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docs: clarify security-bugs disclosure policy

PATCH In review Dave Hansen 7 participants 9 messages Mar 7, 2018 – Apr 22, 2018 Documentation

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 docs: clarify security-bugs disclosure policy

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

I think we need to soften the language a bit. It might scare folks off, especially the:

We prefer to fully disclose the bug as soon as possible.

which is not really the case. Linus says:

It's not full disclosure, it's not coordinated disclosure, and it's not "no disclosure". It's more like just "timely open fixes".

I changed a bit of the wording in here, but mostly to remove the word "disclosure" since it seems to mean very specific things to people that we do not mean here.

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Alan Cox <[email protected]>
Cc Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc Tim Chen <[email protected]>
Cc Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>

---

 b/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst |   24 +++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst renamed from Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst~embargo2 +13 -11
diff -puN Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst~embargo2 Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst
@@ -29,18 +29,20 @@ made public.
 Disclosure
 ----------
 
-The goal of the Linux kernel security team is to work with the
-bug submitter to bug resolution as well as disclosure.  We prefer
-to fully disclose the bug as soon as possible.  It is reasonable to
-delay disclosure when the bug or the fix is not yet fully understood,
-the solution is not well-tested or for vendor coordination.  However, we
-expect these delays to be short, measurable in days, not weeks or months.
-A disclosure date is negotiated by the security team working with the
-bug submitter as well as vendors.  However, the kernel security team
-holds the final say when setting a disclosure date.  The timeframe for
-disclosure is from immediate (esp. if it's already publicly known)
+The goal of the Linux kernel security team is to work with the bug
+submitter to understand and fix the bug.  We prefer to publish the fix as
+soon as possible, but try to avoid public discussion of the bug itself
+and leave that to others.
+
+Publishing the fix may be delayed when the bug or the fix is not yet
+fully understood, the solution is not well-tested or for vendor
+coordination.  However, we expect these delays to be short, measurable in
+days, not weeks or months.  A release date is negotiated by the security
+team working with the bug submitter as well as vendors.  However, the
+kernel security team holds the final say when setting a timeframe.  The
+timeframe varies from immediate (esp. if it's already publicly known bug)
 to a few weeks.  As a basic default policy, we expect report date to
-disclosure date to be on the order of 7 days.
+release date to be on the order of 7 days.
 
 Coordination
 ------------

_

#1 lore raw

That patch looks fine to me, avoiding any terms that might be misunderstood, and being pretty straightforward.

I'm guessing this will go through Jon?

Linus

Acked-by on v2 1/1
#3 lore raw
In reply to Dave Hansen
Quoted 57 lines · Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

I think we need to soften the language a bit. It might scare folks off, especially the:

We prefer to fully disclose the bug as soon as possible.

which is not really the case. Linus says:

It's not full disclosure, it's not coordinated disclosure, and it's not "no disclosure". It's more like just "timely open fixes".

I changed a bit of the wording in here, but mostly to remove the word "disclosure" since it seems to mean very specific things to people that we do not mean here.

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Alan Cox <[email protected]>
Cc Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc Tim Chen <[email protected]>
Cc Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>

---

 b/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst |   24 +++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff -puN Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst~embargo2 Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst

Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst 2018-03-07 13:42:37.618225395 -0800 renamed from Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst~embargo2 2018-03-07 13:23:49.390228208 -0800 +2 -10
@@ -29,18 +29,20 @@ made public.
 Disclosure
 ----------
 
-The goal of the Linux kernel security team is to work with the
-bug submitter to bug resolution as well as disclosure.  We prefer
-to fully disclose the bug as soon as possible.  It is reasonable to
-delay disclosure when the bug or the fix is not yet fully understood,
-the solution is not well-tested or for vendor coordination.  However, we
-expect these delays to be short, measurable in days, not weeks or months.
-A disclosure date is negotiated by the security team working with the
-bug submitter as well as vendors.  However, the kernel security team
-holds the final say when setting a disclosure date.  The timeframe for
-disclosure is from immediate (esp. if it's already publicly known)
+The goal of the Linux kernel security team is to work with the bug
+submitter to understand and fix the bug.  We prefer to publish the fix as

Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst 2018-03-07 13:42:37.618225395 -0800 made public. · line 43

Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst 2018-03-07 13:42:37.618225395 -0800 renamed from Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst~embargo2 2018-03-07 13:23:49.390228208 -0800 +10 -0
+soon as possible, but try to avoid public discussion of the bug itself
+and leave that to others.
+
+Publishing the fix may be delayed when the bug or the fix is not yet
+fully understood, the solution is not well-tested or for vendor
+coordination.  However, we expect these delays to be short, measurable in
+days, not weeks or months.  A release date is negotiated by the security
+team working with the bug submitter as well as vendors.  However, the
+kernel security team holds the final say when setting a timeframe.  The
+timeframe varies from immediate (esp. if it's already publicly known bug)

Nit: I think "a" is missing. I was expecting: "... already a publicly known ...

Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst 2018-03-07 13:42:37.618225395 -0800 made public. · line 45

Quoted 3 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst 2018-03-07 13:42:37.618225395 -0800 renamed from Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst~embargo2 2018-03-07 13:23:49.390228208 -0800 +1 -1
 to a few weeks.  As a basic default policy, we expect report date to
-disclosure date to be on the order of 7 days.
+release date to be on the order of 7 days.

Otherwise, yeah, looks good.

-Kees

Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
Reviewed-by on v2 1/1
#4 lore raw
In reply to Dave Hansen
Quoted 33 lines · Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

I think we need to soften the language a bit. It might scare folks off, especially the:

We prefer to fully disclose the bug as soon as possible.

which is not really the case. Linus says:

It's not full disclosure, it's not coordinated disclosure, and it's not "no disclosure". It's more like just "timely open fixes".

I changed a bit of the wording in here, but mostly to remove the word "disclosure" since it seems to mean very specific things to people that we do not mean here.

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Alan Cox <[email protected]>
Cc Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc Tim Chen <[email protected]>
Cc Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Quoted 2 lines

---

maintainer
#2 lore raw
In reply to Linus Torvalds
Quoted 1 line · On Wed, 7 Mar 2018 13:53:06 -0800 Linus Torvalds…

I'm guessing this will go through Jon?

Sounds like a fine guess to me; will apply shortly.

Thanks,

jon

#5 lore raw
In reply to Dave Hansen
Quoted 9 lines · On Wed, 07 Mar 2018 13:46:24 -0800 Dave Hansen <[email protected]>…

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

I think we need to soften the language a bit. It might scare folks off, especially the:

We prefer to fully disclose the bug as soon as possible.

which is not really the case. Linus says:

Quoted 8 lines

It's not full disclosure, it's not coordinated disclosure, and it's not "no disclosure". It's more like just "timely open fixes".

I changed a bit of the wording in here, but mostly to remove the word "disclosure" since it seems to mean very specific things to people that we do not mean here.

If you want to be taken seriously then I think minimum you also need to
- Give a GPG key for messages to the list
- State what security is in place (encryption etc) to protect the list itself

There are probably a lot more things people would ask but given the policy now clear that it's basically just an 'early tip off'/'make sure Linus doesn't miss this' list for very short notification periods doesn't matter so much.

Alan

#6 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines · Alan Cox

If you want to be taken seriously then I think minimum you also need to
- Give a GPG key for messages to the list

Oh, I don't want to be taken seriously by people who use gpg encrypted email.

It's garbage and should be shunned as such.

I keep quoting this:

https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/vvbw9a/even-the-inventor-of-pgp-doesnt-use-pgp

and anybody who thinks pgp encrypted email is fine is a clown.

Quoted 2 lines

- State what security is in place (encryption etc) to protect the list itself

That could be stated, but it's worth noting the other rules.

If you have some long corrupt vendor disclosure period and are worried about any good guys finding out (the bad guys probably already have it), we're not the list for you anyway.

Keep your "we'll keep security problems under wraps so that they can be exploited for a long time" emails to yourself, or send them to /dev/null.

Linus

#7 lore raw

Hi!

Quoted 7 lines · Linus Torvalds
Quoted 3 lines · Alan Cox

If you want to be taken seriously then I think minimum you also need to
- Give a GPG key for messages to the list

Oh, I don't want to be taken seriously by people who use gpg encrypted email.

Heh. I see that gpg has some usability problems, but we do encrypt our http connections, and email is at least as sensitive.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines

- State what security is in place (encryption etc) to protect the list itself

That could be stated, but it's worth noting the other rules.

Quoted 7 lines

If you have some long corrupt vendor disclosure period and are worried about any good guys finding out (the bad guys probably already have it), we're not the list for you anyway.

Keep your "we'll keep security problems under wraps so that they can be exploited for a long time" emails to yourself, or send them to /dev/null.

Umm, they will not sent it to /dev/null, as that is not encrypted :-).

I guess I can act as this kind of /dev/null. It might be useful to note the issues, and for the serious ones notify you few days before the "long" embargo is going to expire...

Best regards,

Pavel

Signature · 2 lines
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
#8 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Pavel Machek
Quoted 3 lines · Linus Torvalds

Oh, I don't want to be taken seriously by people who use gpg encrypted email.

Heh. I see that gpg has some usability problems, but we do encrypt our http connections, and email is at least as sensitive.

It's not about sensitivity.

It's about the technology actually *working*.

PGP does not work for email. Never has, never will. It's unusable crap. Nobody sane uses it, because the cost is just too damn high.

Make it as easy to use as https, and things will change. As it is, don't even bother.

Thomas helped me get S/MIME working, and even for that I had to fix an alpine bug that caused alpine to SIGSEGV. And that's _convenient_ compared to pgp email. Whee.

Linus