ALSA: rme9652: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability
PATCH 1/1 ALSA: rme9652: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability
info->channel is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
sound/pci/rme9652/hdsp.c:4100 snd_hdsp_channel_info() warn: potential spectre issue 'hdsp->channel_map' [r] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing info->channel before using it to index hdsp->channel_map
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Also, notice that I refactored the code a bit in order to get rid of the following checkpatch warning:
ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition
FILE: sound/pci/rme9652/hdsp.c:4103:
if ((mapped_channel = hdsp->channel_map[info->channel]) < 0)
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
--- sound/pci/rme9652/hdsp.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
sound/pci/rme9652/hdsp.c +6 -4
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@#include <linux/math64.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include <linux/io.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <sound/core.h> #include <sound/control.h>
@@ -4092,15 +4093,16 @@ static int snd_hdsp_channel_info(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, struct snd_pcm_channel_info *info) {struct hdsp *hdsp =snd_pcm_substream_chip (substream); -int mapped_channel; +unsigned int channel = info->channel; -if (snd_BUG_ON (info->channel >= hdsp->max_channels)) +if (snd_BUG_ON (channel >= hdsp->max_channels))return -EINVAL ; + channel =array_index_nospec (channel, hdsp->max_channels); -if ((mapped_channel = hdsp->channel_map[info->channel]) <0 ) +if (hdsp->channel_map[channel] <0 )return -EINVAL ; - info->offset = mapped_channel *HDSP_CHANNEL_BUFFER_BYTES ; + info->offset = hdsp->channel_map[channel] *HDSP_CHANNEL_BUFFER_BYTES ; info->first =0 ; info->step =32 ;return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.2
Hi,
[This is an automated email]
This commit has been processed because it contains a -stable tag. The stable tag indicates that it's relevant for the following trees: all
The bot has tested the following trees: v4.19.10, v4.14.89, v4.9.146, v4.4.168, v3.18.130,
v4.19.10: Build OK!
v4.14.89: Build OK!
v4.9.146: Build OK!
v4.4.168: Build OK!
v3.18.130: Failed to apply! Possible dependencies:
6cbbfe1c8ddb ("ALSA: Include linux/io.h instead of asm/io.h")
How should we proceed with this patch?
--
Thanks,
Sasha
Takashi Iwai
AppliedQuoted 19 lines · Gustavo A. R. Silva
info->channelis indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
sound/pci/rme9652/hdsp.c:4100snd_hdsp_channel_info()warn: potential spectre issue 'hdsp->channel_map' [r] (local cap)Fix this by sanitizing
info->channelbefore using it to indexhdsp->channel_mapNotice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Also, notice that I refactored the code a bit in order to get rid of the following checkpatch warning:
ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition
FILE:sound/pci/rme9652/hdsp.c:4103:
Quoted 7 lines
if ((mapped_channel = hdsp->channel_map[info->channel]) < 0)[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Signed-off-by Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
Applied, thanks.
Takashi