4.9.144-stable review

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

commit b1286ed7158e9b62787508066283ab0b8850b518 upstream.

New versions of gcc reasonably warn about the odd pattern of

	strncpy(p, q, strlen(q));

which really doesn't make sense: the strncpy() ends up being just a slow and odd way to write memcpy() in this case.

Apparently there was a patch for this floating around earlier, but it got lost.

---
 lib/test_hexdump.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static void __init test_hexdump_prepare_
 		const char *q = *result++;
 		size_t amount = strlen(q);
 
-		strncpy(p, q, amount);
+		memcpy(p, q, amount);
 		p += amount;
 
 		*p++ = ' ';

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>

commit 77d2a24b6107bd9b3bf2403a65c1428a9da83dd0 upstream.

gcc 8.1.0 complains:

lib/kobject.c:128:3: warning:
'strncpy' output truncated before terminating nul copying as many bytes from a string as its length [-Wstringop-truncation]
lib/kobject.c: In function 'kobject_get_path':
lib/kobject.c:125:13: note: length computed here

Using strncpy() is indeed less than perfect since the length of data to be copied has already been determined with strlen(). Replace strncpy() with memcpy() to address the warning and optimize the code a little.

---
 lib/kobject.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static void fill_kobj_path(struct kobjec
 		int cur = strlen(kobject_name(parent));
 		/* back up enough to print this name with '/' */
 		length -= cur;
-		strncpy(path + length, kobject_name(parent), cur);
+		memcpy(path + length, kobject_name(parent), cur);
 		*(path + --length) = '/';
 	}
 

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

commit 38c7b224ce22c25fed04007839edf974bd13439d upstream.

New versions of gcc reasonably warn about the odd pattern of

	strncpy(p, q, strlen(q));

which really doesn't make sense: the strncpy() ends up being just a slow and odd way to write memcpy() in this case.

There was a comment about _why_ the code used strncpy - to avoid the terminating NUL byte, but memcpy does the same and avoids the warning.

---
 scripts/unifdef.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ usage(void)
  * When we have processed a group that starts off with a known-false
  * #if/#elif sequence (which has therefore been deleted) followed by a
  * #elif that we don't understand and therefore must keep, we edit the
- * latter into a #if to keep the nesting correct. We use strncpy() to
+ * latter into a #if to keep the nesting correct. We use memcpy() to
  * overwrite the 4 byte token "elif" with "if  " without a '\0' byte.
  *
  * When we find a true #elif in a group, the following block will

@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ static void Idrop (void) { Fdrop();  ign
 static void Itrue (void) { Ftrue();  ignoreon(); }
 static void Ifalse(void) { Ffalse(); ignoreon(); }
 /* modify this line */
-static void Mpass (void) { strncpy(keyword, "if  ", 4); Pelif(); }
+static void Mpass (void) { memcpy(keyword, "if  ", 4); Pelif(); }
 static void Mtrue (void) { keywordedit("else");  state(IS_TRUE_MIDDLE); }
 static void Melif (void) { keywordedit("endif"); state(IS_FALSE_TRAILER); }
 static void Melse (void) { keywordedit("endif"); state(IS_FALSE_ELSE); }

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>

commit 166126c1e54d927c2e8efa2702d420e0ce301fd9 upstream.

gcc 8.1.0 complains:

fs/kernfs/symlink.c:91:3: warning:
'strncpy' output truncated before terminating nul copying as many bytes from a string as its length
fs/kernfs/symlink.c: In function 'kernfs_iop_get_link':
fs/kernfs/symlink.c:88:14: note: length computed here

Using strncpy() is indeed less than perfect since the length of data to be copied has already been determined with strlen(). Replace strncpy() with memcpy() to address the warning and optimize the code a little.

---
 fs/kernfs/symlink.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int kernfs_get_target_path(struct
 		int slen = strlen(kn->name);
 
 		len -= slen;
-		strncpy(s + len, kn->name, slen);
+		memcpy(s + len, kn->name, slen);
 		if (len)
 			s[--len] = '/';
 

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>

commit 67a3b63a54cbe18944191f43d644686731cf30c7 upstream.

gcc-8 points out a condition that almost certainly doesn't do what the author had in mind:

drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/mdfld_intel_display.c: In function 'mdfldWaitForPipeEnable':
drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/mdfld_intel_display.c:102:37: error: bitwise comparison always evaluates to false [-Werror=tautological-compare]

This changes it to a simple bit mask operation to check whether the bit is set.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/mdfld_intel_display.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ void mdfldWaitForPipeEnable(struct drm_d
 	/* Wait for for the pipe enable to take effect. */
 	for (count = 0; count < COUNT_MAX; count++) {
 		temp = REG_READ(map->conf);
-		if ((temp & PIPEACONF_PIPE_STATE) == 1)
+		if (temp & PIPEACONF_PIPE_STATE)
 			break;
 	}
 }

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>

commit 24c3456c8d5ee6fc1933ca40f7b4406130682668 upstream.

If for some reason we failed to query the mr status, we need to make sure to provide sufficient information for an ambiguous error (guard error on sector 0).

---
 drivers/infiniband/ulp/iser/iser_verbs.c |    7 +++----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -1110,7 +1110,9 @@ u8 iser_check_task_pi_status(struct iscs
 					 IB_MR_CHECK_SIG_STATUS, &mr_status);
 		if (ret) {
 			pr_err("ib_check_mr_status failed, ret %d\n", ret);
-			goto err;
+			/* Not a lot we can do, return ambiguous guard error */
+			*sector = 0;
+			return 0x1;
 		}
 
 		if (mr_status.fail_status & IB_MR_CHECK_SIG_STATUS) {

@@ -1138,9 +1140,6 @@ u8 iser_check_task_pi_status(struct iscs
 	}
 
 	return 0;
-err:
-	/* Not alot we can do here, return ambiguous guard error */
-	return 0x1;
 }
 
 void iser_err_comp(struct ib_wc *wc, const char *type)

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Martin Wilck <[email protected]>

commit 81df022b688d43d2a3667518b2f755d384397910 upstream.

Cleanly fill memory for "vendor" and "model" with 0-bytes for the "compatible" case rather than adding only a single 0 byte. This simplifies the devinfo code a a bit, and avoids mistakes in other places of the code (not in current upstream, but we had one such mistake in the SUSE kernel).

[mkp: applied by hand and added braces]

---
 drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c |   22 +++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ struct scsi_dev_info_list_table {
 };
 
 
-static const char spaces[] = "                "; /* 16 of them */
 static unsigned scsi_default_dev_flags;
 static LIST_HEAD(scsi_dev_info_list);
 static char scsi_dev_flags[256];

@@ -298,20 +297,13 @@ static void scsi_strcpy_devinfo(char *na
 	size_t from_length;
 
 	from_length = strlen(from);
-	strncpy(to, from, min(to_length, from_length));
-	if (from_length < to_length) {
-		if (compatible) {
-			/*
-			 * NUL terminate the string if it is short.
-			 */
-			to[from_length] = '\0';
-		} else {
-			/* 
-			 * space pad the string if it is short. 
-			 */
-			strncpy(&to[from_length], spaces,
-				to_length - from_length);
-		}
+	/* this zero-pads the destination */
+	strncpy(to, from, to_length);
+	if (from_length < to_length && !compatible) {
+		/*
+		 * space pad the string if it is short.
+		 */
+		memset(&to[from_length], ' ', to_length - from_length);
 	}
 	if (from_length > to_length)
 		 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: %s string '%s' is too long\n",

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

commit 42c335f7e67029d2e01711f2f2bc6252277c8993 upstream.

When copying attributes, the len argument was padded out and the resulting memcpy() would copy beyond the end of the source buffer. Avoid this, and use size_t for val_len to avoid all the casts. Similarly, avoid source buffer casts and use void *.

Additionally enforces val_len can be represented by u16 and that the DMA buffer was not overflowed. Fixes the size of mfa, which is not FC_FDMI_PORT_ATTR_MAXFRAMESIZE_LEN (but it will be padded up to 4). This was noticed by the future CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE checks.

---
 drivers/scsi/csiostor/csio_lnode.c |   43 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

@@ -238,14 +238,23 @@ csio_osname(uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len
 }
 
 static inline void
-csio_append_attrib(uint8_t **ptr, uint16_t type, uint8_t *val, uint16_t len)
+csio_append_attrib(uint8_t **ptr, uint16_t type, void *val, size_t val_len)
 {
+	uint16_t len;
 	struct fc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae = (struct fc_fdmi_attr_entry *)*ptr;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(val_len > U16_MAX))
+		return;
+
+	len = val_len;
+
 	ae->type = htons(type);
 	len += 4;		/* includes attribute type and length */
 	len = (len + 3) & ~3;	/* should be multiple of 4 bytes */
 	ae->len = htons(len);
-	memcpy(ae->value, val, len);
+	memcpy(ae->value, val, val_len);
+	if (len > val_len)
+		memset(ae->value + val_len, 0, len - val_len);
 	*ptr += len;
 }
 

@@ -335,7 +344,7 @@ csio_ln_fdmi_rhba_cbfn(struct csio_hw *h
 	numattrs++;
 	val = htonl(FC_PORTSPEED_1GBIT | FC_PORTSPEED_10GBIT);
 	csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_PORT_ATTR_SUPPORTEDSPEED,
-			   (uint8_t *)&val,
+			   &val,
 			   FC_FDMI_PORT_ATTR_SUPPORTEDSPEED_LEN);
 	numattrs++;
 

@@ -346,23 +355,22 @@ csio_ln_fdmi_rhba_cbfn(struct csio_hw *h
 	else
 		val = htonl(CSIO_HBA_PORTSPEED_UNKNOWN);
 	csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_PORT_ATTR_CURRENTPORTSPEED,
-			   (uint8_t *)&val,
-			   FC_FDMI_PORT_ATTR_CURRENTPORTSPEED_LEN);
+			   &val, FC_FDMI_PORT_ATTR_CURRENTPORTSPEED_LEN);
 	numattrs++;
 
 	mfs = ln->ln_sparm.csp.sp_bb_data;
 	csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_PORT_ATTR_MAXFRAMESIZE,
-			   (uint8_t *)&mfs, FC_FDMI_PORT_ATTR_MAXFRAMESIZE_LEN);
+			   &mfs, sizeof(mfs));
 	numattrs++;
 
 	strcpy(buf, "csiostor");
 	csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_PORT_ATTR_OSDEVICENAME, buf,
-			   (uint16_t)strlen(buf));
+			   strlen(buf));
 	numattrs++;
 
 	if (!csio_hostname(buf, sizeof(buf))) {
 		csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_PORT_ATTR_HOSTNAME,
-				   buf, (uint16_t)strlen(buf));
+				   buf, strlen(buf));
 		numattrs++;
 	}
 	attrib_blk->numattrs = htonl(numattrs);

@@ -444,33 +452,32 @@ csio_ln_fdmi_dprt_cbfn(struct csio_hw *h
 
 	strcpy(buf, "Chelsio Communications");
 	csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_HBA_ATTR_MANUFACTURER, buf,
-			   (uint16_t)strlen(buf));
+			   strlen(buf));
 	numattrs++;
 	csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_HBA_ATTR_SERIALNUMBER,
-			   hw->vpd.sn, (uint16_t)sizeof(hw->vpd.sn));
+			   hw->vpd.sn, sizeof(hw->vpd.sn));
 	numattrs++;
 	csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_HBA_ATTR_MODEL, hw->vpd.id,
-			   (uint16_t)sizeof(hw->vpd.id));
+			   sizeof(hw->vpd.id));
 	numattrs++;
 	csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_HBA_ATTR_MODELDESCRIPTION,
-			   hw->model_desc, (uint16_t)strlen(hw->model_desc));
+			   hw->model_desc, strlen(hw->model_desc));
 	numattrs++;
 	csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_HBA_ATTR_HARDWAREVERSION,
-			   hw->hw_ver, (uint16_t)sizeof(hw->hw_ver));
+			   hw->hw_ver, sizeof(hw->hw_ver));
 	numattrs++;
 	csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_HBA_ATTR_FIRMWAREVERSION,
-			   hw->fwrev_str, (uint16_t)strlen(hw->fwrev_str));
+			   hw->fwrev_str, strlen(hw->fwrev_str));
 	numattrs++;
 
 	if (!csio_osname(buf, sizeof(buf))) {
 		csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_HBA_ATTR_OSNAMEVERSION,
-				   buf, (uint16_t)strlen(buf));
+				   buf, strlen(buf));
 		numattrs++;
 	}
 
 	csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_HBA_ATTR_MAXCTPAYLOAD,
-			   (uint8_t *)&maxpayload,
-			   FC_FDMI_HBA_ATTR_MAXCTPAYLOAD_LEN);
+			   &maxpayload, FC_FDMI_HBA_ATTR_MAXCTPAYLOAD_LEN);
 	len = (uint32_t)(pld - (uint8_t *)cmd);
 	numattrs++;
 	attrib_blk->numattrs = htonl(numattrs);

@@ -1794,6 +1801,8 @@ csio_ln_mgmt_submit_req(struct csio_iore
 	struct csio_mgmtm *mgmtm = csio_hw_to_mgmtm(hw);
 	int rv;
 
+	BUG_ON(pld_len > pld->len);
+
 	io_req->io_cbfn = io_cbfn;	/* Upper layer callback handler */
 	io_req->fw_handle = (uintptr_t) (io_req);
 	io_req->eq_idx = mgmtm->eq_idx;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Laura Abbott <[email protected]>

commit 2dd453168643d9475028cd867c57e65956a0f7f9 upstream.

There's an error when compiled with restrict:

drivers/tty/serial/kgdboc.c: In function ‘configure_kgdboc’:
drivers/tty/serial/kgdboc.c:137:2: error: ‘strcpy’ source argument is the same as destination [-Werror=restrict]
strcpy(config, opt);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

As the error implies, this is from trying to use config as both source and destination. Drop the call to the function where config is the argument since nothing else happens in the function.

---
 drivers/tty/serial/kgdboc.c |    6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -162,15 +162,13 @@ static int configure_kgdboc(void)
 {
 	struct tty_driver *p;
 	int tty_line = 0;
-	int err;
+	int err = -ENODEV;
 	char *cptr = config;
 	struct console *cons;
 
-	err = kgdboc_option_setup(config);
-	if (err || !strlen(config) || isspace(config[0]))
+	if (!strlen(config) || isspace(config[0]))
 		goto noconfig;
 
-	err = -ENODEV;
 	kgdboc_io_ops.is_console = 0;
 	kgdb_tty_driver = NULL;
 

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Laura Abbott <[email protected]>

commit 1cd25cbb2fedbc777f3a8c3cb1ba69b645aeaa64 upstream.

After 2dd453168643 ("kgdboc: Fix restrict error"), kgdboc_option_setup is now only used when built in, resulting in a warning when compiled as a module:

drivers/tty/serial/kgdboc.c:134:12: warning: 'kgdboc_option_setup' defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
static int kgdboc_option_setup(char *opt)

            ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Move the function under the appropriate ifdef for builtin only.

---
 drivers/tty/serial/kgdboc.c |   37 +++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

@@ -131,24 +131,6 @@ static void kgdboc_unregister_kbd(void)
 #define kgdboc_restore_input()
 #endif /* ! CONFIG_KDB_KEYBOARD */
 
-static int kgdboc_option_setup(char *opt)
-{
-	if (!opt) {
-		pr_err("kgdboc: config string not provided\n");
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	if (strlen(opt) >= MAX_CONFIG_LEN) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "kgdboc: config string too long\n");
-		return -ENOSPC;
-	}
-	strcpy(config, opt);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-__setup("kgdboc=", kgdboc_option_setup);
-
 static void cleanup_kgdboc(void)
 {
 	if (kgdb_unregister_nmi_console())

@@ -316,6 +298,25 @@ static struct kgdb_io kgdboc_io_ops = {
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KGDB_SERIAL_CONSOLE
+static int kgdboc_option_setup(char *opt)
+{
+	if (!opt) {
+		pr_err("config string not provided\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (strlen(opt) >= MAX_CONFIG_LEN) {
+		pr_err("config string too long\n");
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	}
+	strcpy(config, opt);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+__setup("kgdboc=", kgdboc_option_setup);
+
+
 /* This is only available if kgdboc is a built in for early debugging */
 static int __init kgdboc_early_init(char *opt)
 {

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Todd Kjos <[email protected]>

commit 7f3dc0088b98533f17128058fac73cd8b2752ef1 upstream.

proc->files cleanup is initiated by binder_vma_close. Therefore a reference on the binder_proc is not enough to prevent the files_struct from being released while the binder_proc still has a reference. This can lead to an attempt to dereference the stale pointer obtained from proc->files prior to proc->files cleanup. This has been seen once in task_get_unused_fd_flags() when __alloc_fd() is called with a stale "files".

The fix is to protect proc->files with a mutex to prevent cleanup while in use.

---
 drivers/android/binder.c |   41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

@@ -302,6 +302,7 @@ struct binder_proc {
 	struct mm_struct *vma_vm_mm;
 	struct task_struct *tsk;
 	struct files_struct *files;
+	struct mutex files_lock;
 	struct hlist_node deferred_work_node;
 	int deferred_work;
 	void *buffer;

@@ -375,20 +376,26 @@ binder_defer_work(struct binder_proc *pr
 
 static int task_get_unused_fd_flags(struct binder_proc *proc, int flags)
 {
-	struct files_struct *files = proc->files;
 	unsigned long rlim_cur;
 	unsigned long irqs;
+	int ret;
 
-	if (files == NULL)
-		return -ESRCH;
-
-	if (!lock_task_sighand(proc->tsk, &irqs))
-		return -EMFILE;
-
+	mutex_lock(&proc->files_lock);
+	if (proc->files == NULL) {
+		ret = -ESRCH;
+		goto err;
+	}
+	if (!lock_task_sighand(proc->tsk, &irqs)) {
+		ret = -EMFILE;
+		goto err;
+	}
 	rlim_cur = task_rlimit(proc->tsk, RLIMIT_NOFILE);
 	unlock_task_sighand(proc->tsk, &irqs);
 
-	return __alloc_fd(files, 0, rlim_cur, flags);
+	ret = __alloc_fd(proc->files, 0, rlim_cur, flags);
+err:
+	mutex_unlock(&proc->files_lock);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /*

@@ -397,8 +404,10 @@ static int task_get_unused_fd_flags(stru
 static void task_fd_install(
 	struct binder_proc *proc, unsigned int fd, struct file *file)
 {
+	mutex_lock(&proc->files_lock);
 	if (proc->files)
 		__fd_install(proc->files, fd, file);
+	mutex_unlock(&proc->files_lock);
 }
 
 /*

@@ -408,9 +417,11 @@ static long task_close_fd(struct binder_
 {
 	int retval;
 
-	if (proc->files == NULL)
-		return -ESRCH;
-
+	mutex_lock(&proc->files_lock);
+	if (proc->files == NULL) {
+		retval = -ESRCH;
+		goto err;
+	}
 	retval = __close_fd(proc->files, fd);
 	/* can't restart close syscall because file table entry was cleared */
 	if (unlikely(retval == -ERESTARTSYS ||

@@ -418,7 +429,8 @@ static long task_close_fd(struct binder_
 		     retval == -ERESTARTNOHAND ||
 		     retval == -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK))
 		retval = -EINTR;
-
+err:
+	mutex_unlock(&proc->files_lock);
 	return retval;
 }
 

@@ -2946,7 +2958,9 @@ static int binder_mmap(struct file *filp
 	binder_insert_free_buffer(proc, buffer);
 	proc->free_async_space = proc->buffer_size / 2;
 	barrier();
+	mutex_lock(&proc->files_lock);
 	proc->files = get_files_struct(current);
+	mutex_unlock(&proc->files_lock);
 	proc->vma = vma;
 	proc->vma_vm_mm = vma->vm_mm;
 

@@ -2982,6 +2996,7 @@ static int binder_open(struct inode *nod
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	get_task_struct(current->group_leader);
 	proc->tsk = current->group_leader;
+	mutex_init(&proc->files_lock);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&proc->todo);
 	init_waitqueue_head(&proc->wait);
 	proc->default_priority = task_nice(current);

@@ -3220,9 +3235,11 @@ static void binder_deferred_func(struct
 
 		files = NULL;
 		if (defer & BINDER_DEFERRED_PUT_FILES) {
+			mutex_lock(&proc->files_lock);
 			files = proc->files;
 			if (files)
 				proc->files = NULL;
+			mutex_unlock(&proc->files_lock);
 		}
 
 		if (defer & BINDER_DEFERRED_FLUSH)

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Hoff <[email protected]>

commit d55bda1b3e7c5a87f10da54fdda866a9a9cef30b upstream.

"of_get_named_gpio()" returns a negative error value if it fails and drivers should check for this. This missing check was now added to the matrix_keypad driver.

In my case "of_get_named_gpio()" returned -EPROBE_DEFER because the referenced GPIOs belong to an I/O expander, which was not yet probed at the point in time when the matrix_keypad driver was loading. Because the driver did not check for errors from the "of_get_named_gpio()" routine, it was assuming that "-EPROBE_DEFER" is actually a GPIO number and continued as usual, which led to further errors like this later on:

WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 167 at drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c:114
gpio_to_desc+0xc8/0xd0

invalid GPIO -517

Note that the "GPIO number" -517 in the error message above is actually "-EPROBE_DEFER".

As part of the patch a misleading error message "no platform data defined" was also removed. This does not lead to information loss because the other error paths in matrix_keypad_parse_dt() already print an error.

---
 drivers/input/keyboard/matrix_keypad.c |   23 ++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ matrix_keypad_parse_dt(struct device *de
 	struct matrix_keypad_platform_data *pdata;
 	struct device_node *np = dev->of_node;
 	unsigned int *gpios;
-	int i, nrow, ncol;
+	int ret, i, nrow, ncol;
 
 	if (!np) {
 		dev_err(dev, "device lacks DT data\n");

@@ -447,12 +447,19 @@ matrix_keypad_parse_dt(struct device *de
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 	}
 
-	for (i = 0; i < pdata->num_row_gpios; i++)
-		gpios[i] = of_get_named_gpio(np, "row-gpios", i);
+	for (i = 0; i < nrow; i++) {
+		ret = of_get_named_gpio(np, "row-gpios", i);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ERR_PTR(ret);
+		gpios[i] = ret;
+	}
 
-	for (i = 0; i < pdata->num_col_gpios; i++)
-		gpios[pdata->num_row_gpios + i] =
-			of_get_named_gpio(np, "col-gpios", i);
+	for (i = 0; i < ncol; i++) {
+		ret = of_get_named_gpio(np, "col-gpios", i);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ERR_PTR(ret);
+		gpios[nrow + i] = ret;
+	}
 
 	pdata->row_gpios = gpios;
 	pdata->col_gpios = &gpios[pdata->num_row_gpios];

@@ -479,10 +486,8 @@ static int matrix_keypad_probe(struct pl
 	pdata = dev_get_platdata(&pdev->dev);
 	if (!pdata) {
 		pdata = matrix_keypad_parse_dt(&pdev->dev);
-		if (IS_ERR(pdata)) {
-			dev_err(&pdev->dev, "no platform data defined\n");
+		if (IS_ERR(pdata))
 			return PTR_ERR(pdata);
-		}
 	} else if (!pdata->keymap_data) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "no keymap data defined\n");
 		return -EINVAL;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

commit 9084cb6a24bf5838a665af92ded1af8363f9e563 upstream.

We were iterating a block group's free space cache rbtree without locking first the lock that protects it (the free_space_ctl->free_space_offset rbtree is protected by the free_space_ctl->tree_lock spinlock).

KASAN reported an use-after-free problem when iterating such a rbtree due to a concurrent rbtree delete:

[ 9520.359168] ==================================================================
[ 9520.359656] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rb_next+0x13/0x90
[ 9520.359949] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8800b7ada500 by task btrfs-transacti/1721
[ 9520.360357]
[ 9520.360530] CPU: 4 PID: 1721 Comm: btrfs-transacti Tainted: G             L    4.19.0-rc8-nbor #555
[ 9520.360990] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 9520.362682] Call Trace:
[ 9520.362887]  dump_stack+0xa4/0xf5
[ 9520.363146]  print_address_description+0x78/0x280
[ 9520.363412]  kasan_report+0x263/0x390
[ 9520.363650]  ? rb_next+0x13/0x90
[ 9520.363873]  __asan_load8+0x54/0x90
[ 9520.364102]  rb_next+0x13/0x90
[ 9520.364380]  btrfs_dump_free_space+0x146/0x160 [btrfs]
[ 9520.364697]  dump_space_info+0x2cd/0x310 [btrfs]
[ 9520.364997]  btrfs_reserve_extent+0x1ee/0x1f0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.365310]  __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x1cc/0x620 [btrfs]
[ 9520.365646]  ? btrfs_update_time+0x180/0x180 [btrfs]
[ 9520.365923]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
[ 9520.366204]  ? btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x2c0/0x5c0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.366549]  btrfs_prealloc_file_range_trans+0x23/0x30 [btrfs]
[ 9520.366880]  cache_save_setup+0x42e/0x580 [btrfs]
[ 9520.367220]  ? btrfs_check_data_free_space+0xd0/0xd0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.367518]  ? lock_downgrade+0x2f0/0x2f0
[ 9520.367799]  ? btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x11f/0x6e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.368104]  ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 9520.368349]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa8/0x140
[ 9520.368638]  btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x2af/0x6e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.368978]  ? btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x870/0x870 [btrfs]
[ 9520.369282]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa8/0x140
[ 9520.369534]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
[ 9520.369811]  ? btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1b8/0x230 [btrfs]
[ 9520.370137]  commit_cowonly_roots+0x4b9/0x610 [btrfs]
[ 9520.370560]  ? commit_fs_roots+0x350/0x350 [btrfs]
[ 9520.370926]  ? btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1b8/0x230 [btrfs]
[ 9520.371285]  btrfs_commit_transaction+0x5e5/0x10e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.371612]  ? btrfs_apply_pending_changes+0x90/0x90 [btrfs]
[ 9520.371943]  ? start_transaction+0x168/0x6c0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.372257]  transaction_kthread+0x21c/0x240 [btrfs]
[ 9520.372537]  kthread+0x1d2/0x1f0
[ 9520.372793]  ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0xb50/0xb50 [btrfs]
[ 9520.373090]  ? kthread_park+0xb0/0xb0
[ 9520.373329]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[ 9520.373567]
[ 9520.373738] Allocated by task 1804:
[ 9520.373974]  kasan_kmalloc+0xff/0x180
[ 9520.374208]  kasan_slab_alloc+0x11/0x20
[ 9520.374447]  kmem_cache_alloc+0xfc/0x2d0
[ 9520.374731]  __btrfs_add_free_space+0x40/0x580 [btrfs]
[ 9520.375044]  unpin_extent_range+0x4f7/0x7a0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.375383]  btrfs_finish_extent_commit+0x15f/0x4d0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.375707]  btrfs_commit_transaction+0xb06/0x10e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.376027]  btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x237/0x5c0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.376365]  btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x81/0xd0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.376689]  btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space+0x25/0x80 [btrfs]
[ 9520.377018]  btrfs_direct_IO+0x42e/0x6d0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.377284]  generic_file_direct_write+0x11e/0x220
[ 9520.377587]  btrfs_file_write_iter+0x472/0xac0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.377875]  aio_write+0x25c/0x360
[ 9520.378106]  io_submit_one+0xaa0/0xdc0
[ 9520.378343]  __se_sys_io_submit+0xfa/0x2f0
[ 9520.378589]  __x64_sys_io_submit+0x43/0x50
[ 9520.378840]  do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x240
[ 9520.379081]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 9520.379387]
[ 9520.379557] Freed by task 1802:
[ 9520.379782]  __kasan_slab_free+0x173/0x260
[ 9520.380028]  kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10
[ 9520.380262]  kmem_cache_free+0xc1/0x2c0
[ 9520.380544]  btrfs_find_space_for_alloc+0x4cd/0x4e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.380866]  find_free_extent+0xa99/0x17e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.381166]  btrfs_reserve_extent+0xd5/0x1f0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.381474]  btrfs_get_blocks_direct+0x60b/0xbd0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.381761]  __blockdev_direct_IO+0x10ee/0x58a1
[ 9520.382059]  btrfs_direct_IO+0x25a/0x6d0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.382321]  generic_file_direct_write+0x11e/0x220
[ 9520.382623]  btrfs_file_write_iter+0x472/0xac0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.382904]  aio_write+0x25c/0x360
[ 9520.383172]  io_submit_one+0xaa0/0xdc0
[ 9520.383416]  __se_sys_io_submit+0xfa/0x2f0
[ 9520.383678]  __x64_sys_io_submit+0x43/0x50
[ 9520.383927]  do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x240
[ 9520.384165]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 9520.384439]
[ 9520.384610] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8800b7ada500
                which belongs to the cache btrfs_free_space of size 72
[ 9520.385175] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
                72-byte region [ffff8800b7ada500, ffff8800b7ada548)
[ 9520.385691] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 9520.385957] page:ffffea0002deb680 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff880108a1d700 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 9520.388030] flags: 0x8100(slab|head)
[ 9520.388281] raw: 0000000000008100 ffffea0002deb608 ffffea0002728808 ffff880108a1d700
[ 9520.388722] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000130013 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 9520.389169] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 9520.389473]
[ 9520.389658] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 9520.389943]  ffff8800b7ada400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 9520.390368]  ffff8800b7ada480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 9520.390796] >ffff8800b7ada500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 9520.391223]                    ^
[ 9520.391461]  ffff8800b7ada580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 9520.391885]  ffff8800b7ada600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 9520.392313] ==================================================================
[ 9520.392772] BTRFS critical (device vdc): entry offset 2258497536, bytes 131072, bitmap no
[ 9520.393247] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000011
[ 9520.393705] PGD 800000010dbab067 P4D 800000010dbab067 PUD 107551067 PMD 0
[ 9520.394059] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI
[ 9520.394378] CPU: 4 PID: 1721 Comm: btrfs-transacti Tainted: G    B        L    4.19.0-rc8-nbor #555
[ 9520.394858] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 9520.395350] RIP: 0010:rb_next+0x3c/0x90
[ 9520.396461] RSP: 0018:ffff8801074ff780 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 9520.396762] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff81b5ac4c
[ 9520.397115] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000011
[ 9520.397468] RBP: ffff8801074ff7a0 R08: ffffed0021d64ccc R09: ffffed0021d64ccc
[ 9520.397821] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0021d64ccb R12: ffff8800b91e0000
[ 9520.398188] R13: ffff8800a3ceba48 R14: ffff8800b627bf80 R15: 0000000000020000
[ 9520.398555] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88010eb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 9520.399007] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 9520.399335] CR2: 0000000000000011 CR3: 0000000106b52000 CR4: 00000000000006a0
[ 9520.399679] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 9520.400023] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 9520.400400] Call Trace:
[ 9520.400648]  btrfs_dump_free_space+0x146/0x160 [btrfs]
[ 9520.400974]  dump_space_info+0x2cd/0x310 [btrfs]
[ 9520.401287]  btrfs_reserve_extent+0x1ee/0x1f0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.401609]  __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x1cc/0x620 [btrfs]
[ 9520.401952]  ? btrfs_update_time+0x180/0x180 [btrfs]
[ 9520.402232]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
[ 9520.402522]  ? btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x2c0/0x5c0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.402882]  btrfs_prealloc_file_range_trans+0x23/0x30 [btrfs]
[ 9520.403261]  cache_save_setup+0x42e/0x580 [btrfs]
[ 9520.403570]  ? btrfs_check_data_free_space+0xd0/0xd0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.403871]  ? lock_downgrade+0x2f0/0x2f0
[ 9520.404161]  ? btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x11f/0x6e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.404481]  ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 9520.404732]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa8/0x140
[ 9520.405026]  btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x2af/0x6e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.405375]  ? btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x870/0x870 [btrfs]
[ 9520.405694]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa8/0x140
[ 9520.405958]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
[ 9520.406243]  ? btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1b8/0x230 [btrfs]
[ 9520.406574]  commit_cowonly_roots+0x4b9/0x610 [btrfs]
[ 9520.406899]  ? commit_fs_roots+0x350/0x350 [btrfs]
[ 9520.407253]  ? btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1b8/0x230 [btrfs]
[ 9520.407589]  btrfs_commit_transaction+0x5e5/0x10e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.407925]  ? btrfs_apply_pending_changes+0x90/0x90 [btrfs]
[ 9520.408262]  ? start_transaction+0x168/0x6c0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.408582]  transaction_kthread+0x21c/0x240 [btrfs]
[ 9520.408870]  kthread+0x1d2/0x1f0
[ 9520.409138]  ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0xb50/0xb50 [btrfs]
[ 9520.409440]  ? kthread_park+0xb0/0xb0
[ 9520.409682]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[ 9520.410508] Dumping ftrace buffer:
[ 9520.410764]    (ftrace buffer empty)
[ 9520.411007] CR2: 0000000000000011
[ 9520.411297] ---[ end trace 01a0863445cf360a ]---
[ 9520.411568] RIP: 0010:rb_next+0x3c/0x90
[ 9520.412644] RSP: 0018:ffff8801074ff780 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 9520.412932] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff81b5ac4c
[ 9520.413274] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000011
[ 9520.413616] RBP: ffff8801074ff7a0 R08: ffffed0021d64ccc R09: ffffed0021d64ccc
[ 9520.414007] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0021d64ccb R12: ffff8800b91e0000
[ 9520.414349] R13: ffff8800a3ceba48 R14: ffff8800b627bf80 R15: 0000000000020000
[ 9520.416074] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88010eb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 9520.416536] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 9520.416848] CR2: 0000000000000011 CR3: 0000000106b52000 CR4: 00000000000006a0
[ 9520.418477] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 9520.418846] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 9520.419204] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 9520.419666] Dumping ftrace buffer:
[ 9520.419930]    (ftrace buffer empty)
[ 9520.420168] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 9520.420406] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]---

Fix this by acquiring the respective lock before iterating the rbtree.

---
 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -2464,6 +2464,7 @@ void btrfs_dump_free_space(struct btrfs_
 	struct rb_node *n;
 	int count = 0;
 
+	spin_lock(&ctl->tree_lock);
 	for (n = rb_first(&ctl->free_space_offset); n; n = rb_next(n)) {
 		info = rb_entry(n, struct btrfs_free_space, offset_index);
 		if (info->bytes >= bytes && !block_group->ro)

@@ -2473,6 +2474,7 @@ void btrfs_dump_free_space(struct btrfs_
 			   info->offset, info->bytes,
 		       (info->bitmap) ? "yes" : "no");
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&ctl->tree_lock);
 	btrfs_info(block_group->fs_info, "block group has cluster?: %s",
 	       list_empty(&block_group->cluster_list) ? "no" : "yes");
 	btrfs_info(block_group->fs_info,

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ramiro Oliveira <[email protected]>

commit bb475230b8e59a547ab66ac3b02572df21a580e9 upstream.

The *_get_optional_* functions weren't really optional so this patch makes them really optional.

These *_get_optional_* functions will now return NULL instead of an error if no matching reset phandle is found in the DT, and all the reset_control_* functions now accept NULL rstc pointers.

---
 drivers/reset/core.c  |   48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 include/linux/reset.h |   45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

@@ -135,11 +135,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(devm_reset_controller_
  * @rstc: reset controller
  *
  * Calling this on a shared reset controller is an error.
+ *
+ * If rstc is NULL it is an optional reset and the function will just
+ * return 0.
  */
 int reset_control_reset(struct reset_control *rstc)
 {
-	if (WARN_ON(IS_ERR_OR_NULL(rstc)) ||
-	    WARN_ON(rstc->shared))
+	if (!rstc)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(IS_ERR(rstc)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (rstc->rcdev->ops->reset)

@@ -159,10 +164,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(reset_control_reset);
  *
  * For shared reset controls a driver cannot expect the hw's registers and
  * internal state to be reset, but must be prepared for this to happen.
+ *
+ * If rstc is NULL it is an optional reset and the function will just
+ * return 0.
  */
 int reset_control_assert(struct reset_control *rstc)
 {
-	if (WARN_ON(IS_ERR_OR_NULL(rstc)))
+	if (!rstc)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(IS_ERR(rstc)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!rstc->rcdev->ops->assert)

@@ -185,10 +196,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(reset_control_assert);
  * @rstc: reset controller
  *
  * After calling this function, the reset is guaranteed to be deasserted.
+ *
+ * If rstc is NULL it is an optional reset and the function will just
+ * return 0.
  */
 int reset_control_deassert(struct reset_control *rstc)
 {
-	if (WARN_ON(IS_ERR_OR_NULL(rstc)))
+	if (!rstc)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(IS_ERR(rstc)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!rstc->rcdev->ops->deassert)

@@ -206,12 +223,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(reset_control_deassert
 /**
  * reset_control_status - returns a negative errno if not supported, a
  * positive value if the reset line is asserted, or zero if the reset
- * line is not asserted.
+ * line is not asserted or if the desc is NULL (optional reset).
  * @rstc: reset controller
  */
 int reset_control_status(struct reset_control *rstc)
 {
-	if (WARN_ON(IS_ERR_OR_NULL(rstc)))
+	if (!rstc)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(IS_ERR(rstc)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (rstc->rcdev->ops->status)

@@ -268,7 +288,8 @@ static void __reset_control_put(struct r
 }
 
 struct reset_control *__of_reset_control_get(struct device_node *node,
-				     const char *id, int index, int shared)
+				     const char *id, int index, bool shared,
+				     bool optional)
 {
 	struct reset_control *rstc;
 	struct reset_controller_dev *r, *rcdev;

@@ -282,14 +303,18 @@ struct reset_control *__of_reset_control
 	if (id) {
 		index = of_property_match_string(node,
 						 "reset-names", id);
+		if (index == -EILSEQ)
+			return ERR_PTR(index);
 		if (index < 0)
-			return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
+			return optional ? NULL : ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
 	}
 
 	ret = of_parse_phandle_with_args(node, "resets", "#reset-cells",
 					 index, &args);
-	if (ret)
+	if (ret == -EINVAL)
 		return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	if (ret)
+		return optional ? NULL : ERR_PTR(ret);
 
 	mutex_lock(&reset_list_mutex);
 	rcdev = NULL;

@@ -348,7 +373,8 @@ static void devm_reset_control_release(s
 }
 
 struct reset_control *__devm_reset_control_get(struct device *dev,
-				     const char *id, int index, int shared)
+				     const char *id, int index, bool shared,
+				     bool optional)
 {
 	struct reset_control **ptr, *rstc;
 

@@ -358,7 +384,7 @@ struct reset_control *__devm_reset_contr
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 
 	rstc = __of_reset_control_get(dev ? dev->of_node : NULL,
-				      id, index, shared);
+				      id, index, shared, optional);
 	if (!IS_ERR(rstc)) {
 		*ptr = rstc;
 		devres_add(dev, ptr);

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Philipp Zabel <[email protected]>

commit 62e24c5775ecb387a3eb33701378ccfa6dbc98ee upstream.

Rename the internal __reset_control_get/put functions to __reset_control_get/put_internal and add an exported __reset_control_get equivalent to __of_reset_control_get that takes a struct device parameter.
This avoids the confusing call to __of_reset_control_get in the non-DT case and fixes the devm_reset_control_get_optional function to return NULL if RESET_CONTROLLER is enabled but dev->of_node == NULL.

---
 drivers/reset/core.c  |   22 ++++++++++++++++------
 include/linux/reset.h |   22 ++++++++++++++--------
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ int reset_control_status(struct reset_co
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(reset_control_status);
 
-static struct reset_control *__reset_control_get(
+static struct reset_control *__reset_control_get_internal(
 				struct reset_controller_dev *rcdev,
 				unsigned int index, int shared)
 {

@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static struct reset_control *__reset_con
 	return rstc;
 }
 
-static void __reset_control_put(struct reset_control *rstc)
+static void __reset_control_put_internal(struct reset_control *rstc)
 {
 	lockdep_assert_held(&reset_list_mutex);
 

@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ struct reset_control *__of_reset_control
 	}
 
 	/* reset_list_mutex also protects the rcdev's reset_control list */
-	rstc = __reset_control_get(rcdev, rstc_id, shared);
+	rstc = __reset_control_get_internal(rcdev, rstc_id, shared);
 
 	mutex_unlock(&reset_list_mutex);
 

@@ -351,6 +351,17 @@ struct reset_control *__of_reset_control
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__of_reset_control_get);
 
+struct reset_control *__reset_control_get(struct device *dev, const char *id,
+					  int index, bool shared, bool optional)
+{
+	if (dev->of_node)
+		return __of_reset_control_get(dev->of_node, id, index, shared,
+					      optional);
+
+	return optional ? NULL : ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__reset_control_get);
+
 /**
  * reset_control_put - free the reset controller
  * @rstc: reset controller

@@ -362,7 +373,7 @@ void reset_control_put(struct reset_cont
 		return;
 
 	mutex_lock(&reset_list_mutex);
-	__reset_control_put(rstc);
+	__reset_control_put_internal(rstc);
 	mutex_unlock(&reset_list_mutex);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(reset_control_put);

@@ -383,8 +394,7 @@ struct reset_control *__devm_reset_contr
 	if (!ptr)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 
-	rstc = __of_reset_control_get(dev ? dev->of_node : NULL,
-				      id, index, shared, optional);
+	rstc = __reset_control_get(dev, id, index, shared, optional);
 	if (!IS_ERR(rstc)) {
 		*ptr = rstc;
 		devres_add(dev, ptr);

@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ int reset_control_status(struct reset_co
 struct reset_control *__of_reset_control_get(struct device_node *node,
 				     const char *id, int index, bool shared,
 				     bool optional);
+struct reset_control *__reset_control_get(struct device *dev, const char *id,
+					  int index, bool shared,
+					  bool optional);
 void reset_control_put(struct reset_control *rstc);
 struct reset_control *__devm_reset_control_get(struct device *dev,
 				     const char *id, int index, bool shared,

@@ -72,6 +75,13 @@ static inline struct reset_control *__of
 	return optional ? NULL : ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
 }
 
+static inline struct reset_control *__reset_control_get(
+					struct device *dev, const char *id,
+					int index, bool shared, bool optional)
+{
+	return optional ? NULL : ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
+}
+
 static inline struct reset_control *__devm_reset_control_get(
 					struct device *dev, const char *id,
 					int index, bool shared, bool optional)

@@ -102,8 +112,7 @@ __must_check reset_control_get_exclusive
 #ifndef CONFIG_RESET_CONTROLLER
 	WARN_ON(1);
 #endif
-	return __of_reset_control_get(dev ? dev->of_node : NULL, id, 0, false,
-									false);
+	return __reset_control_get(dev, id, 0, false, false);
 }
 
 /**

@@ -131,22 +140,19 @@ __must_check reset_control_get_exclusive
 static inline struct reset_control *reset_control_get_shared(
 					struct device *dev, const char *id)
 {
-	return __of_reset_control_get(dev ? dev->of_node : NULL, id, 0, true,
-									false);
+	return __reset_control_get(dev, id, 0, true, false);
 }
 
 static inline struct reset_control *reset_control_get_optional_exclusive(
 					struct device *dev, const char *id)
 {
-	return __of_reset_control_get(dev ? dev->of_node : NULL, id, 0, false,
-									true);
+	return __reset_control_get(dev, id, 0, false, true);
 }
 
 static inline struct reset_control *reset_control_get_optional_shared(
 					struct device *dev, const char *id)
 {
-	return __of_reset_control_get(dev ? dev->of_node : NULL, id, 0, true,
-									true);
+	return __reset_control_get(dev, id, 0, true, true);
 }
 
 /**

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>

commit 0dde584882ade13dc9708d611fbf69b0ae8a9e48 upstream.

The length of the reply is protocol-dependent - for cephx it's ceph_x_authorize_reply. Nothing sensible can be passed from the messenger layer anyway.

---
 fs/ceph/mds_client.c           |    4 ++--
 include/linux/ceph/auth.h      |    5 ++---
 include/linux/ceph/messenger.h |    2 +-
 net/ceph/auth.c                |    4 ++--
 net/ceph/auth_x.c              |    2 +-
 net/ceph/messenger.c           |    2 +-
 net/ceph/osd_client.c          |    4 ++--
 7 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

@@ -3984,13 +3984,13 @@ static struct ceph_auth_handshake *get_a
 }
 
 
-static int verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_connection *con, int len)
+static int verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_connection *con)
 {
 	struct ceph_mds_session *s = con->private;
 	struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = s->s_mdsc;
 	struct ceph_auth_client *ac = mdsc->fsc->client->monc.auth;
 
-	return ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply(ac, s->s_auth.authorizer, len);
+	return ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply(ac, s->s_auth.authorizer);
 }
 
 static int invalidate_authorizer(struct ceph_connection *con)

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ struct ceph_auth_client_ops {
 	int (*update_authorizer)(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, int peer_type,
 				 struct ceph_auth_handshake *auth);
 	int (*verify_authorizer_reply)(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
-				       struct ceph_authorizer *a, size_t len);
+				       struct ceph_authorizer *a);
 	void (*invalidate_authorizer)(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
 				      int peer_type);
 

@@ -118,8 +118,7 @@ extern int ceph_auth_update_authorizer(s
 				       int peer_type,
 				       struct ceph_auth_handshake *a);
 extern int ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
-					     struct ceph_authorizer *a,
-					     size_t len);
+					     struct ceph_authorizer *a);
 extern void ceph_auth_invalidate_authorizer(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
 					    int peer_type);
 

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ struct ceph_connection_operations {
 	struct ceph_auth_handshake *(*get_authorizer) (
 				struct ceph_connection *con,
 			       int *proto, int force_new);
-	int (*verify_authorizer_reply) (struct ceph_connection *con, int len);
+	int (*verify_authorizer_reply) (struct ceph_connection *con);
 	int (*invalidate_authorizer)(struct ceph_connection *con);
 
 	/* there was some error on the socket (disconnect, whatever) */

@@ -315,13 +315,13 @@ int ceph_auth_update_authorizer(struct c
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_auth_update_authorizer);
 
 int ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
-				      struct ceph_authorizer *a, size_t len)
+				      struct ceph_authorizer *a)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
 	mutex_lock(&ac->mutex);
 	if (ac->ops && ac->ops->verify_authorizer_reply)
-		ret = ac->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(ac, a, len);
+		ret = ac->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(ac, a);
 	mutex_unlock(&ac->mutex);
 	return ret;
 }

@@ -623,7 +623,7 @@ static int ceph_x_update_authorizer(
 }
 
 static int ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
-					  struct ceph_authorizer *a, size_t len)
+					  struct ceph_authorizer *a)
 {
 	struct ceph_x_authorizer *au = (void *)a;
 	void *p = au->enc_buf;

@@ -2045,7 +2045,7 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_c
 		 * should also define ->verify_authorizer_reply().
 		 * See get_connect_authorizer().
 		 */
-		ret = con->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(con, 0);
+		ret = con->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(con);
 		if (ret < 0) {
 			con->error_msg = "bad authorize reply";
 			return ret;

@@ -4479,13 +4479,13 @@ static struct ceph_auth_handshake *get_a
 }
 
 
-static int verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_connection *con, int len)
+static int verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_connection *con)
 {
 	struct ceph_osd *o = con->private;
 	struct ceph_osd_client *osdc = o->o_osdc;
 	struct ceph_auth_client *ac = osdc->client->monc.auth;
 
-	return ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply(ac, o->o_auth.authorizer, len);
+	return ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply(ac, o->o_auth.authorizer);
 }
 
 static int invalidate_authorizer(struct ceph_connection *con)

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>

commit b3bbd3f2ab19c8ca319003b4b51ce4c4ca74da06 upstream.

->get_authorizer(), ->verify_authorizer_reply(), ->sign_message() and ->check_message_signature() shouldn't be doing anything with or on the connection (like closing it or sending messages).

---
 net/ceph/messenger.c |    6 ------
 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)

@@ -1405,15 +1405,9 @@ static struct ceph_auth_handshake *get_c
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
-	/* Can't hold the mutex while getting authorizer */
-	mutex_unlock(&con->mutex);
 	auth = con->ops->get_authorizer(con, auth_proto, con->auth_retry);
-	mutex_lock(&con->mutex);
-
 	if (IS_ERR(auth))
 		return auth;
-	if (con->state != CON_STATE_NEGOTIATING)
-		return ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
 
 	con->auth_reply_buf = auth->authorizer_reply_buf;
 	con->auth_reply_buf_len = auth->authorizer_reply_buf_len;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>

commit 6daca13d2e72bedaaacfc08f873114c9307d5aea upstream.

When a client authenticates with a service, an authorizer is sent with a nonce to the service (ceph_x_authorize_[ab]) and the service responds with a mutation of that nonce (ceph_x_authorize_reply). This lets the client verify the service is who it says it is but it doesn't protect against a replay: someone can trivially capture the exchange and reuse the same authorizer to authenticate themselves.

Allow the service to reject an initial authorizer with a random challenge (ceph_x_authorize_challenge). The client then has to respond with an updated authorizer proving they are able to decrypt the service's challenge and that the new authorizer was produced for this specific connection instance.

The accepting side requires this challenge and response unconditionally if the client side advertises they have CEPHX_V2 feature bit.

This addresses CVE-2018-1128.

---
 fs/ceph/mds_client.c           |   11 ++++++
 include/linux/ceph/auth.h      |    8 ++++
 include/linux/ceph/messenger.h |    3 +
 include/linux/ceph/msgr.h      |    2 -
 net/ceph/auth.c                |   16 +++++++++
 net/ceph/auth_x.c              |   72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 net/ceph/auth_x_protocol.h     |    7 +++
 net/ceph/messenger.c           |   17 +++++++++
 net/ceph/osd_client.c          |   11 ++++++
 9 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

@@ -3983,6 +3983,16 @@ static struct ceph_auth_handshake *get_a
 	return auth;
 }
 
+static int add_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_connection *con,
+				    void *challenge_buf, int challenge_buf_len)
+{
+	struct ceph_mds_session *s = con->private;
+	struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = s->s_mdsc;
+	struct ceph_auth_client *ac = mdsc->fsc->client->monc.auth;
+
+	return ceph_auth_add_authorizer_challenge(ac, s->s_auth.authorizer,
+					    challenge_buf, challenge_buf_len);
+}
 
 static int verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_connection *con)
 {

@@ -4046,6 +4056,7 @@ static const struct ceph_connection_oper
 	.put = con_put,
 	.dispatch = dispatch,
 	.get_authorizer = get_authorizer,
+	.add_authorizer_challenge = add_authorizer_challenge,
 	.verify_authorizer_reply = verify_authorizer_reply,
 	.invalidate_authorizer = invalidate_authorizer,
 	.peer_reset = peer_reset,

@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ struct ceph_auth_client_ops {
 	/* ensure that an existing authorizer is up to date */
 	int (*update_authorizer)(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, int peer_type,
 				 struct ceph_auth_handshake *auth);
+	int (*add_authorizer_challenge)(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+					struct ceph_authorizer *a,
+					void *challenge_buf,
+					int challenge_buf_len);
 	int (*verify_authorizer_reply)(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
 				       struct ceph_authorizer *a);
 	void (*invalidate_authorizer)(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,

@@ -117,6 +121,10 @@ void ceph_auth_destroy_authorizer(struct
 extern int ceph_auth_update_authorizer(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
 				       int peer_type,
 				       struct ceph_auth_handshake *a);
+int ceph_auth_add_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+				       struct ceph_authorizer *a,
+				       void *challenge_buf,
+				       int challenge_buf_len);
 extern int ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
 					     struct ceph_authorizer *a);
 extern void ceph_auth_invalidate_authorizer(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,

@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ struct ceph_connection_operations {
 	struct ceph_auth_handshake *(*get_authorizer) (
 				struct ceph_connection *con,
 			       int *proto, int force_new);
+	int (*add_authorizer_challenge)(struct ceph_connection *con,
+					void *challenge_buf,
+					int challenge_buf_len);
 	int (*verify_authorizer_reply) (struct ceph_connection *con);
 	int (*invalidate_authorizer)(struct ceph_connection *con);
 

@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ struct ceph_entity_inst {
 #define CEPH_MSGR_TAG_SEQ           13 /* 64-bit int follows with seen seq number */
 #define CEPH_MSGR_TAG_KEEPALIVE2    14 /* keepalive2 byte + ceph_timespec */
 #define CEPH_MSGR_TAG_KEEPALIVE2_ACK 15 /* keepalive2 reply */
-
+#define CEPH_MSGR_TAG_CHALLENGE_AUTHORIZER 16  /* cephx v2 doing server challenge */
 
 /*
  * connection negotiation

@@ -314,6 +314,22 @@ int ceph_auth_update_authorizer(struct c
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_auth_update_authorizer);
 
+int ceph_auth_add_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+				       struct ceph_authorizer *a,
+				       void *challenge_buf,
+				       int challenge_buf_len)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&ac->mutex);
+	if (ac->ops && ac->ops->add_authorizer_challenge)
+		ret = ac->ops->add_authorizer_challenge(ac, a, challenge_buf,
+							challenge_buf_len);
+	mutex_unlock(&ac->mutex);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_auth_add_authorizer_challenge);
+
 int ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
 				      struct ceph_authorizer *a)
 {

@@ -69,6 +69,13 @@ struct ceph_x_authorize_a {
 struct ceph_x_authorize_b {
 	__u8 struct_v;
 	__le64 nonce;
+	__u8 have_challenge;
+	__le64 server_challenge_plus_one;
+} __attribute__ ((packed));
+
+struct ceph_x_authorize_challenge {
+	__u8 struct_v;
+	__le64 server_challenge;
 } __attribute__ ((packed));
 
 struct ceph_x_authorize_reply {

@@ -2037,9 +2037,24 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_c
 	if (con->auth) {
 		/*
 		 * Any connection that defines ->get_authorizer()
-		 * should also define ->verify_authorizer_reply().
+		 * should also define ->add_authorizer_challenge() and
+		 * ->verify_authorizer_reply().
+		 *
 		 * See get_connect_authorizer().
 		 */
+		if (con->in_reply.tag == CEPH_MSGR_TAG_CHALLENGE_AUTHORIZER) {
+			ret = con->ops->add_authorizer_challenge(
+				    con, con->auth->authorizer_reply_buf,
+				    le32_to_cpu(con->in_reply.authorizer_len));
+			if (ret < 0)
+				return ret;
+
+			con_out_kvec_reset(con);
+			__prepare_write_connect(con);
+			prepare_read_connect(con);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
 		ret = con->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(con);
 		if (ret < 0) {
 			con->error_msg = "bad authorize reply";

@@ -4478,6 +4478,16 @@ static struct ceph_auth_handshake *get_a
 	return auth;
 }
 
+static int add_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_connection *con,
+				    void *challenge_buf, int challenge_buf_len)
+{
+	struct ceph_osd *o = con->private;
+	struct ceph_osd_client *osdc = o->o_osdc;
+	struct ceph_auth_client *ac = osdc->client->monc.auth;
+
+	return ceph_auth_add_authorizer_challenge(ac, o->o_auth.authorizer,
+					    challenge_buf, challenge_buf_len);
+}
 
 static int verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_connection *con)
 {

@@ -4519,6 +4529,7 @@ static const struct ceph_connection_oper
 	.put = put_osd_con,
 	.dispatch = dispatch,
 	.get_authorizer = get_authorizer,
+	.add_authorizer_challenge = add_authorizer_challenge,
 	.verify_authorizer_reply = verify_authorizer_reply,
 	.invalidate_authorizer = invalidate_authorizer,
 	.alloc_msg = alloc_msg,

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>

commit cc255c76c70f7a87d97939621eae04b600d9f4a1 upstream.

Derive the signature from the entire buffer (both AES cipher blocks) instead of using just the first half of the first block, leaving out data_crc entirely.

This addresses CVE-2018-1129.

[bwh: Backported to 4.9:
- Define and test the feature bit in the old way
- Don't change any other feature bits in ceph_features.h]

---
 include/linux/ceph/ceph_features.h |    4 +
 net/ceph/auth_x.c                  |   77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
 // duplicated since it was introduced at the same time as CEPH_FEATURE_CRUSH_TUNABLES5
 #define CEPH_FEATURE_NEW_OSDOPREPLY_ENCODING   (1ULL<<58) /* New, v7 encoding */
 #define CEPH_FEATURE_FS_FILE_LAYOUT_V2       (1ULL<<58) /* file_layout_t */
+#define CEPH_FEATURE_CEPHX_V2	(1ULL<<61) // *do not share this bit*
 
 /*
  * The introduction of CEPH_FEATURE_OSD_SNAPMAPPER caused the feature

@@ -124,7 +125,8 @@ static inline u64 ceph_sanitize_features
 	 CEPH_FEATURE_MSGR_KEEPALIVE2 |		\
 	 CEPH_FEATURE_CRUSH_V4 |		\
 	 CEPH_FEATURE_CRUSH_TUNABLES5 |		\
-	 CEPH_FEATURE_NEW_OSDOPREPLY_ENCODING)
+	 CEPH_FEATURE_NEW_OSDOPREPLY_ENCODING |	\
+	 CEPH_FEATURE_CEPHX_V2)
 
 #define CEPH_FEATURES_REQUIRED_DEFAULT   \
 	(CEPH_FEATURE_NOSRCADDR |	 \

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>

commit f1d10e04637924f2b00a0fecdd2ca4565f5cfc3f upstream.

Allow for extending ceph_x_authorize_reply in the future.

---
 net/ceph/auth_x.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -733,8 +733,10 @@ static int ceph_x_verify_authorizer_repl
 	ret = ceph_x_decrypt(&au->session_key, &p, p + CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
-	if (ret != sizeof(*reply))
-		return -EPERM;
+	if (ret < sizeof(*reply)) {
+		pr_err("bad size %d for ceph_x_authorize_reply\n", ret);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	if (au->nonce + 1 != le64_to_cpu(reply->nonce_plus_one))
 		ret = -EPERM;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>

Extracted from commit dc503a8ad984 "bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning".

---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |    8 +++-----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bp
 static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off,
 			     int size, int value_regno)
 {
-	int i;
+	int i, spi = (MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE;
 	/* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0,
 	 * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits
 	 */

@@ -558,15 +558,13 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_
 		}
 
 		/* save register state */
-		state->spilled_regs[(MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE] =
-			state->regs[value_regno];
+		state->spilled_regs[spi] = state->regs[value_regno];
 
 		for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
 			state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] = STACK_SPILL;
 	} else {
 		/* regular write of data into stack */
-		state->spilled_regs[(MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE] =
-			(struct bpf_reg_state) {};
+		state->spilled_regs[spi] = (struct bpf_reg_state) {};
 
 		for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
 			state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] = STACK_MISC;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lior David <[email protected]>

commit b5a8ffcae4103a9d823ea3aa3a761f65779fbe2a upstream.

Add a length check in wmi_set_ie to detect unsigned integer overflow.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/wil6210/wmi.c |    8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1302,8 +1302,14 @@ int wmi_set_ie(struct wil6210_priv *wil,
 	};
 	int rc;
 	u16 len = sizeof(struct wmi_set_appie_cmd) + ie_len;
-	struct wmi_set_appie_cmd *cmd = kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	struct wmi_set_appie_cmd *cmd;
 
+	if (len < ie_len) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	cmd = kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!cmd) {
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>

commit 045c7a3f53d9403b62d396b6d051c4be5044cdb4 upstream.

If mmap() maps a file, it can be passed an offset into the file at which the mapping is to start. Offset could be a negative value when represented as a loff_t. The offset plus length will be used to update the file size (i_size) which is also a loff_t.

Validate the value of offset and offset + length to make sure they do not overflow and appear as negative.

Found by syzcaller with commit ff8c0c53c475 ("mm/hugetlb.c: don't call region_abort if region_chg fails") applied. Prior to this commit, the overflow would still occur but we would luckily return ENOMEM.

To reproduce:

   mmap(0, 0x2000, 0, 0x40021, 0xffffffffffffffffULL, 0x8000000000000000ULL);

Resulted in,

kernel BUG at mm/hugetlb.c:742!

  Call Trace:
   hugetlbfs_evict_inode+0x80/0xa0
   evict+0x24a/0x620
   iput+0x48f/0x8c0
   dentry_unlink_inode+0x31f/0x4d0
   __dentry_kill+0x292/0x5e0
   dput+0x730/0x830
   __fput+0x438/0x720
   ____fput+0x1a/0x20
   task_work_run+0xfe/0x180
   exit_to_usermode_loop+0x133/0x150
   syscall_return_slowpath+0x184/0x1c0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xab/0xad

---
 fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c |   15 ++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -136,17 +136,26 @@ static int hugetlbfs_file_mmap(struct fi
 	vma->vm_flags |= VM_HUGETLB | VM_DONTEXPAND;
 	vma->vm_ops = &hugetlb_vm_ops;
 
+	/*
+	 * Offset passed to mmap (before page shift) could have been
+	 * negative when represented as a (l)off_t.
+	 */
+	if (((loff_t)vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (vma->vm_pgoff & (~huge_page_mask(h) >> PAGE_SHIFT))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	vma_len = (loff_t)(vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start);
+	len = vma_len + ((loff_t)vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT);
+	/* check for overflow */
+	if (len < vma_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	inode_lock(inode);
 	file_accessed(file);
 
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
-	len = vma_len + ((loff_t)vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT);
-
 	if (hugetlb_reserve_pages(inode,
 				vma->vm_pgoff >> huge_page_order(h),
 				len >> huge_page_shift(h), vma,

@@ -155,7 +164,7 @@ static int hugetlbfs_file_mmap(struct fi
 
 	ret = 0;
 	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE && inode->i_size < len)
-		inode->i_size = len;
+		i_size_write(inode, len);
 out:
 	inode_unlock(inode);
 

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>

commit 4b865cab96fe2a30ed512cf667b354bd291b3b0a upstream.

EXTENT_CSUM checker is a relatively easy one, only needs to check:

1) Objectid
Fixed to BTRFS_EXTENT_CSUM_OBJECTID

2) Key offset alignment
Must be aligned to sectorsize

3) Item size alignedment
Must be aligned to csum size

[bwh: Backported to 4.9: Use root->sectorsize instead of
root->fs_info->sectorsize]

---
 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c |   24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)

@@ -621,6 +621,27 @@ static int check_extent_data_item(struct
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int check_csum_item(struct btrfs_root *root, struct extent_buffer *leaf,
+			   struct btrfs_key *key, int slot)
+{
+	u32 sectorsize = root->sectorsize;
+	u32 csumsize = btrfs_super_csum_size(root->fs_info->super_copy);
+
+	if (key->objectid != BTRFS_EXTENT_CSUM_OBJECTID) {
+		CORRUPT("invalid objectid for csum item", leaf, root, slot);
+		return -EUCLEAN;
+	}
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(key->offset, sectorsize)) {
+		CORRUPT("unaligned key offset for csum item", leaf, root, slot);
+		return -EUCLEAN;
+	}
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(btrfs_item_size_nr(leaf, slot), csumsize)) {
+		CORRUPT("unaligned csum item size", leaf, root, slot);
+		return -EUCLEAN;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Common point to switch the item-specific validation.
  */

@@ -634,6 +655,9 @@ static int check_leaf_item(struct btrfs_
 	case BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY:
 		ret = check_extent_data_item(root, leaf, key, slot);
 		break;
+	case BTRFS_EXTENT_CSUM_KEY:
+		ret = check_csum_item(root, leaf, key, slot);
+		break;
 	}
 	return ret;
 }

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>

commit bba4f29896c986c4cec17bc0f19f2ce644fceae1 upstream.

Use inline function to replace macro since we don't need stringification.
(Macro still exists until all callers get updated)

And add more info about the error, and replace EIO with EUCLEAN.

For nr_items error, report if it's too large or too small, and output the valid value range.

For node block pointer, added a new alignment checker.

For key order, also output the next key to make the problem more obvious.

[bwh: Backported to 4.9:
- Use root->sectorsize instead of root->fs_info->sectorsize
- BTRFS_NODEPTRS_PER_BLOCK() takes a root instead of an fs_info]

---
 fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c |   68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

@@ -37,6 +37,46 @@
 		   btrfs_header_level(eb) == 0 ? "leaf" : "node",	\
 		   reason, btrfs_header_bytenr(eb), root->objectid, slot)
 
+/*
+ * Error message should follow the following format:
+ * corrupt <type>: <identifier>, <reason>[, <bad_value>]
+ *
+ * @type:	leaf or node
+ * @identifier:	the necessary info to locate the leaf/node.
+ * 		It's recommened to decode key.objecitd/offset if it's
+ * 		meaningful.
+ * @reason:	describe the error
+ * @bad_value:	optional, it's recommened to output bad value and its
+ *		expected value (range).
+ *
+ * Since comma is used to separate the components, only space is allowed
+ * inside each component.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Append generic "corrupt leaf/node root=%llu block=%llu slot=%d: " to @fmt.
+ * Allows callers to customize the output.
+ */
+__printf(4, 5)
+static void generic_err(const struct btrfs_root *root,
+			const struct extent_buffer *eb, int slot,
+			const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	struct va_format vaf;
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+
+	vaf.fmt = fmt;
+	vaf.va = &args;
+
+	btrfs_crit(root->fs_info,
+		"corrupt %s: root=%llu block=%llu slot=%d, %pV",
+		btrfs_header_level(eb) == 0 ? "leaf" : "node",
+		root->objectid, btrfs_header_bytenr(eb), slot, &vaf);
+	va_end(args);
+}
+
 static int check_extent_data_item(struct btrfs_root *root,
 				  struct extent_buffer *leaf,
 				  struct btrfs_key *key, int slot)

@@ -282,9 +322,11 @@ int btrfs_check_node(struct btrfs_root *
 
 	if (nr == 0 || nr > BTRFS_NODEPTRS_PER_BLOCK(root)) {
 		btrfs_crit(root->fs_info,
-			   "corrupt node: block %llu root %llu nritems %lu",
-			   node->start, root->objectid, nr);
-		return -EIO;
+"corrupt node: root=%llu block=%llu, nritems too %s, have %lu expect range [1,%u]",
+			   root->objectid, node->start,
+			   nr == 0 ? "small" : "large", nr,
+			   BTRFS_NODEPTRS_PER_BLOCK(root));
+		return -EUCLEAN;
 	}
 
 	for (slot = 0; slot < nr - 1; slot++) {

@@ -293,14 +335,26 @@ int btrfs_check_node(struct btrfs_root *
 		btrfs_node_key_to_cpu(node, &next_key, slot + 1);
 
 		if (!bytenr) {
-			CORRUPT("invalid item slot", node, root, slot);
-			ret = -EIO;
+			generic_err(root, node, slot,
+				"invalid NULL node pointer");
+			ret = -EUCLEAN;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (!IS_ALIGNED(bytenr, root->sectorsize)) {
+			generic_err(root, node, slot,
+			"unaligned pointer, have %llu should be aligned to %u",
+				bytenr, root->sectorsize);
+			ret = -EUCLEAN;
 			goto out;
 		}
 
 		if (btrfs_comp_cpu_keys(&key, &next_key) >= 0) {
-			CORRUPT("bad key order", node, root, slot);
-			ret = -EIO;
+			generic_err(root, node, slot,
+	"bad key order, current (%llu %u %llu) next (%llu %u %llu)",
+				key.objectid, key.type, key.offset,
+				next_key.objectid, next_key.type,
+				next_key.offset);
+			ret = -EUCLEAN;
 			goto out;
 		}
 	}

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>

commit 7cfad65297bfe0aa2996cd72d21c898aa84436d9 upstream.

The return value of sizeof() is of type size_t, so we must print it using the %z format modifier rather than %l to avoid this warning on some architectures:

fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c: In function 'check_dir_item':
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c:273:50: error: format '%lu' expects argument of type 'long unsigned int', but argument 5 has type 'u32' {aka 'unsigned int'} [-Werror=format=]

---
 fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ static int check_dir_item(struct btrfs_r
 		/* header itself should not cross item boundary */
 		if (cur + sizeof(*di) > item_size) {
 			dir_item_err(root, leaf, slot,
-		"dir item header crosses item boundary, have %lu boundary %u",
+		"dir item header crosses item boundary, have %zu boundary %u",
 				cur + sizeof(*di), item_size);
 			return -EUCLEAN;
 		}

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yunlei He <[email protected]>

commit d4fdf8ba0e5808ba9ad6b44337783bd9935e0982 upstream.

Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:

        if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
                ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
                atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush);   ->  Here, fcc illegal
                return ret;
        }

---
 fs/f2fs/segment.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -493,6 +493,9 @@ int create_flush_cmd_control(struct f2fs
 	init_waitqueue_head(&fcc->flush_wait_queue);
 	init_llist_head(&fcc->issue_list);
 	SM_I(sbi)->cmd_control_info = fcc;
+	if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE))
+		return err;
+
 	fcc->f2fs_issue_flush = kthread_run(issue_flush_thread, sbi,
 				"f2fs_flush-%u:%u", MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev));
 	if (IS_ERR(fcc->f2fs_issue_flush)) {

@@ -2539,7 +2542,7 @@ int build_segment_manager(struct f2fs_sb
 
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sm_info->sit_entry_set);
 
-	if (test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE) && !f2fs_readonly(sbi->sb)) {
+	if (!f2fs_readonly(sbi->sb)) {
 		err = create_flush_cmd_control(sbi);
 		if (err)
 			return err;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>

commit e1da7872f6eda977bd812346bf588c35e4495a1e upstream.

This patch introduces verify_blkaddr to check meta/data block address with valid range to detect bug earlier.

In addition, once we encounter an invalid blkaddr, notice user to run fsck to fix, and let the kernel panic.

[bwh: Backported to 4.9:
- I skipped an earlier renaming of is_valid_meta_blkaddr() to f2fs_is_valid_meta_blkaddr()
- Adjust context]

---
 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c |   11 +++++++++--
 fs/f2fs/data.c       |    6 +++---
 fs/f2fs/f2fs.h       |   32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 fs/f2fs/file.c       |    9 +++++----
 fs/f2fs/inode.c      |    7 ++++---
 fs/f2fs/node.c       |    4 ++--
 fs/f2fs/recovery.c   |    6 +++---
 fs/f2fs/segment.c    |    4 ++--
 fs/f2fs/segment.h    |    8 +++-----
 9 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

@@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ struct page *get_tmp_page(struct f2fs_sb
 	return __get_meta_page(sbi, index, false);
 }
 
-bool is_valid_meta_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr, int type)
+bool f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
+					block_t blkaddr, int type)
 {
 	switch (type) {
 	case META_NAT:

@@ -138,10 +139,16 @@ bool is_valid_meta_blkaddr(struct f2fs_s
 			return false;
 		break;
 	case META_POR:
+	case DATA_GENERIC:
 		if (unlikely(blkaddr >= MAX_BLKADDR(sbi) ||
 			blkaddr < MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi)))
 			return false;
 		break;
+	case META_GENERIC:
+		if (unlikely(blkaddr < SEG0_BLKADDR(sbi) ||
+			blkaddr >= MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi)))
+			return false;
+		break;
 	default:
 		BUG();
 	}

@@ -173,7 +180,7 @@ int ra_meta_pages(struct f2fs_sb_info *s
 	blk_start_plug(&plug);
 	for (; nrpages-- > 0; blkno++) {
 
-		if (!is_valid_meta_blkaddr(sbi, blkno, type))
+		if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkno, type))
 			goto out;
 
 		switch (type) {

@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void f2fs_submit_page_mbio(struct f2fs_i
 
 	io = is_read ? &sbi->read_io : &sbi->write_io[btype];
 
-	if (is_valid_blkaddr(fio->old_blkaddr))
+	if (__is_valid_data_blkaddr(fio->old_blkaddr))
 		verify_block_addr(fio, fio->old_blkaddr);
 	verify_block_addr(fio, fio->new_blkaddr);
 

@@ -723,7 +723,7 @@ next_dnode:
 next_block:
 	blkaddr = datablock_addr(dn.node_page, dn.ofs_in_node);
 
-	if (!is_valid_blkaddr(blkaddr)) {
+	if (!is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr)) {
 		if (create) {
 			if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi))) {
 				err = -EIO;

@@ -1217,7 +1217,7 @@ retry_encrypt:
 	 * If current allocation needs SSR,
 	 * it had better in-place writes for updated data.
 	 */
-	if (unlikely(is_valid_blkaddr(fio->old_blkaddr) &&
+	if (unlikely(is_valid_data_blkaddr(fio->sbi, fio->old_blkaddr) &&
 			!is_cold_data(page) &&
 			!IS_ATOMIC_WRITTEN_PAGE(page) &&
 			need_inplace_update(inode))) {

@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ struct cp_control {
 };
 
 /*
- * For CP/NAT/SIT/SSA readahead
+ * indicate meta/data type
  */
 enum {
 	META_CP,

@@ -153,6 +153,8 @@ enum {
 	META_SIT,
 	META_SSA,
 	META_POR,
+	DATA_GENERIC,
+	META_GENERIC,
 };
 
 /* for the list of ino */

@@ -1930,13 +1932,36 @@ static inline void *f2fs_kvzalloc(size_t
 	(pgofs - ADDRS_PER_INODE(inode) + ADDRS_PER_BLOCK) /	\
 	ADDRS_PER_BLOCK * ADDRS_PER_BLOCK + ADDRS_PER_INODE(inode))
 
-static inline bool is_valid_blkaddr(block_t blkaddr)
+bool f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
+					block_t blkaddr, int type);
+void f2fs_msg(struct super_block *sb, const char *level, const char *fmt, ...);
+static inline void verify_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
+					block_t blkaddr, int type)
+{
+	if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, type)) {
+		f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
+			"invalid blkaddr: %u, type: %d, run fsck to fix.",
+			blkaddr, type);
+		f2fs_bug_on(sbi, 1);
+	}
+}
+
+static inline bool __is_valid_data_blkaddr(block_t blkaddr)
 {
 	if (blkaddr == NEW_ADDR || blkaddr == NULL_ADDR)
 		return false;
 	return true;
 }
 
+static inline bool is_valid_data_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
+						block_t blkaddr)
+{
+	if (!__is_valid_data_blkaddr(blkaddr))
+		return false;
+	verify_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, DATA_GENERIC);
+	return true;
+}
+
 /*
  * file.c
  */

@@ -2122,7 +2147,8 @@ void f2fs_stop_checkpoint(struct f2fs_sb
 struct page *grab_meta_page(struct f2fs_sb_info *, pgoff_t);
 struct page *get_meta_page(struct f2fs_sb_info *, pgoff_t);
 struct page *get_tmp_page(struct f2fs_sb_info *, pgoff_t);
-bool is_valid_meta_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr, int type);
+bool f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
+					block_t blkaddr, int type);
 int ra_meta_pages(struct f2fs_sb_info *, block_t, int, int, bool);
 void ra_meta_pages_cond(struct f2fs_sb_info *, pgoff_t);
 long sync_meta_pages(struct f2fs_sb_info *, enum page_type, long);

@@ -310,13 +310,13 @@ static pgoff_t __get_first_dirty_index(s
 	return pgofs;
 }
 
-static bool __found_offset(block_t blkaddr, pgoff_t dirty, pgoff_t pgofs,
-							int whence)
+static bool __found_offset(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr,
+				pgoff_t dirty, pgoff_t pgofs, int whence)
 {
 	switch (whence) {
 	case SEEK_DATA:
 		if ((blkaddr == NEW_ADDR && dirty == pgofs) ||
-			is_valid_blkaddr(blkaddr))
+			is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr))
 			return true;
 		break;
 	case SEEK_HOLE:

@@ -378,7 +378,8 @@ static loff_t f2fs_seek_block(struct fil
 			block_t blkaddr;
 			blkaddr = datablock_addr(dn.node_page, dn.ofs_in_node);
 
-			if (__found_offset(blkaddr, dirty, pgofs, whence)) {
+			if (__found_offset(F2FS_I_SB(inode), blkaddr, dirty,
+							pgofs, whence)) {
 				f2fs_put_dnode(&dn);
 				goto found;
 			}

@@ -59,11 +59,12 @@ static void __get_inode_rdev(struct inod
 	}
 }
 
-static bool __written_first_block(struct f2fs_inode *ri)
+static bool __written_first_block(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
+					struct f2fs_inode *ri)
 {
 	block_t addr = le32_to_cpu(ri->i_addr[0]);
 
-	if (is_valid_blkaddr(addr))
+	if (is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, addr))
 		return true;
 	return false;
 }

@@ -159,7 +160,7 @@ static int do_read_inode(struct inode *i
 	/* get rdev by using inline_info */
 	__get_inode_rdev(inode, ri);
 
-	if (__written_first_block(ri))
+	if (__written_first_block(sbi, ri))
 		set_inode_flag(inode, FI_FIRST_BLOCK_WRITTEN);
 
 	if (!need_inode_block_update(sbi, inode->i_ino))

@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ static void set_node_addr(struct f2fs_sb
 			new_blkaddr == NULL_ADDR);
 	f2fs_bug_on(sbi, nat_get_blkaddr(e) == NEW_ADDR &&
 			new_blkaddr == NEW_ADDR);
-	f2fs_bug_on(sbi, is_valid_blkaddr(nat_get_blkaddr(e)) &&
+	f2fs_bug_on(sbi, is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, nat_get_blkaddr(e)) &&
 			new_blkaddr == NEW_ADDR);
 
 	/* increment version no as node is removed */

@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ static void set_node_addr(struct f2fs_sb
 
 	/* change address */
 	nat_set_blkaddr(e, new_blkaddr);
-	if (!is_valid_blkaddr(new_blkaddr))
+	if (!is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, new_blkaddr))
 		set_nat_flag(e, IS_CHECKPOINTED, false);
 	__set_nat_cache_dirty(nm_i, e);
 

@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static int find_fsync_dnodes(struct f2fs
 	while (1) {
 		struct fsync_inode_entry *entry;
 
-		if (!is_valid_meta_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, META_POR))
+		if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, META_POR))
 			return 0;
 
 		page = get_tmp_page(sbi, blkaddr);

@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ retry_dn:
 		}
 
 		/* dest is valid block, try to recover from src to dest */
-		if (is_valid_meta_blkaddr(sbi, dest, META_POR)) {
+		if (f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, dest, META_POR)) {
 
 			if (src == NULL_ADDR) {
 				err = reserve_new_block(&dn);

@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ static int recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_i
 	while (1) {
 		struct fsync_inode_entry *entry;
 
-		if (!is_valid_meta_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, META_POR))
+		if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, META_POR))
 			break;
 
 		ra_meta_pages_cond(sbi, blkaddr);

@@ -944,7 +944,7 @@ bool is_checkpointed_data(struct f2fs_sb
 	struct seg_entry *se;
 	bool is_cp = false;
 
-	if (!is_valid_blkaddr(blkaddr))
+	if (!is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr))
 		return true;
 
 	mutex_lock(&sit_i->sentry_lock);

@@ -1668,7 +1668,7 @@ void f2fs_wait_on_encrypted_page_writeba
 {
 	struct page *cpage;
 
-	if (!is_valid_blkaddr(blkaddr))
+	if (!is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr))
 		return;
 
 	cpage = find_lock_page(META_MAPPING(sbi), blkaddr);

@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@
 	(GET_SEGOFF_FROM_SEG0(sbi, blk_addr) & (sbi->blocks_per_seg - 1))
 
 #define GET_SEGNO(sbi, blk_addr)					\
-	((!is_valid_blkaddr(blk_addr)) ?			\
+	((!is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, blk_addr)) ?			\
 	NULL_SEGNO : GET_L2R_SEGNO(FREE_I(sbi),			\
 		GET_SEGNO_FROM_SEG0(sbi, blk_addr)))
 #define GET_SECNO(sbi, segno)					\

@@ -603,11 +603,9 @@ static inline void verify_block_addr(str
 
 	if (PAGE_TYPE_OF_BIO(fio->type) == META &&
 				(!is_read_io(fio->op) || fio->is_meta))
-		BUG_ON(blk_addr < SEG0_BLKADDR(sbi) ||
-				blk_addr >= MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi));
+		verify_blkaddr(sbi, blk_addr, META_GENERIC);
 	else
-		BUG_ON(blk_addr < MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi) ||
-				blk_addr >= MAX_BLKADDR(sbi));
+		verify_blkaddr(sbi, blk_addr, DATA_GENERIC);
 }
 
 /*

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>

commit c9b60788fc760d136211853f10ce73dc152d1f4a upstream.

This patch add to do sanity check with below field:
- cp_pack_total_block_count
- blkaddr of data/node
- extent info

- Overview
BUG() in verify_block_addr() when writing to a corrupted f2fs image

- Reproduce (4.18 upstream kernel)

- POC (poc.c)

static void activity(char *mpoint) {

char *foo_bar_baz;
int err;

  static int buf[8192];
  memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));

  err = asprintf(&foo_bar_baz, "%s/foo/bar/baz", mpoint);

int fd = open(foo_bar_baz, O_RDWR | O_TRUNC, 0777);

  if (fd >= 0) {
    write(fd, (char *)buf, sizeof(buf));
    fdatasync(fd);
    close(fd);

}
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
activity(argv[1]);
return 0;
}

- Kernel message

[  689.349473] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 3
[  699.728662] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1309 at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2860 f2fs_inplace_write_data+0x232/0x240
[  699.728670] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd mac_hid i2c_piix4 soundcore ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul qxl drm_kms_helper syscopyarea aesni_intel sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd 8139cp glue_helper mii pata_acpi floppy
[  699.729056] CPU: 0 PID: 1309 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[  699.729064] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[  699.729074] RIP: 0010:f2fs_inplace_write_data+0x232/0x240
[  699.729076] Code: ff e9 cf fe ff ff 49 8d 7d 10 e8 39 45 ad ff 4d 8b 7d 10 be 04 00 00 00 49 8d 7f 48 e8 07 49 ad ff 45 8b 7f 48 e9 fb fe ff ff <0f> 0b f0 41 80 4d 48 04 e9 65 fe ff ff 90 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 8d
[  699.729130] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f43af568 EFLAGS: 00010202
[  699.729139] RAX: 000000000000003f RBX: ffff8801f43af7b8 RCX: ffffffffb88c9113
[  699.729142] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8802024e5540
[  699.729144] RBP: ffff8801f43af590 R08: 0000000000000009 R09: ffffffffffffffe8
[  699.729147] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0039b0596a R12: ffff8802024e5540
[  699.729149] R13: ffff8801f0335500 R14: ffff8801e3e7a700 R15: ffff8801e1ee4450
[  699.729154] FS:  00007f9bf97f5700(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  699.729156] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  699.729159] CR2: 00007f9bf925d170 CR3: 00000001f0c34000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[  699.729171] Call Trace:
[  699.729192]  f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x2e2/0xe00
[  699.729203]  ? f2fs_should_update_outplace+0xd0/0xd0
[  699.729238]  ? memcg_drain_all_list_lrus+0x280/0x280
[  699.729269]  ? __radix_tree_replace+0xa3/0x120
[  699.729276]  __write_data_page+0x5c7/0xe30
[  699.729291]  ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[  699.729310]  ? page_mapped+0x8a/0x110
[  699.729321]  ? page_mkclean+0xe9/0x160
[  699.729327]  ? f2fs_do_write_data_page+0xe00/0xe00
[  699.729331]  ? invalid_page_referenced_vma+0x130/0x130
[  699.729345]  ? clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x332/0x450
[  699.729351]  f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x4ca/0x860
[  699.729358]  ? __write_data_page+0xe30/0xe30
[  699.729374]  ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x22/0xa0
[  699.729380]  ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[  699.729391]  ? _raw_spin_lock+0x17/0x40
[  699.729403]  ? f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync.part.18+0x16/0x30
[  699.729413]  ? iov_iter_advance+0x113/0x640
[  699.729418]  ? f2fs_write_end+0x133/0x2e0
[  699.729423]  ? balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited+0x239/0x640
[  699.729428]  f2fs_write_data_pages+0x329/0x520
[  699.729433]  ? generic_perform_write+0x250/0x320
[  699.729438]  ? f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x860/0x860
[  699.729454]  ? current_time+0x110/0x110
[  699.729459]  ? f2fs_preallocate_blocks+0x1ef/0x370
[  699.729464]  do_writepages+0x37/0xb0
[  699.729468]  ? f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x860/0x860
[  699.729472]  ? do_writepages+0x37/0xb0
[  699.729478]  __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x19a/0x1f0
[  699.729483]  ? delete_from_page_cache_batch+0x4e0/0x4e0
[  699.729496]  ? __vfs_write+0x2b2/0x410
[  699.729501]  file_write_and_wait_range+0x66/0xb0
[  699.729506]  f2fs_do_sync_file+0x1f9/0xd90
[  699.729511]  ? truncate_partial_data_page+0x290/0x290
[  699.729521]  ? __sb_end_write+0x30/0x50
[  699.729526]  ? vfs_write+0x20f/0x260
[  699.729530]  f2fs_sync_file+0x9a/0xb0
[  699.729534]  ? f2fs_do_sync_file+0xd90/0xd90
[  699.729548]  vfs_fsync_range+0x68/0x100
[  699.729554]  ? __fget_light+0xc9/0xe0
[  699.729558]  do_fsync+0x3d/0x70
[  699.729562]  __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x24/0x30
[  699.729585]  do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[  699.729595]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  699.729613] RIP: 0033:0x7f9bf930d800
[  699.729615] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d 49 bf 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 4b 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 be 78 01 00 48 89 04 24
[  699.729668] RSP: 002b:00007ffee3606c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004b
[  699.729673] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f9bf930d800
[  699.729675] RDX: 0000000000008000 RSI: 00000000006010a0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[  699.729678] RBP: 00007ffee3606ca0 R08: 0000000001503010 R09: 0000000000000000
[  699.729680] R10: 00000000000002e8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400610
[  699.729683] R13: 00007ffee3606da0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  699.729687] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df5 ]---
[  699.729782] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  699.729785] kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.h:654!
[  699.731055] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[  699.732104] CPU: 0 PID: 1309 Comm: a.out Tainted: G        W         4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[  699.733684] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[  699.735611] RIP: 0010:f2fs_submit_page_bio+0x29b/0x730
[  699.736649] Code: 54 49 8d bd 18 04 00 00 e8 b2 59 af ff 41 8b 8d 18 04 00 00 8b 45 b8 41 d3 e6 44 01 f0 4c 8d 73 14 41 39 c7 0f 82 37 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 65 8b 05 2c 04 77 47 89 c0 48 0f a3 05 52 c1 d5 01 0f 92 c0
[  699.740524] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f43af508 EFLAGS: 00010283
[  699.741573] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8801f43af7b8 RCX: ffffffffb88a7cef
[  699.743006] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e3e7a64c
[  699.744426] RBP: ffff8801f43af558 R08: ffffed003e066b55 R09: ffffed003e066b55
[  699.745833] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e066b54 R12: ffffea0007876940
[  699.747256] R13: ffff8801f0335500 R14: ffff8801e3e7a600 R15: 0000000000000001
[  699.748683] FS:  00007f9bf97f5700(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  699.750293] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  699.751462] CR2: 00007f9bf925d170 CR3: 00000001f0c34000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[  699.752874] Call Trace:
[  699.753386]  ? f2fs_inplace_write_data+0x93/0x240
[  699.754341]  f2fs_inplace_write_data+0xd2/0x240
[  699.755271]  f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x2e2/0xe00
[  699.756214]  ? f2fs_should_update_outplace+0xd0/0xd0
[  699.757215]  ? memcg_drain_all_list_lrus+0x280/0x280
[  699.758209]  ? __radix_tree_replace+0xa3/0x120
[  699.759164]  __write_data_page+0x5c7/0xe30
[  699.760002]  ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[  699.760823]  ? page_mapped+0x8a/0x110
[  699.761573]  ? page_mkclean+0xe9/0x160
[  699.762345]  ? f2fs_do_write_data_page+0xe00/0xe00
[  699.763332]  ? invalid_page_referenced_vma+0x130/0x130
[  699.764374]  ? clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x332/0x450
[  699.765347]  f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x4ca/0x860
[  699.766276]  ? __write_data_page+0xe30/0xe30
[  699.767161]  ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x22/0xa0
[  699.768112]  ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[  699.768951]  ? _raw_spin_lock+0x17/0x40
[  699.769739]  ? f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync.part.18+0x16/0x30
[  699.770885]  ? iov_iter_advance+0x113/0x640
[  699.771743]  ? f2fs_write_end+0x133/0x2e0
[  699.772569]  ? balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited+0x239/0x640
[  699.773680]  f2fs_write_data_pages+0x329/0x520
[  699.774603]  ? generic_perform_write+0x250/0x320
[  699.775544]  ? f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x860/0x860
[  699.776510]  ? current_time+0x110/0x110
[  699.777299]  ? f2fs_preallocate_blocks+0x1ef/0x370
[  699.778279]  do_writepages+0x37/0xb0
[  699.779026]  ? f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x860/0x860
[  699.779978]  ? do_writepages+0x37/0xb0
[  699.780755]  __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x19a/0x1f0
[  699.781746]  ? delete_from_page_cache_batch+0x4e0/0x4e0
[  699.782820]  ? __vfs_write+0x2b2/0x410
[  699.783597]  file_write_and_wait_range+0x66/0xb0
[  699.784540]  f2fs_do_sync_file+0x1f9/0xd90
[  699.785381]  ? truncate_partial_data_page+0x290/0x290
[  699.786415]  ? __sb_end_write+0x30/0x50
[  699.787204]  ? vfs_write+0x20f/0x260
[  699.787941]  f2fs_sync_file+0x9a/0xb0
[  699.788694]  ? f2fs_do_sync_file+0xd90/0xd90
[  699.789572]  vfs_fsync_range+0x68/0x100
[  699.790360]  ? __fget_light+0xc9/0xe0
[  699.791128]  do_fsync+0x3d/0x70
[  699.791779]  __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x24/0x30
[  699.792614]  do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[  699.793371]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  699.794406] RIP: 0033:0x7f9bf930d800
[  699.795134] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d 49 bf 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 4b 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 be 78 01 00 48 89 04 24
[  699.798960] RSP: 002b:00007ffee3606c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004b
[  699.800483] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f9bf930d800
[  699.801923] RDX: 0000000000008000 RSI: 00000000006010a0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[  699.803373] RBP: 00007ffee3606ca0 R08: 0000000001503010 R09: 0000000000000000
[  699.804798] R10: 00000000000002e8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400610
[  699.806233] R13: 00007ffee3606da0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  699.807667] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd mac_hid i2c_piix4 soundcore ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul qxl drm_kms_helper syscopyarea aesni_intel sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd 8139cp glue_helper mii pata_acpi floppy
[  699.817079] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df6 ]---
[  699.818068] RIP: 0010:f2fs_submit_page_bio+0x29b/0x730
[  699.819114] Code: 54 49 8d bd 18 04 00 00 e8 b2 59 af ff 41 8b 8d 18 04 00 00 8b 45 b8 41 d3 e6 44 01 f0 4c 8d 73 14 41 39 c7 0f 82 37 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 65 8b 05 2c 04 77 47 89 c0 48 0f a3 05 52 c1 d5 01 0f 92 c0
[  699.822919] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f43af508 EFLAGS: 00010283
[  699.823977] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8801f43af7b8 RCX: ffffffffb88a7cef
[  699.825436] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e3e7a64c
[  699.826881] RBP: ffff8801f43af558 R08: ffffed003e066b55 R09: ffffed003e066b55
[  699.828292] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e066b54 R12: ffffea0007876940
[  699.829750] R13: ffff8801f0335500 R14: ffff8801e3e7a600 R15: 0000000000000001
[  699.831192] FS:  00007f9bf97f5700(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  699.832793] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  699.833981] CR2: 00007f9bf925d170 CR3: 00000001f0c34000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[  699.835556] ==================================================================
[  699.837029] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in update_stack_state+0x38c/0x3e0
[  699.838462] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801f43af970 by task a.out/1309

[  699.840086] CPU: 0 PID: 1309 Comm: a.out Tainted: G      D W         4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[  699.841603] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[  699.843475] Call Trace:
[  699.843982]  dump_stack+0x7b/0xb5
[  699.844661]  print_address_description+0x70/0x290
[  699.845607]  kasan_report+0x291/0x390
[  699.846351]  ? update_stack_state+0x38c/0x3e0
[  699.853831]  __asan_load8+0x54/0x90
[  699.854569]  update_stack_state+0x38c/0x3e0
[  699.855428]  ? __read_once_size_nocheck.constprop.7+0x20/0x20
[  699.856601]  ? __save_stack_trace+0x5e/0x100
[  699.857476]  unwind_next_frame.part.5+0x18e/0x490
[  699.858448]  ? unwind_dump+0x290/0x290
[  699.859217]  ? clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x332/0x450
[  699.860185]  __unwind_start+0x106/0x190
[  699.860974]  __save_stack_trace+0x5e/0x100
[  699.861808]  ? __save_stack_trace+0x5e/0x100
[  699.862691]  ? unlink_anon_vmas+0xba/0x2c0
[  699.863525]  save_stack_trace+0x1f/0x30
[  699.864312]  save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[  699.864993]  ? __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x1420/0x1420
[  699.865990]  ? flush_tlb_mm_range+0x15e/0x220
[  699.866889]  ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[  699.867724]  ? __dec_node_state+0x92/0xb0
[  699.868543]  ? lock_page_memcg+0x85/0xf0
[  699.869350]  ? unlock_page_memcg+0x16/0x80
[  699.870185]  ? page_remove_rmap+0x198/0x520
[  699.871048]  ? mark_page_accessed+0x133/0x200
[  699.871930]  ? _cond_resched+0x1a/0x50
[  699.872700]  ? unmap_page_range+0xcd4/0xe50
[  699.873551]  ? rb_next+0x58/0x80
[  699.874217]  ? rb_next+0x58/0x80
[  699.874895]  __kasan_slab_free+0x13c/0x1a0
[  699.875734]  ? unlink_anon_vmas+0xba/0x2c0
[  699.876563]  kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10
[  699.877315]  kmem_cache_free+0x89/0x1e0
[  699.878095]  unlink_anon_vmas+0xba/0x2c0
[  699.878913]  free_pgtables+0x101/0x1b0
[  699.879677]  exit_mmap+0x146/0x2a0
[  699.880378]  ? __ia32_sys_munmap+0x50/0x50
[  699.881214]  ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[  699.882052]  ? mm_update_next_owner+0x322/0x380
[  699.882985]  mmput+0x8b/0x1d0
[  699.883602]  do_exit+0x43a/0x1390
[  699.884288]  ? mm_update_next_owner+0x380/0x380
[  699.885212]  ? f2fs_sync_file+0x9a/0xb0
[  699.885995]  ? f2fs_do_sync_file+0xd90/0xd90
[  699.886877]  ? vfs_fsync_range+0x68/0x100
[  699.887694]  ? __fget_light+0xc9/0xe0
[  699.888442]  ? do_fsync+0x3d/0x70
[  699.889118]  ? __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x24/0x30
[  699.889996]  rewind_stack_do_exit+0x17/0x20
[  699.890860] RIP: 0033:0x7f9bf930d800
[  699.891585] Code: Bad RIP value.
[  699.892268] RSP: 002b:00007ffee3606c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004b
[  699.893781] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f9bf930d800
[  699.895220] RDX: 0000000000008000 RSI: 00000000006010a0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[  699.896643] RBP: 00007ffee3606ca0 R08: 0000000001503010 R09: 0000000000000000
[  699.898069] R10: 00000000000002e8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400610
[  699.899505] R13: 00007ffee3606da0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

[  699.901241] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[  699.902215] page:ffffea0007d0ebc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
[  699.903811] flags: 0x2ffff0000000000()
[  699.904585] raw: 02ffff0000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff07d00101 0000000000000000
[  699.906125] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000240000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[  699.907673] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

[  699.909108] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  699.910077]  ffff8801f43af800: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f4 f4 f4 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00
[  699.911528]  ffff8801f43af880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  699.912953] >ffff8801f43af900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 01 f4 f4 f4 f2 f2 f2
[  699.914392]                                                              ^
[  699.915758]  ffff8801f43af980: f2 00 f4 f4 00 00 00 00 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  699.917193]  ffff8801f43afa00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00
[  699.918634] ==================================================================

- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc1/source/fs/f2fs/segment.h#L644

Reported-by Wen Xu <[email protected]>

[bwh: Backported to 4.9:
- Error label is different in validate_checkpoint() due to the earlier backport of "f2fs: fix invalid memory access"
- Adjust context]

---
 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c |   22 +++++++++++++++++++---
 fs/f2fs/data.c       |   21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
 fs/f2fs/f2fs.h       |    3 +++
 fs/f2fs/file.c       |   12 ++++++++++++
 fs/f2fs/inode.c      |   16 ++++++++++++++++
 fs/f2fs/node.c       |    4 ++++
 fs/f2fs/segment.h    |    3 +--
 7 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

@@ -86,8 +86,10 @@ repeat:
 	fio.page = page;
 
 	if (f2fs_submit_page_bio(&fio)) {
-		f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
-		goto repeat;
+		memset(page_address(page), 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+		f2fs_stop_checkpoint(sbi, false);
+		f2fs_bug_on(sbi, 1);
+		return page;
 	}
 
 	lock_page(page);

@@ -141,8 +143,14 @@ bool f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(struct f2fs_s
 	case META_POR:
 	case DATA_GENERIC:
 		if (unlikely(blkaddr >= MAX_BLKADDR(sbi) ||
-			blkaddr < MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi)))
+			blkaddr < MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi))) {
+			if (type == DATA_GENERIC) {
+				f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
+					"access invalid blkaddr:%u", blkaddr);
+				WARN_ON(1);
+			}
 			return false;
+		}
 		break;
 	case META_GENERIC:
 		if (unlikely(blkaddr < SEG0_BLKADDR(sbi) ||

@@ -715,6 +723,14 @@ static struct page *validate_checkpoint(
 					&cp_page_1, version);
 	if (err)
 		return NULL;
+
+	if (le32_to_cpu(cp_block->cp_pack_total_block_count) >
+					sbi->blocks_per_seg) {
+		f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
+			"invalid cp_pack_total_block_count:%u",
+			le32_to_cpu(cp_block->cp_pack_total_block_count));
+		goto invalid_cp;
+	}
 	pre_version = *version;
 
 	cp_addr += le32_to_cpu(cp_block->cp_pack_total_block_count) - 1;

@@ -240,7 +240,10 @@ int f2fs_submit_page_bio(struct f2fs_io_
 	struct page *page = fio->encrypted_page ?
 			fio->encrypted_page : fio->page;
 
-	verify_block_addr(fio, fio->new_blkaddr);
+	if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(fio->sbi, fio->new_blkaddr,
+			__is_meta_io(fio) ? META_GENERIC : DATA_GENERIC))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
 	trace_f2fs_submit_page_bio(page, fio);
 	f2fs_trace_ios(fio, 0);
 

@@ -723,6 +726,12 @@ next_dnode:
 next_block:
 	blkaddr = datablock_addr(dn.node_page, dn.ofs_in_node);
 
+	if (__is_valid_data_blkaddr(blkaddr) &&
+		!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, DATA_GENERIC)) {
+		err = -EFAULT;
+		goto sync_out;
+	}
+
 	if (!is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr)) {
 		if (create) {
 			if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi))) {

@@ -1085,6 +1094,10 @@ got_it:
 				SetPageUptodate(page);
 				goto confused;
 			}
+
+			if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(F2FS_I_SB(inode), block_nr,
+								DATA_GENERIC))
+				goto set_error_page;
 		} else {
 			zero_user_segment(page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
 			if (!PageUptodate(page))

@@ -1213,6 +1226,12 @@ retry_encrypt:
 
 	set_page_writeback(page);
 
+	if (__is_valid_data_blkaddr(fio->old_blkaddr) &&
+		!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(fio->sbi, fio->old_blkaddr,
+							DATA_GENERIC)) {
+		err = -EFAULT;
+		goto out_writepage;
+	}
 	/*
 	 * If current allocation needs SSR,
 	 * it had better in-place writes for updated data.

@@ -1932,6 +1932,9 @@ static inline void *f2fs_kvzalloc(size_t
 	(pgofs - ADDRS_PER_INODE(inode) + ADDRS_PER_BLOCK) /	\
 	ADDRS_PER_BLOCK * ADDRS_PER_BLOCK + ADDRS_PER_INODE(inode))
 
+#define __is_meta_io(fio) (PAGE_TYPE_OF_BIO(fio->type) == META &&	\
+				(!is_read_io(fio->op) || fio->is_meta))
+
 bool f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
 					block_t blkaddr, int type);
 void f2fs_msg(struct super_block *sb, const char *level, const char *fmt, ...);

@@ -378,6 +378,13 @@ static loff_t f2fs_seek_block(struct fil
 			block_t blkaddr;
 			blkaddr = datablock_addr(dn.node_page, dn.ofs_in_node);
 
+			if (__is_valid_data_blkaddr(blkaddr) &&
+				!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(F2FS_I_SB(inode),
+						blkaddr, DATA_GENERIC)) {
+				f2fs_put_dnode(&dn);
+				goto fail;
+			}
+
 			if (__found_offset(F2FS_I_SB(inode), blkaddr, dirty,
 							pgofs, whence)) {
 				f2fs_put_dnode(&dn);

@@ -482,6 +489,11 @@ int truncate_data_blocks_range(struct dn
 
 		dn->data_blkaddr = NULL_ADDR;
 		set_data_blkaddr(dn);
+
+		if (__is_valid_data_blkaddr(blkaddr) &&
+			!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, DATA_GENERIC))
+			continue;
+
 		invalidate_blocks(sbi, blkaddr);
 		if (dn->ofs_in_node == 0 && IS_INODE(dn->node_page))
 			clear_inode_flag(dn->inode, FI_FIRST_BLOCK_WRITTEN);

@@ -129,6 +129,22 @@ static bool sanity_check_inode(struct in
 		return false;
 	}
 
+	if (F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree) {
+		struct extent_info *ei = &F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree->largest;
+
+		if (ei->len &&
+			(!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, ei->blk, DATA_GENERIC) ||
+			!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, ei->blk + ei->len - 1,
+							DATA_GENERIC))) {
+			set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+			f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
+				"%s: inode (ino=%lx) extent info [%u, %u, %u] "
+				"is incorrect, run fsck to fix",
+				__func__, inode->i_ino,
+				ei->blk, ei->fofs, ei->len);
+			return false;
+		}
+	}
 	return true;
 }
 

@@ -1605,6 +1605,10 @@ static int f2fs_write_node_page(struct p
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	if (__is_valid_data_blkaddr(ni.blk_addr) &&
+		!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, ni.blk_addr, DATA_GENERIC))
+		goto redirty_out;
+
 	set_page_writeback(page);
 	fio.old_blkaddr = ni.blk_addr;
 	write_node_page(nid, &fio);

@@ -601,8 +601,7 @@ static inline void verify_block_addr(str
 {
 	struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = fio->sbi;
 
-	if (PAGE_TYPE_OF_BIO(fio->type) == META &&
-				(!is_read_io(fio->op) || fio->is_meta))
+	if (__is_meta_io(fio))
 		verify_blkaddr(sbi, blk_addr, META_GENERIC);
 	else
 		verify_blkaddr(sbi, blk_addr, DATA_GENERIC);

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>

commit 89d13c38501df730cbb2e02c4499da1b5187119d upstream.

This patch fixes missing up_read call.

---
 fs/f2fs/node.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1606,8 +1606,10 @@ static int f2fs_write_node_page(struct p
 	}
 
 	if (__is_valid_data_blkaddr(ni.blk_addr) &&
-		!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, ni.blk_addr, DATA_GENERIC))
+		!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, ni.blk_addr, DATA_GENERIC)) {
+		up_read(&sbi->node_write);
 		goto redirty_out;
+	}
 
 	set_page_writeback(page);
 	fio.old_blkaddr = ni.blk_addr;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>

commit 91291e9998d208370eb8156c760691b873bd7522 upstream.

This patch adds f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr() in below functions to do sanity check with block address to avoid pentential panic:
- f2fs_grab_read_bio()
- __written_first_block()

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200465

- Reproduce

- POC (poc.c)

    #define _GNU_SOURCE
    #include <sys/types.h>
    #include <sys/mount.h>
    #include <sys/mman.h>
    #include <sys/stat.h>
    #include <sys/xattr.h>

    #include <dirent.h>
    #include <errno.h>
    #include <error.h>
    #include <fcntl.h>
    #include <stdio.h>
    #include <stdlib.h>
    #include <string.h>
    #include <unistd.h>

    #include <linux/falloc.h>
    #include <linux/loop.h>

    static void activity(char *mpoint) {

      char *xattr;
      int err;

      err = asprintf(&xattr, "%s/foo/bar/xattr", mpoint);

      char buf2[113];
      memset(buf2, 0, sizeof(buf2));
      listxattr(xattr, buf2, sizeof(buf2));

    }

    int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
      activity(argv[1]);
      return 0;
    }

- kernel message

[  844.718738] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 2
[  846.430929] F2FS-fs (loop0): access invalid blkaddr:1024
[  846.431058] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1249 at fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:154 f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x10f/0x160
[  846.431059] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer snd input_leds joydev soundcore serio_raw i2c_piix4 mac_hid ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi autofs4 raid10 raid456 libcrc32c async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear qxl ttm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul drm_kms_helper ghash_clmulni_intel syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops pcbc drm 8139too aesni_intel 8139cp floppy psmouse mii aes_x86_64 crypto_simd pata_acpi cryptd glue_helper
[  846.431310] CPU: 1 PID: 1249 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.18.0-rc3+ #1
[  846.431312] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[  846.431315] RIP: 0010:f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x10f/0x160
[  846.431316] Code: 00 eb ed 31 c0 83 fa 05 75 ae 48 83 ec 08 48 8b 3f 89 f1 48 c7 c2 fc 0b 0f 8b 48 c7 c6 8b d7 09 8b 88 44 24 07 e8 61 8b ff ff <0f> 0b 0f b6 44 24 07 48 83 c4 08 eb 81 4c 8b 47 10 8b 8f 38 04 00
[  846.431347] RSP: 0018:ffff961c414a7bc0 EFLAGS: 00010282
[  846.431349] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc5f787b8ea80 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  846.431350] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff89dfffd165d8 RDI: ffff89dfffd165d8
[  846.431351] RBP: ffff961c414a7c20 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000248
[  846.431353] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000248 R12: 0000000000000007
[  846.431369] R13: ffff89dff5492800 R14: ffff89dfae3aa000 R15: ffff89dff4ff88d0
[  846.431372] FS:  00007f882e2fb700(0000) GS:ffff89dfffd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  846.431373] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  846.431374] CR2: 0000000001a88008 CR3: 00000001eb572000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[  846.431384] Call Trace:
[  846.431426]  f2fs_iget+0x6f4/0xe70
[  846.431430]  ? f2fs_find_entry+0x71/0x90
[  846.431432]  f2fs_lookup+0x1aa/0x390
[  846.431452]  __lookup_slow+0x97/0x150
[  846.431459]  lookup_slow+0x35/0x50
[  846.431462]  walk_component+0x1c6/0x470
[  846.431479]  ? memcg_kmem_charge_memcg+0x70/0x90
[  846.431488]  ? page_add_file_rmap+0x13/0x200
[  846.431491]  path_lookupat+0x76/0x230
[  846.431501]  ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xfc/0x280
[  846.431504]  filename_lookup+0xb8/0x1a0
[  846.431534]  ? _cond_resched+0x16/0x40
[  846.431541]  ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x160/0x1d0
[  846.431549]  ? path_listxattr+0x41/0xa0
[  846.431551]  path_listxattr+0x41/0xa0
[  846.431570]  do_syscall_64+0x55/0x100
[  846.431583]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  846.431607] RIP: 0033:0x7f882de1c0d7
[  846.431607] Code: f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d be dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 b8 c2 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 91 dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[  846.431639] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8e66c238 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000c2
[  846.431641] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f882de1c0d7
[  846.431642] RDX: 0000000000000071 RSI: 00007ffe8e66c280 RDI: 0000000001a880c0
[  846.431643] RBP: 00007ffe8e66c300 R08: 0000000001a88010 R09: 0000000000000000
[  846.431645] R10: 00000000000001ab R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000400550
[  846.431646] R13: 00007ffe8e66c400 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  846.431648] ---[ end trace abca54df39d14f5c ]---
[  846.431651] F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid blkaddr: 1024, type: 5, run fsck to fix.
[  846.431762] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1249 at fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2697 f2fs_iget+0xd17/0xe70
[  846.431763] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer snd input_leds joydev soundcore serio_raw i2c_piix4 mac_hid ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi autofs4 raid10 raid456 libcrc32c async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear qxl ttm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul drm_kms_helper ghash_clmulni_intel syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops pcbc drm 8139too aesni_intel 8139cp floppy psmouse mii aes_x86_64 crypto_simd pata_acpi cryptd glue_helper
[  846.431797] CPU: 1 PID: 1249 Comm: a.out Tainted: G        W         4.18.0-rc3+ #1
[  846.431798] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[  846.431800] RIP: 0010:f2fs_iget+0xd17/0xe70
[  846.431801] Code: ff ff 48 63 d8 e9 e1 f6 ff ff 48 8b 45 c8 41 b8 05 00 00 00 48 c7 c2 d8 e8 0e 8b 48 c7 c6 1d b0 0a 8b 48 8b 38 e8 f9 b4 00 00 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 c8 f0 80 48 48 04 e9 d8 f9 ff ff 0f 0b 48 8b 43 18
[  846.431832] RSP: 0018:ffff961c414a7bd0 EFLAGS: 00010282
[  846.431834] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc5f787b8ea80 RCX: 0000000000000006
[  846.431835] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000096 RDI: ffff89dfffd165d0
[  846.431836] RBP: ffff961c414a7c20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000273
[  846.431837] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff89dfad50ca60 R12: 0000000000000007
[  846.431838] R13: ffff89dff5492800 R14: ffff89dfae3aa000 R15: ffff89dff4ff88d0
[  846.431840] FS:  00007f882e2fb700(0000) GS:ffff89dfffd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  846.431841] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  846.431842] CR2: 0000000001a88008 CR3: 00000001eb572000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[  846.431846] Call Trace:
[  846.431850]  ? f2fs_find_entry+0x71/0x90
[  846.431853]  f2fs_lookup+0x1aa/0x390
[  846.431856]  __lookup_slow+0x97/0x150
[  846.431858]  lookup_slow+0x35/0x50
[  846.431874]  walk_component+0x1c6/0x470
[  846.431878]  ? memcg_kmem_charge_memcg+0x70/0x90
[  846.431880]  ? page_add_file_rmap+0x13/0x200
[  846.431882]  path_lookupat+0x76/0x230
[  846.431884]  ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xfc/0x280
[  846.431886]  filename_lookup+0xb8/0x1a0
[  846.431890]  ? _cond_resched+0x16/0x40
[  846.431891]  ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x160/0x1d0
[  846.431894]  ? path_listxattr+0x41/0xa0
[  846.431896]  path_listxattr+0x41/0xa0
[  846.431898]  do_syscall_64+0x55/0x100
[  846.431901]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  846.431902] RIP: 0033:0x7f882de1c0d7
[  846.431903] Code: f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d be dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 b8 c2 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 91 dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[  846.431934] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8e66c238 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000c2
[  846.431936] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f882de1c0d7
[  846.431937] RDX: 0000000000000071 RSI: 00007ffe8e66c280 RDI: 0000000001a880c0
[  846.431939] RBP: 00007ffe8e66c300 R08: 0000000001a88010 R09: 0000000000000000
[  846.431940] R10: 00000000000001ab R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000400550
[  846.431941] R13: 00007ffe8e66c400 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  846.431943] ---[ end trace abca54df39d14f5d ]---
[  846.432033] F2FS-fs (loop0): access invalid blkaddr:1024
[  846.432051] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1249 at fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:154 f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x10f/0x160
[  846.432051] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer snd input_leds joydev soundcore serio_raw i2c_piix4 mac_hid ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi autofs4 raid10 raid456 libcrc32c async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear qxl ttm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul drm_kms_helper ghash_clmulni_intel syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops pcbc drm 8139too aesni_intel 8139cp floppy psmouse mii aes_x86_64 crypto_simd pata_acpi cryptd glue_helper
[  846.432085] CPU: 1 PID: 1249 Comm: a.out Tainted: G        W         4.18.0-rc3+ #1
[  846.432086] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[  846.432089] RIP: 0010:f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x10f/0x160
[  846.432089] Code: 00 eb ed 31 c0 83 fa 05 75 ae 48 83 ec 08 48 8b 3f 89 f1 48 c7 c2 fc 0b 0f 8b 48 c7 c6 8b d7 09 8b 88 44 24 07 e8 61 8b ff ff <0f> 0b 0f b6 44 24 07 48 83 c4 08 eb 81 4c 8b 47 10 8b 8f 38 04 00
[  846.432120] RSP: 0018:ffff961c414a7900 EFLAGS: 00010286
[  846.432122] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000400 RCX: 0000000000000006
[  846.432123] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000096 RDI: ffff89dfffd165d0
[  846.432124] RBP: ffff89dff5492800 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 000000000000029d
[  846.432125] R10: ffff961c414a7820 R11: 000000000000029d R12: 0000000000000400
[  846.432126] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff89dff4ff88d0 R15: 0000000000000000
[  846.432128] FS:  00007f882e2fb700(0000) GS:ffff89dfffd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  846.432130] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  846.432131] CR2: 0000000001a88008 CR3: 00000001eb572000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[  846.432135] Call Trace:
[  846.432151]  f2fs_wait_on_block_writeback+0x20/0x110
[  846.432158]  f2fs_grab_read_bio+0xbc/0xe0
[  846.432161]  f2fs_submit_page_read+0x21/0x280
[  846.432163]  f2fs_get_read_data_page+0xb7/0x3c0
[  846.432165]  f2fs_get_lock_data_page+0x29/0x1e0
[  846.432167]  f2fs_get_new_data_page+0x148/0x550
[  846.432170]  f2fs_add_regular_entry+0x1d2/0x550
[  846.432178]  ? __switch_to+0x12f/0x460
[  846.432181]  f2fs_add_dentry+0x6a/0xd0
[  846.432184]  f2fs_do_add_link+0xe9/0x140
[  846.432186]  __recover_dot_dentries+0x260/0x280
[  846.432189]  f2fs_lookup+0x343/0x390
[  846.432193]  __lookup_slow+0x97/0x150
[  846.432195]  lookup_slow+0x35/0x50
[  846.432208]  walk_component+0x1c6/0x470
[  846.432212]  ? memcg_kmem_charge_memcg+0x70/0x90
[  846.432215]  ? page_add_file_rmap+0x13/0x200
[  846.432217]  path_lookupat+0x76/0x230
[  846.432219]  ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xfc/0x280
[  846.432221]  filename_lookup+0xb8/0x1a0
[  846.432224]  ? _cond_resched+0x16/0x40
[  846.432226]  ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x160/0x1d0
[  846.432228]  ? path_listxattr+0x41/0xa0
[  846.432230]  path_listxattr+0x41/0xa0
[  846.432233]  do_syscall_64+0x55/0x100
[  846.432235]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  846.432237] RIP: 0033:0x7f882de1c0d7
[  846.432237] Code: f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d be dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 b8 c2 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 91 dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[  846.432269] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8e66c238 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000c2
[  846.432271] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f882de1c0d7
[  846.432272] RDX: 0000000000000071 RSI: 00007ffe8e66c280 RDI: 0000000001a880c0
[  846.432273] RBP: 00007ffe8e66c300 R08: 0000000001a88010 R09: 0000000000000000
[  846.432274] R10: 00000000000001ab R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000400550
[  846.432275] R13: 00007ffe8e66c400 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  846.432277] ---[ end trace abca54df39d14f5e ]---
[  846.432279] F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid blkaddr: 1024, type: 5, run fsck to fix.
[  846.432376] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1249 at fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2697 f2fs_wait_on_block_writeback+0xb1/0x110
[  846.432376] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer snd input_leds joydev soundcore serio_raw i2c_piix4 mac_hid ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi autofs4 raid10 raid456 libcrc32c async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear qxl ttm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul drm_kms_helper ghash_clmulni_intel syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops pcbc drm 8139too aesni_intel 8139cp floppy psmouse mii aes_x86_64 crypto_simd pata_acpi cryptd glue_helper
[  846.432410] CPU: 1 PID: 1249 Comm: a.out Tainted: G        W         4.18.0-rc3+ #1
[  846.432411] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[  846.432413] RIP: 0010:f2fs_wait_on_block_writeback+0xb1/0x110
[  846.432414] Code: 66 90 f0 ff 4b 34 74 59 5b 5d c3 48 8b 7d 00 41 b8 05 00 00 00 89 d9 48 c7 c2 d8 e8 0e 8b 48 c7 c6 1d b0 0a 8b e8 df bc fd ff <0f> 0b f0 80 4d 48 04 e9 67 ff ff ff 48 8b 03 48 c1 e8 37 83 e0 07
[  846.432445] RSP: 0018:ffff961c414a7910 EFLAGS: 00010286
[  846.432447] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000400 RCX: 0000000000000006
[  846.432448] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000092 RDI: ffff89dfffd165d0
[  846.432449] RBP: ffff89dff5492800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000000002d1
[  846.432450] R10: ffff961c414a7820 R11: ffff89dfad50cf80 R12: 0000000000000400
[  846.432451] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff89dff4ff88d0 R15: 0000000000000000
[  846.432453] FS:  00007f882e2fb700(0000) GS:ffff89dfffd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  846.432454] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  846.432455] CR2: 0000000001a88008 CR3: 00000001eb572000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[  846.432459] Call Trace:
[  846.432463]  f2fs_grab_read_bio+0xbc/0xe0
[  846.432464]  f2fs_submit_page_read+0x21/0x280
[  846.432466]  f2fs_get_read_data_page+0xb7/0x3c0
[  846.432468]  f2fs_get_lock_data_page+0x29/0x1e0
[  846.432470]  f2fs_get_new_data_page+0x148/0x550
[  846.432473]  f2fs_add_regular_entry+0x1d2/0x550
[  846.432475]  ? __switch_to+0x12f/0x460
[  846.432477]  f2fs_add_dentry+0x6a/0xd0
[  846.432480]  f2fs_do_add_link+0xe9/0x140
[  846.432483]  __recover_dot_dentries+0x260/0x280
[  846.432485]  f2fs_lookup+0x343/0x390
[  846.432488]  __lookup_slow+0x97/0x150
[  846.432490]  lookup_slow+0x35/0x50
[  846.432505]  walk_component+0x1c6/0x470
[  846.432509]  ? memcg_kmem_charge_memcg+0x70/0x90
[  846.432511]  ? page_add_file_rmap+0x13/0x200
[  846.432513]  path_lookupat+0x76/0x230
[  846.432515]  ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xfc/0x280
[  846.432517]  filename_lookup+0xb8/0x1a0
[  846.432520]  ? _cond_resched+0x16/0x40
[  846.432522]  ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x160/0x1d0
[  846.432525]  ? path_listxattr+0x41/0xa0
[  846.432526]  path_listxattr+0x41/0xa0
[  846.432529]  do_syscall_64+0x55/0x100
[  846.432531]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  846.432533] RIP: 0033:0x7f882de1c0d7
[  846.432533] Code: f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d be dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 b8 c2 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 91 dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[  846.432565] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8e66c238 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000c2
[  846.432567] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f882de1c0d7
[  846.432568] RDX: 0000000000000071 RSI: 00007ffe8e66c280 RDI: 0000000001a880c0
[  846.432569] RBP: 00007ffe8e66c300 R08: 0000000001a88010 R09: 0000000000000000
[  846.432570] R10: 00000000000001ab R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000400550
[  846.432571] R13: 00007ffe8e66c400 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  846.432573] ---[ end trace abca54df39d14f5f ]---
[  846.434280] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008
[  846.434424] PGD 80000001ebd3a067 P4D 80000001ebd3a067 PUD 1eb1ae067 PMD 0
[  846.434551] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[  846.434697] CPU: 0 PID: 44 Comm: kworker/u5:0 Tainted: G        W         4.18.0-rc3+ #1
[  846.434805] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[  846.435000] Workqueue: fscrypt_read_queue decrypt_work
[  846.435174] RIP: 0010:fscrypt_do_page_crypto+0x6e/0x2d0
[  846.435351] Code: 00 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 84 24 88 00 00 00 31 c0 e8 43 c2 e0 ff 49 8b 86 48 02 00 00 85 ed c7 44 24 70 00 00 00 00 <48> 8b 58 08 0f 84 14 02 00 00 48 8b 78 10 48 8b 0c 24 48 c7 84 24
[  846.435696] RSP: 0018:ffff961c40f9bd60 EFLAGS: 00010206
[  846.435870] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc5f787719b80 RCX: ffffc5f787719b80
[  846.436051] RDX: ffffffff8b9f4b88 RSI: ffffffff8b0ae622 RDI: ffff961c40f9bdb8
[  846.436261] RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: ffffc5f787719b80 R09: 0000000000001000
[  846.436433] R10: 0000000000000018 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffffc5f787719b80
[  846.436562] R13: ffffc5f787719b80 R14: ffff89dff4ff88d0 R15: 0ffff89dfaddee60
[  846.436658] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff89dfffc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  846.436758] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  846.436898] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 00000001eddd0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[  846.437001] Call Trace:
[  846.437181]  ? check_preempt_wakeup+0xf2/0x230
[  846.437276]  ? check_preempt_curr+0x7c/0x90
[  846.437370]  fscrypt_decrypt_page+0x48/0x4d
[  846.437466]  __fscrypt_decrypt_bio+0x5b/0x90
[  846.437542]  decrypt_work+0x12/0x20
[  846.437651]  process_one_work+0x15e/0x3d0
[  846.437740]  worker_thread+0x4c/0x440
[  846.437848]  kthread+0xf8/0x130
[  846.437938]  ? rescuer_thread+0x350/0x350
[  846.438022]  ? kthread_associate_blkcg+0x90/0x90
[  846.438117]  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[  846.438201] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer snd input_leds joydev soundcore serio_raw i2c_piix4 mac_hid ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi autofs4 raid10 raid456 libcrc32c async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear qxl ttm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul drm_kms_helper ghash_clmulni_intel syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops pcbc drm 8139too aesni_intel 8139cp floppy psmouse mii aes_x86_64 crypto_simd pata_acpi cryptd glue_helper
[  846.438653] CR2: 0000000000000008
[  846.438713] ---[ end trace abca54df39d14f60 ]---
[  846.438796] RIP: 0010:fscrypt_do_page_crypto+0x6e/0x2d0
[  846.438844] Code: 00 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 84 24 88 00 00 00 31 c0 e8 43 c2 e0 ff 49 8b 86 48 02 00 00 85 ed c7 44 24 70 00 00 00 00 <48> 8b 58 08 0f 84 14 02 00 00 48 8b 78 10 48 8b 0c 24 48 c7 84 24
[  846.439084] RSP: 0018:ffff961c40f9bd60 EFLAGS: 00010206
[  846.439176] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc5f787719b80 RCX: ffffc5f787719b80
[  846.440927] RDX: ffffffff8b9f4b88 RSI: ffffffff8b0ae622 RDI: ffff961c40f9bdb8
[  846.442083] RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: ffffc5f787719b80 R09: 0000000000001000
[  846.443284] R10: 0000000000000018 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffffc5f787719b80
[  846.444448] R13: ffffc5f787719b80 R14: ffff89dff4ff88d0 R15: 0ffff89dfaddee60
[  846.445558] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff89dfffc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  846.446687] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  846.447796] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 00000001eddd0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0

- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc4/source/fs/crypto/crypto.c#L149

	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = ci->ci_ctfm;

Here ci can be NULL

Note that this issue maybe require CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y to reproduce.

Reported-by Wen Xu <[email protected]>

---
 fs/f2fs/data.c  |    3 +++
 fs/f2fs/inode.c |   18 +++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -995,6 +995,9 @@ static struct bio *f2fs_grab_bio(struct
 	struct block_device *bdev = sbi->sb->s_bdev;
 	struct bio *bio;
 
+	if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, DATA_GENERIC))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+
 	if (f2fs_encrypted_inode(inode) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
 		ctx = fscrypt_get_ctx(inode, GFP_NOFS);
 		if (IS_ERR(ctx))

@@ -59,14 +59,16 @@ static void __get_inode_rdev(struct inod
 	}
 }
 
-static bool __written_first_block(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
+static int __written_first_block(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
 					struct f2fs_inode *ri)
 {
 	block_t addr = le32_to_cpu(ri->i_addr[0]);
 
-	if (is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, addr))
-		return true;
-	return false;
+	if (!__is_valid_data_blkaddr(addr))
+		return 1;
+	if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, addr, DATA_GENERIC))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static void __set_inode_rdev(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_inode *ri)

@@ -154,6 +156,7 @@ static int do_read_inode(struct inode *i
 	struct f2fs_inode_info *fi = F2FS_I(inode);
 	struct page *node_page;
 	struct f2fs_inode *ri;
+	int err;
 
 	/* Check if ino is within scope */
 	if (check_nid_range(sbi, inode->i_ino)) {

@@ -209,7 +212,12 @@ static int do_read_inode(struct inode *i
 	/* get rdev by using inline_info */
 	__get_inode_rdev(inode, ri);
 
-	if (__written_first_block(sbi, ri))
+	err = __written_first_block(sbi, ri);
+	if (err < 0) {
+		f2fs_put_page(node_page, 1);
+		return err;
+	}
+	if (!err)
 		set_inode_flag(inode, FI_FIRST_BLOCK_WRITTEN);
 
 	if (!need_inode_block_update(sbi, inode->i_ino))

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>

commit e494c2f995d6181d6e29c4927d68e0f295ecf75b upstream.

After fuzzing, cp_pack_start_sum could be corrupted, so current log's summary info should be wrong due to loading incorrect summary block. Then, if segment's type in current log is exceeded NR_CURSEG_TYPE, it can lead accessing invalid dirty_i->dirty_segmap bitmap finally.

Add sanity check for cp_pack_start_sum to fix this issue.

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200419

- Reproduce

- Kernel message (f2fs-dev w/ KASAN)

[ 3117.578432] F2FS-fs (loop0): Invalid log blocks per segment (8)

[ 3117.578445] F2FS-fs (loop0): Can't find valid F2FS filesystem in 2th superblock
[ 3117.581364] F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc_offset: 30716
[ 3117.583564] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1225 at fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:90 __get_meta_page+0x448/0x4b0
[ 3117.583570] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer joydev input_leds serio_raw snd soundcore mac_hid i2c_piix4 ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi btrfs zstd_decompress zstd_compress xxhash raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too qxl ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel psmouse aes_x86_64 8139cp crypto_simd cryptd mii glue_helper pata_acpi floppy
[ 3117.584014] CPU: 1 PID: 1225 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.17.0+ #1
[ 3117.584017] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 3117.584022] RIP: 0010:__get_meta_page+0x448/0x4b0
[ 3117.584023] Code: 00 49 8d bc 24 84 00 00 00 e8 74 54 da ff 41 83 8c 24 84 00 00 00 08 4c 89 f6 4c 89 ef e8 c0 d9 95 00 48 89 ef e8 18 e3 00 00 <0f> 0b f0 80 4d 48 04 e9 0f fe ff ff 0f 0b 48 89 c7 48 89 04 24 e8
[ 3117.584072] RSP: 0018:ffff88018eb678c0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 3117.584082] RAX: ffff88018f0a6a78 RBX: ffffea0007a46600 RCX: ffffffff9314d1b2
[ 3117.584085] RDX: ffffffff00000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88018f0a6a98
[ 3117.584087] RBP: ffff88018ebe9980 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 3117.584090] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed00326e4450 R12: ffff880193722200
[ 3117.584092] R13: ffff88018ebe9afc R14: 0000000000000206 R15: ffff88018eb67900
[ 3117.584096] FS:  00007f5694636840(0000) GS:ffff8801f3b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 3117.584098] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 3117.584101] CR2: 00000000016f21b8 CR3: 0000000191c22000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 3117.584112] Call Trace:
[ 3117.584121]  ? f2fs_set_meta_page_dirty+0x150/0x150
[ 3117.584127]  ? f2fs_build_segment_manager+0xbf9/0x3190
[ 3117.584133]  ? f2fs_npages_for_summary_flush+0x75/0x120
[ 3117.584145]  f2fs_build_segment_manager+0xda8/0x3190
[ 3117.584151]  ? f2fs_get_valid_checkpoint+0x298/0xa00
[ 3117.584156]  ? f2fs_flush_sit_entries+0x10e0/0x10e0
[ 3117.584184]  ? map_id_range_down+0x17c/0x1b0
[ 3117.584188]  ? __put_user_ns+0x30/0x30
[ 3117.584206]  ? find_next_bit+0x53/0x90
[ 3117.584237]  ? cpumask_next+0x16/0x20
[ 3117.584249]  f2fs_fill_super+0x1948/0x2b40
[ 3117.584258]  ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.584279]  ? sget_userns+0x65e/0x690
[ 3117.584296]  ? set_blocksize+0x88/0x130
[ 3117.584302]  ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.584305]  mount_bdev+0x1c0/0x200
[ 3117.584310]  mount_fs+0x5c/0x190
[ 3117.584320]  vfs_kern_mount+0x64/0x190
[ 3117.584330]  do_mount+0x2e4/0x1450
[ 3117.584343]  ? lockref_put_return+0x130/0x130
[ 3117.584347]  ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[ 3117.584357]  ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x31/0x40
[ 3117.584362]  ? kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 3117.584373]  ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x16/0x90
[ 3117.584377]  ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x196/0x210
[ 3117.584383]  ? _copy_from_user+0x61/0x90
[ 3117.584396]  ? memdup_user+0x3e/0x60
[ 3117.584401]  ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.584405]  __x64_sys_mount+0x62/0x70
[ 3117.584427]  do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 3117.584440]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 3117.584455] RIP: 0033:0x7f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.584456] Code: 48 8b 0d 01 c3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ce c2 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 3117.584505] RSP: 002b:00007fff27346488 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 3117.584510] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000016e2030 RCX: 00007f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.584512] RDX: 00000000016e2210 RSI: 00000000016e3f30 RDI: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.584514] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
[ 3117.584516] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.584519] R13: 00000000016e2210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 3117.584523] ---[ end trace a8e0d899985faf31 ]---
[ 3117.685663] F2FS-fs (loop0): f2fs_check_nid_range: out-of-range nid=2, run fsck to fix.
[ 3117.685673] F2FS-fs (loop0): recover_data: ino = 2 (i_size: recover) recovered = 1, err = 0
[ 3117.685707] ==================================================================
[ 3117.685955] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __remove_dirty_segment+0xdd/0x1e0
[ 3117.686175] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88018f0a63d0 by task mount/1225

[ 3117.686477] CPU: 0 PID: 1225 Comm: mount Tainted: G        W         4.17.0+ #1
[ 3117.686481] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 3117.686483] Call Trace:
[ 3117.686494]  dump_stack+0x71/0xab
[ 3117.686512]  print_address_description+0x6b/0x290
[ 3117.686517]  kasan_report+0x28e/0x390
[ 3117.686522]  ? __remove_dirty_segment+0xdd/0x1e0
[ 3117.686527]  __remove_dirty_segment+0xdd/0x1e0
[ 3117.686532]  locate_dirty_segment+0x189/0x190
[ 3117.686538]  f2fs_allocate_new_segments+0xa9/0xe0
[ 3117.686543]  recover_data+0x703/0x2c20
[ 3117.686547]  ? f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0x48f/0xd50
[ 3117.686553]  ? ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.686564]  ? policy_nodemask+0x1a/0x90
[ 3117.686567]  ? policy_node+0x56/0x70
[ 3117.686571]  ? add_fsync_inode+0xf0/0xf0
[ 3117.686592]  ? blk_finish_plug+0x44/0x60
[ 3117.686597]  ? f2fs_ra_meta_pages+0x38b/0x5e0
[ 3117.686602]  ? find_inode_fast+0xac/0xc0
[ 3117.686606]  ? f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x320/0x320
[ 3117.686618]  ? __radix_tree_lookup+0x150/0x150
[ 3117.686633]  ? dqget+0x670/0x670
[ 3117.686648]  ? pagecache_get_page+0x29/0x410
[ 3117.686656]  ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x176/0x1e0
[ 3117.686660]  ? f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x11d/0x320
[ 3117.686664]  f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0xc23/0xd50
[ 3117.686670]  ? f2fs_space_for_roll_forward+0x60/0x60
[ 3117.686674]  ? rb_insert_color+0x323/0x3d0
[ 3117.686678]  ? f2fs_recover_orphan_inodes+0xa5/0x700
[ 3117.686683]  ? proc_register+0x153/0x1d0
[ 3117.686686]  ? f2fs_remove_orphan_inode+0x10/0x10
[ 3117.686695]  ? f2fs_attr_store+0x50/0x50
[ 3117.686700]  ? proc_create_single_data+0x52/0x60
[ 3117.686707]  f2fs_fill_super+0x1d06/0x2b40
[ 3117.686728]  ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.686735]  ? sget_userns+0x65e/0x690
[ 3117.686740]  ? set_blocksize+0x88/0x130
[ 3117.686745]  ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.686748]  mount_bdev+0x1c0/0x200
[ 3117.686753]  mount_fs+0x5c/0x190
[ 3117.686758]  vfs_kern_mount+0x64/0x190
[ 3117.686762]  do_mount+0x2e4/0x1450
[ 3117.686769]  ? lockref_put_return+0x130/0x130
[ 3117.686773]  ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[ 3117.686777]  ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x31/0x40
[ 3117.686780]  ? kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 3117.686786]  ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x16/0x90
[ 3117.686790]  ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x196/0x210
[ 3117.686795]  ? _copy_from_user+0x61/0x90
[ 3117.686801]  ? memdup_user+0x3e/0x60
[ 3117.686804]  ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.686809]  __x64_sys_mount+0x62/0x70
[ 3117.686816]  do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 3117.686824]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 3117.686829] RIP: 0033:0x7f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.686830] Code: 48 8b 0d 01 c3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ce c2 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 3117.686887] RSP: 002b:00007fff27346488 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 3117.686892] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000016e2030 RCX: 00007f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.686894] RDX: 00000000016e2210 RSI: 00000000016e3f30 RDI: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.686896] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
[ 3117.686899] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.686901] R13: 00000000016e2210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003

[ 3117.687005] Allocated by task 1225:
[ 3117.687152]  kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 3117.687157]  kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xfd/0x200
[ 3117.687161]  f2fs_build_segment_manager+0x2d09/0x3190
[ 3117.687165]  f2fs_fill_super+0x1948/0x2b40
[ 3117.687168]  mount_bdev+0x1c0/0x200
[ 3117.687171]  mount_fs+0x5c/0x190
[ 3117.687174]  vfs_kern_mount+0x64/0x190
[ 3117.687177]  do_mount+0x2e4/0x1450
[ 3117.687180]  ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.687182]  __x64_sys_mount+0x62/0x70
[ 3117.687186]  do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 3117.687190]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

[ 3117.687285] Freed by task 19:
[ 3117.687412]  __kasan_slab_free+0x137/0x190
[ 3117.687416]  kfree+0x8b/0x1b0
[ 3117.687460]  ttm_bo_man_put_node+0x61/0x80 [ttm]
[ 3117.687476]  ttm_bo_cleanup_refs+0x15f/0x250 [ttm]
[ 3117.687492]  ttm_bo_delayed_delete+0x2f0/0x300 [ttm]
[ 3117.687507]  ttm_bo_delayed_workqueue+0x17/0x50 [ttm]
[ 3117.687528]  process_one_work+0x2f9/0x740
[ 3117.687531]  worker_thread+0x78/0x6b0
[ 3117.687541]  kthread+0x177/0x1c0
[ 3117.687545]  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

[ 3117.687638] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88018f0a6300
                which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192
[ 3117.688014] The buggy address is located 16 bytes to the right of
                192-byte region [ffff88018f0a6300, ffff88018f0a63c0)
[ 3117.688382] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 3117.688554] page:ffffea00063c2980 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801f3403180 index:0x0
[ 3117.688788] flags: 0x17fff8000000100(slab)
[ 3117.688944] raw: 017fff8000000100 ffffea00063c2840 0000000e0000000e ffff8801f3403180
[ 3117.689166] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 3117.689386] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

[ 3117.689653] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 3117.689816]  ffff88018f0a6280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 3117.690027]  ffff88018f0a6300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 3117.690239] >ffff88018f0a6380: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 3117.690448]                                                  ^
[ 3117.690644]  ffff88018f0a6400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 3117.690868]  ffff88018f0a6480: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 3117.691077] ==================================================================
[ 3117.691290] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[ 3117.693893] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
[ 3117.694120] PGD 80000001f01bc067 P4D 80000001f01bc067 PUD 1d9638067 PMD 0
[ 3117.694338] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 3117.694490] CPU: 1 PID: 1225 Comm: mount Tainted: G    B   W         4.17.0+ #1
[ 3117.694703] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 3117.695073] RIP: 0010:__remove_dirty_segment+0xe2/0x1e0
[ 3117.695246] Code: c4 48 89 c7 e8 cf bb d7 ff 45 0f b6 24 24 41 83 e4 3f 44 88 64 24 07 41 83 e4 3f 4a 8d 7c e3 08 e8 b3 bc d7 ff 4a 8b 4c e3 08 <f0> 4c 0f b3 29 0f 82 94 00 00 00 48 8d bd 20 04 00 00 e8 97 bb d7
[ 3117.695793] RSP: 0018:ffff88018eb67638 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 3117.695969] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88018f0a6300 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 3117.696182] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000297 RDI: 0000000000000297
[ 3117.696391] RBP: ffff88018ebe9980 R08: ffffed003e743ebb R09: ffffed003e743ebb
[ 3117.696604] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e743eba R12: 0000000000000019
[ 3117.696813] R13: 0000000000000014 R14: 0000000000000320 R15: ffff88018ebe99e0
[ 3117.697032] FS:  00007f5694636840(0000) GS:ffff8801f3b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 3117.697280] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 3117.702357] CR2: 00007fe89bb1a000 CR3: 0000000191c22000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 3117.707235] Call Trace:
[ 3117.712077]  locate_dirty_segment+0x189/0x190
[ 3117.716891]  f2fs_allocate_new_segments+0xa9/0xe0
[ 3117.721617]  recover_data+0x703/0x2c20
[ 3117.726316]  ? f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0x48f/0xd50
[ 3117.730957]  ? ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.735573]  ? policy_nodemask+0x1a/0x90
[ 3117.740198]  ? policy_node+0x56/0x70
[ 3117.744829]  ? add_fsync_inode+0xf0/0xf0
[ 3117.749487]  ? blk_finish_plug+0x44/0x60
[ 3117.754152]  ? f2fs_ra_meta_pages+0x38b/0x5e0
[ 3117.758831]  ? find_inode_fast+0xac/0xc0
[ 3117.763448]  ? f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x320/0x320
[ 3117.768046]  ? __radix_tree_lookup+0x150/0x150
[ 3117.772603]  ? dqget+0x670/0x670
[ 3117.777159]  ? pagecache_get_page+0x29/0x410
[ 3117.781648]  ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x176/0x1e0
[ 3117.786067]  ? f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x11d/0x320
[ 3117.790476]  f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0xc23/0xd50
[ 3117.794790]  ? f2fs_space_for_roll_forward+0x60/0x60
[ 3117.799086]  ? rb_insert_color+0x323/0x3d0
[ 3117.803304]  ? f2fs_recover_orphan_inodes+0xa5/0x700
[ 3117.807563]  ? proc_register+0x153/0x1d0
[ 3117.811766]  ? f2fs_remove_orphan_inode+0x10/0x10
[ 3117.815947]  ? f2fs_attr_store+0x50/0x50
[ 3117.820087]  ? proc_create_single_data+0x52/0x60
[ 3117.824262]  f2fs_fill_super+0x1d06/0x2b40
[ 3117.828367]  ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.832432]  ? sget_userns+0x65e/0x690
[ 3117.836500]  ? set_blocksize+0x88/0x130
[ 3117.840501]  ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.844420]  mount_bdev+0x1c0/0x200
[ 3117.848275]  mount_fs+0x5c/0x190
[ 3117.852053]  vfs_kern_mount+0x64/0x190
[ 3117.855810]  do_mount+0x2e4/0x1450
[ 3117.859441]  ? lockref_put_return+0x130/0x130
[ 3117.862996]  ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[ 3117.866417]  ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x31/0x40
[ 3117.869719]  ? kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 3117.872948]  ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x16/0x90
[ 3117.876121]  ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x196/0x210
[ 3117.879333]  ? _copy_from_user+0x61/0x90
[ 3117.882467]  ? memdup_user+0x3e/0x60
[ 3117.885604]  ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.888700]  __x64_sys_mount+0x62/0x70
[ 3117.891742]  do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 3117.894692]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 3117.897669] RIP: 0033:0x7f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.900563] Code: 48 8b 0d 01 c3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ce c2 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 3117.906922] RSP: 002b:00007fff27346488 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 3117.910159] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000016e2030 RCX: 00007f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.913469] RDX: 00000000016e2210 RSI: 00000000016e3f30 RDI: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.916764] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
[ 3117.920071] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.923393] R13: 00000000016e2210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 3117.926680] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer joydev input_leds serio_raw snd soundcore mac_hid i2c_piix4 ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi btrfs zstd_decompress zstd_compress xxhash raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too qxl ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel psmouse aes_x86_64 8139cp crypto_simd cryptd mii glue_helper pata_acpi floppy
[ 3117.949979] CR2: 0000000000000000
[ 3117.954283] ---[ end trace a8e0d899985faf32 ]---
[ 3117.958575] RIP: 0010:__remove_dirty_segment+0xe2/0x1e0
[ 3117.962810] Code: c4 48 89 c7 e8 cf bb d7 ff 45 0f b6 24 24 41 83 e4 3f 44 88 64 24 07 41 83 e4 3f 4a 8d 7c e3 08 e8 b3 bc d7 ff 4a 8b 4c e3 08 <f0> 4c 0f b3 29 0f 82 94 00 00 00 48 8d bd 20 04 00 00 e8 97 bb d7
[ 3117.971789] RSP: 0018:ffff88018eb67638 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 3117.976333] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88018f0a6300 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 3117.980926] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000297 RDI: 0000000000000297
[ 3117.985497] RBP: ffff88018ebe9980 R08: ffffed003e743ebb R09: ffffed003e743ebb
[ 3117.990098] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e743eba R12: 0000000000000019
[ 3117.994761] R13: 0000000000000014 R14: 0000000000000320 R15: ffff88018ebe99e0
[ 3117.999392] FS:  00007f5694636840(0000) GS:ffff8801f3b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 3118.004096] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 3118.008816] CR2: 00007fe89bb1a000 CR3: 0000000191c22000 CR4: 00000000000006e0

- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc3/source/fs/f2fs/segment.c#L775

		if (test_and_clear_bit(segno, dirty_i->dirty_segmap[t]))
			dirty_i->nr_dirty[t]--;

Here dirty_i->dirty_segmap[t] can be NULL which leads to crash in test_and_clear_bit()

Reported-by Wen Xu <[email protected]>

---
 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c |    8 ++++----
 fs/f2fs/super.c      |   12 ++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -794,15 +794,15 @@ int get_valid_checkpoint(struct f2fs_sb_
 	cp_block = (struct f2fs_checkpoint *)page_address(cur_page);
 	memcpy(sbi->ckpt, cp_block, blk_size);
 
-	/* Sanity checking of checkpoint */
-	if (sanity_check_ckpt(sbi))
-		goto free_fail_no_cp;
-
 	if (cur_page == cp1)
 		sbi->cur_cp_pack = 1;
 	else
 		sbi->cur_cp_pack = 2;
 
+	/* Sanity checking of checkpoint */
+	if (sanity_check_ckpt(sbi))
+		goto free_fail_no_cp;
+
 	if (cp_blks <= 1)
 		goto done;
 

@@ -1487,6 +1487,7 @@ int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_inf
 	unsigned int sit_bitmap_size, nat_bitmap_size;
 	unsigned int log_blocks_per_seg;
 	unsigned int segment_count_main;
+	unsigned int cp_pack_start_sum, cp_payload;
 	block_t user_block_count;
 	int i;
 

@@ -1547,6 +1548,17 @@ int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_inf
 		return 1;
 	}
 
+	cp_pack_start_sum = __start_sum_addr(sbi);
+	cp_payload = __cp_payload(sbi);
+	if (cp_pack_start_sum < cp_payload + 1 ||
+		cp_pack_start_sum > blocks_per_seg - 1 -
+			NR_CURSEG_TYPE) {
+		f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
+			"Wrong cp_pack_start_sum: %u",
+			cp_pack_start_sum);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
 	if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi))) {
 		f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR, "A bug case: need to run fsck");
 		return 1;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Darrick J. Wong" <[email protected]>

commit 7b38460dc8e4eafba06c78f8e37099d3b34d473c upstream.

Kanda Motohiro reported that expanding a tiny xattr into a large xattr fails on XFS because we remove the tiny xattr from a shortform fork and then try to re-add it after converting the fork to extents format having not removed the ATTR_REPLACE flag. This fails because the attr is no longer present, causing a fs shutdown.

This is derived from the patch in his bug report, but we really shouldn't ignore a nonzero retval from the remove call.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199119

---
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr.c |    9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -487,7 +487,14 @@ xfs_attr_shortform_addname(xfs_da_args_t
 		if (args->flags & ATTR_CREATE)
 			return retval;
 		retval = xfs_attr_shortform_remove(args);
-		ASSERT(retval == 0);
+		if (retval)
+			return retval;
+		/*
+		 * Since we have removed the old attr, clear ATTR_REPLACE so
+		 * that the leaf format add routine won't trip over the attr
+		 * not being around.
+		 */
+		args->flags &= ~ATTR_REPLACE;
 	}
 
 	if (args->namelen >= XFS_ATTR_SF_ENTSIZE_MAX ||

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xiongfeng Wang <[email protected]>

commit 321cb0308a9e76841394b4bbab6a1107cfedbae0 upstream.

gcc-8 reports many -Wpacked-not-aligned warnings. The below are some examples.

./include/linux/ceph/msgr.h:67:1: warning: alignment 1 of 'struct ceph_entity_addr' is less than 8 [-Wpacked-not-aligned]
} __attribute__ ((packed));

./include/linux/ceph/msgr.h:67:1: warning: alignment 1 of 'struct ceph_entity_addr' is less than 8 [-Wpacked-not-aligned]
} __attribute__ ((packed));

./include/linux/ceph/msgr.h:67:1: warning: alignment 1 of 'struct ceph_entity_addr' is less than 8 [-Wpacked-not-aligned]
} __attribute__ ((packed));

This patch suppresses this kind of warnings for default setting.

---
 scripts/Makefile.extrawarn |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
 # are not supported by all versions of the compiler
 # ==========================================================================
 
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, packed-not-aligned)
+
 ifeq ("$(origin W)", "command line")
   export KBUILD_ENABLE_EXTRA_GCC_CHECKS := $(W)
 endif

@@ -25,6 +27,7 @@ warning-1 += -Wold-style-definition
 warning-1 += $(call cc-option, -Wmissing-include-dirs)
 warning-1 += $(call cc-option, -Wunused-but-set-variable)
 warning-1 += $(call cc-option, -Wunused-const-variable)
+warning-1 += $(call cc-option, -Wpacked-not-aligned)
 warning-1 += $(call cc-disable-warning, missing-field-initializers)
 warning-1 += $(call cc-disable-warning, sign-compare)
 

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>

commit 58930cced012adb01bc78b3687049b17ef44d0a3 upstream.

As gcc-8 points out, the bit mask check makes no sense here:

drivers/staging/rts5208/sd.c: In function 'ext_sd_send_cmd_get_rsp':
drivers/staging/rts5208/sd.c:4130:25: error: bitwise comparison always evaluates to true [-Werror=tautological-compare]

However, the code is even more bogus, as we have already checked for the SD_RSP_TYPE_R0 case earlier in the function and returned success. As seen in the mmc/sd driver core, SD_RSP_TYPE_R0 means "no response" anyway, so checking for a particular response would not help either.

This just removes the nonsensical code to get rid of the warning.

---
 drivers/staging/rts5208/sd.c |    6 ------
 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)

@@ -4110,12 +4110,6 @@ RTY_SEND_CMD:
 					rtsx_trace(chip);
 					return STATUS_FAIL;
 				}
-
-			} else if (rsp_type == SD_RSP_TYPE_R0) {
-				if ((ptr[3] & 0x1E) != 0x03) {
-					rtsx_trace(chip);
-					return STATUS_FAIL;
-				}
 			}
 		}
 	}

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>

commit 2cf2f0d5b91fd1b06a6ae260462fc7945ea84add upstream.

gcc discovered that the memcpy() arguments in kdbnearsym() overlap, so we should really use memmove(), which is defined to handle that correctly:

In function 'memcpy',
inlined from 'kdbnearsym' at /git/arm-soc/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_support.c:132:4:
/git/arm-soc/include/linux/string.h:353:9: error: '__builtin_memcpy' accessing 792 bytes at offsets 0 and 8 overlaps 784 bytes at offset 8 [-Werror=restrict]
return __builtin_memcpy(p, q, size);

---
 kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_support.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -129,13 +129,13 @@ int kdbnearsym(unsigned long addr, kdb_s
 		}
 		if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(kdb_name_table)) {
 			debug_kfree(kdb_name_table[0]);
-			memcpy(kdb_name_table, kdb_name_table+1,
+			memmove(kdb_name_table, kdb_name_table+1,
 			       sizeof(kdb_name_table[0]) *
 			       (ARRAY_SIZE(kdb_name_table)-1));
 		} else {
 			debug_kfree(knt1);
 			knt1 = kdb_name_table[i];
-			memcpy(kdb_name_table+i, kdb_name_table+i+1,
+			memmove(kdb_name_table+i, kdb_name_table+i+1,
 			       sizeof(kdb_name_table[0]) *
 			       (ARRAY_SIZE(kdb_name_table)-i-1));
 		}

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

commit c0944883c97c0ddc71da67cc731590a7c878a1a2 upstream.

This switches the hibernate_64.S function names into character arrays to match other areas of the kernel where this is done (e.g., linker scripts). Specifically this fixes a compile-time error noticed by the future CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE routines that complained about PAGE_SIZE being copied out of the "single byte" core_restore_code variable.

Additionally drops the "acpi_save_state_mem" exern which does not appear to be used anywhere else in the kernel.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/suspend_64.h |    5 ++---
 arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c     |    6 +++---
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

@@ -42,8 +42,7 @@ struct saved_context {
 	set_debugreg((thread)->debugreg##register, register)
 
 /* routines for saving/restoring kernel state */
-extern int acpi_save_state_mem(void);
-extern char core_restore_code;
-extern char restore_registers;
+extern char core_restore_code[];
+extern char restore_registers[];
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_SUSPEND_64_H */

@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static int relocate_restore_code(void)
 	if (!relocated_restore_code)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	memcpy((void *)relocated_restore_code, &core_restore_code, PAGE_SIZE);
+	memcpy((void *)relocated_restore_code, core_restore_code, PAGE_SIZE);
 
 	/* Make the page containing the relocated code executable */
 	pgd = (pgd_t *)__va(read_cr3()) + pgd_index(relocated_restore_code);

@@ -197,8 +197,8 @@ int arch_hibernation_header_save(void *a
 
 	if (max_size < sizeof(struct restore_data_record))
 		return -EOVERFLOW;
-	rdr->jump_address = (unsigned long)&restore_registers;
-	rdr->jump_address_phys = __pa_symbol(&restore_registers);
+	rdr->jump_address = (unsigned long)restore_registers;
+	rdr->jump_address_phys = __pa_symbol(restore_registers);
 	rdr->cr3 = restore_cr3;
 	rdr->magic = RESTORE_MAGIC;
 	return 0;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andrea Parri <[email protected]>

commit 09d3f015d1e1b4fee7e9bbdcf54201d239393391 upstream.

Commit:

142b18ddc8143 ("uprobes: Fix handle_swbp() vs unregister() + register() race")

added the UPROBE_COPY_INSN flag, and corresponding smp_wmb() and smp_rmb() memory barriers, to ensure that handle_swbp() uses fully-initialized uprobes only.

However, the smp_rmb() is mis-placed: this barrier should be placed after handle_swbp() has tested for the flag, thus guaranteeing that (program-order) subsequent loads from the uprobe can see the initial stores performed by prepare_uprobe().

Move the smp_rmb() accordingly. Also amend the comments associated to the two memory barriers to indicate their actual locations.

---
 kernel/events/uprobes.c |   12 ++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ static int prepare_uprobe(struct uprobe
 	BUG_ON((uprobe->offset & ~PAGE_MASK) +
 			UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE);
 
-	smp_wmb(); /* pairs with rmb() in find_active_uprobe() */
+	smp_wmb(); /* pairs with the smp_rmb() in handle_swbp() */
 	set_bit(UPROBE_COPY_INSN, &uprobe->flags);
 
  out:

@@ -1902,10 +1902,18 @@ static void handle_swbp(struct pt_regs *
 	 * After we hit the bp, _unregister + _register can install the
 	 * new and not-yet-analyzed uprobe at the same address, restart.
 	 */
-	smp_rmb(); /* pairs with wmb() in install_breakpoint() */
 	if (unlikely(!test_bit(UPROBE_COPY_INSN, &uprobe->flags)))
 		goto out;
 
+	/*
+	 * Pairs with the smp_wmb() in prepare_uprobe().
+	 *
+	 * Guarantees that if we see the UPROBE_COPY_INSN bit set, then
+	 * we must also see the stores to &uprobe->arch performed by the
+	 * prepare_uprobe() call.
+	 */
+	smp_rmb();
+
 	/* Tracing handlers use ->utask to communicate with fetch methods */
 	if (!get_utask())
 		goto out;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mathias Kresin <[email protected]>

commit 7d35baa4e9ec4b717bc0e58a39cdb6a1c50f5465 upstream.

In case the nd_sd group is set to the sd-card function, Pins 45 + 46 are configured as GPIOs. If they are blocked by the sd function, they can't be used as GPIOs.

Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/21220/

---
 arch/mips/ralink/mt7620.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static struct rt2880_pmx_func pcie_rst_g
 };
 static struct rt2880_pmx_func nd_sd_grp[] = {
 	FUNC("nand", MT7620_GPIO_MODE_NAND, 45, 15),
-	FUNC("sd", MT7620_GPIO_MODE_SD, 45, 15)
+	FUNC("sd", MT7620_GPIO_MODE_SD, 47, 13)
 };
 
 static struct rt2880_pmx_group mt7620a_pinmux_data[] = {

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dmitry V. Levin <[email protected]>

commit c50cbd85cd7027d32ac5945bb60217936b4f7eaf upstream.

When checking for TIF_32BIT_REGS flag, mips_get_syscall_arg() should use the task specified as its argument instead of the current task.

This potentially affects all syscall_get_arguments() users who specify tasks different from the current.

Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/21185/

---
 arch/mips/include/asm/syscall.h |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static inline unsigned long mips_get_sys
 #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
 	case 4: case 5: case 6: case 7:
 #ifdef CONFIG_MIPS32_O32
-		if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT_REGS))
+		if (test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_32BIT_REGS))
 			return get_user(*arg, (int *)usp + n);
 		else
 #endif

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Guralnik <[email protected]>

commit db7a691a1551a748cb92d9c89c6b190ea87e28d5 upstream.

If the firmware reports a connection width that is not 1x, 4x, 8x or 12x it causes the driver to fail during initialization.

To prevent this failure every time a new width is introduced to the RDMA stack, we will set a default 4x width for these widths which ar unknown to the driver.

This is needed to allow to run old kernels with new firmware.

---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c |   29 +++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

@@ -710,31 +710,26 @@ enum mlx5_ib_width {
 	MLX5_IB_WIDTH_12X	= 1 << 4
 };
 
-static int translate_active_width(struct ib_device *ibdev, u8 active_width,
+static void translate_active_width(struct ib_device *ibdev, u8 active_width,
 				  u8 *ib_width)
 {
 	struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev = to_mdev(ibdev);
-	int err = 0;
 
-	if (active_width & MLX5_IB_WIDTH_1X) {
+	if (active_width & MLX5_IB_WIDTH_1X)
 		*ib_width = IB_WIDTH_1X;
-	} else if (active_width & MLX5_IB_WIDTH_2X) {
-		mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "active_width %d is not supported by IB spec\n",
-			    (int)active_width);
-		err = -EINVAL;
-	} else if (active_width & MLX5_IB_WIDTH_4X) {
+	else if (active_width & MLX5_IB_WIDTH_4X)
 		*ib_width = IB_WIDTH_4X;
-	} else if (active_width & MLX5_IB_WIDTH_8X) {
+	else if (active_width & MLX5_IB_WIDTH_8X)
 		*ib_width = IB_WIDTH_8X;
-	} else if (active_width & MLX5_IB_WIDTH_12X) {
+	else if (active_width & MLX5_IB_WIDTH_12X)
 		*ib_width = IB_WIDTH_12X;
-	} else {
-		mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "Invalid active_width %d\n",
+	else {
+		mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "Invalid active_width %d, setting width to default value: 4x\n",
 			    (int)active_width);
-		err = -EINVAL;
+		*ib_width = IB_WIDTH_4X;
 	}
 
-	return err;
+	return;
 }
 
 static int mlx5_mtu_to_ib_mtu(int mtu)

@@ -842,10 +837,8 @@ static int mlx5_query_hca_port(struct ib
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
-	err = translate_active_width(ibdev, ib_link_width_oper,
-				     &props->active_width);
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
+	translate_active_width(ibdev, ib_link_width_oper, &props->active_width);
+
 	err = mlx5_query_port_ib_proto_oper(mdev, &props->active_speed, port);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sam Bobroff <[email protected]>

commit dc25ab067645eabd037f1a23d49a666f9e0b8c68 upstream.

If the platform has no IO space, ioregs is placed next to the already allocated regs. In this case, it should not be separately freed.

This prevents a kernel warning from __vunmap "Trying to vfree() nonexistent vm area" when unloading the driver.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/ast/ast_main.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -556,7 +556,8 @@ int ast_driver_unload(struct drm_device
 	drm_mode_config_cleanup(dev);
 
 	ast_mm_fini(ast);
-	pci_iounmap(dev->pdev, ast->ioregs);
+	if (ast->ioregs != ast->regs + AST_IO_MM_OFFSET)
+		pci_iounmap(dev->pdev, ast->ioregs);
 	pci_iounmap(dev->pdev, ast->regs);
 	kfree(ast);
 	return 0;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sergio Correia <[email protected]>

commit 23a336b34258aba3b50ea6863cca4e81b5ef6384 upstream.

When drm_new_set_master() fails, set is_master to 0, to prevent a possible NULL pointer deref.

Here is a problematic flow: we check is_master in drm_is_current_master(), then proceed to call drm_lease_owner() passing master. If we do not restore is_master status when drm_new_set_master() fails, we may have a situation in which is_master will be 1 and master itself, NULL, leading to the deref of a NULL pointer in drm_lease_owner().

This fixes the following OOPS, observed on an ArchLinux running a 4.19.2 kernel:

[   97.804282] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000080
[   97.807224] PGD 0 P4D 0
[   97.807224] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[   97.807224] CPU: 0 PID: 1348 Comm: xfwm4 Tainted: P           OE     4.19.2-arch1-1-ARCH #1
[   97.807224] Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./AB350 Pro4, BIOS P5.10 10/16/2018
[   97.807224] RIP: 0010:drm_lease_owner+0xd/0x20 [drm]
[   97.807224] Code: 83 c4 18 5b 5d c3 b8 ea ff ff ff eb e2 b8 ed ff ff ff eb db e8 b4 ca 68 fb 0f 1f 40 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 eb 03 48 89 d0 <48> 8b 90 80 00 00 00 48 85 d2 75 f1 c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44
[   97.807224] RSP: 0018:ffffb8cf08e07bb0 EFLAGS: 00010202
[   97.807224] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9cf0f2586c00 RCX: ffff9cf0f2586c88
[   97.807224] RDX: ffff9cf0ddbd8000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[   97.807224] RBP: ffff9cf1040e9800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[   97.807224] R10: ffffdeb30fd5d680 R11: ffffdeb30f5d6808 R12: ffff9cf1040e9888
[   97.807224] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: dead000000000200 R15: ffff9cf0f2586cc8
[   97.807224] FS:  00007f4145513180(0000) GS:ffff9cf10ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   97.807224] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   97.807224] CR2: 0000000000000080 CR3: 00000003d7548000 CR4: 00000000003406f0
[   97.807224] Call Trace:
[   97.807224]  drm_is_current_master+0x1a/0x30 [drm]
[   97.807224]  drm_master_release+0x3e/0x130 [drm]
[   97.807224]  drm_file_free.part.0+0x2be/0x2d0 [drm]
[   97.807224]  drm_open+0x1ba/0x1e0 [drm]
[   97.807224]  drm_stub_open+0xaf/0xe0 [drm]
[   97.807224]  chrdev_open+0xa3/0x1b0
[   97.807224]  ? cdev_put.part.0+0x20/0x20
[   97.807224]  do_dentry_open+0x132/0x340
[   97.807224]  path_openat+0x2d1/0x14e0
[   97.807224]  ? mem_cgroup_commit_charge+0x7a/0x520
[   97.807224]  do_filp_open+0x93/0x100
[   97.807224]  ? __check_object_size+0x102/0x189
[   97.807224]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x16/0x30
[   97.807224]  do_sys_open+0x186/0x210
[   97.807224]  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x170
[   97.807224]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[   97.807224] RIP: 0033:0x7f4147b07976
[   97.807224] Code: 89 54 24 08 e8 7b f4 ff ff 8b 74 24 0c 48 8b 3c 24 41 89 c0 44 8b 54 24 08 b8 01 01 00 00 89 f2 48 89 fe bf 9c ff ff ff 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 30 44 89 c7 89 44 24 08 e8 a6 f4 ff ff 8b 44
[   97.807224] RSP: 002b:00007ffcced96ca0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
[   97.807224] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005619d5037f80 RCX: 00007f4147b07976
[   97.807224] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00005619d46b969c RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
[   98.040039] RBP: 0000000000000024 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[   98.040039] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000024
[   98.040039] R13: 0000000000000012 R14: 00005619d5035950 R15: 0000000000000012
[   98.040039] Modules linked in: nct6775 hwmon_vid algif_skcipher af_alg nls_iso8859_1 nls_cp437 vfat fat uvcvideo videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_common arc4 videodev media snd_usb_audio snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_usbmidi_lib snd_rawmidi snd_seq_device mousedev input_leds iwlmvm mac80211 snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec edac_mce_amd kvm_amd snd_hda_core kvm iwlwifi snd_hwdep r8169 wmi_bmof cfg80211 snd_pcm irqbypass snd_timer snd libphy soundcore pinctrl_amd rfkill pcspkr sp5100_tco evdev gpio_amdpt k10temp mac_hid i2c_piix4 wmi pcc_cpufreq acpi_cpufreq vboxnetflt(OE) vboxnetadp(OE) vboxpci(OE) vboxdrv(OE) msr sg crypto_user ip_tables x_tables ext4 crc32c_generic crc16 mbcache jbd2 fscrypto uas usb_storage dm_crypt hid_generic usbhid hid
[   98.040039]  dm_mod raid1 md_mod sd_mod crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc ahci libahci aesni_intel aes_x86_64 libata crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper ccp xhci_pci rng_core scsi_mod xhci_hcd nvidia_drm(POE) drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm agpgart nvidia_uvm(POE) nvidia_modeset(POE) nvidia(POE) ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler
[   98.040039] CR2: 0000000000000080
[   98.040039] ---[ end trace 3b65093b6fe62b2f ]---
[   98.040039] RIP: 0010:drm_lease_owner+0xd/0x20 [drm]
[   98.040039] Code: 83 c4 18 5b 5d c3 b8 ea ff ff ff eb e2 b8 ed ff ff ff eb db e8 b4 ca 68 fb 0f 1f 40 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 eb 03 48 89 d0 <48> 8b 90 80 00 00 00 48 85 d2 75 f1 c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44
[   98.040039] RSP: 0018:ffffb8cf08e07bb0 EFLAGS: 00010202
[   98.040039] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9cf0f2586c00 RCX: ffff9cf0f2586c88
[   98.040039] RDX: ffff9cf0ddbd8000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[   98.040039] RBP: ffff9cf1040e9800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[   98.040039] R10: ffffdeb30fd5d680 R11: ffffdeb30f5d6808 R12: ffff9cf1040e9888
[   98.040039] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: dead000000000200 R15: ffff9cf0f2586cc8
[   98.040039] FS:  00007f4145513180(0000) GS:ffff9cf10ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   98.040039] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   98.040039] CR2: 0000000000000080 CR3: 00000003d7548000 CR4: 00000000003406f0

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_auth.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ static int drm_new_set_master(struct drm
 
 	lockdep_assert_held_once(&dev->master_mutex);
 
+	WARN_ON(fpriv->is_master);
 	old_master = fpriv->master;
 	fpriv->master = drm_master_create(dev);
 	if (!fpriv->master) {

@@ -161,6 +162,7 @@ out_err:
 	/* drop references and restore old master on failure */
 	drm_master_put(&fpriv->master);
 	fpriv->master = old_master;
+	fpriv->is_master = 0;
 
 	return ret;
 }

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stephen Rothwell <[email protected]>

commit 217c3e0196758662aa0429863b09d1c13da1c5d6 upstream.

They are too noisy

---
 Makefile |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -802,6 +802,9 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Wdecl
 # disable pointer signed / unsigned warnings in gcc 4.0
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, pointer-sign)
 
+# disable stringop warnings in gcc 8+
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, stringop-truncation)
+
 # disable invalid "can't wrap" optimizations for signed / pointers
 KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= $(call cc-option,-fno-strict-overflow)
 

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

commit d6b340d7cb33c816ef4abe8143764ec5ab14a5cc upstream.

The meddlesome gcc warns about the possible shortname string in
trident driver code:
sound/pci/trident/trident.c: In function ‘snd_trident_probe’:
sound/pci/trident/trident.c:126:2: warning: ‘strcat’ accessing 17 or more bytes at offsets 36 and 20 may overlap 1 byte at offset 36 [-Wrestrict] strcat(card->shortname, card->driver);

It happens since gcc calculates the possible string size from card->driver, but this can't be true since we did set the string just before that, and they are much shorter.

For shutting it up, use the exactly same string set to card->driver for strcat() to card->shortname, too.

---
 sound/pci/trident/trident.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ static int snd_trident_probe(struct pci_
 	} else {
 		strcpy(card->shortname, "Trident ");
 	}
-	strcat(card->shortname, card->driver);
+	strcat(card->shortname, str);
 	sprintf(card->longname, "%s PCI Audio at 0x%lx, irq %d",
 		card->shortname, trident->port, trident->irq);
 

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wei Wang <[email protected]>

commit 30510387a5e45bfcf8190e03ec7aa15b295828e2 upstream.

There is a race condition when accessing kvm->arch.apic_access_page_done. Due to it, x86_set_memory_region will fail when creating the second vcpu for a svm guest.

Add a mutex_lock to serialize the accesses to apic_access_page_done. This lock is also used by vmx for the same purpose.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c |   19 +++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -1333,20 +1333,23 @@ static u64 *avic_get_physical_id_entry(s
 static int avic_init_access_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
-	int ret;
+	int ret = 0;
 
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
 	if (kvm->arch.apic_access_page_done)
-		return 0;
+		goto out;
 
-	ret = x86_set_memory_region(kvm,
-				    APIC_ACCESS_PAGE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT,
-				    APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE,
-				    PAGE_SIZE);
+	ret = __x86_set_memory_region(kvm,
+				      APIC_ACCESS_PAGE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT,
+				      APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE,
+				      PAGE_SIZE);
 	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+		goto out;
 
 	kvm->arch.apic_access_page_done = true;
-	return 0;
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static int avic_init_backing_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)