arm64/mm: migrate swapper_pg_dir
Quoted 16 lines · Robin Murphy
Quoted 8 lines
Currently, The offset between
swapper_pg_dirand_textis fixed. When attackers know the address of_text(no KASLR or breaking KASLR), they can caculate the address ofswapper_pg_dir. Then KSMA(Kernel Space Mirroring Attack) can be applied.The principle of KSMA is to insert a carefully constructed PGD entry into the translation table. The type of this entry is
Out of interest, how does that part work? AFAICS, modifying a PGD entry involves writing to kernel memory, which would mean the implication of KSMA is "userspace can gain write permission to kernel memory by writing to kernel memory" - that doesn't sound like an attack in itself, more just a convenience for ease of exploiting whatever successful attack got you in there in the first place.
Quoted 2 lines
That's not to say that it isn't still worth mitigating, I'm just questioning the given rationale here.
Yes, you are right. KSMA is just a convenience for ease of exploiting. I think that the biggest role of KSMA is to covert an arbitrary write to multiple arbitrary writes. In the past, to accomplish this, a function pointer(e.g. ptmx_fops) is modified to point to gadget, which can r/w kernel memory. However, PAN makes this more difficult. And KSMA becomes a new way to do that.
For details on KSMA, you can refer to:
thanks,
Jun