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Avoid IANA-assigned port numbers

PATCH Superseded Chuck Lever 1 participant 5 messages Feb 16, 2018

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v2 of 3 Superseded Latest is v3 →

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#0 lore raw

v2 cover Avoid IANA-assigned port numbers

Following up on https://bugzilla.linux-nfs.org/show_bug.cgi?id=320 .

Here's a possible way to get libtirpc to avoid well-known port numbers when a caller requests a dynamically-assigned port. This approach also reduces the number of reserved ports used by long running user space RPC daemons, and could be applied in combination with changing bindresvport(3) to skip port numbers that appear in /etc/services.

I've done some light testing, fixed bugs, re-organized the patches slightly, and clarified the patch descriptions.

---

Chuck Lever (4):
Add an internal helper for binding to a dynamically-assigned port Avoid choosing reserved ports in svc_tli_create(3) Avoid choosing reserved ports in clnt_tli_create(3) Avoid choosing reserved ports in legacy RPC APIs

 src/Makefile.am    |    5 +-
 src/binddynport.c  |  133 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 src/clnt_generic.c |    4 +-
 src/rpc_soc.c      |   10 ++--
 src/svc_generic.c  |   12 ++---
 5 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 src/binddynport.c

--
Chuck Lever

#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/4 Add an internal helper for binding to a dynamically-assigned port

Create a helper function akin to bindresvport(3) that instead binds to a dynamically assigned port using the rules in RFC 6335 Section 6 to avoid all IANA-assigned service port numbers.

This is intended to remain an internal helper for the time being, so this commit provides no header declaration.

All internal bindresvport(3) call sites manufacture an INADDR_ANY- type address to pass to bind(2), so the helper handles that as well, to avoid code duplication. This means that callers do not need to pass in a sockaddr. Only an open socket is required.

---
 src/Makefile.am   |    5 +-
 src/binddynport.c |  133 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 136 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 src/binddynport.c
src/Makefile.am +3 -2
index fba2aa4..932414d 100644
@@ -15,8 +15,9 @@ lib_LTLIBRARIES = libtirpc.la
 libtirpc_la_LDFLAGS = @LDFLAG_NOUNDEFINED@ -no-undefined -lpthread
 libtirpc_la_LDFLAGS += -version-info @LT_VERSION_INFO@
 
-libtirpc_la_SOURCES = auth_none.c auth_unix.c authunix_prot.c bindresvport.c clnt_bcast.c \
-        clnt_dg.c clnt_generic.c clnt_perror.c clnt_raw.c clnt_simple.c \
+libtirpc_la_SOURCES = auth_none.c auth_unix.c authunix_prot.c \
+        binddynport.c bindresvport.c \
+        clnt_bcast.c clnt_dg.c clnt_generic.c clnt_perror.c clnt_raw.c clnt_simple.c \
         clnt_vc.c rpc_dtablesize.c getnetconfig.c getnetpath.c getrpcent.c \
         getrpcport.c mt_misc.c pmap_clnt.c pmap_getmaps.c pmap_getport.c \
         pmap_prot.c pmap_prot2.c pmap_rmt.c rpc_prot.c rpc_commondata.c \
src/binddynport.c new file +133 -0

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#2 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/4 Avoid choosing reserved ports in svc_tli_create(3)

In reply to Chuck Lever

Callers of svc_tli_create(3) can specify that an arbitrary port number be dynamically assigned for the service listener being created. svc_tli_create(3) tries bindresvport(3) first in this case. bindresvport(3) chooses a reserved port if the caller has CAP_NET_ADMIN_BIND privilege. If this fails, bind(2) is used to assign a port number from the range above 1024.

This approach becomes a problem should bindresvport(3) or bind(2) happen to choose the port number of a well-known service. If the caller is a long-running service (like rpc.statd), the caller's listener indefinitely blocks the IANA-assigned well-known service for that port from starting.

Moreover, it seems that a reserved port is completely unnecessary for listener sockets. It does not confer any extra privilege or functionality to the listener socket, nor do remote clients infer any extra privilege from a listener on a port number lower than 1024.

Therefore, remove the bindresvport step, and instead of invoking bind(2) directly, use a mechanism which allocates the port number from the dynamic port range described in RFC 6335 Section 6.

This also impacts all users of svc_tli_create(3) within the library, such as svc_tp_create(3).

---
 src/svc_generic.c |   12 ++++--------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
src/svc_generic.c +4 -8
index 7aae796..52a56c2 100644
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
 #include <rpc/svc.h>
 
 extern int __svc_vc_setflag(SVCXPRT *, int);
+extern int __binddynport(int fd);
 
 /*
  * The highest level interface for server creation.
@@ -220,15 +221,10 @@ svc_tli_create(fd, nconf, bindaddr, sendsz, recvsz)
 	 */
 	if (madefd || !__rpc_sockisbound(fd)) {
 		if (bindaddr == NULL) {
-			if (bindresvport(fd, NULL) < 0) {
-				memset(&ss, 0, sizeof ss);
-				ss.ss_family = si.si_af;
-				if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)(void *)&ss,
-				    (socklen_t)si.si_alen) < 0) {
-					warnx(
+			if (__binddynport(fd) == -1) {
+				warnx(
 			"svc_tli_create: could not bind to anonymous port");
-					goto freedata;
-				}
+				goto freedata;
 			}
 			listen(fd, SOMAXCONN);
 		} else {
#3 lore raw

PATCH v2 3/4 Avoid choosing reserved ports in clnt_tli_create(3)

In reply to Chuck Lever

Callers of clnt_tli_create(3) can specify that an arbitrary port number be dynamically assigned for the client socket being created. clnt_tli_create(3) tries bindresvport(3) first in this case. bindresvport(3) chooses a reserved port if the caller has CAP_NET_ADMIN_BIND privilege. If this fails, bind(2) is used to assign a port number from the range above 1024.

This approach becomes a problem should bindresvport(3) or bind(2) happen to choose the port number of a well-known service. If the caller is a long-running service (like rpc.statd), it indefinitely blocks the IANA-assigned well-known service for that port from starting.

When using the AUTH_SYS authentication flavor, RPC services can use the remote client's source port number to determine whether the client is privileged, and thus the UID and GID numbers in the RPC are trustworthy. However, it's pretty easy for a man-in-the-middle to replace these values while the RPC is in flight. The source port number is no guarantee of actual security.

Therefore, remove the bindresvport step, and instead of invoking bind(2) directly, use a mechanism which allocates the port number from the dynamic port range described in RFC 6335 Section 6.

This also impacts all users of clnt_tli_create(3) within the library, such as clnt_tp_create(3), and the portmap/rpcbind clients.

---
 src/clnt_generic.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/clnt_generic.c +3 -1
index 3f3dabf..e5a314f 100644
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
 
 extern bool_t __rpc_is_local_host(const char *);
 int __rpc_raise_fd(int);
+extern int __binddynport(int fd);
 
 #ifndef NETIDLEN
 #define	NETIDLEN 32
@@ -340,7 +341,8 @@ clnt_tli_create(int fd, const struct netconfig *nconf,
 		servtype = nconf->nc_semantics;
 		if (!__rpc_fd2sockinfo(fd, &si))
 			goto err;
-		bindresvport(fd, NULL);
+		if (__binddynport(fd) == -1)
+			goto err;
 	} else {
 		if (!__rpc_fd2sockinfo(fd, &si))
 			goto err;
#4 lore raw

PATCH v2 4/4 Avoid choosing reserved ports in legacy RPC APIs

In reply to Chuck Lever

Prevent a caller of legacy RPC client and server APIs from dynamically allocating a well-known port number, when no port number is provided. This is similar to recent changes to svc_tli_create(3) and clnt_tli_create(3).

---
 src/rpc_soc.c |   10 ++++------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
src/rpc_soc.c +4 -6
index ed0892a..af6c482 100644
@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@
 
 extern mutex_t	rpcsoc_lock;
 
+extern int __binddynport(int fd);
+
 static CLIENT *clnt_com_create(struct sockaddr_in *, rpcprog_t, rpcvers_t,
     int *, u_int, u_int, char *, int);
 static SVCXPRT *svc_com_create(int, u_int, u_int, char *);
@@ -145,7 +147,8 @@ clnt_com_create(raddr, prog, vers, sockp, sendsz, recvsz, tp, flags)
 	bindaddr.maxlen = bindaddr.len =  sizeof (struct sockaddr_in);
 	bindaddr.buf = raddr;
 
-	bindresvport(fd, NULL);
+	if (__binddynport(fd) == -1)
+		goto err;
 	cl = clnt_tli_create(fd, nconf, &bindaddr, prog, vers,
 				sendsz, recvsz);
 	if (cl) {
@@ -313,7 +316,6 @@ svc_com_create(fd, sendsize, recvsize, netid)
 	SVCXPRT *svc;
 	int madefd = FALSE;
 	int port;
-	struct sockaddr_in sin;
 
 	if ((nconf = __rpc_getconfip(netid)) == NULL) {
 		(void) syslog(LOG_ERR, "Could not get %s transport", netid);
@@ -330,10 +332,6 @@ svc_com_create(fd, sendsize, recvsize, netid)
 		madefd = TRUE;
 	}
 
-	memset(&sin, 0, sizeof sin);
-	sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
-	bindresvport(fd, &sin);
-	listen(fd, SOMAXCONN);
 	svc = svc_tli_create(fd, nconf, NULL, sendsize, recvsize);
 	(void) freenetconfigent(nconf);
 	if (svc == NULL) {