Does CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY break /dev/mem?
Subsystems (2)
Hello Kees,
When I try to run the crash tool on my s390 live system I get a kernel panic when reading memory within the kernel image:
# uname -a Linux r3545011 4.14.0-rc8-00066-g1c9dbd4615fd #45 SMP PREEMPT Fri Nov 10 16:16:22 CET 2017 s390x s390x s390x GNU/Linux # crash /boot/vmlinux-devel /dev/mem # crash> rd 0x100000
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from 0000000000100000 (<kernel text>) (8 bytes)
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:72!
illegal operation: 0001 ilc:1 [#1] PREEMPT SMP.
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1461 Comm: crash Not tainted 4.14.0-rc8-00066-g1c9dbd4615fd-dirty #46
Hardware name: IBM 2827 H66 706 (z/VM 6.3.0)
task: 000000001ad10100 task.stack: 000000001df78000
Krnl PSW : 0704d00180000000 000000000038165c (__check_object_size+0x164/0x1d0)
R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:1 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3
Krnl GPRS: 0000000012440e1d 0000000080000000 0000000000000061 00000000001cabc0
00000000001cc6d6 0000000000000000 0000000000cc4ed2 0000000000001000
000003ffc22fdd20 0000000000000008 0000000000100008 0000000000000001
0000000000000008 0000000000100000 0000000000381658 000000001df7bc90
Krnl Code: 000000000038164c: c020004a1c4a larl %r2,cc4ee0
0000000000381652: c0e5fff2581b brasl %r14,1cc688
#0000000000381658: a7f40001 brc 15,38165a
>000000000038165c: eb42000c000c srlg %r4,%r2,12
0000000000381662: eb32001c000c srlg %r3,%r2,28
0000000000381668: c0110003ffff lgfi %r1,262143
000000000038166e: ec31ff752065 clgrj %r3,%r1,2,381558
0000000000381674: a7f4ff67 brc 15,381542
Call Trace:
([<0000000000381658>] __check_object_size+0x160/0x1d0)
[<000000000082263a>] read_mem+0xaa/0x130.
[<0000000000386182>] __vfs_read+0x42/0x168.
[<000000000038632e>] vfs_read+0x86/0x140.
[<0000000000386a26>] SyS_read+0x66/0xc0.
[<0000000000ace6a4>] system_call+0xc4/0x2b0.
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
Last Breaking-Event-Address:
[<0000000000381658>] __check_object_size+0x160/0x1d0
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oopsWith CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY copy_to_user() checks in __check_object_size() if the source address is within the kernel image:
- __check_object_size() -> check_kernel_text_object():
/* Is this address range in the kernel text area? */ static inline const char *check_kernel_text_object(const void *ptr,
unsigned long n)
{
unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext;
unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext;
unsigned long textlow_linear, texthigh_linear;
if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh))
return "<kernel text>";When the crash tool reads from 0x100000, this check leads to the kernel BUG() in drivers/char/mem.c:
144 } else {
145 /*
146 * On ia64 if a page has been mapped somewhere as 147 * uncached, then it must also be accessed uncached 148 * by the kernel or data corruption may occur. 149 */
150 ptr = xlate_dev_mem_ptr(p);
151 if (!ptr)
152 return -EFAULT;
153
154 remaining = copy_to_user(buf, ptr, sz); <<<---- BUG
155
156 unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(p, ptr);
157 }
Here the reporting function in mm/usercopy.c:
61 static void report_usercopy(const void *ptr, unsigned long len,
62 bool to_user, const char *type)
63 {
64 pr_emerg("kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %p (%s) (%lu bytes)\n",
65 to_user ? "exposure" : "overwrite",
66 to_user ? "from" : "to", ptr, type ? : "unknown", len);
67 /*
68 * For greater effect, it would be nice to do do_group_exit(), 69 * but BUG() actually hooks all the lock-breaking and per-arch 70 * Oops code, so that is used here instead. 71 */
72 BUG();
73 }
Shouldn't we skip the kernel address check for /dev/mem - at least when CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM is not enabled?
Michael
Quoted 92 lines · Michael Holzheu
Hello Kees,
When I try to run the crash tool on my s390 live system I get a kernel panic when reading memory within the kernel image:
# uname -a Linux r3545011 4.14.0-rc8-00066-g1c9dbd4615fd #45 SMP PREEMPT Fri Nov 10 16:16:22 CET 2017 s390x s390x s390x GNU/Linux # crash /boot/vmlinux-devel /dev/mem # crash> rd 0x100000usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from 0000000000100000 (<kernel text>) (8 bytes)
------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:72! illegal operation: 0001 ilc:1 [#1] PREEMPT SMP. Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1461 Comm: crash Not tainted 4.14.0-rc8-00066-g1c9dbd4615fd-dirty #46 Hardware name: IBM 2827 H66 706 (z/VM 6.3.0) task: 000000001ad10100 task.stack: 000000001df78000 Krnl PSW : 0704d00180000000 000000000038165c (__check_object_size+0x164/0x1d0) R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:1 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 Krnl GPRS: 0000000012440e1d 0000000080000000 0000000000000061 00000000001cabc0 00000000001cc6d6 0000000000000000 0000000000cc4ed2 0000000000001000 000003ffc22fdd20 0000000000000008 0000000000100008 0000000000000001 0000000000000008 0000000000100000 0000000000381658 000000001df7bc90 Krnl Code: 000000000038164c: c020004a1c4a larl %r2,cc4ee0 0000000000381652: c0e5fff2581b brasl %r14,1cc688 #0000000000381658: a7f40001 brc 15,38165a >000000000038165c: eb42000c000c srlg %r4,%r2,12 0000000000381662: eb32001c000c srlg %r3,%r2,28 0000000000381668: c0110003ffff lgfi %r1,262143 000000000038166e: ec31ff752065 clgrj %r3,%r1,2,381558 0000000000381674: a7f4ff67 brc 15,381542 Call Trace: ([<0000000000381658>] __check_object_size+0x160/0x1d0) [<000000000082263a>] read_mem+0xaa/0x130. [<0000000000386182>] __vfs_read+0x42/0x168. [<000000000038632e>] vfs_read+0x86/0x140. [<0000000000386a26>] SyS_read+0x66/0xc0. [<0000000000ace6a4>] system_call+0xc4/0x2b0. INFO: lockdep is turned off. Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<0000000000381658>] __check_object_size+0x160/0x1d0 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oopsWith
CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPYcopy_to_user()checks in__check_object_size()if the source address is within the kernel image:-
__check_object_size()->check_kernel_text_object():/* Is this address range in the kernel text area? */ static inline const char *check_kernel_text_object(const void *ptr,
unsigned long n){ unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext; unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext; unsigned long textlow_linear, texthigh_linear; if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh)) return "<kernel text>";When the crash tool reads from
0x100000, this check leads to the kernelBUG()indrivers/char/mem.c:144 } else {
145 /*146 * On ia64 if a page has been mapped somewhere as 147 * uncached, then it must also be accessed uncached 148 * by the kernel or data corruption may occur. 149 */150 ptr =
xlate_dev_mem_ptr(p);
151 if (!ptr)
152 return-EFAULT;
153
154 remaining =copy_to_user(buf, ptr, sz); <<<---- BUG
155
156unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(p, ptr);
157 }Here the reporting function in
mm/usercopy.c:61 static void report_usercopy(const void *ptr, unsigned long len,
62 boolto_user, const char *type)
63 {
64 pr_emerg("kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %p (%s) (%lu bytes)\n",
65to_user? "exposure" : "overwrite",
66to_user? "from" : "to", ptr, type ? : "unknown", len);
67 /*68 * For greater effect, it would be nice to do do_group_exit(), 69 * but BUG() actually hooks all the lock-breaking and per-arch 70 * Oops code, so that is used here instead. 71 */
Quoted 5 lines
72
BUG();
73 }Shouldn't we skip the kernel address check for
/dev/mem- at least whenCONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEMis not enabled?
Some kind of better interaction is needed here, I agree. The prior discussions around this basically resulted in declaring that HARDENED_USERCOPY without STRICT_DEVMEM didn't make a lot of sense. i.e. HARDENED_USERCOPY should maybe require STRICT_DEVMEM, etc. Tycho wrote this up after some back-and-forth:
In the end, I was still uncomfortable with it because the usercopy protection is wider than just the kernel text, so it seemed strange to force it off when not using STRICT_DEVMEM.
What's the use-case here where you've got hardened usercopy without strict devmem? Normally I'd expect any system built with secure configurations to want strict devmem.
-Kees
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Pixel Security
Am Fri, 10 Nov 2017 10:46:49 -0800
schrieb Kees Cook <[email protected]>:
Quoted 106 lines
Quoted 92 lines · Michael Holzheu
Hello Kees,
When I try to run the crash tool on my s390 live system I get a kernel panic when reading memory within the kernel image:
# uname -a Linux r3545011 4.14.0-rc8-00066-g1c9dbd4615fd #45 SMP PREEMPT Fri Nov 10 16:16:22 CET 2017 s390x s390x s390x GNU/Linux # crash /boot/vmlinux-devel /dev/mem # crash> rd 0x100000usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from 0000000000100000 (<kernel text>) (8 bytes)
------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:72! illegal operation: 0001 ilc:1 [#1] PREEMPT SMP. Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1461 Comm: crash Not tainted 4.14.0-rc8-00066-g1c9dbd4615fd-dirty #46 Hardware name: IBM 2827 H66 706 (z/VM 6.3.0) task: 000000001ad10100 task.stack: 000000001df78000 Krnl PSW : 0704d00180000000 000000000038165c (__check_object_size+0x164/0x1d0) R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:1 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 Krnl GPRS: 0000000012440e1d 0000000080000000 0000000000000061 00000000001cabc0 00000000001cc6d6 0000000000000000 0000000000cc4ed2 0000000000001000 000003ffc22fdd20 0000000000000008 0000000000100008 0000000000000001 0000000000000008 0000000000100000 0000000000381658 000000001df7bc90 Krnl Code: 000000000038164c: c020004a1c4a larl %r2,cc4ee0 0000000000381652: c0e5fff2581b brasl %r14,1cc688 #0000000000381658: a7f40001 brc 15,38165a >000000000038165c: eb42000c000c srlg %r4,%r2,12 0000000000381662: eb32001c000c srlg %r3,%r2,28 0000000000381668: c0110003ffff lgfi %r1,262143 000000000038166e: ec31ff752065 clgrj %r3,%r1,2,381558 0000000000381674: a7f4ff67 brc 15,381542 Call Trace: ([<0000000000381658>] __check_object_size+0x160/0x1d0) [<000000000082263a>] read_mem+0xaa/0x130. [<0000000000386182>] __vfs_read+0x42/0x168. [<000000000038632e>] vfs_read+0x86/0x140. [<0000000000386a26>] SyS_read+0x66/0xc0. [<0000000000ace6a4>] system_call+0xc4/0x2b0. INFO: lockdep is turned off. Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<0000000000381658>] __check_object_size+0x160/0x1d0 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oopsWith
CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPYcopy_to_user()checks in__check_object_size()if the source address is within the kernel image:-
__check_object_size()->check_kernel_text_object():/* Is this address range in the kernel text area? */ static inline const char *check_kernel_text_object(const void *ptr,
unsigned long n){ unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext; unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext; unsigned long textlow_linear, texthigh_linear; if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh)) return "<kernel text>";When the crash tool reads from
0x100000, this check leads to the kernelBUG()indrivers/char/mem.c:144 } else {
145 /*146 * On ia64 if a page has been mapped somewhere as 147 * uncached, then it must also be accessed uncached 148 * by the kernel or data corruption may occur. 149 */150 ptr =
xlate_dev_mem_ptr(p);
151 if (!ptr)
152 return-EFAULT;
153
154 remaining =copy_to_user(buf, ptr, sz); <<<---- BUG
155
156unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(p, ptr);
157 }Here the reporting function in
mm/usercopy.c:61 static void report_usercopy(const void *ptr, unsigned long len,
62 boolto_user, const char *type)
63 {
64 pr_emerg("kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %p (%s) (%lu bytes)\n",
65to_user? "exposure" : "overwrite",
66to_user? "from" : "to", ptr, type ? : "unknown", len);
67 /*68 * For greater effect, it would be nice to do do_group_exit(), 69 * but BUG() actually hooks all the lock-breaking and per-arch 70 * Oops code, so that is used here instead. 71 */Quoted 5 lines
72
BUG();
73 }Shouldn't we skip the kernel address check for
/dev/mem- at least whenCONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEMis not enabled?Some kind of better interaction is needed here, I agree. The prior discussions around this basically resulted in declaring that
HARDENED_USERCOPYwithoutSTRICT_DEVMEMdidn't make a lot of sense. i.e.HARDENED_USERCOPYshould maybe requireSTRICT_DEVMEM, etc. Tycho wrote this up after some back-and-forth:
Quoted 8 lines
In the end, I was still uncomfortable with it because the usercopy protection is wider than just the kernel text, so it seemed strange to force it off when not using
STRICT_DEVMEM.What's the use-case here where you've got hardened usercopy without strict devmem?
We use that configuration for development and test. We disabled STRICT_DEVMEM for debugging the live system with crash. We enabled HARDENED_USERCOPY for finding user-copy bugs.
Michael
Am Mon, 13 Nov 2017 11:19:38 +0100
schrieb Michael Holzheu <[email protected]>:
Quoted 115 lines
Am Fri, 10 Nov 2017 10:46:49 -0800
schrieb Kees Cook <[email protected]>:Quoted 112 lines
Quoted 92 lines · Michael Holzheu
Hello Kees,
When I try to run the crash tool on my s390 live system I get a kernel panic when reading memory within the kernel image:
# uname -a Linux r3545011 4.14.0-rc8-00066-g1c9dbd4615fd #45 SMP PREEMPT Fri Nov 10 16:16:22 CET 2017 s390x s390x s390x GNU/Linux # crash /boot/vmlinux-devel /dev/mem # crash> rd 0x100000usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from 0000000000100000 (<kernel text>) (8 bytes)
------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:72! illegal operation: 0001 ilc:1 [#1] PREEMPT SMP. Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1461 Comm: crash Not tainted 4.14.0-rc8-00066-g1c9dbd4615fd-dirty #46 Hardware name: IBM 2827 H66 706 (z/VM 6.3.0) task: 000000001ad10100 task.stack: 000000001df78000 Krnl PSW : 0704d00180000000 000000000038165c (__check_object_size+0x164/0x1d0) R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:1 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 Krnl GPRS: 0000000012440e1d 0000000080000000 0000000000000061 00000000001cabc0 00000000001cc6d6 0000000000000000 0000000000cc4ed2 0000000000001000 000003ffc22fdd20 0000000000000008 0000000000100008 0000000000000001 0000000000000008 0000000000100000 0000000000381658 000000001df7bc90 Krnl Code: 000000000038164c: c020004a1c4a larl %r2,cc4ee0 0000000000381652: c0e5fff2581b brasl %r14,1cc688 #0000000000381658: a7f40001 brc 15,38165a >000000000038165c: eb42000c000c srlg %r4,%r2,12 0000000000381662: eb32001c000c srlg %r3,%r2,28 0000000000381668: c0110003ffff lgfi %r1,262143 000000000038166e: ec31ff752065 clgrj %r3,%r1,2,381558 0000000000381674: a7f4ff67 brc 15,381542 Call Trace: ([<0000000000381658>] __check_object_size+0x160/0x1d0) [<000000000082263a>] read_mem+0xaa/0x130. [<0000000000386182>] __vfs_read+0x42/0x168. [<000000000038632e>] vfs_read+0x86/0x140. [<0000000000386a26>] SyS_read+0x66/0xc0. [<0000000000ace6a4>] system_call+0xc4/0x2b0. INFO: lockdep is turned off. Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<0000000000381658>] __check_object_size+0x160/0x1d0 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oopsWith
CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPYcopy_to_user()checks in__check_object_size()if the source address is within the kernel image:-
__check_object_size()->check_kernel_text_object():/* Is this address range in the kernel text area? */ static inline const char *check_kernel_text_object(const void *ptr,
unsigned long n){ unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext; unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext; unsigned long textlow_linear, texthigh_linear; if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh)) return "<kernel text>";When the crash tool reads from
0x100000, this check leads to the kernelBUG()indrivers/char/mem.c:144 } else {
145 /*146 * On ia64 if a page has been mapped somewhere as 147 * uncached, then it must also be accessed uncached 148 * by the kernel or data corruption may occur. 149 */150 ptr =
xlate_dev_mem_ptr(p);
151 if (!ptr)
152 return-EFAULT;
153
154 remaining =copy_to_user(buf, ptr, sz); <<<---- BUG
155
156unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(p, ptr);
157 }Here the reporting function in
mm/usercopy.c:61 static void report_usercopy(const void *ptr, unsigned long len,
62 boolto_user, const char *type)
63 {
64 pr_emerg("kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %p (%s) (%lu bytes)\n",
65to_user? "exposure" : "overwrite",
66to_user? "from" : "to", ptr, type ? : "unknown", len);
67 /*68 * For greater effect, it would be nice to do do_group_exit(), 69 * but BUG() actually hooks all the lock-breaking and per-arch 70 * Oops code, so that is used here instead. 71 */Quoted 5 lines
72
BUG();
73 }Shouldn't we skip the kernel address check for
/dev/mem- at least whenCONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEMis not enabled?Some kind of better interaction is needed here, I agree. The prior discussions around this basically resulted in declaring that
HARDENED_USERCOPYwithoutSTRICT_DEVMEMdidn't make a lot of sense. i.e.HARDENED_USERCOPYshould maybe requireSTRICT_DEVMEM, etc. Tycho wrote this up after some back-and-forth:In the end, I was still uncomfortable with it because the usercopy protection is wider than just the kernel text, so it seemed strange to force it off when not using
STRICT_DEVMEM.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
What's the use-case here where you've got hardened usercopy without strict devmem?
We use that configuration for development and test. We disabled
STRICT_DEVMEMfor debugging the live system with crash. We enabledHARDENED_USERCOPYfor finding user-copy bugs.
So what's your plan now? How will you fix this issue?
Michael
Quoted 118 lines · Michael Holzheu
Am Mon, 13 Nov 2017 11:19:38 +0100
schrieb Michael Holzheu <[email protected]>:Quoted 115 lines
Am Fri, 10 Nov 2017 10:46:49 -0800
schrieb Kees Cook <[email protected]>:Quoted 112 lines
Quoted 92 lines · Michael Holzheu
Hello Kees,
When I try to run the crash tool on my s390 live system I get a kernel panic when reading memory within the kernel image:
# uname -a Linux r3545011 4.14.0-rc8-00066-g1c9dbd4615fd #45 SMP PREEMPT Fri Nov 10 16:16:22 CET 2017 s390x s390x s390x GNU/Linux # crash /boot/vmlinux-devel /dev/mem # crash> rd 0x100000usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from 0000000000100000 (<kernel text>) (8 bytes)
------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:72! illegal operation: 0001 ilc:1 [#1] PREEMPT SMP. Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1461 Comm: crash Not tainted 4.14.0-rc8-00066-g1c9dbd4615fd-dirty #46 Hardware name: IBM 2827 H66 706 (z/VM 6.3.0) task: 000000001ad10100 task.stack: 000000001df78000 Krnl PSW : 0704d00180000000 000000000038165c (__check_object_size+0x164/0x1d0) R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:1 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 Krnl GPRS: 0000000012440e1d 0000000080000000 0000000000000061 00000000001cabc0 00000000001cc6d6 0000000000000000 0000000000cc4ed2 0000000000001000 000003ffc22fdd20 0000000000000008 0000000000100008 0000000000000001 0000000000000008 0000000000100000 0000000000381658 000000001df7bc90 Krnl Code: 000000000038164c: c020004a1c4a larl %r2,cc4ee0 0000000000381652: c0e5fff2581b brasl %r14,1cc688 #0000000000381658: a7f40001 brc 15,38165a >000000000038165c: eb42000c000c srlg %r4,%r2,12 0000000000381662: eb32001c000c srlg %r3,%r2,28 0000000000381668: c0110003ffff lgfi %r1,262143 000000000038166e: ec31ff752065 clgrj %r3,%r1,2,381558 0000000000381674: a7f4ff67 brc 15,381542 Call Trace: ([<0000000000381658>] __check_object_size+0x160/0x1d0) [<000000000082263a>] read_mem+0xaa/0x130. [<0000000000386182>] __vfs_read+0x42/0x168. [<000000000038632e>] vfs_read+0x86/0x140. [<0000000000386a26>] SyS_read+0x66/0xc0. [<0000000000ace6a4>] system_call+0xc4/0x2b0. INFO: lockdep is turned off. Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<0000000000381658>] __check_object_size+0x160/0x1d0 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oopsWith
CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPYcopy_to_user()checks in__check_object_size()if the source address is within the kernel image:-
__check_object_size()->check_kernel_text_object():/* Is this address range in the kernel text area? */ static inline const char *check_kernel_text_object(const void *ptr,
unsigned long n){ unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext; unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext; unsigned long textlow_linear, texthigh_linear; if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh)) return "<kernel text>";When the crash tool reads from
0x100000, this check leads to the kernelBUG()indrivers/char/mem.c:144 } else {
145 /*146 * On ia64 if a page has been mapped somewhere as 147 * uncached, then it must also be accessed uncached 148 * by the kernel or data corruption may occur. 149 */150 ptr =
xlate_dev_mem_ptr(p);
151 if (!ptr)
152 return-EFAULT;
153
154 remaining =copy_to_user(buf, ptr, sz); <<<---- BUG
155
156unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(p, ptr);
157 }Here the reporting function in
mm/usercopy.c:61 static void report_usercopy(const void *ptr, unsigned long len,
62 boolto_user, const char *type)
63 {
64 pr_emerg("kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %p (%s) (%lu bytes)\n",
65to_user? "exposure" : "overwrite",
66to_user? "from" : "to", ptr, type ? : "unknown", len);
67 /*68 * For greater effect, it would be nice to do do_group_exit(), 69 * but BUG() actually hooks all the lock-breaking and per-arch 70 * Oops code, so that is used here instead. 71 */Quoted 5 lines
72
BUG();
73 }Shouldn't we skip the kernel address check for
/dev/mem- at least whenCONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEMis not enabled?Some kind of better interaction is needed here, I agree. The prior discussions around this basically resulted in declaring that
HARDENED_USERCOPYwithoutSTRICT_DEVMEMdidn't make a lot of sense. i.e.HARDENED_USERCOPYshould maybe requireSTRICT_DEVMEM, etc. Tycho wrote this up after some back-and-forth:In the end, I was still uncomfortable with it because the usercopy protection is wider than just the kernel text, so it seemed strange to force it off when not using
STRICT_DEVMEM.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
What's the use-case here where you've got hardened usercopy without strict devmem?
We use that configuration for development and test. We disabled
STRICT_DEVMEMfor debugging the live system with crash. We enabledHARDENED_USERCOPYfor finding user-copy bugs.So what's your plan now? How will you fix this issue?
I think the best plan here would be to use the Kconfig "imply STRICT_DEVMEM" in HARDENED_USERCOPY. That would make STRICT_DEVMEM enabled by default but still configurable. Then the kernel-text check in hardened usercopy could be skip when !STRICT_DEVMEM.
My primary concern is with failing closed. If someone is only paying attention to choosing HARDENED_USERCOPY, it should not be possible to read out kernel memory unless they specifically try to unset something else (in this case, STRICT_DEVMEM).
How does that sound?
-Kees
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Pixel Security
Quoted 8 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 1 line · Michael Holzheu
So what's your plan now? How will you fix this issue?
I think the best plan here would be to use the
Kconfig"implySTRICT_DEVMEM" inHARDENED_USERCOPY. That would makeSTRICT_DEVMEMenabled by default but still configurable. Then the kernel-text check in hardened usercopy could be skip when !STRICT_DEVMEM.
Hmm, this doesn't work the way I was expecting...
security/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace" depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR select BUG + imply STRICT_DEVMEM help This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
$ make defconfig $ egrep '(DEVMEM|HARDENED_USERCOPY)\b' .config CONFIG_DEVMEM=y # CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM is not set # CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is not set $ ./scripts/config -e CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY $ egrep '(DEVMEM|HARDENED_USERCOPY)\b' .config CONFIG_DEVMEM=y # CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM is not set CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y
Maybe make STRICT_DEVMEM's default tie to HARDENED_USERCOPY? Bleh, this doesn't seem to work either:
lib/Kconfig.debug +1 -1
@@ -1985,7 +1985,7 @@ config STRICT_DEVMEM bool "Filter access to /dev/mem" depends on MMU && DEVMEM depends on ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED - default y if TILE || PPC + default y if TILE || PPC || HARDENED_USERCOPY ---help--- If this option is disabled, you allow userspace (root) access to all of memory, including kernel and userspace memory. Accidental
I'm open to suggestions...
-Kees
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Pixel Security
Am Wed, 22 Nov 2017 09:43:19 -0800
schrieb Kees Cook <[email protected]>:
Quoted 134 lines
Quoted 118 lines · Michael Holzheu
Am Mon, 13 Nov 2017 11:19:38 +0100
schrieb Michael Holzheu <[email protected]>:Quoted 115 lines
Am Fri, 10 Nov 2017 10:46:49 -0800
schrieb Kees Cook <[email protected]>:Quoted 112 lines
Quoted 92 lines · Michael Holzheu
Hello Kees,
When I try to run the crash tool on my s390 live system I get a kernel panic when reading memory within the kernel image:
# uname -a Linux r3545011 4.14.0-rc8-00066-g1c9dbd4615fd #45 SMP PREEMPT Fri Nov 10 16:16:22 CET 2017 s390x s390x s390x GNU/Linux # crash /boot/vmlinux-devel /dev/mem # crash> rd 0x100000usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from 0000000000100000 (<kernel text>) (8 bytes)
------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:72! illegal operation: 0001 ilc:1 [#1] PREEMPT SMP. Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1461 Comm: crash Not tainted 4.14.0-rc8-00066-g1c9dbd4615fd-dirty #46 Hardware name: IBM 2827 H66 706 (z/VM 6.3.0) task: 000000001ad10100 task.stack: 000000001df78000 Krnl PSW : 0704d00180000000 000000000038165c (__check_object_size+0x164/0x1d0) R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:1 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 Krnl GPRS: 0000000012440e1d 0000000080000000 0000000000000061 00000000001cabc0 00000000001cc6d6 0000000000000000 0000000000cc4ed2 0000000000001000 000003ffc22fdd20 0000000000000008 0000000000100008 0000000000000001 0000000000000008 0000000000100000 0000000000381658 000000001df7bc90 Krnl Code: 000000000038164c: c020004a1c4a larl %r2,cc4ee0 0000000000381652: c0e5fff2581b brasl %r14,1cc688 #0000000000381658: a7f40001 brc 15,38165a >000000000038165c: eb42000c000c srlg %r4,%r2,12 0000000000381662: eb32001c000c srlg %r3,%r2,28 0000000000381668: c0110003ffff lgfi %r1,262143 000000000038166e: ec31ff752065 clgrj %r3,%r1,2,381558 0000000000381674: a7f4ff67 brc 15,381542 Call Trace: ([<0000000000381658>] __check_object_size+0x160/0x1d0) [<000000000082263a>] read_mem+0xaa/0x130. [<0000000000386182>] __vfs_read+0x42/0x168. [<000000000038632e>] vfs_read+0x86/0x140. [<0000000000386a26>] SyS_read+0x66/0xc0. [<0000000000ace6a4>] system_call+0xc4/0x2b0. INFO: lockdep is turned off. Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<0000000000381658>] __check_object_size+0x160/0x1d0 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oopsWith
CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPYcopy_to_user()checks in__check_object_size()if the source address is within the kernel image:-
__check_object_size()->check_kernel_text_object():/* Is this address range in the kernel text area? */ static inline const char *check_kernel_text_object(const void *ptr,
unsigned long n){ unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext; unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext; unsigned long textlow_linear, texthigh_linear; if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh)) return "<kernel text>";When the crash tool reads from
0x100000, this check leads to the kernelBUG()indrivers/char/mem.c:144 } else {
145 /*146 * On ia64 if a page has been mapped somewhere as 147 * uncached, then it must also be accessed uncached 148 * by the kernel or data corruption may occur. 149 */150 ptr =
xlate_dev_mem_ptr(p);
151 if (!ptr)
152 return-EFAULT;
153
154 remaining =copy_to_user(buf, ptr, sz); <<<---- BUG
155
156unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(p, ptr);
157 }Here the reporting function in
mm/usercopy.c:61 static void report_usercopy(const void *ptr, unsigned long len,
62 boolto_user, const char *type)
63 {
64 pr_emerg("kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %p (%s) (%lu bytes)\n",
65to_user? "exposure" : "overwrite",
66to_user? "from" : "to", ptr, type ? : "unknown", len);
67 /*68 * For greater effect, it would be nice to do do_group_exit(), 69 * but BUG() actually hooks all the lock-breaking and per-arch 70 * Oops code, so that is used here instead. 71 */Quoted 5 lines
72
BUG();
73 }Shouldn't we skip the kernel address check for
/dev/mem- at least whenCONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEMis not enabled?Some kind of better interaction is needed here, I agree. The prior discussions around this basically resulted in declaring that
HARDENED_USERCOPYwithoutSTRICT_DEVMEMdidn't make a lot of sense. i.e.HARDENED_USERCOPYshould maybe requireSTRICT_DEVMEM, etc. Tycho wrote this up after some back-and-forth:In the end, I was still uncomfortable with it because the usercopy protection is wider than just the kernel text, so it seemed strange to force it off when not using
STRICT_DEVMEM.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
What's the use-case here where you've got hardened usercopy without strict devmem?
We use that configuration for development and test. We disabled
STRICT_DEVMEMfor debugging the live system with crash. We enabledHARDENED_USERCOPYfor finding user-copy bugs.So what's your plan now? How will you fix this issue?
I think the best plan here would be to use the
Kconfig"implySTRICT_DEVMEM" inHARDENED_USERCOPY. That would makeSTRICT_DEVMEMenabled by default but still configurable. Then the kernel-text check in hardened usercopy could be skip when !STRICT_DEVMEM.
Quoted 6 lines
My primary concern is with failing closed. If someone is only paying attention to choosing
HARDENED_USERCOPY, it should not be possible to read out kernel memory unless they specifically try to unset something else (in this case,STRICT_DEVMEM).How does that sound?
Looks ok to me.
Michael