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objtool: retpoline validation

PATCH Superseded Peter Zijlstra 4 participants 24 messages Feb 1, 2018 – Feb 6, 2018

Subsystems (6)
x86 Kbuild x86 MM objtool +2 more subsystems

v1 of 2 Superseded Latest is v2 →

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Peter Zijlstra

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

cover objtool: retpoline validation

There are the retpoline validation patches; they work with the __noretpoline thing from David.

author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/7 objtool: Use existing global variables for options

Use the existing global variables instead of passing them around and creating duplicate global variables.

---
 tools/objtool/builtin-check.c |    2 +-
 tools/objtool/builtin-orc.c   |    6 +-----
 tools/objtool/builtin.h       |    5 +++++
 tools/objtool/check.c         |    5 ++---
 tools/objtool/check.h         |    2 +-
 5 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
tools/objtool/builtin-check.c +1 -1
@@ -53,5 +53,5 @@ int cmd_check(int argc, const char **arg
 
 	objname = argv[0];
 
-	return check(objname, no_fp, no_unreachable, false);
+	return check(objname, false);
 }
tools/objtool/builtin-orc.c +1 -5
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
  */
 
 #include <string.h>
-#include <subcmd/parse-options.h>
 #include "builtin.h"
 #include "check.h"
 
@@ -36,9 +35,6 @@ static const char *orc_usage[] = {
 	NULL,
 };
 
-extern const struct option check_options[];
-extern bool no_fp, no_unreachable;
-
 int cmd_orc(int argc, const char **argv)
 {
 	const char *objname;
@@ -54,7 +50,7 @@ int cmd_orc(int argc, const char **argv)
 
 		objname = argv[0];
 
-		return check(objname, no_fp, no_unreachable, true);
+		return check(objname, true);
 	}
 
 	if (!strcmp(argv[0], "dump")) {
tools/objtool/builtin.h +5 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,11 @@
 #ifndef _BUILTIN_H
 #define _BUILTIN_H
 
+#include <subcmd/parse-options.h>
+
+extern const struct option check_options[];
+extern bool no_fp, no_unreachable;
+
 extern int cmd_check(int argc, const char **argv);
 extern int cmd_orc(int argc, const char **argv);
 
tools/objtool/check.c +2 -3
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 
+#include "builtin.h"
 #include "check.h"
 #include "elf.h"
 #include "special.h"
@@ -33,7 +34,6 @@ struct alternative {
 };
 
 const char *objname;
-static bool no_fp;
 struct cfi_state initial_func_cfi;
 
 struct instruction *find_insn(struct objtool_file *file,
@@ -1978,13 +1978,12 @@ static void cleanup(struct objtool_file
 	elf_close(file->elf);
 }
 
-int check(const char *_objname, bool _no_fp, bool no_unreachable, bool orc)
+int check(const char *_objname, bool orc)
 {
 	struct objtool_file file;
 	int ret, warnings = 0;
 
 	objname = _objname;
-	no_fp = _no_fp;
 
 	file.elf = elf_open(objname, orc ? O_RDWR : O_RDONLY);
 	if (!file.elf)
tools/objtool/check.h +1 -1
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ struct objtool_file {
 	bool ignore_unreachables, c_file, hints;
 };
 
-int check(const char *objname, bool no_fp, bool no_unreachable, bool orc);
+int check(const char *objname, bool orc);
 
 struct instruction *find_insn(struct objtool_file *file,
 			      struct section *sec, unsigned long offset);
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/7 objtool: Add retpoline validation

In reply to Peter Zijlstra

David requested a objtool validation pass for RETPOLINE enabled builds, where it validates no unannotated indirect jumps or calls are left.

Add an additional .discard.retpoline_safe section to allow annotating the few indirect sites that are required and safe.

---
 scripts/Makefile.build        |    4 +
 tools/objtool/builtin-check.c |    3 -
 tools/objtool/builtin.h       |    2 
 tools/objtool/check.c         |   86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 tools/objtool/check.h         |    1 
 5 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
scripts/Makefile.build +4 -0
@@ -269,6 +269,10 @@ objtool_args += --no-unreachable
 else
 objtool_args += $(call cc-ifversion, -lt, 0405, --no-unreachable)
 endif
+ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+  objtool_args += --retpoline
+endif
+
 
 ifdef CONFIG_MODVERSIONS
 objtool_o = $(@D)/.tmp_$(@F)
tools/objtool/builtin-check.c +2 -1
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
 #include "builtin.h"
 #include "check.h"
 
-bool no_fp, no_unreachable;
+bool no_fp, no_unreachable, retpoline;
 
 static const char * const check_usage[] = {
 	"objtool check [<options>] file.o",
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ static const char * const check_usage[]
 const struct option check_options[] = {
 	OPT_BOOLEAN('f', "no-fp", &no_fp, "Skip frame pointer validation"),
 	OPT_BOOLEAN('u', "no-unreachable", &no_unreachable, "Skip 'unreachable instruction' warnings"),
+	OPT_BOOLEAN('r', "retpoline", &retpoline, "Validate retpoline assumptions"),
 	OPT_END(),
 };
 
tools/objtool/builtin.h +1 -1
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 #include <subcmd/parse-options.h>
 
 extern const struct option check_options[];
-extern bool no_fp, no_unreachable;
+extern bool no_fp, no_unreachable, retpoline;
 
 extern int cmd_check(int argc, const char **argv);
 extern int cmd_orc(int argc, const char **argv);
tools/objtool/check.c +85 -1

122 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/objtool/check.h +1 -0
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ struct instruction {
 	unsigned char type;
 	unsigned long immediate;
 	bool alt_group, visited, dead_end, ignore, hint, save, restore, ignore_alts;
+	bool retpoline_safe;
 	struct symbol *call_dest;
 	struct instruction *jump_dest;
 	struct list_head alts;
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/7 objtool: Add module specific retpoline rules

In reply to Peter Zijlstra

David wanted to not use retpolines in .init.text but that will trip up objtool retpoline validation, fix that.

---
 scripts/Makefile.build        |    2 ++
 tools/objtool/builtin-check.c |    3 ++-
 tools/objtool/builtin.h       |    2 +-
 tools/objtool/check.c         |    9 +++++++++
 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
scripts/Makefile.build +2 -0
@@ -256,6 +256,8 @@ __objtool_obj := $(objtree)/tools/objtoo
 
 objtool_args = $(if $(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC),orc generate,check)
 
+objtool_args += $(if $(part-of-module), --module,)
+
 ifndef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
 objtool_args += --no-fp
 endif
tools/objtool/builtin-check.c +2 -1
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
 #include "builtin.h"
 #include "check.h"
 
-bool no_fp, no_unreachable, retpoline;
+bool no_fp, no_unreachable, retpoline, module;
 
 static const char * const check_usage[] = {
 	"objtool check [<options>] file.o",
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ const struct option check_options[] = {
 	OPT_BOOLEAN('f', "no-fp", &no_fp, "Skip frame pointer validation"),
 	OPT_BOOLEAN('u', "no-unreachable", &no_unreachable, "Skip 'unreachable instruction' warnings"),
 	OPT_BOOLEAN('r', "retpoline", &retpoline, "Validate retpoline assumptions"),
+	OPT_BOOLEAN('m', "module", &module, "Indicates the object will be part of a kernel module"),
 	OPT_END(),
 };
 
tools/objtool/builtin.h +1 -1
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 #include <subcmd/parse-options.h>
 
 extern const struct option check_options[];
-extern bool no_fp, no_unreachable, retpoline;
+extern bool no_fp, no_unreachable, retpoline, module;
 
 extern int cmd_check(int argc, const char **argv);
 extern int cmd_orc(int argc, const char **argv);
tools/objtool/check.c +9 -0
@@ -1920,6 +1920,15 @@ static int validate_retpoline(struct obj
 		if (insn->retpoline_safe)
 			continue;
 
+		/*
+		 * .init.text code is ran before userspace and thus doesn't
+		 * strictly need retpolines, except for modules which are
+		 * loaded late, they very much do need retpoline in their
+		 * .init.text
+		 */
+		if (!strcmp(insn->sec->name, ".init.text") && !module)
+			continue;
+
 		WARN_FUNC("indirect %s found in RETPOLINE build",
 			  insn->sec, insn->offset,
 			  insn->type == INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC ? "jump" : "call");
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/7 x86,nospec: Annotate indirect calls/jumps

In reply to Peter Zijlstra

Annotate the indirect calls/jumps in the CALL_NOSPEC/JUMP_NOSPEC alternatives.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |   27 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +23 -4
@@ -67,6 +67,18 @@
 .endm
 
 /*
+ * This should be used immediately before an indirect jump/call. It tells
+ * objtool the subsequent indirect jump/call is vouched safe for retpoline
+ * builds.
+ */
+.macro ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
+	.Lannotate_\@:
+	.pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe
+	_ASM_PTR .Lannotate_\@
+	.popsection
+.endm
+
+/*
  * These are the bare retpoline primitives for indirect jmp and call.
  * Do not use these directly; they only exist to make the ALTERNATIVE
  * invocation below less ugly.
@@ -102,9 +114,9 @@
 .macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
 	ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
-	ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(jmp *\reg),				\
+	ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg),	\
 		__stringify(RETPOLINE_JMP \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,	\
-		__stringify(lfence; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
+		__stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
 #else
 	jmp	*\reg
 #endif
@@ -113,9 +125,9 @@
 .macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req
 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
 	ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
-	ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(call *\reg),				\
+	ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg),	\
 		__stringify(RETPOLINE_CALL \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,\
-		__stringify(lfence; call *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
+		__stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
 #else
 	call	*\reg
 #endif
@@ -143,6 +155,12 @@
 	".long 999b - .\n\t"					\
 	".popsection\n\t"
 
+#define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE					\
+	"999:\n\t"						\
+	".pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe\n\t"		\
+	_ASM_PTR " 999b\n\t"					\
+	".popsection\n\t"
+
 #if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(RETPOLINE)
 
 /*
@@ -152,6 +170,7 @@
 # define CALL_NOSPEC						\
 	ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE				\
 	ALTERNATIVE(						\
+	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE					\
 	"call *%[thunk_target]\n",				\
 	"call __x86_indirect_thunk_%V[thunk_target]\n",		\
 	X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4/7] x86,nospec: Annotate indirect calls/jumps

Quoted 8 lines · Peter Zijlstra

  * These are the bare retpoline primitives for indirect jmp and call.
  * Do not use these directly; they only exist to make the ALTERNATIVE
  * invocation below less ugly.

(quoted diff) +0 -0
@@ -102,9 +114,9 @@

 .macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
        ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE

Quoted 8 lines

-       ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(jmp *\reg),                           \
+       ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg),  \
                __stringify(RETPOLINE_JMP \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
-               __stringify(lfence; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
+               __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD #else
        jmp     *\reg
 #endif

The first one, yes. But the second one for the AMD retpoline is redundant, isn't it? Objtool isn't going to look there.

author maintainer
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4/7] x86,nospec: Annotate indirect calls/jumps

Quoted 14 lines · David Woodhouse
Quoted 11 lines · Peter Zijlstra

  * These are the bare retpoline primitives for indirect jmp and call.
  * Do not use these directly; they only exist to make the ALTERNATIVE
  * invocation below less ugly.

(quoted diff) +0 -0
@@ -102,9 +114,9 @@

 .macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
        ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
-       ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(jmp *\reg),                           \
+       ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg),  \
                __stringify(RETPOLINE_JMP \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

-               __stringify(lfence; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
+               __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD #else
        jmp     *\reg
 #endif

The first one, yes. But the second one for the AMD retpoline is redundant, isn't it? Objtool isn't going to look there.

It was when I wrote it.. lemme try again.

author maintainer
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4/7] x86,nospec: Annotate indirect calls/jumps

Quoted 24 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 14 lines · David Woodhouse
Quoted 11 lines · Peter Zijlstra

  * These are the bare retpoline primitives for indirect jmp and call.
  * Do not use these directly; they only exist to make the ALTERNATIVE
  * invocation below less ugly.

(quoted diff) +0 -0
@@ -102,9 +114,9 @@

 .macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
        ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
-       ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(jmp *\reg),                           \
+       ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg),  \
                __stringify(RETPOLINE_JMP \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

-               __stringify(lfence; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
+               __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD #else
        jmp     *\reg
 #endif

The first one, yes. But the second one for the AMD retpoline is redundant, isn't it? Objtool isn't going to look there.

Quoted 1 line

It was when I wrote it.. lemme try again.

Insta complaint:

arch/x86/entry/.tmp_entry_64.o: warning: objtool: .altinstr_replacement+0x19: indirect jump found in RETPOLINE build

#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4/7] x86,nospec: Annotate indirect calls/jumps

Quoted 25 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 24 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 22 lines · David Woodhouse
Quoted 8 lines · Peter Zijlstra

  * These are the bare retpoline primitives for indirect jmp and call.
  * Do not use these directly; they only exist to make the ALTERNATIVE
  * invocation below less ugly.

(quoted diff) +0 -0
@@ -102,9 +114,9 @@

 .macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
        ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE

Quoted 8 lines

-       ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(jmp *\reg),                           \
+       ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg),  \
                __stringify(RETPOLINE_JMP \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
-               __stringify(lfence; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
+               __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD #else
        jmp     *\reg
 #endif

The first one, yes. But the second one for the AMD retpoline is redundant, isn't it? Objtool isn't going to look there.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line

It was when I wrote it.. lemme try again.

Insta complaint:

arch/x86/entry/.tmp_entry_64.o: warning: objtool: .altinstr_replacement+0x19: indirect jump found in RETPOLINE build

Right, objtool was recently made smarter, such that it actually decodes the ignored alternatives. The check for that warning needs to also check that insn->ignore isn't set.

Signature · 1 line
Josh
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4/7] x86,nospec: Annotate indirect calls/jumps

Quoted 6 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 1 line · Peter Zijlstra

arch/x86/entry/.tmp_entry_64.o: warning: objtool: .altinstr_replacement+0x19: indirect jump found in RETPOLINE build

Right, objtool was recently made smarter, such that it actually decodes the ignored alternatives.

I think it always did, you just ignored the alternatives for the code flow stuff.

Quoted 2 lines

The check for that warning needs to also check that insn->ignore isn't set.

So I tried to keep the two annotations independent, thinking the code flow ignore would eventually go away when we got smarter about it. It even has a comment about that:

/*
* FIXME: For now, just ignore any alternatives which add retpolines. This is
* a temporary hack, as it doesn't allow ORC to unwind from inside a retpoline.
* But it at least allows objtool to understand the control flow *around* the
* retpoline.
*/

So I'm not seeing how making retpoline_safe depend on nospec_ignores is a good thing.

author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 5/7 x86/paravirt: Annotate indirect calls

In reply to Peter Zijlstra

Paravirt emits indirect calls which get flagged by objtool retpoline checks, annotate it away because all these indirect calls will be patched out before we start userspace.

This patching happens through alternative_instructions() -> apply_paravirt() -> pv_init_ops.patch() which will eventually end up in paravirt_patch_default(). This function _will_ write direct alternatives.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h       |   17 +++++++++++++----
 arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h |    5 ++++-
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h +13 -4
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
 #include <asm/pgtable_types.h>
 #include <asm/asm.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 #include <asm/paravirt_types.h>
 
@@ -879,23 +880,27 @@ extern void default_banner(void);
 
 #define INTERRUPT_RETURN						\
 	PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops, PV_CPU_iret), CLBR_NONE,	\
-		  jmp PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_iret))
+		  ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE;					\
+		  jmp PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_iret);)
 
 #define DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(clobbers)					\
 	PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_irq_ops, PV_IRQ_irq_disable), clobbers, \
 		  PV_SAVE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE);		\
+		  ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE;					\
 		  call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_irq_ops+PV_IRQ_irq_disable);	\
 		  PV_RESTORE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE);)
 
 #define ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(clobbers)					\
 	PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_irq_ops, PV_IRQ_irq_enable), clobbers,	\
 		  PV_SAVE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE);		\
+		  ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE;					\
 		  call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_irq_ops+PV_IRQ_irq_enable);	\
 		  PV_RESTORE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE);)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
 #define GET_CR0_INTO_EAX				\
 	push %ecx; push %edx;				\
+	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE;				\
 	call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_read_cr0);	\
 	pop %edx; pop %ecx
 #else	/* !CONFIG_X86_32 */
@@ -917,21 +922,25 @@ extern void default_banner(void);
  */
 #define SWAPGS								\
 	PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops, PV_CPU_swapgs), CLBR_NONE,	\
-		  call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_swapgs)		\
+		  ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE;					\
+		  call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_swapgs);		\
 		 )
 
 #define GET_CR2_INTO_RAX				\
-	call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_mmu_ops+PV_MMU_read_cr2)
+	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE;				\
+	call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_mmu_ops+PV_MMU_read_cr2);
 
 #define USERGS_SYSRET64							\
 	PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops, PV_CPU_usergs_sysret64),	\
 		  CLBR_NONE,						\
-		  jmp PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_usergs_sysret64))
+		  ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE;					\
+		  jmp PARA_INDIRECT(pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_usergs_sysret64);)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY
 #define SAVE_FLAGS(clobbers)                                        \
 	PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_irq_ops, PV_IRQ_save_fl), clobbers, \
 		  PV_SAVE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE);        \
+		  ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE;				    \
 		  call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_irq_ops+PV_IRQ_save_fl);    \
 		  PV_RESTORE_REGS(clobbers | CLBR_CALLEE_SAVE);)
 #endif
arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h +4 -1
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
 #include <asm/desc_defs.h>
 #include <asm/kmap_types.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable_types.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 struct page;
 struct thread_struct;
@@ -392,7 +393,9 @@ int paravirt_disable_iospace(void);
  * offset into the paravirt_patch_template structure, and can therefore be
  * freely converted back into a structure offset.
  */
-#define PARAVIRT_CALL	"call *%c[paravirt_opptr];"
+#define PARAVIRT_CALL					\
+	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE				\
+	"call *%c[paravirt_opptr];"
 
 /*
  * These macros are intended to wrap calls through one of the paravirt
author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH 6/7 x86: Annotate indirect jump in head_64.S

In reply to Peter Zijlstra

The objtool retpoline validation found this indirect jump. Seeing how it's on CPU bringup before we run userspace it should be safe, annotate it.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +2 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <asm/nops.h>
 #include "../entry/calling.h"
 #include <asm/export.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
 #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
@@ -134,6 +135,7 @@ ENTRY(secondary_startup_64)
 
 	/* Ensure I am executing from virtual addresses */
 	movq	$1f, %rax
+	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
 	jmp	*%rax
 1:
 	UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH 7/7 x86,sme: Annotate indirect call

In reply to Peter Zijlstra

This is boot code, we run this _way_ before userspace comes along to poison our branch predictor.

Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S +2 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <asm/page.h>
 #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
 #include <asm/msr-index.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 	.text
 	.code64
@@ -59,6 +60,7 @@ ENTRY(sme_encrypt_execute)
 	movq	%rax, %r8		/* Workarea encryption routine */
 	addq	$PAGE_SIZE, %r8		/* Workarea intermediate copy buffer */
 
+	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
 	call	*%rax			/* Call the encryption routine */
 
 	pop	%r12
#13 lore raw
In reply to Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 2 lines · Peter Zijlstra

There are the retpoline validation patches; they work with the __noretpoline thing from David.

Have you run this through 0-day bot yet? A manual awk/sed found another one, which objtool confirms:

drivers/watchdog/.tmp_hpwdt.o: warning: objtool: .text+0x24: indirect call found in RETPOLINE build

And my search wasn't exhaustive so it would be good to sic 0-day bot on it.

Signature · 1 line
Josh
#14 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 4 lines · Peter Zijlstra

There are the retpoline validation patches; they work with the __noretpoline
thing from David.

Have you run this through 0-day bot yet?  A manual awk/sed found another
one, which objtool confirms:

Quoted 5 lines

  drivers/watchdog/.tmp_hpwdt.o: warning: objtool: .text+0x24:
indirect call found in RETPOLINE build

And my search wasn't exhaustive so it would be good to sic 0-day bot on it.

We discussed that one. It's correct; we're calling into firmware so there's *no* point in retpolining that one. We need to set IBRS before any runtime calls into firmware, if we want to be safe.

author maintainer
#15 lore raw
Quoted 13 lines · David Woodhouse
Quoted 12 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 4 lines · Peter Zijlstra

There are the retpoline validation patches; they work with the __noretpoline
thing from David.

Have you run this through 0-day bot yet?  A manual awk/sed found another
one, which objtool confirms:

  drivers/watchdog/.tmp_hpwdt.o: warning: objtool: .text+0x24:
indirect call found in RETPOLINE build

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

And my search wasn't exhaustive so it would be good to sic 0-day bot on it.

We discussed that one. It's correct; we're calling into firmware so there's *no* point in retpolining that one. We need to set IBRS before any runtime calls into firmware, if we want to be safe.

Ideally we'd have a way to mark the module 'unsafe' or something.

#16 lore raw
Quoted 17 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 16 lines · David Woodhouse
Quoted 14 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 5 lines · Peter Zijlstra

There are the retpoline validation patches; they work with the __noretpoline
thing from David.

Have you run this through 0-day bot yet?  A manual awk/sed found another
one, which objtool confirms:

  drivers/watchdog/.tmp_hpwdt.o: warning: objtool: .text+0x24:
indirect call found in RETPOLINE build

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines

And my search wasn't exhaustive so it would be good to sic 0-day bot on it.

We discussed that one. It's correct; we're calling into firmware so there's *no* point in retpolining that one. We need to set IBRS before any runtime calls into firmware, if we want to be safe.

Ideally we'd have a way to mark the module 'unsafe' or something.

No, we just need to set IBRS before doing it. The same applies to any EFI runtime calls, APM and all kinds of other random crap that calls into firmware. I'm not sure why those aren't showing up.

author maintainer
#17 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines · David Woodhouse
Quoted 1 line

Ideally we'd have a way to mark the module 'unsafe' or something.

No, we just need to set IBRS before doing it.

That would work, assuming IBRS is available to begin with of course. Do we WARN if we hit this code and don't have IBRS available?

Quoted 3 lines

The same applies to any
EFI runtime calls, APM and all kinds of other random crap that calls into firmware. I'm not sure why those aren't showing up.

arch/x86/platform/efi/Makefile:OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_efi_thunk_$(BITS).o := y arch/x86/platform/efi/Makefile:OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_efi_stub_$(BITS).o := y

And similar things tell objtool to please not look..

#18 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 3 lines · David Woodhouse
Quoted 1 line

Ideally we'd have a way to mark the module 'unsafe' or something.

No, we just need to set IBRS before doing it.

That would work, assuming IBRS is available to begin with of course. Do we WARN if we hit this code and don't have IBRS available?

Perhaps it should just be reported in the spectre_v2 sysfs file.

So

"Mitigation: Full generic retpoline"

would instead be something like

"Vulnerable: Retpoline without IBRS"

?

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines

The same applies to any
EFI runtime calls, APM and all kinds of other random crap that calls into firmware. I'm not sure why those aren't showing up.

arch/x86/platform/efi/Makefile:OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_efi_thunk_$(BITS).o := y arch/x86/platform/efi/Makefile:OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_efi_stub_$(BITS).o := y

And similar things tell objtool to please not look..

Right, some of the corner cases like efi, vdso, and bpf tend to be ignored by objtool right now.

Signature · 1 line
Josh
#19 lore raw
In reply to David Woodhouse
Quoted 5 lines · David Woodhouse

No, we just need to set IBRS before doing it. The same applies to any EFI runtime calls, APM and all kinds of other random crap that calls into firmware. I'm not sure why those aren't showing up.

Dave,

Are you planning to update your IBRS for firmware call patches and repost those?

Tim

author maintainer
#21 lore raw
In reply to Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 5 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 2 lines · Peter Zijlstra

There are the retpoline validation patches; they work with the __noretpoline thing from David.

Have you run this through 0-day bot yet?

Yes, it complains a _lot_ because no retpoline supported compiler.

Quoted 4 lines

A manual awk/sed found another
one, which objtool confirms:

drivers/watchdog/.tmp_hpwdt.o: warning: objtool: .text+0x24: indirect call found in RETPOLINE build

That is the only known one left. It calls into BIOS code, so its not safe and using a retpoline for it is pointless since nobody audited the BIOS code.

author maintainer
#22 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 5 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 2 lines · Peter Zijlstra

There are the retpoline validation patches; they work with the __noretpoline thing from David.

Have you run this through 0-day bot yet?

Yes, it complains a _lot_ because no retpoline supported compiler.

I think I finally got something that works there... Damn I hate makefiles..

Makefile +5 -0
@@ -486,6 +486,11 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(CLANG_TARGET) $(CLANG
 KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(CLANG_TARGET) $(CLANG_GCC_TC)
 endif
 
+ifneq ($(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register),)
+  CC_HAS_RETPOLINE := 1
+endif
+export CC_HAS_RETPOLINE
+
 ifeq ($(config-targets),1)
 # ===========================================================================
 # *config targets only - make sure prerequisites are updated, and descend
scripts/Makefile.build +2 -0
@@ -267,8 +267,10 @@ else
 objtool_args += $(call cc-ifversion, -lt, 0405, --no-unreachable)
 endif
 ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CC_HAS_RETPOLINE
   objtool_args += --retpoline
 endif
+endif
 
 
 ifdef CONFIG_MODVERSIONS