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ALSA: emu10k1: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities

PATCH Applied Gustavo A. R. Silva 3 participants 3 messages Dec 18, 2018 – Dec 19, 2018 Sound

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PATCH 1/1 ALSA: emu10k1: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities

ipcm->substream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1031 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_poke() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap) sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1075 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_peek() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing ipcm->substream before using it to index emu->fx8010.pcm

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

---
 sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c +5 -0
index 6ebe817801ea..1f25e6d029d8 100644
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include <sound/core.h>
 #include <sound/tlv.h>
@@ -1026,6 +1027,8 @@ static int snd_emu10k1_ipcm_poke(struct snd_emu10k1 *emu,
 
 	if (ipcm->substream >= EMU10K1_FX8010_PCM_COUNT)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	ipcm->substream = array_index_nospec(ipcm->substream,
+					     EMU10K1_FX8010_PCM_COUNT);
 	if (ipcm->channels > 32)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	pcm = &emu->fx8010.pcm[ipcm->substream];
@@ -1072,6 +1075,8 @@ static int snd_emu10k1_ipcm_peek(struct snd_emu10k1 *emu,
 
 	if (ipcm->substream >= EMU10K1_FX8010_PCM_COUNT)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	ipcm->substream = array_index_nospec(ipcm->substream,
+					     EMU10K1_FX8010_PCM_COUNT);
 	pcm = &emu->fx8010.pcm[ipcm->substream];
 	mutex_lock(&emu->fx8010.lock);
 	spin_lock_irq(&emu->reg_lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.2
#1 lore raw

Hi,

[This is an automated email]

This commit has been processed because it contains a -stable tag. The stable tag indicates that it's relevant for the following trees: all

The bot has tested the following trees: v4.19.10, v4.14.89, v4.9.146, v4.4.168, v3.18.130,

v4.19.10: Build OK!
v4.14.89: Build OK!
v4.9.146: Build OK!
v4.4.168: Build OK!
v3.18.130: Build failed! Errors:
sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:39:10: fatal error: linux/nospec.h: No such file or directory

How should we proceed with this patch?

--
Thanks,
Sasha

Applied
#2 lore raw
In reply to Gustavo A. R. Silva
Quoted 11 lines · Gustavo A. R. Silva

ipcm->substream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1031 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_poke() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap) sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1075 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_peek() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing ipcm->substream before using it to index emu->fx8010.pcm

Quoted 8 lines

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Applied, thanks.

Takashi