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ptrace versus setuid changes in 4.14?

DISCUSSION Tom Horsley 3 participants 4 messages Dec 21, 2017 – Dec 22, 2017

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On my fedora 26 box with a 4.13 kernel, when a process under ptrace control did an exec of a setuid program, the program lost all of its setuid privileges and ptrace could operate on it like a normal program.

Experimental evidence seems to indicate that on fedora 27 with a 4.14 kernel, ptrace cannot do a PEEKDATA to read anything from the just execed setuid program. (I get errno 5 - I/O error).

Am I confused somehow, or did something really change in this vicinity?

It puts a real crimp in my fancy debug feature to patch code into a setuid program to make it re-exec itself, then detach from it. (I don't suppose we could get a setoptions feature to tell the kernel to detach from setuid programs automagically and let the debugger know it is no longer in control of the process?)

Acked-by Serge Hallyn Reviewed-by James Morris
#1 lore raw
Quoted 13 lines · Tom Horsley

On my fedora 26 box with a 4.13 kernel, when a process under ptrace control did an exec of a setuid program, the program lost all of its setuid privileges and ptrace could operate on it like a normal program.

Experimental evidence seems to indicate that on fedora 27 with a 4.14 kernel, ptrace cannot do a PEEKDATA to read anything from the just execed setuid program. (I get errno 5 - I/O error).

Am I confused somehow, or did something really change in this vicinity?

Quoted 7 lines

It puts a real crimp in my fancy debug feature to patch code into a setuid program to make it re-exec itself, then detach from it. (I don't suppose we could get a setoptions feature to tell the kernel to detach from setuid programs automagically and let the debugger know it is no longer in control of the process?)

Assuming this is https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1528633
This is yet another victim of

commit e37fdb785a5f95ecadf43b773c97f676500ac7b8 (refs/bisect/bad)

Author: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Date:   Tue Jul 18 15:25:31 2017 -0700

exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability

The examination of "current" to decide dumpability is wrong. This was a check of and euid/uid (or egid/gid) mismatch in the existing process, not the newly created one. This appears to stretch back into even the "history.git" tree. Luckily, dumpability is later set in commit_creds(). In earlier kernel versions before creds existed, similar checks also existed late in the exec flow, covering up the mistake as far back as I could find.

Note that because the commit_creds() check examines differences of euid, uid, egid, gid, and capabilities between the old and new creds, it would look like the setup_new_exec() dumpability test could be entirely removed. However, the secureexec test may cover a different set of tests (specific to the LSMs) than what commit_creds() checks for. So, fix this test to use secureexec (the removed euid tests are redundant to the commoncap secureexec checks now).

Is it time to think about reverting?

Thanks,
Laura

#2 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · On Fri, 22 Dec 2017 12:28:25 -0800 Laura Abbott wrote:

Assuming this is https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1528633
This is yet another victim of

commit e37fdb785a5f95ecadf43b773c97f676500ac7b8 (refs/bisect/bad)

Author: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Date:   Tue Jul 18 15:25:31 2017 -0700

exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability

You mean there is hope this really is a bug and not a security enhancement? Amazing :-).

And yes, that is the bugzilla I submitted after I reduced things to a small test program.

#3 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Tom Horsley
Quoted 7 lines · On Fri, 22 Dec 2017 12:28:25 -0800 Laura Abbott wrote:

Assuming this is https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1528633
This is yet another victim of

commit e37fdb785a5f95ecadf43b773c97f676500ac7b8 (refs/bisect/bad)

Author: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Date:   Tue Jul 18 15:25:31 2017 -0700
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability

You mean there is hope this really is a bug and not a security enhancement? Amazing :-).

And yes, that is the bugzilla I submitted after I reduced things to a small test program.

I think the secureexec dumpability logic just needs to be removed -- the logic in commit_creds() _should_ be sufficient, but I want to double-check it now that I've got some more tests cases.

-Kees

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Kees Cook
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