Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal
Subsystems (10)
v8 cover Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal
Hello,
v8 is just a rebase on top of today's linux-integrity/next-integrity. There aren't any noteworthy changes since v7, which is why I'm keeping its description below:
The main difference in v7 is the addition of the last patch, which ensures that there will always be a measurement entry containing the appended modsig if one was used to appraise the file. The patch description and comments in the code should explain in which circumstances the patch proved necessary.
Apart from that, there was some small cleaning up of the code, and merging and splitting of patches. The changelog below has the details.
Original cover letter:
On the OpenPOWER platform, secure boot and trusted boot are being implemented using IMA for taking measurements and verifying signatures. Since the kernel image on Power servers is an ELF binary, kernels are signed using the scripts/sign-file tool and thus use the same signature format as signed kernel modules.
This patch series adds support in IMA for verifying those signatures. It adds flexibility to OpenPOWER secure boot, because it allows it to boot kernels with the signature appended to them as well as kernels where the signature is stored in the IMA extended attribute.
Changes since v7:
- Patch "MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions"
- Added module name parameter to validate_module_sig() so that it can be shown in error messages.
- Patch "integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr"
- Dropped use of struct evm_xattr in evm_update_evmxattr() and evm_verify_hmac(). It's not needed there anymore because of changes to support portable EVM signatures.
Changes since v6:
- Patch "PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_message_sig() and verify_pkcs7_message_sig()"
- Retitled to "PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature() and
add pkcs7_get_message_sig()"
- Reworded description to clarify why the refactoring is needed. The code is unchanged. (Suggested by Mimi Zohar)
- Added Mimi Zohar's Reviewed-by.
- Patch "PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()"
- Added Mimi Zohar's Reviewed-by.
- Patch "integrity: Introduce integrity_keyring_from_id"
- Added Mimi Zohar's Signed-off-by.
- Patch "integrity: Introduce asymmetric_sig_has_known_key()"
- Added Mimi Zohar's Signed-off-by.
- Patch "integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it"
- Added Mimi Zohar's Signed-off-by.
- Patch "ima: Introduce is_ima_sig()"
- Renamed function to is_signed() (suggested by Mimi Zohar).
- Patch "ima: Add functions to read and verify a modsig signature"
- Changed stubs for the !CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG to return -EOPNOTSUPP instead of -ENOTSUPP, since the latter isn't defined in uapi headers.
- Moved functions to the patches which use them and dropped this patch (suggested by Mimi Zohar).
- Patch "ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures"
- Prevent reading and writing of IMA_MODSIG xattr in ima_read_xattr() and ima_inode_setxattr().
- Simplify code in process_measurement() which decides whether to try reading a modsig (suggested by Mimi Zohar).
- Moved some functions from patch "ima: Add functions to read and verify a modsig signature" into this patch.
- Patch "ima: Add new "d-sig" template field"
- New patch containing code from patch "ima: Write modsig to the measurement list" (Suggested by Mimi Zohar).
- Patch "ima: Write modsig to the measurement list"
- Moved some functions from patch "ima: Add functions to read and verify a modsig signature" into this patch.
- Moved code related to d-sig support to new patch.
- Patch "ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig"
- New patch.
Changes since v5:
- Patch "ima: Remove some superfluous parentheses"
- Dropped.
- Patch "evm, ima: Remove superfluous parentheses"
- Dropped.
- Patch "evm, ima: Remove more superfluous parentheses"
- Dropped.
- Patch "ima: Don't pass xattr value to EVM xattr verification."
- Dropped.
- Patch "ima: Store measurement after appraisal"
- Dropped.
- Patch "MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions"
- Reduced changes to the code that was moved into validate_module_sig() to the minimum necessary (suggested by Mimi Zohar).
- Added SPDX license identifier.
- Patch "PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_message_sig() and verify_pkcs7_message_sig()"
- In the hypothetical case that there's more than one sinfo, changed pkcs7_get_message_sig() to return NULL instead of the first sinfo's sig.
- Dropped Mimi's Reviewed-by because of the code change above.
- Patch "PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()"
- New patch.
- Patch "integrity: Introduce integrity_keyring_from_id"
- Add stub in case CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE isn't set.
- Patch "integrity: Introduce asymmetric_sig_has_known_key()"
- New patch.
- Patch "ima: Introduce is_ima_sig"
- New patch, with code from "ima: Improvements in ima_appraise_measurement"
- Patch "ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended signatures"
- Changed appraise_type to accept "imasig|modsig" instead of "modsig|imasig" to reflect the fact that now IMA only looks for the modsig after failing to find a suitable imasig stored in the xattr.
- Added SPDX license identifier.
- Patch "ima: Add functions to read and verify a modsig signature"
- Changed ima_read_modsig() to abort loading the modsig if it uses a key which isn't known to IMA.
- Changed ima_get_modsig_hash() to use pkcs7_get_digest().
- Patch "ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures"
- Added ima_xattr_sig_known_key() auxiliary function.
- Call ima_read_modsig() directly from process_measurement() instead of from ima_appraise_measurement(), and only if there's no xattr signature or if the xattr signature uses a key which isn't known to IMA.
- hash_algo in process_measurement() is always obtained from the xattr signature, never from the modsig.
- Changes to ima_appraise_measurement() are a lot simpler now, and don't involve going back to the main switch statement a second time.
- Pass xattr_value to evm_verifyxattr() unless xattr_value is a modsig.
- Patch "ima: Write modsig to the measurement list"
- Since now we determine whether we'll use an xattr sig or a modsig at the time they are read, there's no need to store a measurement again in the modsig case. Thus, this patch doesn't need to change ima_store_measurement() nor process_measurement() anymore.
- Define new "d-sig" template field which holds the digest that is expected to match the one contained in the modsig.
- Moved addition of ima_modsig_serialize_data() to patch "ima: Add functions to read and verify a modsig signature".
- Increase MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN to 24.
Changes since v4:
- Patch "ima: Remove redundant conditional operator"
- New patch.
- Patch "ima: Remove some superfluous parentheses"
- New patch.
- Patch "evm, ima: Remove superfluous parentheses"
- New patch.
- Patch "evm, ima: Remove more superfluous parentheses"
- New patch.
- Patch "ima: Simplify ima_eventsig_init"
- New patch.
- Patch "ima: Improvements in ima_appraise_measurement"
- New patch.
- Patch "ima: Don't pass xattr value to EVM xattr verification."
- New patch.
- Patch "ima: Export func_tokens"
- Split from patch "ima: Support module-style appended signatures for appraisal".
- Patch "ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended signatures"
- Split from patch "ima: Support module-style appended signatures for appraisal".
- Mention modsig option in Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy (suggested by Mimi Zohar).
- Patch "ima: Add functions to read and verify a modsig signature"
- Split from patch "ima: Support module-style appended signatures for appraisal".
- Patch "ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures"
- Split from patch "ima: Support module-style appended signatures for appraisal".
- In ima_appraise_measurement, change the logic of dealing with xattr errors in case the modsig verification fails. With this, process_xattr_error isn't needed anymore.
- Patch "ima: Write modsig to the measurement list"
- Split from patch "ima: Support module-style appended signatures for appraisal".
- Added ima_current_template_has_sig function.
- Removed hdr parameter from ima_modsig_serialize_data.
- In ima_store_measurement, continue processing even if the given PCR is already measured if it's for a modsig.
- In process_measurement, add exception to store measurement even if IMA_MEASURE is not set when appraising a modsig (suggested by Mimi Zohar).
- Call is_ima_sig in ima_eventsig_init.
Thiago Jung Bauermann (14):
MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature() and add
pkcs7_get_message_sig()
PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()
integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr
integrity: Introduce integrity_keyring_from_id()
integrity: Introduce asymmetric_sig_has_known_key()
integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it
ima: Introduce is_signed()
ima: Export func_tokens
ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended
signatures
ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures
ima: Add new "d-sig" template field
ima: Write modsig to the measurement list
ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 6 +- Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst | 5 + certs/system_keyring.c | 61 +++++-- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 16 ++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 25 +++ include/crypto/pkcs7.h | 5 + include/linux/module.h | 3 - include/linux/module_signature.h | 47 +++++ include/linux/verification.h | 10 + init/Kconfig | 6 +- kernel/Makefile | 2 +- kernel/module.c | 1 + kernel/module_signing.c | 82 ++++----- security/integrity/Kconfig | 2 +- security/integrity/digsig.c | 28 ++- security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 44 +++-- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 8 +- security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 13 ++ security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 67 +++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 8 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 79 ++++++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 33 +++- security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 212 ++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 81 +++++++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 31 +++- security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 49 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h | 2 + security/integrity/integrity.h | 30 ++- 29 files changed, 829 insertions(+), 128 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/module_signature.h create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
PATCH v8 1/14 MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions
IMA will use the module_signature format for append signatures, so export the relevant definitions and factor out the code which verifies that the appended signature trailer is valid.
Also, create a CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT option so that IMA can select it and be able to use validate_module_sig() without having to depend on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG.
--- include/linux/module.h | 3 -- include/linux/module_signature.h | 47 ++++++++++++++++++ init/Kconfig | 6 ++- kernel/Makefile | 2 +- kernel/module.c | 1 + kernel/module_signing.c | 82 ++++++++++++++------------------ 6 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
include/linux/module.h +0 -3
@@ -25,9 +25,6 @@#include <linux/percpu.h> #include <asm/module.h> -/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */ -#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n" -/* Not Yet Implemented */ #define MODULE_SUPPORTED_DEVICE (name)
include/linux/module_signature.h new file +47 -0
47 lines not on this page · raw message
init/Kconfig +5 -1
@@ -1864,7 +1864,7 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL config MODULE_SIG bool "Module signature verification" depends on MODULES - select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT help Check modules for valid signatures upon load: the signature is simply appended to the module. For more information see
@@ -1879,6 +1879,10 @@ config MODULE_SIG debuginfo strip done by some packagers (such as rpmbuild) and inclusion into an initramfs that wants the module size reduced. +config MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + def_bool n + select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + config MODULE_SIG_FORCE bool "Require modules to be validly signed" depends on MODULE_SIG
kernel/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ obj-y += up.o endif obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o -obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o +obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT) += module_signing.o obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_CORE) += crash_core.o
kernel/module.c +1 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@#include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/extable.h> #include <linux/moduleloader.h> +#include <linux/module_signature.h> #include <linux/trace_events.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/kallsyms.h>
kernel/module_signing.c +37 -45
111 lines not on this page · raw message
PATCH v8 2/14 PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature() and add pkcs7_get_message_sig()
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannIMA will need to verify a PKCS#7 which has already been parsed. For this reason, factor out the code which does that from verify_pkcs7_signature() into a new function which takes a struct pkcs7_message instead of a data buffer.
In addition, IMA will need to know the key that signed a given PKCS#7 message, so add pkcs7_get_message_sig().
--- certs/system_keyring.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++------- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 16 +++++++ include/crypto/pkcs7.h | 2 + include/linux/verification.h | 10 +++++ 4 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
certs/system_keyring.c +45 -16
@@ -191,33 +191,27 @@ late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list);#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION /** -* verify_pkcs7_signature - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data. +* verify_pkcs7_message_sig - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data. * @data: The data to be verified (NULL if expecting internal data). * @len: Size of @data. -* @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature. -* @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7. +* @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature. * @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only, * (void *)1UL for all trusted keys). * @usage: The use to which the key is being put. * @view_content: Callback to gain access to content. * @ctx: Context for callback. */ -int verify_pkcs7_signature (const void *data,size_t len, -const void *raw_pkcs7,size_t pkcs7_len, -struct key *trusted_keys, -enum key_being_used_for usage, -int (*view_content)(void *ctx, -const void *data,size_t len, -size_t asn1hdrlen), -void *ctx) +int verify_pkcs7_message_sig (const void *data,size_t len, +struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, +struct key *trusted_keys, +enum key_being_used_for usage, +int (*view_content)(void *ctx, +const void *data,size_t len, +size_t asn1hdrlen), +void *ctx) { -struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;int ret; - pkcs7 =pkcs7_parse_message (raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len); -if (IS_ERR (pkcs7)) -return PTR_ERR (pkcs7); -/* The data should be detached - so we need to supply it. */ if (data &&pkcs7_supply_detached_data (pkcs7, data, len) <0 ) {pr_err ("PKCS#7 signature with non-detached data\n" );
@@ -259,6 +253,41 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len, } error: +pr_devel ("<=%s() = %d\n" , __func__, ret); +return ret; +} + +/** +* verify_pkcs7_signature - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data. +* @data: The data to be verified (NULL if expecting internal data). +* @len: Size of @data. +* @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature. +* @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7. +* @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only, +* (void *)1UL for all trusted keys). +* @usage: The use to which the key is being put. +* @view_content: Callback to gain access to content. +* @ctx: Context for callback. +*/ +int verify_pkcs7_signature (const void *data,size_t len, +const void *raw_pkcs7,size_t pkcs7_len, +struct key *trusted_keys, +enum key_being_used_for usage, +int (*view_content)(void *ctx, +const void *data,size_t len, +size_t asn1hdrlen), +void *ctx) +{ +struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7; +int ret; + + pkcs7 =pkcs7_parse_message (raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len); +if (IS_ERR (pkcs7)) +return PTR_ERR (pkcs7); + + ret =verify_pkcs7_message_sig (data, len, pkcs7, trusted_keys, usage, + view_content, ctx); +pkcs7_free_message (pkcs7);pr_devel ("<=%s() = %d\n" , __func__, ret);return ret;
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c +16 -0
@@ -684,3 +684,19 @@ int pkcs7_note_signed_info(void *context, size_t hdrlen,return -ENOMEM ;return 0 ; } + +/** +* pkcs7_get_message_sig - get signature in @pkcs7 +*/ +const struct public_key_signature *pkcs7_get_message_sig ( +const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) +{ +/* +* This function doesn't support messages with more than one signature, +* so don't return anything in that case. +*/ +if (pkcs7->signed_infos =NULL || pkcs7->signed_infos->next !=NULL ) +return NULL ; + +return pkcs7->signed_infos->sig; +}
include/crypto/pkcs7.h +2 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ extern void pkcs7_free_message(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7);extern int pkcs7_get_content_data (const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,const void **_data,size_t *_datalen,size_t *_headerlen); +extern const struct public_key_signature *pkcs7_get_message_sig ( +const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7);/* * pkcs7_trust.c
include/linux/verification.h +10 -0
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ extern const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR];#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION struct key ; +struct pkcs7_message ; extern int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len, const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
@@ -44,6 +45,15 @@ extern int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len, const void *data, size_t len, size_t asn1hdrlen), void *ctx); +extern int verify_pkcs7_message_sig (const void *data,size_t len, +struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, +struct key *trusted_keys, +enum key_being_used_for usage, +int (*view_content)(void *ctx, +const void *data, +size_t len, +size_t asn1hdrlen), +void *ctx);#ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
PATCH v8 3/14 PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannIMA will need to access the digest of the PKCS7 message (as calculated by the kernel) before the signature is verified, so introduce pkcs7_get_digest() for that purpose.
Also, modify pkcs7_digest() to detect when the digest was already calculated so that it doesn't have to do redundant work. Verifying that sinfo->sig->digest isn't NULL is sufficient because both places which allocate sinfo->sig (pkcs7_parse_message() and pkcs7_note_signed_info()) use kzalloc() so sig->digest is always initialized to zero.
--- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/pkcs7.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c +25 -0
@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,kenter (",%u,%s" , sinfo->index, sinfo->sig->hash_algo); +/* The digest was calculated already. */ +if (sig->digest) +return 0 ; +if (!sinfo->sig->hash_algo)return -ENOPKG ;
@@ -122,6 +126,27 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,return ret; } +int pkcs7_get_digest (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,const u8 **buf,u8 *len) +{ +struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; +int ret; + +/* +* This function doesn't support messages with more than one signature. +*/ +if (sinfo =NULL || sinfo->next !=NULL ) +return -EBADMSG ; + + ret =pkcs7_digest (pkcs7, sinfo); +if (ret) +return ret; + + *buf = sinfo->sig->digest; + *len = sinfo->sig->digest_size; + +return 0 ; +} +/* * Find the key (X.509 certificate) to use to verify a PKCS#7 message. PKCS#7 * uses the issuer's name and the issuing certificate serial number for
include/crypto/pkcs7.h +3 -0
@@ -46,4 +46,7 @@ extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,extern int pkcs7_supply_detached_data (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,const void *data,size_t datalen); +extern int pkcs7_get_digest (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,const u8 **buf, +u8 *len); +#endif /* _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H */
PATCH v8 4/14 integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannEven though struct evm_ima_xattr_data includes a fixed-size array to hold a SHA1 digest, most of the code ignores the array and uses the struct to mean "type indicator followed by data of unspecified size" and tracks the real size of what the struct represents in a separate length variable.
The only exception to that is the EVM code, which correctly uses the definition of struct evm_ima_xattr_data.
So make this explicit in the code by removing the length specification from the array in struct evm_ima_xattr_data. Also, change the name of the element from digest to data since in most places the array doesn't hold a digest.
A separate struct evm_xattr is introduced, with the original definition of evm_ima_xattr_data to be used in the places that actually expect that definition.
--- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 8 ++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 7 ++++--- security/integrity/integrity.h | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +4 -4
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,/* check value type */ switch (xattr_data->type) {case EVM_XATTR_HMAC : -if (xattr_len !=sizeof (struct evm_ima_xattr_data )) { +if (xattr_len !=sizeof (struct evm_xattr )) { evm_status =INTEGRITY_FAIL ; goto out; }
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, xattr_value_len, &digest);if (rc)break ; - rc =crypto_memneq (xattr_data->digest, digest.digest, + rc =crypto_memneq (xattr_data->data, digest.digest,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE );if (rc) rc = -EINVAL ;
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, struct xattr *evm_xattr) { - struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data; + struct evm_xattr *xattr_data;int rc;if (!evm_key_loaded () || !evm_protected_xattr (lsm_xattr->name))
@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,if (!xattr_data)return -ENOMEM ; - xattr_data->type =EVM_XATTR_HMAC ; + xattr_data->data.type =EVM_XATTR_HMAC ; rc =evm_init_hmac (inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest);if (rc <0 ) goto out;
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +4 -3
@@ -167,7 +167,8 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,return sig->hash_algo;break ;case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG : - ret = xattr_value->digest[0 ]; +/* first byte contains algorithm id */ + ret = xattr_value->data[0 ];if (ret <HASH_ALGO__LAST )return ret;break ;
@@ -175,7 +176,7 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,/* this is for backward compatibility */ if (xattr_len =21 ) {unsigned int zero =0 ; -if (!memcmp (&xattr_value->digest[16 ], &zero,4 )) +if (!memcmp (&xattr_value->data[16 ], &zero,4 ))return HASH_ALGO_MD5 ;else return HASH_ALGO_SHA1 ;
@@ -274,7 +275,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,/* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16 */ - rc =memcmp (&xattr_value->digest[hash_start], + rc =memcmp (&xattr_value->data[hash_start], iint->ima_hash->digest, iint->ima_hash->length); else
security/integrity/integrity.h +5 -0
@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type {struct evm_ima_xattr_data {u8 type; +u8 data[]; +} __packed; + +struct evm_xattr { +struct evm_ima_xattr_data data;u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ]; } __packed;
PATCH v8 5/14 integrity: Introduce integrity_keyring_from_id()
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannIMA will need to obtain the keyring used to verify file signatures so that it can verify the module-style signature appended to files.
--- security/integrity/digsig.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++------- security/integrity/integrity.h | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
security/integrity/digsig.c +3 -4
@@ -43,11 +43,10 @@ static const char * const keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted#endif -int integrity_digsig_verify (const unsigned int id,const char *sig,int siglen, -const char *digest,int digestlen) +struct key *integrity_keyring_from_id (const unsigned int id) { -if (id >=INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX || siglen <2 ) -return -EINVAL ; +if (id >=INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX ) +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL );if (!keyring[id]) { keyring[id] @@ -56,17 +55,32 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
int err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]); pr_err("no %s keyring: %d\n", keyring_name[id], err); keyring[id] = NULL;
- return err;
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
}
}
+ return keyring[id];
+}
+
+int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
+ const char *digest, int digestlen)
+{
+ struct key *keyring;
+
+ if (siglen < 2)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ keyring = integrity_keyring_from_id(id);
+ if (IS_ERR(keyring))
+ return PTR_ERR(keyring);
+
switch (sig[1]) {
case 1:
/* v1 API expect signature without xattr type */
- return digsig_verify(keyring[id], sig + 1, siglen - 1,
+ return digsig_verify(keyring, sig + 1, siglen - 1,
digest, digestlen);
case 2:
- return asymmetric_verify(keyring[id], sig, siglen,
+ return asymmetric_verify(keyring, sig, siglen,
digest, digestlen);
}
security/integrity/integrity.h +6 -0
@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ extern struct dentry *integrity_dir;#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE +struct key *integrity_keyring_from_id (const unsigned int id);int integrity_digsig_verify (const unsigned int id,const char *sig,int siglen,const char *digest,int digestlen);
@@ -160,6 +161,11 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);int __init integrity_load_x509 (const unsigned int id,const char *path);#else +static inline struct key *integrity_keyring_from_id (const unsigned int id) +{ +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +} +static inline int integrity_digsig_verify (const unsigned int id,const char *sig,int siglen,const char *digest,int digestlen)
PATCH v8 6/14 integrity: Introduce asymmetric_sig_has_known_key()
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannIMA will only look for a modsig if the xattr sig references a key which is not in the expected kernel keyring. To that end, introduce asymmetric_sig_has_known_key().
The logic of extracting the key used in the xattr sig is factored out from asymmetric_verify() so that it can be used by the new function.
--- security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++------- security/integrity/integrity.h | 8 +++++ 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c +33 -11
@@ -79,26 +79,48 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, uint32_t keyid)return key; } -int asymmetric_verify (struct key *keyring,const char *sig, -int siglen,const char *data,int datalen) +static struct key *asymmetric_key_from_sig (struct key *keyring,const char *sig, +int siglen) { -struct public_key_signature pks; -struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)sig; -struct key *key; -int ret = -ENOMEM ; +const struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *) sig;if (siglen <=sizeof (*hdr)) -return -EBADMSG ; +return ERR_PTR (-EBADMSG ); siglen -=sizeof (*hdr);if (siglen !=be16_to_cpu (hdr->sig_size)) -return -EBADMSG ; +return ERR_PTR (-EBADMSG );if (hdr->hash_algo >=HASH_ALGO__LAST ) -return -ENOPKG ; +return ERR_PTR (-ENOPKG ); + +return request_asymmetric_key (keyring,be32_to_cpu (hdr->keyid)); +} + +bool asymmetric_sig_has_known_key (struct key *keyring,const char *sig, +int siglen) +{ +struct key *key; + + key =asymmetric_key_from_sig (keyring, sig, siglen); +if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL (key)) +return false; + +key_put (key); + +return true; +} + +int asymmetric_verify (struct key *keyring,const char *sig, +int siglen,const char *data,int datalen) +{ +struct public_key_signature pks; +struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)sig; +struct key *key; +int ret = -ENOMEM ; - key =request_asymmetric_key (keyring,be32_to_cpu (hdr->keyid)); + key =asymmetric_key_from_sig (keyring, sig, siglen);if (IS_ERR (key))return PTR_ERR (key);
@@ -110,7 +132,7 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, pks.digest = (u8 *)data; pks.digest_size = datalen; pks.s = hdr->sig; - pks.s_size = siglen; + pks.s_size = siglen -sizeof (*hdr); ret =verify_signature (key, &pks);key_put (key);pr_debug ("%s() = %d\n" , __func__, ret);
security/integrity/integrity.h +8 -0
@@ -182,12 +182,20 @@ static inline int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS int asymmetric_verify (struct key *keyring,const char *sig,int siglen,const char *data,int datalen); +bool asymmetric_sig_has_known_key (struct key *keyring,const char *sig, +int siglen);#else static inline int asymmetric_verify (struct key *keyring,const char *sig,int siglen,const char *data,int datalen) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } + +static inline bool asymmetric_sig_has_known_key (struct key *keyring, +const char *sig,int siglen) +{ +return false; +}#endif #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509
PATCH v8 7/14 integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannThis avoids a dependency cycle in soon-to-be-introduced CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG: it will select CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT which in turn selects CONFIG_KEYS. Kconfig then complains that CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE depends on CONFIG_KEYS.
--- security/integrity/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/integrity/Kconfig +1 -1
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ if INTEGRITY config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE bool "Digital signature verification using multiple keyrings" - depends on KEYS default n + select KEYS select SIGNATURE help This option enables digital signature verification support
PATCH v8 8/14 ima: Introduce is_signed()
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannWith the introduction of another IMA signature type (modsig), some places will need to check for both of them. It is cleaner to do that if there's a helper function to tell whether an xattr_value represents an IMA signature.
--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 5 +++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 7 +++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +5 -0
@@ -154,6 +154,11 @@ unsigned long ima_get_binary_runtime_size(void);int ima_init_template (void );void ima_init_template_list (void ); +static inline bool is_signed (const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value) +{ +return xattr_value && xattr_value->type =EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG ; +} +/* * used to protect h_table and sha_table */
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +3 -4
@@ -325,15 +325,14 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, }else if (status !=INTEGRITY_PASS ) {/* Fix mode, but don't replace file signatures. */ if ((ima_appraise &IMA_APPRAISE_FIX ) && - (!xattr_value || - xattr_value->type !=EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG )) { + !is_signed (xattr_value)) {if (!ima_fix_xattr (dentry, iint)) status =INTEGRITY_PASS ; }/* Permit new files with file signatures, but without data. */ if (inode->i_size =0 && iint->flags &IMA_NEW_FILE && - xattr_value && xattr_value->type =EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG ) { +is_signed (xattr_value)) { status =INTEGRITY_PASS ; }
@@ -448,7 +447,7 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >=IMA_XATTR_LAST ))return -EINVAL ;ima_reset_appraise_flags (d_backing_inode (dentry), - xvalue->type =EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG ); +is_signed (xvalue)); result =0 ; }return result;
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +1 -1
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, {struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = event_data->xattr_value; -if ((!xattr_value) || (xattr_value->type !=EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG )) +if (!is_signed (xattr_value))return 0 ; return ima_write_template_field_data(xattr_value, event_data->xattr_len,
PATCH v8 9/14 ima: Export func_tokens
In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermannima_read_modsig() will need it so that it can show an error message.
--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 12 ++++++------ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +2 -0
@@ -195,6 +195,8 @@ enum ima_hooks { __ima_hooks(__ima_hook_enumify) }; +extern const char *const func_tokens[]; +/* LIM API function definitions */ int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid,int mask,enum ima_hooks func,int *pcr);
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +6 -6
@@ -1136,6 +1136,12 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void) } } +#define __ima_hook_stringify (str) (#str), + +const char *const func_tokens[] = { +__ima_hooks (__ima_hook_stringify) +}; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY enum { mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append
@@ -1148,12 +1154,6 @@ static const char *const mask_tokens[] = { "MAY_APPEND" }; -#define __ima_hook_stringify (str) (#str), - -static const char *const func_tokens[] = { -__ima_hooks (__ima_hook_stringify) -}; -void *ima_policy_start (struct seq_file *m,loff_t *pos) {loff_t l = *pos;
PATCH v8 10/14 ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended signatures
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannIntroduce the modsig keyword to the IMA policy syntax to specify that a given hook should expect the file to have the IMA signature appended to it. Here is how it can be used in a rule:
appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig
With this rule, IMA will accept either a signature stored in the extended attribute or an appended signature.
For now, the rule above will behave exactly the same as if appraise_type=imasig was specified. The actual modsig implementation will be introduced separately.
--- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 6 +++++- security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 10 +++++++++ security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 9 ++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 12 +++++++++-- security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +5 -1
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Description: euid:= decimal value fowner:= decimal value lsm: are LSM specific - option: appraise_type:= [imasig] + option: appraise_type:= [imasig] [imasig|modsig] pcr:= decimal value default policy:
@@ -103,3 +103,7 @@ Description: measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4 measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK pcr=5 + + Example of appraise rule allowing modsig appended signatures: + + appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +10 -0
@@ -231,6 +231,16 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM This option enables the different "ima_appraise=" modes (eg. fix, log) from the boot command line. +config IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG + bool "Support module-style signatures for appraisal" + depends on IMA_APPRAISE + default n + help + Adds support for signatures appended to files. The format of the + appended signature is the same used for signed kernel modules. + The modsig keyword can be used in the IMA policy to allow a hook + to accept such signatures. + config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed (deprecated)" depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
security/integrity/ima/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -9,5 +9,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \ ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o +ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) += ima_modsig.o ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +9 -0
@@ -299,6 +299,15 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG +bool ima_hook_supports_modsig (enum ima_hooks func); +#else +static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig (enum ima_hooks func) +{ +return false; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */ +/* LSM based policy rules require audit */ #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c new file +31 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/* +* IMA support for appraising module-style appended signatures. +* +* Copyright (C) 2018 IBM Corporation +* +* Author: +* Thiago Jung Bauermann <[email protected]> +*/ + +#include "ima.h" + +/** +* ima_hook_supports_modsig - can the policy allow modsig for this hook? +* +* modsig is only supported by hooks using ima_post_read_file, because only they +* preload the contents of the file in a buffer. FILE_CHECK does that in some +* cases, but not when reached from vfs_open. POLICY_CHECK can support it, but +* it's not useful in practice because it's a text file so deny. +*/ +bool ima_hook_supports_modsig (enum ima_hooks func) +{ +switch (func) { +case FIRMWARE_CHECK : +case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK : +case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK : +return true; +default : +return false; + } +}
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +10 -2
@@ -1034,6 +1034,10 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)ima_log_string (ab,"appraise_type" , args[0 ].from);if ((strcmp (args[0 ].from,"imasig" )) =0 ) entry->flags |=IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED ; +else if (ima_hook_supports_modsig (entry->func) && +strcmp (args[0 ].from,"imasig|modsig" ) =0 ) + entry->flags |=IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED + |IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED ;else result = -EINVAL ;break ;
@@ -1326,8 +1330,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) } } } -if (entry->flags &IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED ) -seq_puts (m,"appraise_type=imasig " ); +if (entry->flags &IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED ) { +if (entry->flags &IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED ) +seq_puts (m,"appraise_type=imasig|modsig " ); +else +seq_puts (m,"appraise_type=imasig " ); + }if (entry->flags &IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO )seq_puts (m,"permit_directio " );rcu_read_unlock ();
security/integrity/integrity.h +1 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@#define IMA_NEW_FILE 0x04000000#define EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG 0x08000000#define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS 0x10000000 +#define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED 0x20000000#define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \ IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
PATCH v8 11/14 ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannImplement the appraise_type=imasig|modsig option, allowing IMA to read and verify modsig signatures.
In case a file has both an xattr signature and an appended modsig, IMA will only use the appended signature if the key used by the xattr signature isn't present in the IMA keyring.
--- security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 3 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 36 ++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 65 ++++++++++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 17 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 145 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 + 6 files changed, 256 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +3 -0
@@ -234,6 +234,9 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG bool "Support module-style signatures for appraisal" depends on IMA_APPRAISE + depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER + select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT default n help Adds support for signatures appended to files. The format of the
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +35 -1
@@ -156,7 +156,8 @@ void ima_init_template_list(void);static inline bool is_signed (const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value) { -return xattr_value && xattr_value->type =EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG ; +return xattr_value && (xattr_value->type =EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG || + xattr_value->type =IMA_MODSIG ); }/*
@@ -253,6 +254,8 @@ enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, enum ima_hooks func);enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo (struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,int xattr_len); +bool ima_xattr_sig_known_key (const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, +int xattr_len);int ima_read_xattr (struct dentry *dentry,struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value);
@@ -291,6 +294,12 @@ ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len)return ima_hash_algo; } +static inline bool ima_xattr_sig_known_key (const struct evm_ima_xattr_data + *xattr_value,int xattr_len) +{ +return false; +} +static inline int ima_read_xattr (struct dentry *dentry,struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value) {
@@ -301,11 +310,36 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG bool ima_hook_supports_modsig (enum ima_hooks func); +int ima_read_modsig (enum ima_hooks func,const void *buf,loff_t buf_len, +struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value, +int *xattr_len); +int ima_modsig_verify (const unsigned int keyring_id, +struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr); +void ima_free_xattr_data (struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr);#else static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig (enum ima_hooks func) {return false; } + +static inline int ima_read_modsig (enum ima_hooks func,const void *buf, +loff_t buf_len, +struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value, +int *xattr_len) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} + +static inline int ima_modsig_verify (const unsigned int keyring_id, +struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} + +static inline void ima_free_xattr_data (struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr) +{ +kfree (hdr); +}#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */ /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +58 -7
109 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +14 -3
@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value =NULL ;int xattr_len =0 ;bool violation_check; +bool read_sig;enum hash_algo hash_algo;if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG (inode->i_mode))
@@ -274,13 +275,23 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, } template_desc =ima_template_desc_current (); -if ((action &IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK ) || -strcmp (template_desc->name,IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME ) !=0 ) + read_sig = action &IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK || +strcmp (template_desc->name,IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME ) !=0 ; +if (read_sig)/* read 'security.ima' */ xattr_len =ima_read_xattr (file_dentry (file), &xattr_value); hash_algo =ima_get_hash_algo (xattr_value, xattr_len); +/* +* Try to find a modsig if there's no xattr sig or if it is signed by an +* unknown key. +*/ +if (read_sig && iint->flags &IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED && + (xattr_len <=0 || !ima_xattr_sig_known_key (xattr_value, + xattr_len))) +ima_read_modsig (func, buf, size, &xattr_value, &xattr_len); + rc =ima_collect_measurement (iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo);if (rc !=0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL ) goto out_locked;
@@ -307,7 +318,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, !(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) rc = -EACCES ;mutex_unlock (&iint->mutex); -kfree (xattr_value); +ima_free_xattr_data (xattr_value); out:if (pathbuf)__putname (pathbuf);
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c +145 -0
156 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/integrity.h +1 -0
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type {EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG ,IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG ,EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG , +IMA_MODSIG , IMA_XATTR_LAST };
PATCH v8 12/14 ima: Add new "d-sig" template field
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannDefine new "d-sig" template field which holds the digest that is expected to match the one contained in the modsig.
--- Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst | 5 ++++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 9 +++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 4 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h | 2 ++ 6 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst +5 -0
@@ -68,6 +68,11 @@ descriptors by adding their identifier to the format string - 'd-ng': the digest of the event, calculated with an arbitrary hash algorithm (field format: [<hash algo>:]digest, where the digest prefix is shown only if the hash algorithm is not SHA1 or MD5); + - 'd-sig': the digest of the event for files that have an appended modsig. This + field is calculated without including the modsig and thus will differ from + the total digest of the file, but it is what should match the digest + contained in the modsig (if it doesn't, the signature is invalid). It is + shown in the same format as 'd-ng'; - 'n-ng': the name of the event, without size limitations; - 'sig': the file signature.
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +9 -0
@@ -313,6 +313,8 @@ bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func);int ima_read_modsig (enum ima_hooks func,const void *buf,loff_t buf_len,struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value,int *xattr_len); +int ima_get_modsig_hash (struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr,enum hash_algo *algo, +const u8 **hash,u8 *len);int ima_modsig_verify (const unsigned int keyring_id,struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr);void ima_free_xattr_data (struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr);
@@ -330,6 +332,13 @@ static inline int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf,return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } +static inline int ima_get_modsig_hash (struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr, +enum hash_algo *algo,const u8 **hash, +u8 *len) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} +static inline int ima_modsig_verify (const unsigned int keyring_id,struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr) {
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c +23 -0
@@ -144,6 +144,29 @@ int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,return rc; } +int ima_get_modsig_hash (struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr,enum hash_algo *algo, +const u8 **hash,u8 *len) +{ +struct modsig_hdr *modsig = (typeof (modsig )) hdr; +const struct public_key_signature *pks; +int i; + +if (!hdr || hdr->type !=IMA_MODSIG ) +return -EINVAL ; + + pks =pkcs7_get_message_sig (modsig->pkcs7_msg); +if (!pks) +return -EBADMSG ; + +for (i =0 ; i <HASH_ALGO__LAST ; i++) +if (!strcmp (hash_algo_name[i], pks->hash_algo)) +break ; + + *algo = i; + +return pkcs7_get_digest (modsig->pkcs7_msg, hash, len); +} +int ima_modsig_verify (const unsigned int keyring_id,struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr) {
security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +3 -1
@@ -43,8 +43,10 @@ static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = { .field_show = ima_show_template_string}, {.field_id = "sig", .field_init = ima_eventsig_init, .field_show = ima_show_template_sig}, + {.field_id = "d-sig", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_sig_init, + .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng}, }; -#define MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN 15 +#define MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN 24static struct ima_template_desc *ima_template;static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc (const char *name);
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +31 -1
@@ -222,7 +222,8 @@ int ima_parse_buf(void *bufstartp, void *bufendp, void **bufcurp,return 0 ; } -static int ima_eventdigest_init_common (u8 *digest,u32 digestsize,u8 hash_algo, +static int ima_eventdigest_init_common (const u8 *digest,u32 digestsize, +u8 hash_algo,struct ima_field_data *field_data) {/*
@@ -325,6 +326,35 @@ int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, hash_algo, field_data); } +/* +* This function writes the digest of the file which is expected to match the +* digest contained in the file's embedded signature. +*/ +int ima_eventdigest_sig_init (struct ima_event_data *event_data, +struct ima_field_data *field_data) +{ +struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = event_data->xattr_value; +enum hash_algo hash_algo =HASH_ALGO_SHA1 ; +const u8 *cur_digest =NULL ; +u8 cur_digestsize =0 ; +int ret; + +if (!xattr_value || xattr_value->type !=IMA_MODSIG ) +return 0 ; + +if (event_data->violation)/* recording a violation. */ + goto out; + + ret =ima_get_modsig_hash (xattr_value, &hash_algo, &cur_digest, + &cur_digestsize); +if (ret) +return ret; + + out: +return ima_eventdigest_init_common (cur_digest, cur_digestsize, + hash_algo, field_data); +} +static int ima_eventname_init_common (struct ima_event_data *event_data,struct ima_field_data *field_data,bool size_limit)
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h +2 -0
@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ int ima_eventname_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data);int ima_eventdigest_ng_init (struct ima_event_data *event_data,struct ima_field_data *field_data); +int ima_eventdigest_sig_init (struct ima_event_data *event_data, +struct ima_field_data *field_data);int ima_eventname_ng_init (struct ima_event_data *event_data,struct ima_field_data *field_data); int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
PATCH v8 13/14 ima: Write modsig to the measurement list
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannAdd modsig support to the "sig" template field, allowing the the contents of the modsig to be included in the measurement list.
--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 7 +++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 13 +++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +7 -0
@@ -315,6 +315,7 @@ int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len, int *xattr_len);int ima_get_modsig_hash (struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr,enum hash_algo *algo,const u8 **hash,u8 *len); +int ima_modsig_serialize_data (struct evm_ima_xattr_data **data,int *data_len);int ima_modsig_verify (const unsigned int keyring_id,struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr);void ima_free_xattr_data (struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr);
@@ -339,6 +340,12 @@ static inline int ima_get_modsig_hash(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr,return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } +static inline int ima_modsig_serialize_data (struct evm_ima_xattr_data **data, +int *data_len) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} +static inline int ima_modsig_verify (const unsigned int keyring_id,struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr) {
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c +13 -0
@@ -167,6 +167,19 @@ int ima_get_modsig_hash(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr, enum hash_algo *algo,return pkcs7_get_digest (modsig->pkcs7_msg, hash, len); } +int ima_modsig_serialize_data (struct evm_ima_xattr_data **data,int *data_len) +{ +struct modsig_hdr *modsig = (struct modsig_hdr *) *data; + +if (!*data || (*data)->type !=IMA_MODSIG ) +return -EINVAL ; + + *data = &modsig->raw_pkcs7; + *data_len = modsig->raw_pkcs7_len; + +return 0 ; +} +int ima_modsig_verify (const unsigned int keyring_id,struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr) {
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +14 -1
@@ -411,10 +411,23 @@ int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data) {struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = event_data->xattr_value; +int xattr_len = event_data->xattr_len;if (!is_signed (xattr_value))return 0 ; -return ima_write_template_field_data (xattr_value, event_data->xattr_len, +/* +* The xattr_value for IMA_MODSIG is a runtime structure containing +* pointers. Get its raw data instead. +*/ +if (xattr_value->type =IMA_MODSIG ) { +int rc; + + rc =ima_modsig_serialize_data (&xattr_value, &xattr_len); +if (rc) +return rc; + } + +return ima_write_template_field_data (xattr_value, xattr_len,DATA_FMT_HEX , field_data); }
PATCH v8 14/14 ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannIf the IMA template contains the 'sig' field, then the modsig should be added to the measurement list when the file is appraised, and that is what normally happens.
But If a measurement rule caused a file containing a modsig to be measured before a different rule causes it to be appraised, the resulting measurement entry will not contain the modsig because it is only fetched during appraisal. When the appraisal rule triggers, it won't store a new measurement containing the modsig because the file was already measured.
We need to detect that situation and store an additional measurement with the modsig. This is done by defining the appraise subaction flag IMA_READ_MEASURE and testing for it in process_measurement().
--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 8 +++- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 16 +++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 27 ++++++++++++ security/integrity/integrity.h | 9 ++-- 6 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +1 -0
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ int ima_init_crypto(void);void ima_putc (struct seq_file *m,void *data,int datalen);void ima_print_digest (struct seq_file *m,u8 *digest,u32 size);struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current (void ); +bool ima_current_template_has_sig (void );int ima_restore_measurement_entry (struct ima_template_entry *entry);int ima_restore_measurement_list (loff_t bufsize,void *buf);int ima_measurements_show (struct seq_file *m,void *v);
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +7 -1
@@ -289,7 +289,13 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, xattr_len, NULL};int violation =0 ; -if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr)) +/* +* We still need to store the measurement in the case of MODSIG because +* we only have its contents to put in the list at the time of +* appraisal. See comment in store_measurement_again() for more details. +*/ +if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr) && + (!xattr_value || xattr_value->type !=IMA_MODSIG ))return ; result =ima_alloc_init_template (&event_data, &entry);
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +15 -1
@@ -166,6 +166,20 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)ima_check_last_writer (iint, inode, file); } +/* +* A file measurement might already exist in the measurement list. Based on +* policy, include an additional file measurement containing the appended +* signature and file hash, without the appended signature (i.e., the 'd-sig' +* field). +*/ +static bool store_measurement_again (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value) +{ +return iint->flags &IMA_READ_MEASURE && xattr_value && + xattr_value->type =IMA_MODSIG && +ima_current_template_has_sig (); +} +static int process_measurement (struct file *file,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid,char *buf,loff_t size,int mask,enum ima_hooks func)
@@ -299,7 +313,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,if (!pathbuf)/* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */ pathname =ima_d_path (&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename); -if (action &IMA_MEASURE ) +if (action &IMA_MEASURE ||store_measurement_again (iint, xattr_value))ima_store_measurement (iint, file, pathname, xattr_value, xattr_len, pcr);if (rc =0 && (action &IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK )) {
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +54 -5
100 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +27 -0
@@ -231,6 +231,33 @@ struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void)return ima_template; } +/* +* Tells whether the current template has fields which reference a file's +* signature. +*/ +bool ima_current_template_has_sig (void ) +{ +static int ima_template_has_sig =-1 ; + +if (ima_template_has_sig <0 ) { +struct ima_template_desc *template; +int i; + + template =ima_template_desc_current (); +for (i =0 ; i < template->num_fields; i++) +if (!strcmp (template->fields[i]->field_id,"sig" ) || + !strcmp (template->fields[i]->field_id,"d-sig" )) { + ima_template_has_sig =1 ; +break ; + } + +if (ima_template_has_sig <0 ) + ima_template_has_sig =0 ; + } + +return ima_template_has_sig; +} +int __init ima_init_template (void ) {struct ima_template_desc *template =ima_template_desc_current ();
security/integrity/integrity.h +6 -3
@@ -39,12 +39,13 @@#define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED 0x20000000#define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \ - IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) + IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | \ + IMA_READ_MEASURE)#define IMA_DONE_MASK (IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_AUDITED | \ IMA_HASHED | IMA_COLLECTED | \ - IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK) + IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK | IMA_READ_MEASURED) -/* iint subaction appraise cache flags */ +/* iint subaction appraise and measure cache flags */ #define IMA_FILE_APPRAISE 0x00001000#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISED 0x00002000#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE 0x00004000
@@ -55,6 +56,8 @@#define IMA_READ_APPRAISED 0x00080000#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE 0x00100000#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED 0x00200000 +#define IMA_READ_MEASURE 0x00400000 +#define IMA_READ_MEASURED 0x00800000#define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \ IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_READ_APPRAISE | \ IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE)
Re: [PATCH v8 04/14] integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannQuoted 8 lines · Thiago Jung Bauermann
Even though struct
evm_ima_xattr_dataincludes a fixed-size array to hold a SHA1 digest, most of the code ignores the array and uses the struct to mean "type indicator followed by data of unspecified size" and tracks the real size of what the struct represents in a separate length variable.The only exception to that is the EVM code, which correctly uses the definition of struct
evm_ima_xattr_data.
Quoted 8 lines
So make this explicit in the code by removing the length specification from the array in struct
evm_ima_xattr_data. Also, change the name of the element from digest to data since in most places the array doesn't hold a digest.A separate struct
evm_xattris introduced, with the original definition ofevm_ima_xattr_datato be used in the places that actually expect that definition.
, specifically the EVM HMAC code.
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Thiago Jung Bauermann <[email protected]>
Other than commenting the evm_xattr usage is limited to HMAC before the structure definition, this looks good.
Quoted 83 lines
--- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 8 ++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 7 ++++--- security/integrity/integrity.h | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +4
-4@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,/* check value type */ switch (xattr_data->type) {case EVM_XATTR_HMAC : -if (xattr_len !=sizeof (struct evm_ima_xattr_data )) { +if (xattr_len !=sizeof (struct evm_xattr )) { evm_status =INTEGRITY_FAIL ; goto out; }@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, xattr_value_len, &digest);if (rc)break ; - rc =crypto_memneq (xattr_data->digest, digest.digest, + rc =crypto_memneq (xattr_data->data, digest.digest,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE );if (rc) rc = -EINVAL ;@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, struct xattr *evm_xattr) { - struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data; + struct evm_xattr *xattr_data;int rc;if (!evm_key_loaded () || !evm_protected_xattr (lsm_xattr->name))@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,if (!xattr_data)return -ENOMEM ; - xattr_data->type =EVM_XATTR_HMAC ; + xattr_data->data.type =EVM_XATTR_HMAC ; rc =evm_init_hmac (inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest);if (rc <0 ) goto out;security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +4
-3@@ -167,7 +167,8 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,return sig->hash_algo;break ;case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG : - ret = xattr_value->digest[0 ]; +/* first byte contains algorithm id */ + ret = xattr_value->data[0 ];if (ret <HASH_ALGO__LAST )return ret;break ;@@ -175,7 +176,7 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,/* this is for backward compatibility */ if (xattr_len =21 ) {unsigned int zero =0 ; -if (!memcmp (&xattr_value->digest[16 ], &zero,4 )) +if (!memcmp (&xattr_value->data[16 ], &zero,4 ))return HASH_ALGO_MD5 ;else return HASH_ALGO_SHA1 ;@@ -274,7 +275,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,/* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16 */ - rc =memcmp (&xattr_value->digest[hash_start], + rc =memcmp (&xattr_value->data[hash_start], iint->ima_hash->digest, iint->ima_hash->length); elsesecurity/integrity/integrity.h +0
-0
security/integrity/integrity.h enum evm_ima_xattr_type { · line 84
Quoted 6 lines
security/integrity/integrity.h +3
-0@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type {struct evm_ima_xattr_data {u8 type; +u8 data[]; +} __packed; +
Please add a comment here saying that evm_xattr is limited to HMAC.
Quoted 5 lines
security/integrity/integrity.h +2
-0+struct evm_xattr { +struct evm_ima_xattr_data data;u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ]; } __packed;
James Morris
maintainerQuoted 7 lines · Thiago Jung Bauermann
On the OpenPOWER platform, secure boot and trusted boot are being implemented using IMA for taking measurements and verifying signatures. Since the kernel image on Power servers is an ELF binary, kernels are signed using the
scripts/sign-filetool and thus use the same signature format as signed kernel modules.This patch series adds support in IMA for verifying those signatures.
Are you saying you use IMA to verify kernels during boot? From a Linux bootloader?
Quoted 3 lines
It adds flexibility to OpenPOWER secure boot, because it allows it to boot kernels with the signature appended to them as well as kernels where the signature is stored in the IMA extended attribute.
Just to clarify, with these patches, IMA will be able to verify the native form of signed kernel modules? i.e. without xattrs at all, and this will work with existing signed modules?
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
Hello James,
Thanks for you interest in these patches.
Quoted 8 lines · James Morris
Quoted 6 lines · Thiago Jung Bauermann
On the OpenPOWER platform, secure boot and trusted boot are being implemented using IMA for taking measurements and verifying signatures. Since the kernel image on Power servers is an ELF binary, kernels are signed using the
scripts/sign-filetool and thus use the same signature format as signed kernel modules.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
This patch series adds support in IMA for verifying those signatures.
Are you saying you use IMA to verify kernels during boot? From a Linux bootloader?
Yes to both. OpenPOWER machines have embedded in their firmware a Linux kernel and initramfs to use as bootloader, using Petitboot. kexec is used to load the OS and boot it.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
It adds flexibility to OpenPOWER secure boot, because it allows it to boot kernels with the signature appended to them as well as kernels where the signature is stored in the IMA extended attribute.
Just to clarify, with these patches, IMA will be able to verify the native form of signed kernel modules?
That wasn't my use case to develop the patches, but I just tested and it works.
I just had to make a slight modification: there's a whitelist of IMA hooks that are allowed to use the module signature format (in the ima_hook_supports_modsig function), and I had to add MODULE_CHECK to it. The next version of the patches will have this change.
The only difference is that IMA looks for a valid key in the IMA keyring, while the CONFIG_MODULE_SIG code looks for the module signing key in the builtin and secondary trusted keyrings.
Quoted 2 lines
i.e. without xattrs at all, and
this will work with existing signed modules?
No xattrs at all, and yes.
--
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center