NULL );if (IS_ERR (session_keyring)) { ret =PTR_ERR (session_keyring); goto error_release;